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
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
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
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MAHDIISM AND THE EGYPTIAN SUDAN



MAHDIISM AND THE EGYPTIAN SUDAN,

BEING AN ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND
PROGRESS OF MAHDIISM, AND OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
IN THE SUDAN TO THE PRESENT TIME

BY

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INTRODUCTION

BY

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR FRANCIS GRENFELL, K.C.B.,
SIRDAR OF THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.

MUCH has been said and written concerning Mahdiism, but it is doubtful whether the somewhat complex nature of this and other religious movements—such as that of Senussi, Morghani, etc.—has ever been well understood by the general public.

Considerable light was thrown on these matters by the capture at the action of Toski of a manuscript book containing a number of decrees, ordinances, and letters of the late so-called Mahdi—Mohammed Ahmed—and of his Khalifa, Abdullah Taashi, and also from information obtained from the large number of prisoners taken at that action.

The idea was conceived of putting the most interesting of these manuscripts into readable form, and, by introducing them, in their chronological order, into the historical sequence of events which have occurred of late years in the Sudan, to form, as far as available matter would allow, a comprehensive narrative.

The author of this work is well fitted for his task. By his knowledge of the Arabic language he has been enabled to examine personally prisoners, refugees, and others from the Sudan, and to test the accuracy of translations from Arabic documents, to which, as Head of the Intelligence Department of the Egyptian army, he has had access, and from which this narrative is largely compiled.

Official and other histories of the recent campaigns in Egypt have already been published. The object, therefore, which

has been held in view in the following pages is to describe the intermediate events which have occurred in various parts of the Sudan, and which bear, in a general way, on the events which are now well-known matters of history. The present state of the Sudan has rendered it difficult to verify with absolute accuracy the various accounts here given, but care has been taken, by comparing personal statements with documentary evidence, to obtain a true record of facts and a faithful history of events in the Sudan from the rise of Mahdism to the present time.

The difficulties with which a work of this description is fraught will be readily understood by any one who has had Oriental experience. It should be borne in mind that the events related extend over a period of some ten years, and occurred throughout an enormous extent of country, the greater part of which has been for years closed to civilisation and to travellers. Mr. Stanley has, it is true, dwelt very fully, in his recent work, on the events which occurred in the Equatorial Provinces—the remarks, therefore, on this subject in the following pages are merely inserted to give a degree of completeness to the narrative. There were, it will be remembered, between 30,000 and 40,000 Government troops in the Sudan when the Mahdi movement first began—of these not more than a few thousand have ever succeeded in returning to Egypt; of the remainder many perished gallantly in their endeavour to uphold the authority of His Highness the Khedive in the Sudan; it is of these latter—such as the garrisons of Kassala, El Obeid, etc.—that an attempt has been made in the following pages to give a faithful record; and Egyptians may indeed be proud of their fellow-countrymen who have played so gallant a part in sieges such as these, the attendant circumstances of which, till recently, have been so little known that their heroism has not been recognised.

The occurrences at Khartum during the last few weeks of General Gordon's heroic defence of that town are never likely to be known with absolute accuracy; but it is believed that the description here given—collected from a variety of sources—may be taken as generally correct.

It may be considered that undue importance has been attached to the various actions in which Egyptian troops have

of late years been engaged, but for this the unique position occupied by the Egyptian army must be the excuse. Re-organised some seven years ago by a few British officers, under the indefatigable direction of General Sir Evelyn Wood, its early promoters cannot but view with some degree of pride the results their labours have produced.

In describing the later campaigns the services of the Egyptian officers have not been prominently mentioned. But their names are omitted for the sake of brevity and not with any intention to detract from their services, which have on many occasions been conspicuous.


For obvious reasons all reference to the political questions which have from time to time arisen has been omitted.

To state facts with as much accuracy as the available information will admit, and to enable the reader to draw deductions therefrom, has been the object aimed at throughout.

With these few remarks, it is hoped that the following pages supply in some degree the links in the chain of the military history of the Sudan since its abandonment, and that they will form, for the present at least, a useful book of reference, in the absence of any other complete and authentic history of those years.

(Sd.) F. GRENFELL,
Major-General, Sirdar.

August 1890.



AUTHOR'S PREFACE

THE writer's aim has been to give a narrative of events connected with that extensive and important revolt against the orthodox Moslem religion and the recognised Government authority in the Sudan, which may conveniently be described under the general name of Mahdiism. To make this complex subject comprehensible to the general public has been his earnest desire.

His official position in Egypt has, on the one hand, enabled him to obtain information to which the general public could not, at the time, have access; while, on the other, he has been enabled to realise how vague and incorrect are the notions held by a large number of persons regarding the nature of the movement and the details of events connected therewith.

Moreover, the momentous question of the future of this vast country of the Sudan must one day come under consideration, and it is hoped that a careful perusal of the events of the last few years will enable the public to obtain a fair idea of the true situation, on a knowledge of which an accurate conclusion can alone be based.

The sources from which the information embodied in the following pages has been obtained are as follows:—

The history of Mahdiism—from the various original letters and papers which have from time to time found their way into Egypt, and from conversations with the leaders of several of the Moslem sects of the country, and well-informed persons who have taken part in the Sudan revolt.

The early events connected with the revolt—from the statements of officers and others who have escaped, and from the official and other works already published.

The long siege and fall of Khartum—from (A) the diary and statements of some of the besieged; (B) from the official records of the Sudan campaign of 1884-85; (C) from the statements of important emirs and others amongst the besiegers; and (D) from the proceedings of the general court-martial held on the officer in command of that portion of the fortifications through which the enemy entered.¹

Events in the Sudan subsequent to the fall of Khartum and the death of the Mahdi—from the statements of officers and others who have taken part in these events, from information collected by the intelligence officers at Suakin and Wady Halfa, and from various original documents obtained from Omdurman.

Events in Darfur—from the statement of officers and others, and original letters from Slatin Bey, etc.

Events in the Bahr el Ghazal—from the statement of an officer who was present during the revolt in that province, and who surrendered with Lupton Bey.

Events in the Equatorial Province—from the early journals (Arabic and English) of Emin Pasha and his officers, from the literary work of Mr. H. M. Stanley, and from the accounts of the various native officers and officials who have returned from that province.

Events on the Abyssinian Frontier and the relief of the Egyptian garrisons—from the Egyptian officer who carried out the withdrawal of the troops, and from the various letters of the Mahdist emirs in that district.

The evacuation of Harrar—from the diary of Radwan Pasha.

Events on the Nile Frontier and at Suakin, and the part taken in them by the Egyptian army—from the various official records on the subject, and from personal experience.

The Senussi and other religious sects—from important religious functionaries connected with these sects, and from original correspondence.

The main difficulty in preparing a work of this description has been, to give an intelligible account of the respective events

¹ It is interesting to note that a detailed report on the siege and fall of Khartum, drawn up by Nushi Pasha with the assistance of a number of officers who had escaped from Khartum at the end of 1885, has, through the kind permission of H.H. the Khedive, recently come into the hands of the writer. This report confirms, in many particulars, the account given in the text of the events connected with that memorable siege.

which occurred in the various parts of the Sudan during each year; and at the same time to show that, although the revolt in each province was, so to speak, distinct in itself, yet it largely depended on the success or the failure of movements carried out in other parts of the country, hundreds of miles distant. In order to enable the reader to grasp the general situation at any particular period, the whole situation has been discussed year by year, and in this way the narration of consecutive events in each respective province is interrupted: the condition of affairs in the several provinces is therefore illustrated by maps placed at the end of each year's record, which show the gradual spread of the revolt. It is hoped that this arrangement will be of use in enabling the combined events to be more thoroughly understood.

Mr. E. A. Floyer, Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society, rendered most valuable assistance and co-operation in the early part of this work, and to him the writer's warmest gratitude and thanks are due.

Also to Major Marriott, D.S.O., R.M.A. (Intelligence Department, Admiralty), and Lieut.-Colonel Dalton, R.A. (Intelligence Division, War Office), who have, in the absence of the writer from England, greatly assisted him, the former in correcting the letterpress proof, the latter the map proofs; and under their careful supervision a considerably more accurate and uniform system of orthography for native names of places and persons has been obtained, based as far as possible on the system adopted by the Council of the Royal Geographical Society¹ (London).

The writer trusts that, taken in connection with the various other historical accounts already published, the present work may be accepted as a small contribution towards the publication

¹ Some difficulty will always present itself in the orthography of native names. In the case of this book, an additional chance of error is met with in the different pronunciation of the ج *kaf* and the ج *jeem* in countries where Arabic is spoken. In the Sudan the ج has the value of a hard *g* and the ج of an English *j*, and the Arabic of the Sudan, being more classical than that of Egypt, supplies a suitable method of transcribing the native names. This is not, however, without its exceptions, as the pronunciation of a few names has now become familiar to Englishmen as heard in the mouths of Egyptians, and to this fact the departure in certain instances from the general rule, *e.g.* Gemaizeh for Jemaizeh, Gellab for Jellab, etc., must be attributed.

of a complete history of the Sudan which must sooner or later be undertaken by abler hands.

For the present it may serve as a useful book of reference.

CAIRO, 1st January 1891.

P.S.—Since writing the above, the Tokar district has been recaptured from the Mahdiists, and is now garrisoned by Egyptian troops. A few details connected with this expedition will be found in the Supplement, as well as some extracts from the mass of Arabic correspondence captured in Osman Digna's headquarters and relating principally to the events which occurred in 1883 and 1884.

A treaty has also been formally concluded defining the Italian sphere of influence, the demarcation of which is shown in the "Map of the Nile Basin."

CAIRO, 1st May 1891.

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ERRATA

- Page 21, line 26, *for* Beni Harrar *read* Beni Jerrar.
,, 66, the first line of footnote applies to *Ayat*, line 16.
,, 72, line 41, *for* Ragab *read* Rajab.
,, 91, line 5 of footnote, *for* make *read* made.
,, 110, line 17, *for* slave trade *read* suppression of the slave trade.
,, 238, footnote, *for* sycamora *read* sycamorus.
,, 331, footnote 2, *for* "see page 289" *read* "see page 243."
,, 509, line 8, *for* province *read* province of Equatoria.

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BOOK I

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BOTH Christianity and Islam have produced their earnest thoughtful men who have advocated one especial branch of their religion with such force that many who found the broad general instruction too wide have followed the well-defined line laid out before them. Thus the Puritans may well be compared with the Wahabis,¹ the Senussiyeh with the Lutherans. They are in the main peaceful men that have produced such movements, but seldom have their doctrines been spread by peaceful methods. The Babis, whose headquarters are at Acre in Syria, and whose leader wrote to Her Majesty in 1868, complimenting her on her noble efforts to suppress the slave trade, have been so far entirely peaceful. They have suffered exile to Cyprus and Khartum, and even martyrdom, for Islam still lends its name to religious persecution; but nothing has yet occurred to push them to aggression.

¹ A sect of Moslem revivalists founded by Mohammed Ibn Abd el Wahab, but as their opponents could not call them Mohammedans they have been distinguished by the name of the father of the founder of the sect, and are called Wahabis.

The Sikh religion, to-day associated with a bold and war-like character, was in its origin an earnest effort by Nana Shah, a poor man living on the boundaries of Buddhism and Islam, to find a peaceful means whereby both classes might dwell together in harmony. And it was not until 230 years after Nana's death that the oppression of Islam, as practised by Aurungzebe, produced the redoubtable warrior Guru Govind. This hero clubbed all sects together in the worship of Durga Bhavani, the Goddess of Courage, and for years was a very scourge to Islam. His name became a synonym for desperate war.

Mahdiism, with which we have to deal, has two sides to it. There is the Mahdi whose coming is looked forward to by good Sunnis as the advent of the Messiah is expected by the Jews. And there is the Mahdi who disappeared, and may appear miraculously at any moment to good Shia's. And it is one of the most singular things in religious history, that Egypt has had at the same moment within, or in proximity to, its boundaries two thriving Mahdis, one of each kind.

The number of religious confraternities in the East is considerable. They all branch off from one or other of the divinity schools at Cairo, Mecca, Baghdad, or elsewhere. All have revelations from heaven. These are indispensable, as also are prophecies. Miracles are not so common, though they are in better repute than in the early days of Christianity, when the Fathers refrained from quoting them as evidence.

Many brotherhoods of Africa are distinguished by a sort of athletic intoxication. This is produced by shaking the head with a violence which would unseat the reason of an educated man, and which produces the most desirable symptom of drunkenness without expense or consequent headache.

The Senussi branch of the Shadli school, so called from the Senus mountain in Algiers, dates its inception about 1837, and received great impulse from the favour of Sultan Abdul Mejid of Turkey towards the sect in 1882. It was in this year that Mukhtar Pasha el Ghazi¹ instructed Sheikh Mohammed Abu Zeid in Cairo to print for the sect a thousand prayer-books inscribed as follows:—

¹ In the Turkish Empire the title of "Ghazi" implies something similar to our "Field Marshal," and is conferred upon generals and warriors of renown; it signifies "one who fights in the cause of Islam"—a hero.

"The Tagaliat Sheikh Idris, a present from Mukhtar el Ghazi to Sidi Mohammed es Senussi, to be distributed among the brethren, and asking their help in prayer."

The following is a facsimile of what is termed by the Senussi the "little rose," i.e. the Tarikh or way by which illiterate Arabs are admitted as brethren to the Senussi confraternity. The writing is the facsimile of that of El Mahdi Sheikh Mohammed es Senussi.

The translation is as follows :—

"God pardon me" to be said one hundred times. "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is His prophet; every glance and every breath is known to Him," to be said three hundred times. "O God, pour Thy blessings on our prophet Mohammed, he who could neither read nor write, and bless us his followers and friends," to be said one hundred times.

ماثورة
أَسْتَغْفِرُ اللَّهَ
لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُ مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ اللَّهِ بِي خُلِّ لَمْ تَحْتِ وَتَقْبِسِ
غَدَا مَا وَسَعَهُ عِلْمُ اللَّهِ
ثَلَاثًا مَثَوْرَةً
اللَّهُمَّ صَلِّ عَلَى سَيِّدِنَا مُحَمَّدٍ النَّبِيِّ الْأَمِيِّ وَعَلَى آلِهِ
وَصَحْبِهِ وَتَسَلِّمْ
ماثورة

The first chief, Sidi Mohammed Ben Ali es Senussi, founded some three hundred lodges in the north of Africa, of which the head centre is at Jerhhub, a little to the west of Siwa.

There, on a spot given him by the Sultan, he built a strong and large enclosure. The Zawia of Islam corresponds to the deir or monastery of Eastern Christianity. The annexed plan of that at Jerhbab shows the nature of the building, which now contains one hundred students—Tunisians, Bedawin, and men from the Fayum; while the work of the establishment is carried on by some three hundred slaves. Here dwells Mohammed es Senussi,¹ some forty years of age, affable and intelligent, not disdainful of newspapers, and a veritable veiled prophet, wearing always a cloud of fine muslin over his head.

While the chief tenet of the sect is opposition to western innovations, its chief support is agriculture. Every little oasis has its Zawia and its cultivation, and the Senussi for choice selects those in which the ruins of ancient Roman civilisation indicate that water was once found there, and will be found again. Even the spots near the sea, where the winter rains remain in sufficient quantity to grow a crop of barley, are all carefully sown, and support, as at Biringi Mariut, near Alexandria, two or three Zawias.


Supplies are maintained and some gunpowder imported from the neighbouring port of Tobruk, an ancient and neglected harbour, visited in 1883 by Schweinfurth, who describes it as the best port in North Africa except Bizerta, nearly as large and as deep as, and more secure than, that of Alexandria.

A second centre is at the south of the Kufara oasis, the Zawia el Istat; while a third of some pretensions is being erected at Taizerbo. The fortunes of the sect were promoted by a sufficiently politic stroke. The Sultan of Waddai, with whom the Senussi had long been making tentatives of proselytism, had despatched northwards a convoy of slaves; these were captured near the Egyptian frontier; the Senussiyeh attacked the robbers, made them disgorge, instructed the slaves in the tenets of their creed, and sent them back to Sultan Ali of Waddai, loaded with benefits. This monarch was shortly afterwards converted, and so many of his subjects followed his example that when, in 1876, he died and a dispute arose as to his succession, the Senussi placed their nominee, Yusef, on the throne. A glance at the map will show the importance of this *pied à terre*. For the men of Waddai

¹ Hereafter called "the Senussi" or simply "Senussi."

Rough Plan of **E.S. SENUSSI'S ZAWIA at JERHBUB** *Drawn by a Native from memory.*

WEST



EAST

70 VINU ABHODHIAO

are bold and self-reliant; they are united by a bond which has held good during forty years of peace, and which cannot but be strengthened should prospect of safe plunder fan the spark of enthusiasm to a glowing heat.

An important part of the story remains to be told. The originator of this movement of reform died some years ago, and at his death he somewhat guardedly expressed the view that his son would be the promised Mahdi. When asked explicitly if it were so, he replied enigmatically, "God knows," and hinted that in the year 1300 H. or 1882 this would become known.

The conditions to be fulfilled by a Mahdi vary according to various traditions. According to the Senussiyeh, the present chief is said to fulfil them, and he has adopted the title, and is styled Mohammed el Mahdi. Perhaps on account of the Sudan movement, the news of which disturbed Senussi very much, his manifestation has, by a later prophecy, been postponed until 1892, by which time the sect may have perhaps decided upon a definite line of action. If not, a third prophecy may be found. The Senussi Mahdi is an able man and has brave and warlike agents. His miracles too are excellent. In a recent conflict between the Mahdiists and the supposed Senussiyeh of the Western Sudan, the latter were accompanied by a magic tent, always full of eatables, the renown of which has spread to Asia.

Mohammed Ahmed of Dongola took up Mahdiism from the Shia' point of view. He is the mysterious and long-hidden twelfth Imam. Mohammed Ahmed styled himself the Mahdi, and in thereby using a more especially Persian and Shia' superstition, and in calling his followers by the Persian name "Darwish," he and other Mahdis have shown an astuteness which has undoubtedly been of great service to them.

The superstition of the twelfth Imam is a curious one, and appears to meet some want throughout the world, for a similar superstition exists amongst the Oriental Jews, for whom Elias plays the part of Mohammed Abu el Kasim el Mahdi, the superstition regarding whom it is worth while to recount briefly, as it has been and will again be an important starting-point for Moslem adventurers.

There were twelve Imams, or rather, for the uncertainty,

which is the value of the whole, begins at the outset, there were eleven or twelve. The Imam signifies he who precedes others, in Islam he who takes the lead of prayers in a mosque; and the Imam *par excellence* was the great prophet Mohammed, whose full name was Mohammed Abu el Kasim Ibn Abdullah. He, however, stands by himself, and is not counted among the twelve. The question as to how the succession to the Imam should take place is the original cause of the division which, on Mohammed's death, at once arose in Islam. The Persians and all Shia's declared that the dignity remained hereditary, while the Sunnis believed it to be elective. As the Persians supported their view with great acrimony, Mohammed Ahmed would find in many an old book a copious store of abuse and denunciation of all who refused to admit the exalted dignity of the true Imam. The Persians called Ali, cousin of the prophet, and the fourth khalif, the first Imam. They regarded the first three khalifs as usurpers. The eleventh was one Hassan Askeri. The son of Hassan Askeri was the twelfth Imam, and named, to increase confusion, Mohammed Abu el Kasim el Mahdi — el Mahdi meaning "the guide." On his birth his father wished to kill him, and he was concealed by his mother in a cave where no one was permitted to see him. From his seclusion he issued divine instructions by messengers.

He did not die, but suffered two eclipses, a short and a long one. After the short disappearance a messenger came from him who predicted the long eclipse and his own death in six days, which latter duly occurred. The Mahdi was to reappear from the long eclipse with the prophet Elias at the second coming of the Messiah; that is, he might appear at any time. It will be seen what an opening this gives for adventurers, and it will be readily understood that this Persian superstition was at once denounced by the good Sunnis of Egypt and Turkey. In the Sudan, where the schism was less known, the idea was accepted on account of what follows. Already two Mahdis had been successful and founded dynasties in Africa. The most recent, the dynasty of the Fathemites, was founded in 908 by Mohammed Obeid Allah, who called himself the Mahdi, and drove out of Egypt the descendants of Ibrahim Bin Aghlab (Harun's governor of Africa) and

established a dynasty of khalifs. The first of these khalifs reigned at Segel Messa, north of Morocco, where this Mahdi manifested himself; the second at Kairwan, and the third at Mahadie. The fourth was Moez, and the dynasty, of which there were fourteen in all, then conquered and reigned in Egypt from 972 to 1172.

Many old Arabic works, Assiuti's *History of the Khalifs*, if no other, detailing the fortunes of this Mahdi, must have been available for Mohammed Ahmed, who further adopted on his banner the word "Keyyum," قائم an emphasised form of "Kaïm," قائم (the subsisting), one of the ninety-nine names for God.

It may be remarked that the position of Segel Messa coincides curiously with that of Sennar. "This town divides Morocco, that is, the country of the African Arabs, from that of the regions which these Arabs call the Sudan. There is a great river passing under its walls which has its source in the mountains," etc.

Mohammed Ahmed's movement was, in the first place, a religious movement—the superior enthusiasm, eloquence, and dramatic knowledge of one priest over that of his fellows. It was recruited by a desire, widespread amongst the villagers, and especially among the superstitious masses of Kordofan, for revenge for the cruelties and injustice of the Egyptians and Bashi-Bazuks.¹ It swept into force on the withdrawal of all semblance of government, the sole element opposed to it, and it became a tool for the imperious and warlike Baggara, and enabled them to usurp the vacant throne. Religion has thus knit together the different races, each with their own grievance, and summoned them to the banner of emirs in search of power and the right to trade in slaves.

In order to deal lucidly with this complex subject, reference must be made to the map annexed; and after a survey of the population of this immense country, an account of the

¹ Bashi-Bazuk is the name given to the irregular Turkish troops, and it is also applied to the irregular troops in the Sudan, but the latter are not Turks, though many of them are of Turkish origin. The annexation of the Sudan by Mohammed Ali more than a century ago was carried out, for the most part, by irregular Turkish troops; numbers of these subsequently settled in the Sudan, intermarried with the inhabitants of the country, and it is from their offspring that the irregular Sudan troops have been, with some exceptions, recruited.

Mahdieh, or Mahdiship, will be intelligible, and its success appear reasonable.

The Sudan may for the present purposes be divided by the thirteenth parallel of latitude. This is the division between efficient rain and scanty rain, between cattle Arabs and camel Arabs.

South of this parallel camels are not usually bred, north of it cattle are not found, north of this line are vast steppes, with thinly scattered thorns and with infrequent wells. Here wander the camel-owning Arabs, the Kababish, Ababdeh, Hadendowa, Shukrieh, and others. Their instincts are naturally peaceful, partly because their property cannot be fenced in, and partly because it brings them profit in proportion as it is employed in transport of goods. These camel-owning Arabs are the first of five main classes of population. In the southwest, in Darfur, the mountainous part of the country is inhabited by negroid tribes, who live in villages, and who, until 1874, formed a kingdom of an ancient line of monarchs. They live at the foot of the mountains, and work in iron, making good spears and hoes. Should danger arise from the ostrich-hunting Arabs who frequent the plains, they retire into the mountains and are secure.

The ancient kingdom of Darfur was, before its conquest by Zubeir, just what the kingdom of Waddai is to-day. The line of ancient kingdoms running across Africa may be numbered from the west as follows: Senegambia, Bambara, Massina, Gando, Sokoto, Bornu, Bagirmi, Waddai, Darfur, Sennar, and Abyssinia. The people of Darfur are a contented and domestic race, who view with contempt the undignified activity of the Arab. These form the second class of the population.

The third class are the dwellers in towns and villages. These are a mixture of almost every Eastern race. By inter-marriage with the Bashi-Bazuks, Egyptians, and foreign traders, they form a population which may not inaptly be compared with that of a Levantine seaport—idle, dissolute, drunken, denationalised, they are superstitious to the lowest degree. At Berber, Khartum, Sennar, such is the population. And the centre of the plains of Kordofan contains a nucleus of 800 or 900 villages which excel all others in baseness. No superstition is too silly for them, no trickery too gross.

fikis, or religious teachers, fatten on their ignorance in most shameless manner. The status of a fiki is at once index of the abject obedience they pay to one who works in their superstition.

In Arabic there are ninety-nine names for God, and it is largely believed that to each of these names numerous dian angels are attached. By a constant repetition of one of these names, accompanied by fasting and prayer, God can be induced to send down a guardian angel to be the servant of a worshipper. These worshippers are fikis, invulnerable, naturally endowed, and able to work miracles. They derive great wealth from their blind devotees, and lead them wistfully whithersoever they will.

These people live in villages, and each cultivates a little plot of *dukhn*, a hardy sort of maize. Their wells are from 90 to 100 feet deep, and when they have drawn the desperately needful water they do nothing. They produce nothing. They never have to fight, for they have nothing to defend. They attend markets to gossip, for they have nothing to sell. No man of ability arises among them, for there is nothing in which he can excel. Devoted Roman Catholic missions have found here a population of 130,000, probably the most worthless in the world. These form the third class of the population.

Below the thirteenth parallel, with rain, come fertile steppes and wooded mountains. Cattle replace camels, and are found at the south of Kordofan, and stretching away to the north-west and north-east, are the tribes and innumerable subdivisions of the Baggara, the Red Indian of the Sudan.

These are the great slave-dealers and the manliest men in the Sudan. Seated on the banks of the White Nile, and in touch at once with the great negro supply to the south, and the great retail market of Khartum to the north, they are the great slave-forwarding agents of the world. This is the fourth class of the population. Well fed on meat, accustomed to defend their flocks, they are inured to war, and in chronic readiness to plunder.

Below the Baggara come the cattle-owning negroes and negroids, who form the fifth class. They are for the most part a good-tempered and peacefully-inclined race, whose protection

has been the malarious nature of their country. They have for thirty years supplied the slave market of Khartum, and some tribes, such as the Bongo, have been almost entirely deported. The Dinka have covered the 60,000 square miles allotted to them by nature with immense herds of cattle. Elephants roam the forests of which the wood is sent to Khartum for boat-building. Here was the home of Zubeir : and Suliman, his son, raised armies of these negroes. Being heathen, there is no one idea which appeals to large masses of them. Stationary as their cattle wealth is stationary, they dwell in villages of huts, and, like their northern congeners, they work in iron. It is this class, these men described by Lupton Bey as "mild-tempered, peaceable people," who, under English tuition, have developed an excellent talent for soldiering. The Dinka and Shilluk, who form for the most part the black regiments of the Egyptian army, have the warm regard of every one who has been in action with them. Thousands of these men, now unwillingly serving under the Khalifa, may have to decide the struggle which will ensue when any advance is made on the Sudan, and it is believed that the blacks of Sir Samuel Baker and of General Gordon will serve under a white man as soon as the opportunity offers.

From the above summary it will be readily seen how a religious revival was nursed in the superstitious crowds of fiki-ridden Kordofan and the debased villages of the Nile valley ; and how it was seized as a weapon by the proud Baggara, deeply resentful of the stoppage of the slave trade ; while the camel-owning Arabs have always been half-hearted, and will be the first to welcome a government.

The dwellers in the villages and towns, those, in fact, within reach of the irresponsible soldiery who infested them, had for long been the victims of every kind of cruel injustice and ill-treatment. From the moment of Gordon's departure in 1879 the soldiers and civil functionaries revenged themselves for enforced good behaviour, and paid off old scores with heavy interest. The wretched creatures would still perhaps have continued to endure ; for there was no life in a religious revival among them. It would have died out, but that it formed a weapon for the Baggara. They it was who gave

the movement strength; they who trod the way with enthusiasm; they who, seizing the weak point in the holy man, pandered to and developed his abnormal uxoriousness; they who offered in marriage their daughters in incredible numbers, and who shortly seized the reins of power and made the movement entirely their own.

As their name *Baggara* indicates, they are large owners of cattle, and are planted in the most favoured portions of the Sudan. They have in abundance all that constitutes the wealth they know. Cattle, corn, and trade in slaves. Their country is in the main the ancient empire of Sennar, and, until the Egyptian invasion, formed one of a line of thriving kingdoms stretching right across Africa on the 13th parallel of latitude. The temperate zone between drought and excessive rain falls between milk-drinking people and flesh-eating people. These were the people who suddenly found the slave trade stopped, trade of all sorts on the White Nile wholly stopped, by order of the "governor," and who, in 1881, had begun to seriously consider among themselves what manner of man it was who gave such an order. The English governor, General Gordon, had gone, and with him the last vestige of capable authority. These men, with tarboushes and uniforms, were now left to themselves. Surely with all their insolence they were a farce. True they had rifles and cannon, but the experiment of resisting their authority was worth trying.

Gordon had been a scourge to them. A slave-dealer once known, no sheikh was sufficiently powerful or great to save him from Gordon, or from Gordon's lightning right hand, Gessi. Zubeir himself, the Tippu-Tib of twenty years ago, was nearly caught. His son, Suliman Zubeir, was shot with eleven others, with the remark from Gordon, "Thus does God make gaps in His enemies." And now Gordon was gone, and all these regiments and mudirs and inspectors for the suppression of the slave trade were sunk back into the wretched sink of misgovernment from which they had been temporarily extricated.

Stewart writes:—

"In 1877 Colonel Gordon is appointed Governor-General of the Sudan, including Harrar and the Equatorial Provinces. He spent most of his time in travelling. During his rule the rebellion of Harun in the Darfur Province was put down, as well as that of Suliman Zubeir in the

Bahr el Ghazal Province. Suliman Zubeir was taken and shot. Vigorous efforts were also made to suppress the slave trade.

"In 1880 Raouf Pasha was made Governor-General. He least of all was fit to ride the storm which Gordon, by his ceaseless vigilance, had directed. During his rule vigorous efforts were made to limit the expenditure. In August 1881 Mohammed Ahmed the Mahdi commenced his divine mission."¹

Gordon had sincerely meant to suppress the slave trade, and with his sincerity was a vigorous ability which left little which he attempted to do undone. The slave trade was suppressed temporarily wherever Gordon was. He set the house on fire, and Raouf and Abd el Kader Pashas, who succeeded him, could do nothing but watch the flames.

When the life-giving energy of Gordon was withdrawn, back fell the Egyptians, an inert mass. The mass was their safety, their great numbers made them for the moment difficult to attack. Raouf Pasha made economies, and sent thousands of irregular negro and Arab troops to wander in search of a leader, as if designed to recruit Mohammed Ahmed's forces.

The ground was well prepared in many ways, but the broad base of the Mahdi's appeal was the injustice and cruelty of every sort which sprang up the moment Gordon's wholesome discipline was withdrawn.

The stage is now ready, and the scene is set, for the introduction of Mohammed Ahmed Ibn Sayid² Abdullah.

There is no doubt that, until he was ruined by unbridled sensuality, this man had the strongest head and the clearest mental vision of any man in the two million square miles of which he more or less made himself master before he died;

¹ It is said that previous to this, early in 1880, Mohammed Ahmed came from the island of Abba to El Obeid, where he secretly began to preach his cause, and one day after the usual Friday prayers he, at the head of a hundred followers, with banners, and shouting "Welcome, famous Imam—the Mahdi of God," proceeded to the mosque of Siwar ed Dahab, where he was arrested by an Egyptian officer and sent to the Mudir, by whom he was imprisoned; but on the representations of Elias Pasha (former mudir of Kordofan), Wad el Arik (chief merchant), and Siwari ed Dahab, an influential townaman, that he was a monomaniac, he was released and returned to Abba.

² "Sayid" must not be confused with "Said." The former signifies "lord" or "master," while the latter is merely a proper name meaning "the happy (one)." The prefix "sidi," which frequently occurs, is a form of "Sayid" signifying "my lord" or "my master."

and it is a matter of regret that more cannot be learnt of his early youth than what follows.

Born at Dongola in 1848, of a family of excellent boat-builders, whose boats are to this day renowned for sound construction, he was early recognised by his family as the clever one, and, so to speak, went into the Church. At twenty-two he was already a sheikh with a great reputation for sanctity, and his preaching was renowned far and wide. Men wept and beat their breasts at his moving words; even his brother fikis could not conceal their admiration.

The first steps of the Mahdi in his career are of genuine interest. Tall, rather slight, of youthful build, and, like many Danagla,¹ with large eyes and pleasing features, Mohammed Ahmed bore externally all the marks of a well-bred gentleman.

He moved with quiet dignity of manner, but there was nothing unusual about him until he commenced to preach. Then indeed one understood the power within him, which men obeyed. With rapid earnest words he stirred their hearts and bowed their heads like corn beneath the storm. And what a theme was his! No orator in France in 1792 could speak of oppression that here in the Sudan was not doubled. None could address the long-enslaved crowds in France with an effect that here in the passionate souls of these ignorant men was not trebled in intensity. What need of description when he could use denunciation; when he could stretch forth his long arm and point to the taxgatherer who twice, three times, and yet again, carried off the last goat, the last bundle of dhurra straw, from yon miserable man listening with intent eyes! And then he urges in warning tones what Whitfield, Wesley, have urged before him, that all this misery, all this oppression, is God's anger at the people's wickedness. That since the Prophet left the earth the world has all fallen into sin and neglect. But now a time was at hand when all this should have an end. The Lord would send a deliverer who should sweep away the veil before their eyes, clear the madness from the brain, the hideous dream would be broken for ever, and, strong in the faith of their divine leader, these new-made men, with clear-seeing vision and well-laid plans before them, should go forth and possess the land. The cursed taxgatherer

¹ Plural of Dongolawi, a native of Dongola.

should be driven into holes and caves, the bribe-taking official hunted from off the field he had usurped, and the Turk should be thrown to jabber his delirium on his own dunghill. With the coming of the Mahdi the right should triumph and all oppression should have an end. When would this Mahdi come? What wonder that every hut and every thicket echoed the longing for the promised Saviour! The hot wind roamed from desert to plain of withered grass, from mountain range to sandy valley, and whispered "Mahdi" as it blew; all nature joined; how childish, yet how effective. The women found the eggs inscribed with "Jesus," "Mohammed," and the "Mahdi." The very leaves rustled down to the ground, and in their fall received the imprint of the sacred names. The land was sown with fikis, many of them passed masters in the art of swaying a crowd. They came and listened, and soon they recognised that they had found their master here. The leaven worked rapidly among them, until one evening at Abba Island, a hundred and fifty miles south of Khartum, there came a band of self-reliant men who heard the stirring words, and saw the tall, slight, earnest figure. They said, "You are our promised leader," and in solemn secrecy he said, "I am the Mahdi."¹

Thus preaching, Mohammed Ahmed moved about first among the villagers along the Nile banks. To them his theme was oppression of the taxgatherer. And then he marched through the plains and valleys round Gedir. Here he spoke of the defilement of an ancient faith by cowardly Turks, and of renegade foreigners ousting the rightful owners of the land. Among the Arabs the Baggara Selim, south of the Tagalla, Dair, and Nuba hills, were the first to whom the spark set fire.

¹ The Mahdi signifies "the guided" in the *hadaya* or true way of salvation, hence "the guide." In the tenets of all sects of the Moslems there is an intimate connection between the Mahdi and Jesus Christ. Some believe Christ will be the Mahdi, i.e. expect His second advent; others share the opinion as stated by Ibn Khaldun (ob. 1406 A.D. in Cairo), who, in the introduction to his history of the Arabs, Persians, and Berbers, says: "At all times the Moslems have believed that towards the end of the world a man of the Prophet's family would appear to sustain the true religion. He will lead the believers and be named 'the Mahdi.'" Then will appear the Messih ed Dejjal (Antichrist). After the appearance of the latter, Christ (Jesus) will come down from heaven and destroy him, and the Mahdi will become Christ's Imam.

BOOK II

1882

Raouf Pasha attempts to capture the Mahdi at Abba—The attempt fails—The Mahdi retires to the mountains south of Kordofan—Mohammed Pasha Said despatched to Kana with a force—Rashid Bey defeated by the Mahdi at Jebel Gedir—Mohammed Ahmed secures the alliance of the Baggara—Raouf Pasha enrolls irregular troops—Tribes in Kordofan, Sennar, and the Eastern Sudan wavering—Raouf Pasha recalled—Geigler Pasha acts as a Governor-General—Yusef Pasha esh Shellali despatched to Kana—Ahmed el Makashif enters Sennar and sacks the town—Troops besieged in the Mudirieh—Saleh Bey relieves Sennar—The Egyptian troops defeat the rebels at Karkoj—Rebels defeat Egyptians at Messalamieh—Geigler Pasha's victory at Abu Haraz—Abd el Kader Pasha succeeds Raouf Pasha as Governor-General—Yusef Pasha esh Shellali completely defeated by the Mahdi at Masat—Abd el Kader Pasha repairs the fortifications of Khartum, mobilises a force of 12,000 men—Garrison of Shatt annihilated—Rebels repulsed with great loss at Duem—El Birket in Kordofan besieged—Reinforcements from El Obeid defeat rebels near Kashgil—Inhabitants of Ashaf massacred—Egyptian force routs rebels at Awlad Muruj—Bara attacked—Fighting at Shattura—Bara invested—Story of Father Bonomi—Mahdi invited by Elias Pasha to come to El Obeid—He leaves Jebel Gedir—Mek Omar besieges and captures the mission station of Jebel Delen—Fiki Minneh attacks Et Tayara—Birket captured—Mahdi invests El Obeid—Town deserted by inhabitants—Garrison strongly entrench themselves—Mahdi attacks but is repulsed with great loss—Abd el Kader Pasha despatches reinforcements, which are heavily defeated at El Kana—Bara garrison makes successful sortie—Nur Angara joins the rebels—Abd el Kader Pasha telegraphs to Cairo for reinforcements—Geigler Pasha secures slight success at Duem—Events in Darfur—The emir Madibbo seizes Shakka, but is repulsed at El Maalieh—Madibbo attacks and is defeated by Slatin Bey at Injileila, and again near Darra—Rebels defeated near Omshanga—Events in Bahr-el-Ghazal—Description of country and tribes—Lupton Bey Governor—The suds of the Nile—Sub-division of districts in the province—Causes of the revolt—First outbreak at Tel Gauna—Revolt of the Janghe tribe—Action at Tuj—Sheikh Jango defeated near Tel Gauna—Events in Equatoria—Description of the province—Emin Bey Governor—The tribes—Stations and garrisons—Causes of the local revolts—Kabarega, King of Unyoro—*Resumé* of situation in the Sudan at the end of 1882—The loyalty of the Shukrieh.

THE first clash with authority, the touchstone of success or failure, was not long in coming. The issue could not long be doubtful.

It happened thus. Much discussion arose at Khartum at the news of a Mahdi manifestation. Marcopoli Bey, a Greek storekeeper in Government service, wished to bring Mohammed Ahmed to Khartum to examine him. Abu Saoud, who has attained notoriety as a scoundrel, even in the Sudan, by urgency prevailed upon Raouf Pasha to send him to Abba, with four of the ulema.¹ Abu Saoud belonged to the great Ghattas family, who for years had farmed the Equatorial Provinces, and who, it seems probable, actually held a lease of the (slave) trade in this country at the time it was placed under Sir Samuel Baker that he might suppress the traffic.

These went to Abba Island in a steamer, and landing, called loudly for the Mahdi. He presently came with much meekness, his hands hidden in his robe, and seated himself on the angarib (native couch) beside Abu Saoud. "What is all this about?" blustered the Egyptian.

"I am the Mahdi," gently replied the new prophet.—"You must come with us to Khartum."—"I do not wish to go to Khartum."—"But you must."—"Must!" said the Mahdi, rising with his hand upon his sword. Abu Saoud retreated, called together the ulema, and embarked.

Returning to Khartum, they woke up Raouf Pasha at night. "Give me fifty men," said Abu Saoud, "and I will bring the impostor here."

Abu Saoud was no soldier, but he was placed in charge of two hundred soldiers next day, and returned to Abba. Here he remained on board, while the officers were disputing whether or not a night surprise should be attempted. The Mahdi's adherents fell upon them and slew them. The failure may have been prearranged. Anything is possible with Abu Saoud; and in that case the credit given to Mohammed Ahmed's presence of mind may be transferred to his powers of organisation. Thus it was that in August 1881 the signal was given for the extermination of the intruders who bore the mission to suppress the slave trade.

¹ The plural of "alim"—a learned man. The term usually includes all religious teachers, such as imams, muftis, kadis, maulawis; and in Turkey denotes the political party led by the religious teachers.

Although Mohammed Ahmed defeated the first efforts to dislodge him from Abba, he was quickly aware that his position was unnecessarily near the centre of authority at Khartum. Accordingly, having secured to himself a following in the Sennar Province, and placed affairs there under two brothers—Makashif—he moved westward to Masat in the Nuba Mountains. This movement he refers to in his addresses as his *hejira* or flight, in imitation of the great prophet, whose *hejira* from Mecca to Medina marks the commencement of the Mussulman era. Here he was pursued by Mohammed Pasha Said, who concentrated some 1400 troops at Kaua on the White Nile; but Mohammed Ahmed had by this time left for the mountainous country to the south of Kordofan. Mohammed Pasha Said's force, after a month's delay, was broken up without having effected anything. From the Nuba Mountains the Mahdi was ousted by the negro ruler of a small district called Tagalla, and he entrenched himself next in the mountains of Gedir, still farther south, where on the 9th December 1881 he defeated Rashid Bey, the governor of Fashoda, and remained quiet to await the success of his emissaries, who had gone forth to all the tribes. He diligently occupied himself in securing the alliance of the Baggara, chiefly by marriages with the daughters of their principal men. And in this way began the partnership between the spiritual power, with the Mahdi for pope, and the temporal powers of the Baggara emirs, smarting at their defeats at Gordon's hands, and conscious of their power to crush the Egyptians, whose English leader was withdrawn.

On receiving news of Rashid Bey's defeat, Raouf Pasha at once began to enrol irregular troops from the Dongola, Berber, and Shaggieh districts;¹ but in the meantime the rebellion was making rapid progress. The Shilluks, who had suffered heavily in the recent defeat, threatened revolt, while the Kababish in the north of Kordofan, the Rufa'a in Sennar, and the Bisharin to the north of the Suakin-Berber road, were wavering in the balance.

In March 1882 Raouf Pasha was recalled, and, pending the arrival of his successor, Geigler Pasha acted as governor-general. He despatched Nubar Pasha Yusef esh Shellali against

¹ Dar Shaikiyeh in the map.

the Mahdi, but the soldiers deserted, and left the pasha stranded at Kaua, fifty miles north of Abba.

Gordon called Mohammed Ahmed's followers "the Arabs," and by that name they will be known in the following pages.

At the end of March, Ahmed el Makashif, who, it will be remembered, the Mahdi on his departure from Abba had left in the neighbourhood of Sennar, invested that town, and on the 6th April Hussein Bey Shukri, the mudir, made a sortie, which was repulsed. The enemy entered and sacked the town, killing over a hundred of the garrison and a number of merchants. The troops, however, retained possession of the mudirieh, and maintained the siege for some time. On receiving this news, Geigler Pasha despatched Saleh Bey from Kaua with 500 regulars; and this latter, after a desperate encounter with the troops of the Makashif, succeeded in entering the town and raising the siege. The enemy then retreated to Karkoj, above Sennar on the Blue Nile, and were followed up from Abu Haraz by the Egyptian troops, who by this time had been reinforced by 2500 Shukrieh warriors carrying coats of mail, under their celebrated chief Awad el Kerim Pasha Abu Sin; but the rebels, falling on them at Messalamieh, defeated them with great slaughter.

Geigler Pasha himself now took to the field, and on the 3d May gained a victory over the enemy at Abu Haraz. On the 25th May he gained another victory near Sennar, after which he returned to Khartum, where he found Abd el Kader Pasha—the successor of Raouf Pasha—who had arrived on the 11th May.

During this interval Yusef Pasha esh Shellali had been strongly reinforced at Kaua, and now prepared to advance against the Mahdi at Jebel Gedir. He, in May, proceeded to Fashoda with 6000 men, thence struck inland, halted for some days at Jebel Tungur—midway between Fashoda and Jebel Gedir—and on the 21st May began his final march through a marshy and wooded country. On the 7th June he was in touch with the enemy, and while making a zariba was surprised by the Arabs, who fell on the troops, utterly defeated and almost annihilated them, capturing all the arms, ammunition, and stores. This was by far the most

important victory gained hitherto by the Mahdi. It gave great stimulus to the movement, and rendered the position of affairs more critical than ever.

Abd el Kader Pasha now commenced to repair the fortifications which preserved Khartum up to the 26th January 1885. He offered also a reward of £2 for every dead Arab, and £18 for every chief. He further sent proclamations to the Arabs, inviting them to remain faithful to the Government, and did what could be done, short of attacking Mohammed Ahmed himself. He lost no time in collecting troops from all parts, withdrew three battalions of regulars from Galabat, Senhit, and Gera, raised two battalions of blacks, collected about 8000 Bashi-Bazuks, and at the end of July had mobilised a force of from 12,000 to 13,000 men. At the same time he reinforced the garrison of El Obeid by 1000 men.

Shortly after this, on the 8th August, the station of Shatt was attacked and taken by the Makashif, who put the garrison of 200 men to the sword; and on the 28th a determined attack was also made on Duem, but was repulsed by the garrison, who inflicted a loss of over 3000 men on the enemy.

During this interval the Mahdi remained inactive at Jebel Gedir, but his lieutenants were scoring successes in various parts of the country.

In Kordofan the small town of El Birket was besieged by the emir Abdullah Wad en Nur, who had collected a large force of Bederieh, Hawazma, Ghodiat, and Homr Arabs. Mohammed Pasha Said despatched a force of 1200 under Major Nazim Effendi from El Obeid to raise the siege. The latter met the Arabs near Kashgil on the 13th May, and after three days' severe fighting succeeded in routing them and temporarily raising the siege; but the troops were afterwards recalled to El Obeid, owing to disturbances in that neighbourhood, and the siege of El Birket was once more resumed.

On the 19th May the village of Ashaf, near Bara, was attacked and pillaged and the inhabitants massacred. The troops sent from Bara for its protection were also completely defeated and their leader slain. It was on this occasion that

Nur Angara,¹ who had gone to Ashaf with the troops from Bara to protect his own home there, lost his celebrated noggara or kettle drums, and only just succeeded in escaping with his life.

Early in June an expedition under Adjutant-Major Sirur Effendi Bahghat was despatched from Bara to Awlad Muruj,² where a number of rebels had collected under Sheikh Rahama. After a severe fight, lasting three hours, the Arabs were routed and their camp and a large number of prisoners and cattle captured.

In spite, however, of this defeat the rebels now gathered in greater numbers round Bara, and on the early morning of the 23d June a determined attack was made on the garrison, which at that time consisted of a mixed force of 2000 men under the command of Ali Bey Sherif, also eight guns. The attack was repulsed, and the Arabs lost heavily both round the walls and in the subsequent cavalry pursuit.

A fortnight later the rebels again assembled at Shattura, two days distant from Bara, whence a force under Major Mahmud Effendi Hassan sallied forth, and on the 11th July was attacked by a large body of Arabs under the emir en Nur. These latter were again repulsed; but, massing in still greater numbers, they intercepted the return of the Egyptian force to Bara. Hassan Effendi succeeded in getting a messenger through to El Obeid, and the commandant of that town despatched Nazim Effendi to relieve the Shattura force. When a short distance from this place he was attacked by the Arabs, but Hassan Effendi, making a sortie, fell on the rebels in rear, dispersed them, and the combined force again returned to Shattura. After two small skirmishes at Firshaha and Abu Sinun these troops were recalled to El Obeid.

Sheikh Rahama, after his defeat on the 23d June at Bara, retired to gather reinforcements, and on the 17th July again advanced, and this time completely invested the town.

¹ Nur Angara had been formerly mudir of Kebkebieh and Kulkul. He was thought highly of by General Gordon, and was known to be a man of courage and ability. An accusation had been brought against him by some of the officials of Kulkul for unjust confiscation of property, on account of which he had been recalled to El Obeid, and pending the settlement of his case had gone to live at Bara. This individual has since taken a very prominent part in Sudan affairs, and it will be of some interest to watch his subsequent career.

² Near Bara.

The pitiful story of Father Bonomi¹ must not be omitted. Chief of a large missionary establishment, he had planted himself at Jebel Delen, in the Nuba group, to the south of Kordofan. Here, in the home of sister Cyprian, they cultivated land, and buying young negroes, sought to teach them the truths of Christianity. Thus, in dangerous proximity to the Mahdi at Gedir, they were the first Europeans to suffer at his hands. They were besieged from April 1882 until September, and for this time their handful of black soldiers remained faithful to them. But in June, when the Mahdi had possessed himself of Yusef Pasha's stores, he received from Elias Pasha²—a relation of Zubeir's—and from other notables at El Obeid a pressing invitation to come and make himself master of that town. This, after some hesitation, the Khalifa Abdullah, already master of the enterprise, agreed that he should accept, when he could advance with the prestige of a victory. The fall of Birket was then imminent, and in August the Mahdi advanced. Passing south of Birket, he detached Mek Omar to reduce the poor missionaries. Mek Omar had but a small force at first, and an obstinate resistance was maintained. But in September Mek Omar was reinforced. The mission soldiers fraternised with the besiegers, and the priests and nuns were, after hideous ill-treatment, taken before the Mahdi, who had by this time arrived outside El Obeid. ✓

Meanwhile fiki Minneh of the Baggara Gimeh tribe had assembled a number of Bederieh, Beni Harrar, Awlad Ahmed, and Hawazma Arabs, and made an attack on the station of Et Tayara, where some two companies of Bashi-Bazuks under Captain Mohammed Effendi Shafai were stationed. The attack was repulsed, but Tayara was now closely besieged,

¹ Father Bonomi escaped from El Obeid on the 5th June 1885, and travelling *vid* Bara, Kajmar, and Safiyeh, arrived in Cairo in July 1885.

² Elias Pasha was by birth a Jaali, i.e. of the Jaalin, a tribe in the Sennar district. He had held several important posts in the Sudan, being at one time mudir of Kordofan, but being implicated in the revolt of Suliman Zubeir, he had been dismissed by Gordon and went to live at El Obeid. On the arrival of the Mahdi at Jebel Gedir, Elias Pasha sent one of his five sons to pay him allegiance, and subsequently threw in his lot with the new leader. All his sons were made emirs. For a long time the family enjoyed the special favour of the Mahdi and his successor. The latter, feeling that they were getting too powerful, confiscated all their wealth, reduced the sons from their exalted rank, and retained the family at Omdurman, where they are now in a state of poverty. Elias Pasha has lost his sight.

and a body of reinforcements despatched from El Obeid was intercepted and annihilated. Soon afterwards the place fell and the garrison surrendered.

By this time the small town of Birket had been captured and the garrison of 2000 men put to the sword; the remainder—1000—escaped to El Obeid. The Mahdi now prepared to advance to El Obeid, at the same time detaching a portion of his force to invest Bara. On this news reaching Mohammed Pasha Said at El Obeid, he at once demanded reinforcements, which were sent him under the command of Mohammed Pasha Imam. A portion of these were detained at Bara by the mudir, Ali Bey Sherif, while the remainder proceeded to El Obeid, where they arrived at the latter end of August.

On the 3d September the Mahdi with a large force arrived within a few miles of El Obeid, and at once wrote to Mohammed Pasha Said demanding the surrender of the town. The latter, on the receipt of this summons, called a council, at which it was decided to return no answer, and to hang the three messengers who had brought the letters. That night almost all the inhabitants of the town joined the rebels, as well as Mohammed Pasha Imam and a few men of the garrison. The remainder of the troops now took to the fortifications, which were unusually strong. The Government House and the magazines were fortified by a quadruple ring of trenches, and eight forts had been built on the walls. Mohammed Pasha Said commanded about 8000 regulars and Bashi-Bazuks, and he enlisted, under Ahmed Bey Dafa'allah, a large number of irregulars—mostly men who had recently been dismissed from motives of economy. The number of the Mahdi's followers was prodigious; they swarmed in thousands, and were accompanied by their wives and families. Some 6000 or 7000 used the rifles taken from Rashid Pasha and from Birket. Many more were armed with double-barrelled guns, and the rest with spears, swords, and shields. The town had, on the inhabitants leaving it, been pulled down by the defenders, and on the 8th September a determined assault was made by the Mahdi, which lasted from 6 A.M. to 11 A.M., resulting in the repulse of the Arabs with great loss. Sixty-three banners were captured, including that of the Mahdi, called the Banner of Izrail or the Angel of Death. It

is said that in this attack upwards of 10,000 men were killed, while the loss on the part of the garrison was under 300 killed and wounded.¹ Elias Pasha, who had previously deserted to the rebels, now advised the Mahdi to retire to Ginzarat, about a mile distant from the town; and here he encamped, awaiting the arrival of more arms and ammunition from Jebel Gedir. These arrived shortly afterwards, and now the town was closely besieged on all sides. ✓

Abd el Kader Pasha, learning that El Obeid and Bara were closely besieged, despatched on the 24th September a column of two battalions of regular troops and 750 Bashi-Bazuks, under Ali Bey Lutfi, for the relief of these two places. This force, after enduring appalling privations from thirst—for the Arabs had choked the wells—arrived at El Kaua, where, towards the end of September, the rebels fell on them, killed over 1100 of them, and captured a large number of rifles and all the ammunition. The remainder managed to escape to Bara, their entry to the town being effected by a successful sortie of 600 of the garrison under Nur Angara. These now joined the garrison of that place, and, making a sortie on the 25th October, they inflicted a severe defeat on the Arabs.

The siege of Bara was now pressed with the utmost vigour, and in November Ahmed Wad Malik, one of the notables of the town, who had been secretly gained over to the Mahdi's cause, set fire to the town, while a simultaneous attack was made by the enemy. The greater part of the town was burnt down, but the attack was repulsed and Wad Malik fled to the rebels. The fire, too, had destroyed most of the grain, and now the garrison had to fall back on horses, dogs, etc., and soon was reduced to great straits for food. Up to this time Nur Angara had remained loyal, but he at last gave way, and wrote to the Mahdi that he would surrender to any important emir, but not to El Minneh, whose vengeance he feared. In response to this, Mohammed Ahmed despatched the emir Wad en Nejumi to Bara, and Nur Angara, accom-

¹ After this repulse the Mahdi issued strict injunctions that his leaders should never order a town to be assaulted in the early stages of its investment, but should rather wait until famine and disease had weakened the resisting powers of the garrison.

panied by sirsiwari¹ Mohammed el Kheir, escaped from the town and was received by Nejumi.

The year 1882 closed on both El Obeid and Bara in the greatest distress from want of food, and hemmed in by countless numbers of the enemy.

Meanwhile the force of rebels in Sennar was gradually increasing, and Abd el Kader Pasha urgently telegraphed to Cairo for 10,000 additional troops, without which he declared it impossible to crush the revolt. He, moreover, said that if these troops did not come at once, four times the number would be required to re-establish the government authority in the Sudan.

In November the long ditch and parapet were begun along the south front of Khartum, and such preparations were made as were suggested by a very elementary knowledge of earthworks. The ditch and parapet were efficient, but a fatal defect lay in their having no flanking defence.

In the same month at Duem, Geigler Pasha secured a slight success over a party of rebels under the emir Abd el Bassit, whom he took prisoner.

DARFUR

It is now necessary to follow the events in Darfur, which comprise the three divisions of El Fasher, Darra, and Shakka.

Immediately after the defeat of Yusef Pasha esh Shellali at Jebel Gedir, in June 1882, the Mahdi despatched the emir Madibbo, sheikh of the Rizighat Arabs, a section of the Baggara tribe, between Shakka and Bahr el Ghazal, to subdue Shakka. Collecting the sheikhs of the Maalieh and other tribes, to whom he distributed Mahdi proclamations, he advanced towards Shakka, and at El Allali he fell upon a detachment of 200 of the Shakka garrison who were out collecting grain, and annihilated them in the month of July. They now pressed on to Shakka, whence the garrison of 600 men succeeded in escaping the night of Madibbo's arrival; the latter followed up and a fight ensued at Goz el Maalieh, where the rebels

¹ A Turkish military title, and still retained in the Bashi-Bazuk corps in the Sudan; it signifies a leader of cavalry, and may be taken as the equivalent of Lieut.-Colonel.

were repulsed and the garrison continued its flight towards Darra. They were, however, met at Injileila by Slatin Bey,¹ the governor-general of Darfur, who, having been apprised of the recent events, and obtaining reinforcements from El Fasher, strongly entrenched himself at that place. Madibbo now heavily attacked Slatin's zariba, but was twice driven off. The latter, however, knowing that his position was untenable for any lengthened period, and that probably the rebels would soon be largely reinforced, decided to retire on Darra: this he effected with some difficulty, being followed up and continually harassed by the enemy.

On arrival at Darra he advanced with all the troops at his disposal against Madibbo, who had now recourse to stratagem. He concealed half his force in a wood, and with the other gradually drew on Slatin till he had passed beyond the wood. A simultaneous attack on front and rear was then made by the Arabs, but Slatin, although surprised, utterly defeated the rebels and killed some two thousand of them; he himself was wounded by a bullet and lost the use of his right forefinger. Madibbo now retired and Slatin returned to Darra, which he put in a complete state of defence. He now received information that the Maalieh, Wadha, and other tribes were in revolt to the north-west of Darra; he therefore instructed Said Bey Guma, the mudir of El Fasher, to despatch a small force to Arafa, midway between Darra and El Fasher, while he himself proceeded to the same place with a portion of the Darra garrison. Most of the revolted tribes submitted; Slatin proceeded thence to El Fasher, and shortly afterwards returned once more to Darra.

Meanwhile Mohammed Ahmed's emissaries were busy raising the tribes around Omshanga. Already the Baggara Homr had made an unsuccessful attack on that place, but returned again and laid siege to the town. Reinforcements

¹ Slatin Bey was by birth an Austrian, and in 1882 must have been about 32 or 33 years of age. In 1876 he went to the Sudan in an unofficial capacity, where he remained some eighteen months. He subsequently returned to Austria and volunteered for the campaign in Herzegovina, in which he served as a sub-lieutenant. He returned to the Sudan in 1879 and was appointed Inspector-General of the Eastern Sudan and of Sennar by Gordon. In July the same year Gordon transferred him to Darra, as mudir of that sub-district, and in 1882 Raouf Pasha nominated him Governor-General of Darfur.

from El Fasher under sirsiwari Omar Agha now arrived, cut their way through the besiegers, joined the garrison, and shortly afterwards a successful sortie was made which resulted in the complete rout of the Arabs, who were pursued to El Ussaifar on the Kordofan frontier.

Such was Slatin Bey's position at the end of 1882.

BAHR EL GHAZAL

To turn now to events which had in the meantime occurred in the southern provinces of Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria.

The province of Bahr el Ghazal includes the larger portion of the basin watered by the Bahr (or river) Ghazal, and, with its affluents the Bahr el Arab, Jur, Rohl, and Roa, extends over an enormous area and forms a labyrinth of streams. The soil is exceptionally fertile and there are cattle in abundance, while the population is estimated at between three and four millions.

The most important tribes in these districts are the Dinka, Bongo, Agar, Jur, Moru, Golo, and Shir; but the first two are the most numerous and powerful. The Bongo are essentially agriculturists, and also work largely in iron and wood-carving. The men are of medium height, and up to the present had shown little desire to throw off the yoke of their rulers. To the north of Bongoland are the Jur, the chief zariba of this tribe being Jur Ghattas; to the north of these again are the Dinka, by far the most numerous as well as the tallest and strongest race of negroes in southern Sudan. They are large cattle-owners.

The port, if it may be so called, of Bahr el Ghazal is Meshra er Rek (or the landing-place of the Rek), and to this place steamers periodically ascended from Khartum.

The first European governor of Bahr el Ghazal was Gessi Pasha, who, in 1878, suppressed the revolt of Suliman, the son of Zubeir Pasha, and cleared the country, in a series of most brilliant campaigns, of its hordes of slave-dealers.

The camp or dem of Suliman was created by Gessi into the capital of the province, and soon it developed into the largest township on the Upper Nile.

Frank Lupton succeeded Gessi Pasha as governor in

1881. He was a native of Ilford, in Essex, had entered the mercantile marine in 1878, was chief officer on a steamer on the Red Sea between Suakin and Jedda, and being desirous of visiting Central Africa, he offered his services to General Gordon, who, on his arrival at Khartum, gave him charge of a flotilla of boats which he was sending to the relief of Emin Bey and Gessi Pasha, then hemmed in by the "sett" or "sud"—that curious grass barrier which from time to time blocks the passage of the Upper Nile. Following up the White Nile south from Khartum, one finds that about latitude 10°, just south of Fashoda, the river emerges from what may well have been the bed of an ancient lake. Into this wide marsh trickle a great number of winding streams, which are often completely blocked by floating vegetation. Through these dense barriers travellers by boat must at times cut their way with swords and axes. On his way back after his triumph over the slave-dealers' armies a long detention here cost the gallant Gessi his life. By these suds Sir Samuel Baker's expedition, 1870-74, was delayed a year. Lupton, previous to succeeding Gessi Pasha, had been Emin's deputy in the Equatorial Province.

The province of Bahr el Ghazal may be described as about five times as big as England, a district covered with forests and mountains, and seamed with low valleys subject to inundation. The mudir was Sati Bey, and both he and Lupton were at the commencement of the revolt at Dem Suliman, the capital of the province.

This extensive mudirieh was subdivided into eight kisms, each kism governed by a nazir (or superintendent). They were:—

<i>Kism.</i>	<i>Nazir.</i>
1. Liffi	Hassan Agha.
2. Bekko	Mohammed Agha Ketenbur.
3. Ed Dembo	Taha Agha.
4. Kawaki	Mohammed Agha Wad Alim.
5. El Biseilieh (Biselli)	Ali Agha Idris.
6. Sabi	Abdullah Wad Abd es Samud.
7. Jur Kurshukali	Osman Agha Bedawi.
8. Jur Ghattas	Hassan Agha Wad Mussaid.

Most of these nazirs were Danagla, with the exception of the last, who was a Jaali; and in each of the above stations there was a garrison of from 200 to 300 men.

✓ The tribesmen from these districts had long been smarting under the injustice and cruelty of their Danagla rulers, and when the news of the first outbreak of the rebellion reached Bahr el Ghazal, the spark of insurrection was soon fanned into a flame, and many of the important sheikhs, without hesitation, sent in their allegiance to the Mahdi. For some time emissaries had been active in the province, and on their reporting that the country was ripe for revolt, their numbers were largely increased, and soon the new doctrines obtained a complete hold on the people. The first outbreak occurred at the station of Tel Gauna in the kism Liffi, where Sheikh Jango, who had just returned from paying his allegiance to the Mahdi, attacked and killed a few Bashi-Bazuks, and seized their property. The rest of the inhabitants at once submitted. This occurred on the 18th August 1882, and while Hassan Agha was absent at the capital. On the news reaching Lupton Bey, he proceeded with a force of 600 men to Liffi, and thence despatched Hassan Agha to Tel Gauna, but Sheikh Jango had already fled and taken refuge with the emir Madibbo, who, it will be remembered, was at this time besieging Shakka. Pursuit was impossible, as at that time the country was under water; the force therefore returned to Liffi, and Lupton, leaving instructions to proceed after Sheikh Jango as soon as the roads were passable, himself returned to the capital. Here he learnt that a party of seventy-five of his Bazingers,¹ who were taking ivory to Meshra er Rek, had been attacked by the Janghe tribe, a section of the Dinka who had adopted Mahdiism. All had been killed. The mudir, Sati Bey, had already proceeded from Jur Ghattas with a force to Tuj, where he fell on some of the tribe, killing a number, and capturing 600 head of cattle.

Lupton now proceeded to Meshra and thence to Tuj, where he again defeated the Janghe, and returned with quantities of spoil to Jur Ghattas.

Meanwhile Sheikh Jango had returned to Tel Gauna with reinforcements from Madibbo, and with the intention of attacking Liffi, but on learning that vigorous preparations were being

¹ "Bazinger" was originally the name of a tribe from which Zubeir Pasha drew his slave-raiding soldiers. All rifle-bearing black troops on the side of the rebels are now known as Bazingers.

made to repel any such attempt his force broke up. Lupton then despatched a force of 2000 men, under Major Mohammed Abdullah el Mehallawi, to proceed to Tel Gauna, which, on arrival, they again found deserted. They, however, followed up Sheikh Jango, attacked and defeated him, killing some 600 of his men and capturing his camp.

Such was the state of affairs in the Bahr el Ghazal Province at the close of 1882.

EQUATORIA

To the south and south-east of the Bahr el Ghazal Province lies Equatoria, or, as it is called in Arabic, "Khat el Istiwa."¹

The original limits of this province extended from the Albert Nyanza as far north as Lado. To the north of this place lay the provinces of Bohr and Rohl, which were sometimes considered part of the Bahr el Ghazal Province, but in 1881 became attached to Equatoria.

The subdivisions of the province south of Lado include Moru, Makaraka, Latuka, Bari, Madi, Shuli, Luri, and the northern portion of Kabarega's kingdom of Unyoro.

This province is described by travellers as a picturesque, fertile, well populated, fairly healthy, and promising region. The Nile traverses Equatoria from north to south, receiving the tributaries Asua on the right and the Yei on the left, and from the lake as far as Duffileh, the channel is from 15 to 20 feet deep, and capable of navigation during the whole year. Between Duffileh and Lado there are a number of rapids, such as Fola, Yerbora, Guji, Makeo, Trimo Gharb, and Jenkoli Gharb, which are quite impassable at Low Nile. Away to the west are the Blue Mountains, forming the boundary between the Nile and Congo basins, on the western slope of which are the sources of the Welle.

The most important among the native tribes are the Makaraka and Madi on the west of the Nile, and the Bari and Latuka on the east. The Makaraka are a section of the powerful Niam-Niam tribe—the celebrated cannibals of the Sudan; they are good agriculturists, and are renowned for their

¹ "The middle line," *i.e.* the Equator.

courage, and as soldiers are preferable to almost any of the tribes. The Madi possess many of the characteristics of the Makaraka, and also cultivate largely tobacco, sesame, and sorghum. The Bari, like the Dinka, in the Bahr el Ghazal, are a pastoral people, but have the reputation as well of being perhaps the bravest and most fierce of all the tribes. The hated Danagla had drawn enormous supplies of slaves from them, and they of all others were the most ready to turn on their oppressors.

Farther to the east are the Latuka, who are supposed to be of Galla origin. They are unusually tall, and of a pleasant and cheerful disposition, and, like the Bari and Dinka, are great cattle-owners.

The capital of Equatoria is Lado, a well-built town; while to the south, on the left bank of the Nile, are the smaller towns of Regaf, Bedden, and Kiri. The principal town of the Madi district is Duffleh, and just below the rapids are the small forts of Laboreh and Muggi. Of the Luri district the chief town is Wadelai, while in the interior are Fadibek, Faloro, and Fatiko.

A post of troops was formerly kept at Foweira, in Unyoro, but this had been abandoned, although Magungo had still been retained. This station overlooks the Murchison Falls, where the Victoria Nile flows into Lake Albert. On the western shore of the lake is the station Mahagi, while farther inland and to the north are the outposts of Wandi and Makaraka Sogheir.

All these stations owed their establishment either to Sir Samuel Baker or General Gordon, and on the departure of the latter in 1879 he placed Emin Bey in charge of the Equatorial Province. At this time the military force in the province amounted to two battalions of regulars—some 1300 men in all—and 3000 irregulars, distributed over between forty and fifty stations.

Edward Schnitzler, or, as he is better known, Emin Bey, was born at Oppeln, in Prussian Silesia, on the 28th March 1840. He studied at Vienna and Paris, where he obtained the degree of Doctor, entered the Ottoman service at Scutari, and some years later, when Gordon assumed the government of the Sudan, he accompanied him as a medical officer. He had been sent on missions to Kabarega of Unyoro and to

M'Tesa, king of Uganda, and was moreover a very distinguished botanist. In March 1882 Emin had gone to Khartum to see Raouf Pasha, then governor; and on the 15th June he left it to return to his province, only to learn, on his arrival at Fashoda, of Yusef Pasha's terrible defeat at Gedir.

The disgraceful misrule, the venality and oppression, which were the main causes of the revolt against Egyptian authority in other parts of the Sudan, here also flourished in a fertile soil. Emin's description of affairs at Rumbek will best describe the state of affairs which existed on his arrival there:—

"Since 1877 no accounts have been sent in from, or kept by, this Administration. Though the governors receive monies for the payment of wages, no one has been paid a piastre for years; probably, however, the governors have bought goods with the funds belonging to the Government and sold them at three times the amount. Slaves figure in these accounts as oxen, asses, etc. The making of false seals and fabricating receipts by their use complete the picture of what has been going on here, and with it all the place is full of prayer places and fikia."

Emin Bey, writing at the close of 1882, thus sums up the situation:—

"During my absence some trouble has also taken place in my district. I was away and the cattle were tempting, so the people made a few razzias, which, remarkably enough, their instigators had paid for with their lives, for the negroes have at last learnt not to be ill-used for nothing. I hope that my people will remember this in the future. In all other respects everything is quiet, and the news I have received from the south, from the Albert Lake; from the east, from Latuka and Fadibek; from the west and south-west, from Makaraka and Monbuttu, all tells of the greatest tranquillity. Kabarega, king of Unyoro, has again sent me an invitation to visit him. Unfortunately I am unable at the present moment to accede to his request, as other and more important affairs await my attention, and therefore I have no time to pay such visits."

And now, with the exception of the Equatorial Province, almost the whole of the country to the south of Khartum was in open revolt. And it must be remembered that these conflicts were between men accustomed to stand in ranks and fire breech-loading rifles, and wild men armed for the most part with spears and swords.

Up to the present the only important tribe which had sided with the Government were the Shukrieh, who, by their position, were compelled to temporise for the moment, for they

dwelt to north-east and south-east of Khartum, which city lay between them and their would-be deliverer.

So far the record is one of wavering and hesitation on the one side, and patient preparation for the inevitable on the other. Mohammed Ahmed had but to wait for the fruit to ripen and drop into his mouth.

BOOK III

CORRESPONDENCE OF THE MAHDI

Capture of the Mahdi's letter-book at Toski—Explanatory notes—The construction of the Khalifate—Historical outline of previous Mahdis—The letters and proclamations—A rebuke to those who do not believe in Mahdiism—A circular enjoining modesty in dress, etc.—Prayers to be said on advancing against the enemy—Circular on the rules to be observed in riding—A vision in which the Prophet and saints proclaim Mohammed Ahmed to be the Mahdi—Instructions as to the correspondence and the formation of Arabic letters—A dissertation on virtue and the Jihad (Holy War)—A dissertation on fate placed over the door of the mosque in the beginning of Ramadan (the month of fasting and prayer)—A short address—A warning to one who doubts—A letter to the Sheikh el Islam in which the Mahdi endeavours to prove the divinity of his cause—A vision in which the Prophet hands to the Mahdi the evergreen crown of victory and promises everlasting happiness to those who die in Holy War—The abolition of the name "dervish" and the adoption of the name "ansar" for his followers.

FROM time to time during the last eight years a slight insight into the religious and temporary government of Mohammed Ahmed and his successor was gleaned from the occasional correspondence which has found its way from the Sudan. But at the action of Toski in 1889 a manuscript book containing the letters and decrees of the Mahdi and the Khalifa Abdullah was found amidst a mass of other correspondence in the captured camp of the commander of the Arab army, Wad en Nejumi. From the maze of verbose letters and proclamations a few extracts have been made, a perusal of which will best explain the rise and cause of Mahdiism; but for a thorough comprehension of them a few explanatory notes are necessary.

At the time of the Prophet Mohammed's death there were in Medina two privileged classes, the one called "Muhajjarin,"

those who had fled or made the Hejira with Mohammed from Mecca; and a second class who welcomed the fleeing Prophet, and were called "Ansar," helpers or auxiliaries.

The Prophet's only son Kassim died when a little child. Ali, who had married the Prophet's daughter Fatima, did not push himself forward successfully on the Prophet's death, though urged to do so by a large party, and Abu Bakr succeeded Mohammed.

The four great men whose names are found on the Mahdi's banners, and whose chairs the Mahdi's vision assigns to four of his leaders, are the rashidin or guides as follows:—Abu Bakr, first khalif; Omar, second khalif; Osman, third khalif; and Ali (the first legitimate khalif according to the Shia'), the fourth khalif. Ali, when at last elected, was elected chiefly by the Egyptians who were implicated in the death of Osman.

The title khalif was selected by Abu Bakr, who was the Khalif Rassul Allah, the representative of the messenger of God, and it has since been adopted by numerous adventurers claiming the title either as mahdis or by genealogy, which among Arabs has an exaggerated importance. Only in the north of Africa does the word khalifa retain its original meaning of head servant or major-domo.

Abd el Kader el Gilani was a learned author and founder of a sect. He came from the province of Gilan in Persia, and died in Baghdad in 1166. A couplet is found in the Gulistan Sadi, which describes El Gilani as praying to be raised up blind on the Day of Judgment, that he might not feel ashamed before the righteous. A prayer of his is well known in the East, and has been Englished as follows:—

"As every morning springs to birth
I prostrate touch the parent earth,
And pray to Him the heavens conceal,
Eternal Lord, to me reveal
If, as I oft remember Thee,
Thou e'er bestowest a thought on me."

El Khudr is a person whose vagueness of identity fits him for employment where a blind reverence is to be encouraged. He is variously reputed to be the general and companion of Dhu el Kurnein, the Man of Two Horns, whose title was

adopted by Alexander the Great ; or he is a Moslem contemporary of Abraham, or he is the Prophet Elias. The name means green, ever-living, and to the Sudanese represented some prophet of dread but indistinct power with whom the Mahdi was necessarily familiar, and without mention of whom the description of the Prophet's throne might have been open to criticism.

The *Ithar* or *Vestiges* is a book of traditions composed by Et Tahawi. The Kuran was found to be somewhat lofty and general in terms, and the worshippers required advice and instructions on many small domestic and social questions. This was supplied in *Howadith*, or *Traditions*, where what the Prophet said and did in various emergencies is related in a style somewhat similar to that of Boswell's *Johnson* ; and thus it is that the name *Muhyi ed Din* (*Muhidin*), the vivifier of the religion, is that borne by more than one learned doctor of Islam.

Hussein and his brother Hassan were sons of Ali, and were slain by Yezid under circumstances which to this day at the annual memorial passion play excite the passionate sympathy of the Shia'. Hussein was the *shahid*, witness or martyr for the faith, and another title of his, the *sayid* or lord, is adopted by thousands of religious mendicants in Persia, who form a principal element of fanaticism in that country, and who claim to be descended from Hussein.

The Mahdi who appeared at El Hajjira in 1126 and founded the dynasty of Muhidin, which reigned in Africa for 144 years, claimed descent from Hussein, and Mohammed Ahmed followed his example.

In the time of Omar the Second, eighth Ommiade khalif, the Abbassides rose into power as the true descendants of the Prophet's ancestors ; genealogy can go no further than it went when on this ground it established in 718 a dynasty of 37 khalifs chiefly remarkable for fecundity of offspring. The machinery by which Islam first governed is simple and easy of construction. Self-abnegation is preached to all. The head is careful merely to transmit the orders which he receives from God in visions, and he contrasts their might and divine wisdom with his own insignificance, contemptible indeed and unworthy, but pure. In the second place, all things of this world are vain, and all property base and contemptible.

Mohammed Ahmed, like the Prophet, surrounded himself with four of his ablest men, or rashidin. The vacant chair of Abu Bakr he assigned to Abdullah et Taashi, the most renowned Baggara chieftain, a brave man, and a very fox for cunning.

In the chair of Omar he seated Wad el Helu, son of the Sweet One.

The chair of Osman he offered to the Senussi Mahdi, and later, upon that chief showing a decided opposition, appointed Adam Wad el Oweysir to it.

The chair of Ali was bestowed on Mohammed esh Sherif, who, as was part of the "business," was an interesting young man who had married his daughter. Thus his succession was provided for by four men who during his lifetime took a leading part in affairs, and whose order of precedence was established by a sanctified tradition.

The principle that only the meek and lowly are acceptable to God forms argument for the slaughter of all such powerful men as remained disaffected to the cause. The slaughter thus made was wholesale and pitiless. The work of organising a civil government may be said to have commenced after the fall of Khartum and Kassala, and from that date no two men dare be seen together. A terrible inquisition reigned. Every one suspected of lukewarmness in the cause or of independence of thought was accused often by his own slaves, or by mere boys. If he remonstrated that the witness against him was a mere slave, the refusal to recognise that God made all men equal was his death-warrant.

In like manner the principle that all worldly goods are to be despised formed argument for forcing every one to place his property in the Beit el Mal, the public warehouse, over which was placed a faithful Mahdiist, charged with such distributions as Mohammed Ahmed might from time to time direct.

The Khalifate is thus constructed by destroying all opposition and by accumulating all property. Its success mainly depends on the credulity of the masses, which in the East is very considerable. The process is so simple that it has been repeated over and over again, so that in the year 937 there were almost as many khalifs as there were countries in the East. For at that time the Abbassides ruled at Baghdad, the Bouides at Basrah and in Persia, the Hamadanides in Mesopo-

tamia, Akhshid in Egypt and Syria, the Fathemites (descendants of a mahdi) in Africa, the Omniades in Spain, the Samanides in Khorasan, and last of all, the Dilemites ruled in Georgia.

Both reflection and experience indicate the weak point in such a system so far as concerns the Mahdi. The qualities and conduct necessary to raise the storm are incompatible with the ability to control it. The ascetic meekness (in food and raiment merely, and never in the East, with reference to women) and the mystic seclusion which obtain credence compel a mahdi to entrust much to his chief khalif.

Again, from the moment the Divine mission is established the prophet is no longer required; his continued existence is even a danger, for at any moment he might let slip the mask. The prophet once dead, canonised, and buried in a tomb, to which pilgrimage is enjoined, the superstition is on safe ground, and an energetic khalif has his hands free. His part is simple; he need pretend to no Divine inspiration; he is simply a man appointed as successor by the divinely-inspired one who has passed the ordeal into safety. The temptation of the khalif to hasten his own access to power is therefore very great.

The record of Oriental is less accurate than that of European events, and the histories of past khalifates do not carry conviction of their truth. But the last khalifate has arisen under European observation, its propaganda have been studied most carefully, and the whole may be summed up in the phrase, "Your money or your life."

Neither Mohammed nor Abdullah Taashi has shown any understanding of the word government, nor has the word trade any meaning for them beyond a suggestion of property made available for attack because its foolish owner has discovered to the world its hiding-place, and has sought to carry it elsewhere whither than to the Beit el Mal.

With these words of explanation some of the letters, dreams, and speeches will themselves convey the truest possible comprehension of Mahdiism.

In the name of God, the most compassionate and merciful, praise be to the generous ruler, prayers and salutations, to our Lord and Prophet Mohammed.

The following was written by the Imam (the Mahdi):—

Peace be upon him. To the ulema (learned men) who have spoken against and opposed Mahdism, and whose names are not mentioned herein. Ye ulema of evil, who pretend to pray, to be charitable, and to study religion, but who do none of these things. What wicked things are you imagining! You pretend to repent and return to the truth, but in reality you follow your own amusements and ambitions. Why should you wash your bodies when your hearts are full of sin and wickedness?

Verily I say unto you, Be not like the sieve, through which the flour passes, but in which the bran remains. Your words are the words of wisdom, but your heart is the heart of wickedness. There is no hope for any one whose desires and ambitions are centred on the things of this life. Verily I say unto you, that in making provision for your life in this world you have destroyed your hope in the world to come. You are indeed the most wicked of men. Did you only know the harm you are laying up for yourselves by your wicked mode of life, you might perhaps be induced to change it. But you are blind—wait, wait,—of what good is it to place a lamp on a housetop when within is darkness and obscurity? Of what good is it to speak words of wisdom and learning when your hearts are so sinful and wicked? You are but slaves of the world. The world will turn upon you, and you will be cast down. Your sins will lay hold on you, they will drag you by the hair of your head, and drive you barefooted and naked into the presence of the great Judge, who will punish you eternally for your evil deeds.

The following is a circular relating to modesty in dress, etc.—

In the name of God, etc.¹—From the servant of his Lord El Imam el Mahdi, Ibn es Sayid Abdullah, to all the brethren who have abandoned their homes to follow the religion of God. Be it known unto you all that the companions of the khalifa of God, and His Prophet who followed him in the days of distress, who gave up their lives for the revival of God's religion, and the establishment of His Prophet's law, who, humble and poor as they were, gave themselves up to God, and vowed that they would either uphold the religion of God or die to the very end; these companions God accepted, forgave them their sins, and gave them strength to follow His word, and to praise Him aloud.

He poured upon His khalifa the spirit of rest, so that they might not fear the power or the numbers of the infidels.

The dress they wore is a sign given to them by God, by His Prophet, and by the khalifas. In wearing this dress there are four virtues: *First*, it makes those that wear it pure and humble; *Secondly*, it makes them feared of their enemies; *Thirdly*, it makes them honoured by the company of El Hadra, i.e. God, His Prophet, and certain angels. It makes them free from all possibility of suspicion.

¹ The innumerable salutations which invariably head these documents, as well as the phrase "Grace be upon him," which is the necessary adjunct when the Prophet's name is mentioned, will be in future for the sake of brevity omitted, in quoting from the Mahdieh correspondence.

These companions fought for the religion of God against His enemies, who evil entreated and oppressed the Moslems throughout the world, and so they were victorious in all their undertakings. The Mahdi stood as Mahdi with them alone till you, hearing the news of victory, came down to join us and fight for the same cause.

My companions being the first in this world shall be the first in the world to come, for God says, The first, they are honoured in Paradise ; honour them therefore, O my followers, and obey their commands ; and you my companions love those who are under you, and treat them as brothers. May God grant us power to do all this. Amen.

Again, the Imam el Mahdi says—

When you march against the enemy say : “ O God, pour down thy spirit upon us, make firm our footsteps when we meet the enemy.” And on meeting the enemy say : “ O God, thou art our Lord and their Lord, our fate and theirs are in thy hands. But thou who art God hast given them up to death.” Then when you begin the battle say : “ God is most great : forward ! ”

Again, the Imam el Mahdi says—

On meeting the enemy say : “ O God, Thee do we worship, and of Thee we beg assistance. We confess that Thou art one, and we attribute no participation to Thee. Those are Thine enemies, they believe not in Thee, nor in Thy holy book. They believe in Thee as having a son. O God, overcome them and put terror into their hearts. Grant us, O Lord, Thy Spirit, save us from punishment and make us victorious. Thou sayest in Thy precious book, Trust ye all in God, He is your Lord, He is an almighty helper.”

CIRCULAR ON RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN RIDING

In the name of God, etc.—From Mohammed el Mahdi Ibn Abdullah, to his brethren and all his followers in God and His Prophet. Brethren : God has, in His holy book, commanded us to be pious. That is, to follow all that pleases Him, and to abstain from all that displeases Him. A man who is wise keeps the commandment of his father ; why should not we then keep the commandments of God our Lord and Master, who is the supreme and only Governor ?

If, therefore, you wish to move from one place to another in the town, you will please God by walking and not riding. No man should ride unless he is unable to walk, and should he have to ride, then let him ride a donkey. When you walk, walk quietly and humbly, be not proud nor haughty. For it is said, “ When you eat, eat to God, when you drink, drink to God. What you wear, wear for God, and what you ride, ride for God.” If you do any of these things in a spirit of pride, you are committing a sin. He who humbles himself before God, God will exalt him. In everything in Heaven and on earth there is evidence of God’s greatness. Do not, therefore, pass by any place without contemplating on the greatness and wisdom of God, and on the littleness and humbleness of yourselves. God has said in His holy book : “ Let the worshippers of God walk humbly on earth.”

No man, therefore, should ride a horse except in time of war, or when he is on parade exercising the troops, and then he should show no pride, but should conduct himself humbly. Again, some men for the sake of show order their servants to walk behind them when they are riding a donkey, or sometimes they lead it by the head. This is entirely forbidden. The Prophet and his companions used to ride with their servants behind them, but if the donkeys became tired, then they dismounted and walked as brothers with their servants. If the servant were sick, he was mounted on his master's donkey, and his master walked till the servant was rested. Follow this example, therefore, my brethren. If God favours you, then accept His favour with modesty and humility. If you accept favours with wantonness and exultation they will be withdrawn from you. When you are favoured by God, kneel down and thank Him, and know that it is not on account of your virtues that you are favoured, but because God is merciful and gracious. This is the example set before us by the Prophet and his companions. Follow this example, and do not lead the example set you by your oppressors the Turks,¹ who live in luxury and exultation, and who fire their guns and rifles through pride and haughtiness. The following has come down to us through the traditions of our Prophet Mohammed: "Tell my brethren, Live not in the way my enemies live, wear not what they wear; if you do not obey this, then you become my enemies as they are my enemies."

A VISION

In the name of God, etc.—From Imam el Mahdi, to my well-beloved and honourable professor, the khalifa of my grandfather, Sheikh Mohammed et Taib el Basir, may God protect him from all evil.

After friendly greetings, you are well aware that those who trust in God fear nothing. He is victorious over all His enemies, and God protects him from all evil.

As you are my agent and intimate friend, you, like myself, should encourage all my relations to come to me and pay their allegiance to me; and should any one be unable to come, let him pay his allegiance to you, for paying allegiance to you is the same as paying allegiance to me. You are the trustee of God's rights, and it is your duty to convince all friends and loved ones to quit their homes and property, and to devote themselves to the service of God.

After your departure I saw a vision which I shall relate to you as follows:—

I saw the Prophet in a vision. He came to me in the presence of our brother fiki Isa (Jesus). He sat by me and he said to our brother Isa, "The Mahdi is your chief." The brother said, "I believe in him." The Prophet again said to him, "If any one believe not in him, he believes neither in God nor His Prophet." And this he repeated three times. The said brother then said unto him, "O Lord, some ulemas mock at us,

¹ It must be remembered that with the Arabs of the Sudan the term "Turk" is a synonym for the hated oppressor, of whatever nationality. The British troops, even, were confounded under the same appellation.

and we fear the Turks." The Prophet then replied, "If ye have a strong faith, ye can do all that ye desire, even by the help of a piece of straw." Then Sheikh Abdullah said to me, "O Lord—Sheikh et Taib—we believe in the message of our Mahdi, but men do not believe." Sheikh et Taib replied: "Your Mahdi has been known as the true Mahdi by the holy men ever since he was born, and when he was forty days old all plants and matters, organic and inorganic, knew him. The way of Mahdiah is based on six virtues,—humility, meekness of spirit, little food, little water, endurance, visiting the tombs of holy men. Mahdiah is also based on six virtues,—war, resolution, prudence, trust in God, surrender of one's will to God, and unity of opinion. These twelve virtues are not found in any other man but in you." Sheikh et Taib then said: "Tell your followers to avoid three vices,—envy, pride, neglect of prayer. Should any one be stained with any one of these vices he can no longer be a soldier of God's army."

Therefore, on your arrival at Gedir, permit not any such person to enter the town, and let the women cover their heads and faces. On your way between Kordofan and Tagalla, examine your men and make sure that none of them are going except for God's sake; should you find a man not so inclined, permit him not to proceed. Pray also for King Adam.

Then Sheikh et Tome came and saluted me, according to the Mahdiah rules, and said: "See that your men—your followers—live on friendly terms with one another, that the rich man is a father to the poor, and that those who are of one class live together like brethren. In the month of Ramadan enter Khalwat el Ibrahim, where you shall discover great plots and mysteries.

Then my grandfather, Sheikh el Basir, came and saluted me, according to the Mahdi rules, and addressed me with words which I understood to mean the following: "Be ever devoted to the fulfilment of the law of the Prophet."

After him came Sheikh el Korashi, and after saluting me said: "Be thoughtful, defend your cause and protect your people."

Sheikh Abdullah then said: "My Lord, the people believe not in our Mahdi." He replied to him, saying: "The Prophet before my death told me that my sheikh was the Mahdi, and Sheikh et Taib before his death said to me, You shall live until you see the Mahdi, and he is your sheikh."

Then came the Prophet accompanied by Sheikh Abd el Kader el Gilani wearing a murakkahieh (jubbeh or dress of the Mahdi's followers), with patches. On seeing him Sheikh Abdullah then said: "O Apostle of God, some men do not believe in the murakkahieh." He then replied: "Every man is made of rags, a blue rag is on his head, the skin of his lips is a red rag, his teeth are a white rag, and his nails are yellow rags. Were it not that you should be dazzled, I would show unto you the murakkahiehs of the four khalifas."

Then the angel Izrail was ordered to ever accompany me and my people, and to ever guard and protect me.

This vision appeared to me on Wednesday night the first of Shaban.

On that night the Prophet gave me instructions as to what I should do on entering Mecca, and told me that I should first make the ordinary people pay their allegiance to me, and afterwards the King of Mecca and his nobility.

INSTRUCTIONS AS TO WRITING

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his Lord Mohammed el Mahdi Ibn Abdullah to all the clerks in his government:—Write, all of you, with care. Change not the form of the letters, for God destroys those who change the form of His letters. Avoid writing as those whom God has destroyed. Let the letter س ("S") be plain in the words بسم الله "Bismillah" (in the name of God), and the letter ش (SH) in the word الشيطان الرجيم "Esh 'Shaitan er'rejim" (the horrible devil), and also the letter ك (K), and the letter ه (H).

Beware of imitating the handwriting of the Turks, but give the letters their original form as they were revealed to us, and accustom yourselves to write exactly as the writing of the holy Kuran.

ON VIRTUE AND HOLY WAR

In the name of God, etc.—From Mohammed el Mahdi Ibn Abdullah, to his beloved friend Abdullah Ibn en Nur. Dear friend, the Prophet says: "While in the world I practised two virtues. Those who love me love to follow these virtues, those who hate me also hate these virtues. The two virtues are, poverty and holy war. Those who follow these virtues are happy in themselves, and the light of God is poured down upon them; their great aim is the practice of everything which brings them daily nearer to God. But those who do not follow these virtues are ever in trouble, in whatever station they may be they are never satisfied. It is said, "If a man possesses two valleys of gold he will wish for a third. Nothing satisfies him but dust." Cling therefore, my friend, to these virtues, preach them to the brethren, and attend to that which satisfies and pleases God.

ON FATE

The following is a copy of the proclamation of the Mahdi, placed over the door of the mosque the day preceding the beginning of Ramadan:—

In the name of God, etc.—The servant of the Lord, Mohammed el Mahdi, says—The coming month is the month of Ramadan. This is the time to draw nearer to God and to contend with one another in living a God-fearing life. Consecrate the whole of this month to God, and accustom yourselves to abstinence and affliction. Troubles and afflictions come to us by the will of God to try our faith and patience. Therefore trust in God and commit yourselves to Him, and whatever happens believe that it is the best for your good and welfare, even if it seem not to be so. God is infinitely good and will not permit any evil to come upon us if we put all our trust in Him.

A wise man once said, "When I saw that fate was real and certain, I put my whole trust in God, and committed myself to His care in all the events of life." Why should there be any question as to the reality of fate? Does not a man often fall into a position which he does not expect, why therefore should a man trouble himself to ask for this thing or that thing? if it is the will of God that he should have anything, it will be given to him without his asking for it; if it is not God's will, even should he ask for it all his life, it would not be granted him. Besides, in both these cases there is distrust in God. Commit therefore all your affairs to God. Complain of nothing that happens to you; be patient in affliction, however severe it may be.

There is no God but God, and there is no power except it be from God. Be sure of this, my brethren. Commit yourself to Him, and speak to Him of your wants, as we are all His servants. Do not trouble me this month in any of your affairs. Let me consecrate it to God, to prayers, and to holy meditations. If any one of you lack patience and is not satisfied, then let him submit his case to my khalifas and agents and the judge, he need not trouble me. If after this he is not satisfied, then he is himself to blame.

A SHORT SERMON

In the name of God, etc.—Praise be unto God, the Creator of the Heavens, who created man from the earth and gave him an excellent form, who has called him to obedience, knowledge, and worship, and has promised abundant reward to those who are pious and who bear affliction with patience.

Praise, much praise be unto God, who has revealed the light of His truth to His faithful who were in-darkness. Praise be unto God for His continual favour, who has shown the nothingness of this world and the glorious riches of the world to come. Blessing and peace be on our lord Mohammed, from whom the rays of light were spread abroad to enlighten those chosen to be the faithful. Be thankful, therefore, and praise him repeatedly, as by him they have been obtained. Through him they have known that God is Almighty and forgiving, they know that in Him alone is their refuge; when they die, they die in Him, and are free from all trouble and affliction. Blessed be they, yea blessed indeed, for they have overcome the world and obtained happiness in the future life. Those who are most favoured are the disciples of the Prophet. These men gave themselves up and all their goods for the defence of his cause, and lived for him alone.

Now therefore, ye faithful worshippers of God, look on the things of this life with a piercing eye. Be sure of the nothingness of it, turn your hearts to things above, to the way of everlasting life. Devote yourselves to God, and abstain from worldly pleasures and enjoyments. God Himself, in the Holy Kuran, has said, "This life is but amusement. The life to come is the true life." Consider this, O man of reason. Can you change this world into one which will last for ever? Leave it, therefore, and apply yourself to the world to come before it is too late, and when repentance is useless. Prepare always for your own salvation, repent, and

ask God's forgiveness for having ever indulged in the trifles and enjoyments of this world. Do not crave after those things which were enjoyed by the Cæsars, the Pharaohs, and the Akasireh (the Persian kings), but pray rather after those things which the prophets and apostles have longed for—poverty and lowliness. The Prophet said, "This world is passing away, and the world to come is approaching; be ye therefore the sons of the world to come, be not the sons of this world." He also said, "Ye men, do not allow the sons of this world to alienate you from the world to come. Do not satisfy your passions, but rather be obedient to your Lord. Do not deceive yourselves, be watchful and vigilant; do not say, 'We heard, when you did not hear.' Each man is responsible for his own soul, be not therefore negligent. You have no part in this world, your part is in the world to come. This world is for the infidels. Take comfort in the saying of the Prophet, 'Should this world be considered as the wing of a gnat, then a breath of wind would not be equivalent to the share of it possessed by the infidels. This world therefore is the share of those that have no share, for those who are faithful have forsaken it.' Forsake it, therefore, and choose that which God wishes, and choose not that which the infidels have chosen. May God forgive me and all of us, and make us participators among the faithful. Amen.

A WARNING TO ONE WHO DOUBTS

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of God, His Mahdi, Ibn es Sayid Abdullah, to the honourable Sheikh el Islam, Mohammed el Amin, may God favour him. Amen. It is not outside the range of your knowledge that argument and eloquence do not always guide men to the truth, for God is the only guide.

The Prophet says, "A messenger has but to deliver his message, and I, as a messenger from God, have delivered my message faithfully to you. I delivered it as I was ordered, without untruth or forgery, and yet you would not believe.

The Prophet assembled the spirits of the ulemas and religious men, and rebuked them, saying, "You are not grateful, for God in His gracious mercy has sent you the Mahdi, and yet you will not believe on him." The ulemas replied, "O Apostle of God, we repent." The Prophet then said, "Go then and seek his pardon." So they then came and asked my pardon, and those chosen ones believed in me. The Prophet then repeated several times that if any man doubts my message he sins against God and His Apostle. And should any one oppose me, destruction will come upon him, and he will lose all hope in this world and in the world to come. Know also that I do nothing but by the direct command of the Prophet. By his command we fight the Turks; he has disclosed to us many hidden things. He has told us we shall be victorious in all our undertakings, and that soon the whole country will be under my authority; he has also revealed to me the day of resurrection, and said, "The Turks whom I kill accuse me to God, saying, 'O God, our Lord el Imam el Mahdi killed us without giving us a chance.'" I then replied, "O God, my Lord, I gave them a chance. I preached your will to them, and informed them of my message, but they would

not listen to me. They listened to their ulema and actually fought against me. The Prophet himself is a witness to it."

God then said unto them, "You are to blame, not he. He preached to you and instructed you in My way, but you listened only to the ulema and disobeyed him." They then turned and spoke to each other, and blamed themselves and their leaders.

It is the will of God that I should become powerful through the sword, as it was with the Prophet. The Prophet said to me, "The Turks will be slain by the sword, only those whom God wishes to save will He allow to listen to the truth." He has also told me that I am born of the light of his heart, that my companions will be like his disciples, and that all of them shall have the title of Sheikh Abd el Kader el Gilani.

You are aware that, besides yourself, there are some ulemas who say that my message is contrary to their belief, but you know well that true revelation may be abrogated by further true revelations. Besides, as I said in the beginning, eloquence is not the guide to truth, God is the only guide. And the evidence of my message can only be seen by those to whom God has given the light to see. At present you are deprived of this light; but when it is granted you, you will then see clearly, as many ulemas have already done, the answers to all the questions which you have asked me.

Before I leave off, I advise you to think of your latter end, so that you may not be the cause of your own death. I need say no more to such a man as you.

LETTER TO THE SHEIKH EL ISLAM, DATED 15TH JULY 1882

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of God, Mohammed el Mahdi Ibn es Sayid Abdullah, to the Reverend Sheikh el Islam, the honourable Professor Sheikh Mohammed el Amin, may God lead him to be one of those who are welcomed.

It is clear to you that explanations are not the only guide, but that God is the guide. God instructed His Prophet to deliver His message and not to try and guide those whom He loved. My hope in you has induced me to write to you, informing you of the truth of my case, which is free from all falsehood. I employ neither guile nor pretence, but what I say is the real truth coming from God and from His Prophet.

God has confirmed me in my Mahdism, and the Prophet has strengthened me in it. It is well known to you that no one dares to doubt God and His Prophet, except he who is deprived of all happiness with God. He who knows that the things of this world are immaterial and in the balances will not weigh down the wing of an insect, would not choose it in preference to God's benefits. His worldly wealth would vanish as if it never existed, and would bring upon his head endless grief and sorrow. No one would choose the pleasures of this world in preference to the benefits of following the example of the prophets and saints, unless indeed he be mad. As for me, I am a poor servant unable to do the least thing of myself; and had it not been for the light of God which is in me, and for the strength which the Prophet has given me, I should be unable either

to say or to do anything. I have only said what I was ordered to say as the messenger of God. What I have said is known neither to the saints nor ulema. God has said, "We create that which you do not understand." The Prophet assembled the spirits of those who denied my Mahdiyyism, amongst them learned preachers and wise men, and reproached them, enumerating to them the worldly and spiritual gifts, the outward and inward calamities, and both the sensual and mental calamities, saying to them, "You have denied the gift of God by denying Mahdiyyism, and in disbelieving Mahdiyyism you have shown yourselves ungrateful for the gifts which God has bestowed upon you. He who has been thankful to God for His gifts has been named by Him as your leader, and given the title of Mahdi. Why, then, do you dare to deny the title given to him?" They then all cried, "O Prophet, thou art the messenger of God." Whereupon he commanded them to ask my pardon, which they did. Those of them who believed in my being the expected Mahdi received happiness. But he who has no share in God's happiness has rejected me. Noble deeds prove the truth of my sayings respecting the Prophet, but neither noble deeds nor miracles are of any avail to him from whom God has withdrawn His light. The Prophet several times said to me that he who doubts that I am the Mahdi is in the eyes of God and His Prophet a renegade, that he who opposes me is an infidel, and that he who wages war against me will neither succeed in this world nor in the world to come. His property and his children will become the property of the Moslems. Be it known to you that all I do is by the order of the Prophet. My war against the Turks was by his orders, and he told me many secret things, one of which is, that all these countries shall be subdued by the holy religion and law. He has told me what will take place in these countries hereafter. He has also told me that I shall be victorious against all my enemies. He revealed to me in a vision the day of resurrection, when the Turks whom I killed pleaded against me through the Almighty, saying, "O God our Lord, Imam el Mahdi killed us without giving us due warning." I then replied, "O Lord, I warned them and taught them, but they would not listen to my words, but followed only the saying of the ulema and waged war against me." Then the Lord of the creation, who was present, said to them: "Your sins are on your heads, El Imam el Mahdi warned you and I instructed you, but you rejected him and attended to the words of your ulema." Thereupon these Turks turned and blamed each other, saying, "Had it not been for you we should have believed." The leaders then answered their followers, saying, "We did not refuse you Mahdiyyism till after it was preached to you, and therefore you are to blame." As to the rulers not having surrendered from the beginning, this is a question left to the will of the Almighty, the time of their surrender is in the hands of God. What happens to me is the same as what happened to the Prophet. Kings did not surrender to him at the beginning, and he and his followers had to undergo great afflictions and troubles, and wage several wars against the learned men and the rulers of both Jews and Christians, who, one would have supposed, would have been among the first to follow him. It is by the will of the Almighty that the Prophet had to undergo these

troubles. I am following in his footsteps and guided by his light. It is said that the Turks can be reformed by sermons and preaching. But they can never be reformed except by the sword, unless God has mercy on a few of them. The Prophet told me that all nations should be reformed through me, but that they would not have to undergo the same troubles that he and his disciples suffered. I am created from the light of his heart. He announced to me that my followers are as his followers, and the commonest of them is in the sight of God like unto Sheikh Abd el Kader el Gilani. Bounty is in the hands of God, and He bestows it as He wills. You are well aware that the ulema reject many questions regarding Mahdiyyism, which do not, according to their notions, coincide with their beliefs; but there are many signs from God which are proof of my Mahdiyyism. Let him who wishes believe, and let him who wishes be an unbeliever. I am also to tell you that true Mahdiyyism is not known by the various learned men. There are several kinds of ahadith (traditions) which have been delivered on this subject from time to time, the hadith maktua (positive), maudua (narrated), or dayif (the weak), i.e. supported by slight evidence. A true hadith is altered by a true hadith, as miracles are altered by miracles. Belief in Mahdiyyism is a difficult task, and can only be embraced by those to whom God has decreed a share of true happiness. None but those saints who are permitted personally to behold their prophets are permitted to fully understand my reality. As regards the questions contained in your letter, their answers must be perfectly well known and clear to any one who is just. I would have explained to you the answers to each one of your questions in detail, but then I knew that reformation does not follow explanation. If you yourself, after believing in my Mahdiyyism, carefully re-examine these questions, you will find their answers to be as clear as the light of day. All the ulema who have followed me, and who appear to be less learned than yourself, now quite agree on this point. If you had really been a wise man you would never have written to me as you have done. I therefore advise you to save your life while there is yet time. Prefer rather to give up family and money and follow me. Then we shall all be participators in the great victory. After this remain no longer in darkness. Are you ignorant of what has happened in Islam, and of which the Prophet has made so many references? For a personage such as you, a mere hint is sufficient.

A SPECIMEN VISION

In the name of God, etc.—A great vision has taken place in which the Prophet with his four great successors and the Mahdi were seen standing together. An angel descended from Heaven bearing in his hand a green crown. He saluted the Prophet and addressed him as follows:—“Your Lord salutes you and sends you His blessings, and He informs you that this is His crown of victory, His present to El Imam el Mahdi. It is a mark of victory, and He orders you to give it to him with your own hands.” Thereupon the Prophet presented it to the Mahdi, saying, “There is no victory save from God.” When the Prophet had given the crown of victory to the Mahdi as a gift from God Almighty, he addressed him as follows: “God has guarded you by His angels and prophets. No

nation shall be able to face you in battle, whether of the human race or of the race of genii. These warriors who have gone forth for the religion of God shall be welcomed by God in the world to come. They shall be allowed into the paradise wherein are lofty palaces, chaste wives, and the greatest happiness and prosperity. These palaces are brilliant with illuminations, but some of them are left in darkness. These are given to those who have hidden or taken for their own use the booty taken in war without the permission of the Mahdi or his khalifa."

Written by the Mahdi with his own hand.

A PROCLAMATION TO ABOLISH THE NAME OF "DERVISH" AND ADOPT
THE NAME "ANSAR"

In the name of God, etc.—From Mohammed el Mahdi to all the brethren. All the faithful have already been cautioned not to call themselves "dervishes," but "ansar." That is to say, those whose hearts are entirely consecrated to God, and whose souls have become enlightened by a desire to possess the joys of the world to come, quitting the pleasures of this life, and having full faith in the power of the Almighty who has created Paradise for those who are truly faithful to Him. The joys of Paradise are such as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. A man who is in hope of gaining such a reward should certainly cease to be called a dervish, that is to say a poor man. But, on the contrary, he should be called an intelligent far-seeing man, a defender of God's cause, a follower of God's will, an abstainer from all things which would displease Him. All such qualities are born from the light of intelligence. Any one who calls such a man a dervish deserves to be beaten seven times and receive many stripes.

Be it also known to you that it is absolutely forbidden to call Mohammed el Bedawi Ibn Aymed el Kinan Abu Safid a "dervish." He will henceforth be called "Sadik," that is, the righteous man. Any infringement of this order will be punished by 100 lashes of the kurbash, and three days' fasting.

This proclamation will be read continuously for three days throughout the country.

In addition to the preceding letters, which bear more directly on the religious aspect and the religious observances of Mahdiism, a few other extracts have been made, and they are placed, as far as possible, in their chronological order, in the sequence of the following historical narrative, and in juxtaposition to the various events which called forth the remarks and directions of the would-be divinely inspired oracle.

BOOK IV

THE EGYPTIAN POSITION IN THE SUDAN UP TO THE END OF 1883.

Egyptian troops in the Sudan in 1883—The slave trade and trade in general—Causes of the revolt—Colonel Stewart's mission—The fall of Bara—The siege and fall of El Obeid—The Mahdi establishes himself at El Obeid and proclaims his khalifate—The laws and ordinances of Mohammed Ahmed—A rebuke to those who have made off with loot—Rules of morality, obedience, and moderation—The Mahdi's ten commandments—He enjoins moderation in the marriage ceremony—A rebuke to the Ashraf—The abolition of all manners and customs appertaining to the Turks—A vision in which Mohammed Ahmed is promised victory over the whole world—A tirade against the disobedient; and against smoking and drinking wine—A proclamation to all people to rise and join the Mahdiah—The letter to El Minneh Ismail—Manifesto to the inhabitants of Khartum—A delegate from the Senussi arrives in Kordofan—The Mahdi's letter to the Senussi—The rebels defeat Egyptians at Karasa—Abd el Kader's victory at Maatuk—The defeat of the Makashif at Meshra ed Dai—Siege of Sennar raised—Rebels routed at Jebel Sekhedi—Abd el Kader superseded by Suliman Niazi—Ala ed Din Pasha appointed Governor-General—Hicks Pasha despatched to the Sudan with an army—He defeats the rebels at Marabieh—Intrigues at Khartum—Hicks sets off with an army for Kordofan—Description of the country through which he marched—Hicks Pasha's last despatch—The account of the whole march and the battle of Shekan from the statement of Hicks Pasha's servant and a clerk of one of the Mahdi's chief emirs—Treachery of the guides—Dissensions between Hicks Pasha and Ala ed Din Pasha—The disarming of the civilians—The desertion of Genawi Bey's men—The enemy attack and annihilate the Egyptian army at Shekan—The death of Hicks Pasha—The effect of the victory on the Mahdi's cause—Corroboration of statements—Events in the neighbourhood of Suakin—Osman Digna sent by Mahdi with proclamation to Eastern Sudan—Osman's arrival, detaches Mustafa Hadal to besiege Kassala—Attacks Sinkat—Defeated there and at Handub—Egyptian reinforcements annihilated near Sinkat—Siege of Sinkat—Reinforcements again annihilated—Panic at Suakin—Government decides to open road from Suakin to Berber—Baker Pasha prepares for expedition—Kassim Effendi's defeat at Tamanib—Mahmud Pasha Taher replaced as Governor by Suliman Niazi Pasha—Baker Pasha attempts to relieve Tokar—His force almost

annihilated at El Teb—Suakin protected by British men-of-war—Arrangements discussed for removal of Harrar garrison—Attitude of Shukrieh—Events in Darfur in 1883—El Fasher, Darra, and Kebkebieh besieged—Said Bey Guma defeated—Orders sent to Slatin Bey to retire did not reach him—Slatin puts Omshanga in a state of defence—Disloyalty amongst his officers—He resorts to stratagem—The despatch of Zogal with letters to the Mahdi and to Hicks Pasha—Zogal joins the Mahdi on learning of Hicks's defeat—Is appointed emir of Darfur—Peaceful surrender of Omshanga—Surrender of Slatin at Darra—Slatin and Zogal call on El Fasher and Kebkebieh to surrender—Mahdi writes to Rabih Zubeir, who refuses to join him—Events in Bahr el Ghazal—Defeat of the Arabs near Tel Gauna—Arabs sack Faroga—Are dispersed near Liffi—Expedition against the Janghe tribe—The latter annihilate Ruffai Agha's force—Road to Meshra er 'Rek blocked by revolt of Dinkas—The traveller Schuwer killed—Lupton warns Junker, exploring the Welle, of danger—The latter and Captain Casati proceed to Equatoria—Lupton entrenched in a zariba repulses attack of Arabs—Events in Equatoria, 1883—Attitude of the Danagla—Emin despatches reinforcements to the Rohl Province—The Dinka and Agar massacre the garrison of Rumbek and Shambek—Rumbek recaptured—Chief Loro endeavours to incite the Bari tribe to rise—Supply of ammunition running short.

A HUNDRED years ago there was no Sudan, nor had the foundations of Khartum been laid. A ferry across the Nile at Kerreri¹ conducted the traveller from Assiut to the celebrated capital Sennar, where a barbarous potentate held a sumptuous court and rivalled in power and wealth the ancient kingdom of Abyssinia. Egypt founded Khartum, and all the faults of an Oriental government were there transplanted to flourish wildly in a fertile soil. Whole families of Coptic clerks, the Bannias of Africa, kept the accounts of Bashi-Bazuk plundering raids supported by Egyptian soldiers. This was a government collecting its taxes.

Lord Dufferin's proviso when fixing the size of the new army, that the number 6000 was "irrespective of events in the Sudan," did not remain veiled in its significance. The old army in Egypt had been disbanded, but in the outlying provinces there remained :

At Harrar	3,595
Gera	501
Zeila	280
Berbera	196
Massawa	2,442
Suakin	1,800

¹ About 6 miles north of Omdurman on the west bank.

On the Abyssinian frontier of the Sudan	4,304
The Sudan	19,492

in all 32,610 men.¹

These are spoken of as troops in occupation of these countries, but the expression is found on investigation to be misleading. The industrious and peaceful Egyptian is the nation least adapted for conquest in the world. His fatal talent for an exaggerated domesticity is ineradicable, and these troops were so many fathers of large families, more or less properly acquired and domesticated in a foreign land. Had they had no weapons they might have made good colonists, and would at least have introduced a cumbrous agriculture. But the prestige which at first attached to their superior weapons and comparative education inclined them to tyranny. Their function was that of honest countrymen sharing in the villainy of the brigands from the Levant and Asia Minor, who wrung money, women, and drink from a miserable population.

Concerning all questions controversy rages in proportion to the difficulty in ascertaining the facts, and the question of the Sudan has been obscured by the presence of two subjects which are not often discussed dispassionately. The one is the sacred question of trade in general, and the other the slave trade, concerning the suppression of which much has been written, with perhaps more feeling than knowledge of the subject.

History teaches at least one thing of trade in unexplored regions, and that is, that it will probably choose the shortest road to the sea. A glance at a map shows that whatever produce there may be in the Sudan, it will never follow the Nile as distinct from the desert routes parallel to that river, until special facilities are provided for it. Up to the time of the Egyptian occupation of the Sudan, trade had gone from Darfur and Kordofan to Assiut, and from Berber to Suakin. The moisture in the herbage and the wells along the routes in proximity to the Nile dried up as the Nile dried up, but the desert route once in order was all that could be desired for the camel. A thousand camels passing along the Atolla valley from Keneh to Berber

¹ See Appendix.

resembles nothing more than a fleet of boats drifting down a sandy stream. The expression, "ship of the desert," though an astonishing mistranslation, will retain life because it is so appropriate. It was the desert routes which carried the trade, and there were excellent reasons for it. Countless thousands of camels roamed the plains north of latitude 13°. They were a property which the weakest could hold in security, which produced food, multiplied annually, and required no outlay. None but their owners could follow them into the wastes. On the other hand, boats could not be produced without capital, and they were no safe investment. There were no means of concealing or protecting them. Then came the Egyptian, an excellent boatman, with a horror a thousand years old of the desert and its people. He said, "Whatever we do, we will cleave to the Nile." He built Khartum and did prodigies of navigation among the rapids. He summoned foreigners, steamers, and railways. But the route was never thoroughly undertaken. Four hundred miles of rapids still remain, and navigation is practically confined to the local traffic on the open stretches.

For the slave trade, its suppression had been undertaken before its nature was understood; from the year 1794 till the present time we have been finding out, but gradually and slowly, what the slave trade is. One thing it is not. It is not a thing to be suppressed easily and promptly by Egyptian troops as Egyptian troops were in 1883 in the Sudan. Venality and oppression of the officials, the suppression of the slave trade, military weakness—these are the three causes of what has been called the rebellion. A people whose principal characteristics were military weakness, venality, and oppression, a people scattered over an enormous area, were to carry out the mandate to suppress the slave trade, a mandate which thirty millions of money and a bloody civil war had hardly carried out in a highly civilised country where Christianity supported it. These weak and venal and domestic colonies were to suppress the slave trade, which was at once the religion, the occupation, and principal source of income of the very fiercest of all the tribes which owned the soil. So long as Baker fought, so long as Gordon ruled, the endeavour was maintained; but on their removal then up sprang the

slave-traders with the added violence of long compression. With the first tarboush knocked off and the first Remington fired through the prostrate body of its owner, Egyptian dominion in the Sudan was at an end.

The year 1882 had in the Sudan, as in Egypt, been a confused welter of disturbance.

There had been a hasty gathering together of dismissed irregulars, and much protestation of fidelity to men who did not understand the words, and who in the storm now raging could only die dogged at their posts.

The Sudan mutiny presents one long chain of disasters; save in a few instances there was no brilliant action throughout the long slow rising of the tide which submerged the Egyptian strongholds. But of stolid fortitude there was an example difficult to match. The garrisons died starving and fighting to the last.

The bond between Egypt, the mother country, and its remote unwieldy African possessions had been strained in every rotting fibre by the events of 1881-1882; and on the 16th of December Colonel Stewart arrived at Khartum, whither he had been sent to inquire into the condition of affairs.

In the matter of revenue and expenditure there was, so far as he could take stock of the chaos, an annual expenditure in salaries of half a million, and the salaries were many months in arrears. Taxes to the amount of about £400,000 appeared to be due annually, and their collection was many years in arrear. Colonel Stewart detailed one by one the various causes of failure in this administration, and he suggested the necessary remedy for each. Lord Granville then requested Lord Dufferin to call the Egyptian Government's attention to the reforms, but the state was ripe for reform from within. Not the steady determination of a Baker, nor the inspired energy of a Gordon, could save the helpless and misguided people who swarmed all over the country, who robbed without being strong, bore arms without having the courage to use them, and professed religion without confidence in its virtue.

Seated solitary at Khartum, Colonel Stewart sent out a warning note of dangers closing round him.

Already in January 1883 he wrote to Sir Edward Malet,

"The new year has begun unfavourably for Egyptian interest." From the beginning to the end of a long series of clear and exhaustive reports no man has been more exactly justified by events. Day after day the telegraph, the longest single wire in the world, brought varying news.

At the end of 1882 it will be remembered that the towns of Bara and El Obeid were closely besieged by the Mahdi.

The former town had been deserted by the influential Nur Angara, and was in great straits for food. Nur Angara, having now joined the rebels, communicated with Surur Effendi, the commandant, and recommended that the town should be surrendered; but Surur Effendi, believing that reinforcements were approaching, continually refused to listen to these demands. At length, however, he was convinced by Nur Angara that all hope of relief must be abandoned, and on 5th January he surrendered the town to Wad en Nejumi; and the garrison of over 2000 men now joined the rebels, who, moreover, obtained considerable supplies of arms and ammunition.

The siege of El Obeid was now pressed with renewed vigour. In the words of an officer who was present during the long six months' siege—

The firing [he says] was continuous; for the first two months provisions lasted, and then we had to eat camels, horses, dogs, cats, etc. A month before the town fell we were reduced to eating the fibre of palm tree, gum, skins, and even the leather of our "angaribs" (native couch).

The Mahdi then wrote to Mohammed Pasha Said to surrender, but he refused, and said he preferred to die, and wanted to blow up the fort, so that the ammunition should not fall into the hands of the enemy. We lost a number of men daily from the enemy's fire, but towards the end of the siege thirty or forty used to die of starvation at their posts. The men fought well, but we were all heartbroken from want of food. Besides, the men of the garrison of Bara, who had already surrendered, had joined the enemy, and used to call out to us from outside the fortifications that we had better surrender. This discouraged the garrison still more. At last Mohammed Pasha Said, the commander of the troops, Ali Bey Sherif, the wakil of the Mudirieh, and Iskander, a kaimakam, held a council at which all the senior officers and officials were present—it was then decided that a letter should be written to the Mahdi proposing to surrender, provided our lives should be spared.

This letter was sent on the afternoon of the 16th January, and the Mahdi replied a few hours afterwards, saying that he would enter the town the following morning, and that no harm should come to us. But I suppose he could not hold his Arabs back, and they rushed on to the fortifications that night. We offered no resistance, and no one was killed

or wounded, but they pillaged everything. The next morning Mohammed Ahmed formally took possession of El Obeid, and the garrison were all sent out and camped in a separate place; while Mohammed Pasha Said, Ali Bey Sherif, Iskander Bey, Ahmed Bey Dafa'allah, and Mohammed Agha Yessin were put in separate tents and guarded by the Baggara. Mohammed Pasha Said was afterwards sent to Alluba, where he was killed by the emir el Minneh Ismail; Ali Bey Sherif was sent to Birket, where he too was killed; while Ahmed Bey Dafa'allah and Mohammed Agha Yessin were sent to Shakka, fifteen days distant, and there killed. The whole of the garrison, about 3500 men, had to join the Mahdi's force, but Iskander Bey was forced to take employment under the Mahdi.

Some 6000 rifles, five guns, and a quantity of ammunition, besides £100,000 in specie, also fell into the hands of Mohammed Ahmed, who now established himself in Government House, destroyed all books and government papers, and having made himself master of Kordofan, he began to establish his rule. A perusal of the following correspondence is perhaps best calculated to give a true impression of the crude form of administration which was now adopted.

The wild looting which followed the capture of this important town called forth the severe rebuke of the Mahdi. In this wholesale plundering he saw the harm which must inevitably ensue, and the danger to which the religious nature of the movement would be exposed, were it not at once checked. He therefore issued the following proclamation:—

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO ALL HIS BELOVED IN GOD

In the name of God, etc. (the proclamation begins with a number of verses from the Kuran bearing on the subject, which it is unnecessary to insert here. He then continues)—If you have no better example to follow than that of the Turks it is not sufficient for you; for God has granted them wealth, long life, and good health, but instead of accepting this from Him as a gift, they entirely forget themselves, and consider themselves to be the sole possessors of the world, they disobey the laws of the Prophet and God's messengers. God has waited for them to return to Him, but in vain.

At length He has destroyed them, has taken their dominions, and handed them over to you. But you, after taking what they formerly possessed, have begun to follow in their footsteps, consequently, you will be destroyed as they were. Repent, therefore, and remember that the Turks used to put your men in prison, bound with chains, used to capture your women and children, and kill people, which is against the law of God. They had neither pity on your little children, nor respect for your old people. It is a wonder to me how you can forget this, and why you do not join in fighting against them. They oppressed you greatly, and

yet you obeyed their orders. God has now sent me as your saviour; join me therefore in my holy war against them, and their bodies shall be burnt with fire, and they shall be slain even to the last man.

I have heard that after looting, many of you deserted from the fight and refused to obey your khalifas and emirs. Beware lest God punish you. If you persist in doing this you will be destroyed, God will burn you up with fire, and the earth will open her mouth and swallow you up. I have warned you so that you may have no excuse. Repent, obey my orders, and return all the loot you have taken, for the Prophet has told me that any man that still keeps loot in his possession will be destroyed, and our Prophet keeps his word. Again I say, repent, for He who has destroyed the Turks will find it no difficult matter to bring you into subjection. The Prophet has told me that after I have killed the infidels and captured this province I must return and punish those who refuse to obey me. Such punishment will be death. Take heed, therefore, and obey the orders of the Prophet.

Other circulars quickly followed, establishing rigid rules of morality, obedience, and moderation, which are here given *in extenso* as being of interest in exposing the arbitrary and despotic intentions of the new ruler. The following circular refers to the conduct of women in general:—

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO ALL HIS BELOVED IN GOD

In the name of God, etc.—My beloved, God in His holy book has forbidden women to appear before men (here follow several verses of the Kuran), therefore, according to God's laws, women should not appear in public places, such as markets, public thoroughfares, etc. A young girl, that is to say, one who has not yet reached the age of womanhood, may, however, do so.

If a woman venture to go out and be seen in these places three days after the circulation of this order, she will receive a punishment of one hundred stripes, which will be a lesson for others not to follow in her footsteps.

This order is to be given to the governor of the market and to the emirs, so that it may be circulated amongst all the people. Any woman disobeying this order must appear before the judge. The Khalifa Abdullah, the Khalifa Mohammed Sherif, and Khalifa Ali should read out this order, in all mosques and public places, for general information.

The following circular is drawn up almost in the form of commandments:—

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO ALL HIS FOLLOWERS

In the name of God, etc.—This world, my brethren, is the world of unbelievers and the prison of the believers. The world to come is the world of the believers. Quit, therefore, the pleasures of this world, and let the unbelievers enjoy them.

My orders are that ye—

1. Abstain from wine, neither sell it nor drink it, whether in the bazaars or in your houses, but rather cleanse yourselves from it, and let it not be seen in your dwellings.

2. That ye order your wives and children to say daily the "Five Prayers," and see that this duty is strictly carried out.

3. That ye abstain from theft and adultery, and punish all those who commit such acts.

4. That ye hold daily family prayers at home, and also in time of travelling.

5. That ye be faithful and honest, never concealing the booty taken in war.

6. That ye oblige your wives and children to cover their heads and bodies, and if you see any woman with uncovered head you should punish her.

7. That ye do not permit women to mourn over the dead, or to follow them to the tomb.

8. That ye see that the dowry of a woman about to be married is not great. In the case of a virgin, ten dollars is sufficient; and in the case of a widow, five.

9. That ye do not permit your wives and daughters to graze cattle in company with men and strangers, and that ye prevent all immodesty amongst them.

10. That if ye see a slave or an animal going astray ye do not conceal it, but rather try to find its owner, and if ye cannot find its owner, then take it to the Beit el Mal.

Be faithful and obedient in carrying out these orders, which are the orders of God and his Mahdi, otherwise you will be destroyed.

The next circular refers at greater length to moderation in the marriage ceremony.

The marriage ceremony in the East is one of the principal events of life. The social position of the contracting families is gauged by the amount of money they are able to expend in the lavish entertainment which a marriage ceremony always involves.

A man, whose income is £12 a year, will think nothing of spending £50 to £60 on his wedding, and to do this he will probably put himself into debt for years.

It therefore behoved the Mahdi to curtail this large expenditure, and pass the economised balance to the credit of the Beit el Mal or treasury.

The circular runs as follows :—

ORDER

As you are now God's followers, your weddings must not be merely a show. Those amongst you who wish to be married must never incur

lavish expenditure. Your weddings must be simple, like that of Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. The Prophet has expressed great anger at the extravagance at present going on.

✓ The banquet should not consist of more than one lamb. The dowry of a widow must not be more than five dollars, and that of a virgin not more than ten dollars. And the trousseau should consist of two dresses only. For the money must be kept to further the Holy War, and must be distributed among the fighting men.

Any man disobeying these orders will be considered as a thief, and will be punished accordingly.

The next is an appeal to all those who feel themselves wronged to at once apply to him for redress.

My beloved, I appeal to every one of you in the name of God and in the name of His Prophet, that if I have oppressed any one of you, and have forgotten that I have done so, you should at once ask for redress. Do not wait till the last day, the day of resurrection.

I wish to bear all such faults, and I do not wish the blame to fall on others. I also make the same appeal on behalf of the khalifas, emirs, and ashraf (religious nobility). Therefore bring forward your accusations now, and do not wait until it is too late.

The next order is evidently directed against the temporal authority, which is always exercised by all persons who claim direct lineage from the Prophet. It was well known to the Mahdi that many of these (*i.e.* the ashraf) had only joined him by force of circumstances, and were at heart far from Mahdism. Such men would be a dangerous element among the credulous masses which formed the fighting force. It therefore became necessary to enforce their obedience to the Mahdi's lieutenants, and in consequence he addressed them as follows :—

Beloved, I send this epistle especially to you, because you are of the direct lineage of the Prophet. You should therefore give up the pleasures of this world, and sacrifice your whole life to the worship of the Almighty God ; and you should obey the emirs, carrying out all their orders. Do not argue with them, lest you be considered amongst the unbelievers. (Here follow several verses of the Kuran.) Beware of disobedience to your emirs, for they are appointed to guide you in the Holy War. (Here follow several verses of the Kuran relating to the necessity of Holy War.)

It is also curious to note the Mahdi's determination to overthrow every custom which would recall the military system of the Government troops. He therefore steadfastly set himself to revive the former customs of the Sudanese.

The copper drum, or noggara, is now universally used by

the Arab troops, and its weird and monotonous roll is familiar to all who have been in action against the Sudanese.

The circular runs as follows :—

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO ALL HIS FRIENDS,
THE OWNERS OF FLAGS

Brethren, praise God under all circumstances, and meditate on the creation of heaven and earth. Put aside all vain amusements, such as playing on kettledrums, side drums, and big drums. Drums must never be beaten except when necessary, nor should side drums or bugles be used any longer. All customs introduced by the Turks should be at once suppressed.

Friends and conquerors in the true religion, remember that God in creating heaven and earth said, "The change between day and night is a miracle which can only be fathomed by those wise persons upon whom God has bestowed light and mercy." All persons like to be considered wise, and hate being thought stupid.

As you my friends understand His sayings and praise Him both in standing up and in sitting and lying down, look therefore with wonder on the creation of heaven and earth, for this is the wish of God, who has given this thought as a sign to His worshippers. This was the custom of the Sahaba (the disciples of Mohammed). They used to meditate on his miracles, both in their fights, wars, and in their going in and coming out. Follow in their footsteps and always pray, whether you are walking, or riding, or with your friends. Abstain from all amusements, for through prayers alone can this world be kept in peace. Abstain also from the pleasures of music, do not beat the big and small drums. In future the *nahass* drums (i.e. the *noggara*) will only be beaten in time of necessity as a summons to the troops to fight, or as a call of assembly for those at a distance.

The constant mention of the name of God is also a mark of all true worshippers, and of his warriors; it enlightens the heart of the ignorant, is the true path to God, and is the crown of righteous victory.

Put aside everything which has the slightest resemblance to the manners and customs of Turks and infidels.

God has said in the Book of Traditions (the Hadith), "Make it known to my worshippers that they should not follow the ways of my enemies nor imitate them in their dress." All their dresses, therefore, as well as drums, bugles, and other articles, must be put aside; adhere only to the manners and customs of the Sahaba—may God bless them. This is now the time to come to God and to make a covenant with Him. Do not therefore lose this chance by adhering to the love of music.

Pray with a pure and obedient heart, praise and glorify God—prayers and salutations be on our Lord el Bishir el Kader Mohammed.

It has ever been the custom in Mohammedan countries for the supreme heads of religion to enter into retirement for a time and indulge in dreams and visions, which are of course made

adaptable to the particular circumstances which necessitate divine interposition and guidance. The Mahdi, to impress his credulous followers with the absolute divinity of his mission, frequently indulged in such visions, in which he directly conversed with the Prophet and his disciples, and received from them all the directions necessary to guide him to a successful issue in his undertakings.

The following vision, which occurred subsequent to the fall of El Obeid, will best explain itself:—

The Prophet of God appeared to me together with Sheikh Abd el Kader el Gilani. God, pointing to me, then said to the Prophet, "This is your khalifa," and this He repeated three times.

The Prophet then said, "You are the Mahdi, and if any one disbelieves in you, he disbelieves in God and His Prophet." This also he repeated three times.

The Imam then said, "The Almighty God has strengthened me with ten angels and their armies, with all the prophets and the apostles, and with 70,000 of His friends. This was when I was granted the Mahdieh. Since that time I have been ordered by God and His Apostle to fight against the Turks, wherever they may be, as the Turks are trying to quench the light of God. God has called them infidels, for they are the prime supporters of infidelity and wickedness on earth. God has therefore turned away from them, and taken away all authority out of their hands."

The Prophet of God also said to me, in the presence of all the friends of God, "We bless you," and then he turned to the friends and asked them to bless me; they then all said, "We bless you also." The Prophet then again addressed "the friends," saying, "The Mahdi is the best of you all, and of all 'the friends' from this time forth." The Prophet then wished me and all my followers to wear marakkahiehs (the Mahdi uniform) and turbans, and he said that in wearing the marakkahieh there are many hidden meanings; one of them is, that the enemy fears the wearer.

The Prophet then told me to kill three cows on the fall of El Obeid in order to celebrate the victory; this I did. Then, in another vision, he told me that as I prayed in the mosque of El Obeid I should also pray in the mosque of Khartum, then in the mosque of Berber, then in the mosque of Mecca, then in the mosque of Jerusalem, then in the mosque of El Irak (Teheran), then in the mosque of El Kufa (near Baghdad). May God grant that we may pray in all these mosques, and finally die as martyrs at the hands of the infidels.

The creatures of God must die either a natural death, or by the sword, or as martyrs. May God grant that we may die as martyrs.

The Imam again said, "The Prophet of God told me, that all evil to our friends comes from one of three things, viz. envy, lying, and neglect of prayer. Beware therefore, my men, and commit not any of these evils."

The Prophet also told me to burn El Obeid with fire. Beware therefore of taking any of the booty. The Apostle says that there is a

tree which is as thin and smooth as a tent-pole, it is very high, and has fruit as the palm tree. If any of the followers steal the booty he will not be permitted to eat of the fruit of this tree (presumably the tree of life), but those who are honest will eat and be filled. If any one of you have stolen anything, let him bring it back and repent. Leave the treasures of this world, my brethren, and cling to the joys of the world to come.

The following circular is directed against those who have been disobedient to the orders of the Mahdi :—

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO A FRIEND

Dear Friend—The true religion of God is that of El Islam, viz. obedience to the orders of God, of His Prophet, and of the agent of His Prophet.

God says in His book, Let those who disobey my orders beware lest dissension arise amongst them, for they will fall into a painful state.

Disobedience amongst the Ansar was the first cause of the failure of the faith.

If they had obeyed our orders and executed them to the letter, the true religion would soon have been reformed. Disobedience to my orders implies disobedience to God and His Prophet, and also the "painful state" above mentioned. If nomad tribes dare to neglect our orders, they will fall into this "painful state." May God save us from it.

You are well aware, my dear friend, that I have already given orders to the effect that women belonging to the "geger" (fortified camp) should all have their own husbands, and that no one should interfere with the husband regarding the possession of his own wife.

I am now informed by a sincere friend that certain of the Ansar say that it is not necessary to comply with the orders of the Mahdi.

I have this day seen that Ali Wad el Jerkuk had his wife, named El 'Izza Bint Nayl, taken from him. She fled from those who had taken her, and came to me accusing those who had detained her, and had taken her from her husband. Another case also occurred in which Fatima Bint Mussa el Krel, the wife of Ahmed, was taken from him.

How is it that my orders—orders with which God inspires me, and which are in conformity with the law—are thus disobeyed and neglected? If a pasha of this world order his chiefs to quit their work and fire their guns, would they not at once obey him and execute his orders without hesitation? For instance, Said Pasha, and Gordon Pasha who drinks wine, if they say, "Do this," is it not at once done? Why then should the Ansar, if they are true Ansar, not at once execute my orders? Those who neglect my orders are obstacles in God's path, and stand in the way of the worshippers of God. Consider this, therefore, my friend, together with the khalifas and Ansar who are with you; and if henceforth any one dare to disobey my orders, put him in prison for a month, and flog him daily with forty blows of the kourbash, as an example to others.

Also, if any one takes a woman who has not been duly entrusted to his care, and refuses to return her to the place from whence he took her,

he should be severely punished. Such customs are but the habits of immoral persons, and they will be tormented in hell-fire. Beware, therefore, in all these matters, which are already to me a cause of heart-burning and continual trouble.

Remember also that the crime of those who smoke tobacco is greater than that of drinking wine. He who drinks wine is punishable by eighty blows of the kourbash, but the smoker of tobacco is punishable by one hundred blows.

The Mahdi was now fully occupied in sending emissaries to all parts of the country; and with the prestige of the capture of the most important city of the Western Sudan, an additional impetus was given to the new propaganda. Long before El Obeid was captured, he had predicted that it must fall into his hands—and now what prevented Khartum from doing the same? The numbers of his followers had increased enormously, proclamations were sent out far and wide, and some found their way to Khartum, in which the townsmen were warned that a like fate to those in El Obeid awaited them, unless they speedily joined the new cause. Here is one of the many circulars issued broadcast:—

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO ALL HIS BELOVED

I have received your letters, read them and understood their contents. May God reward you, and encourage you to yield in all matters to His will and to that of His Prophet, and may He guide you to the true religion. Pray to God for success. Remember that one day you will stand in the presence of God, and remember that, in the eyes of God, this world is not worth the wing of an insect, and that it is shadowy and unstable. The duty of true believers in this world is to prepare for the world to come, where God has prepared eternal happiness for those who truly believe on Him. In this Paradise rivers are continually flowing, and there is no lack of food. It is the reward of the pious, but eternal fire will be the lot of the unbelievers. Those who cast aside the pleasures of this world and devote themselves to God, being contented with what He has given them, these are His pious worshippers. But those who are taken up with the things of this passing life, and forget God, they shall inherit eternal fire. May God preserve us, you, and all Moslems, from being taken up with the vanity of this world, which can only bring grief and sorrow in its train. Be it known to you that evil and good are in the hands of God, also blessing and cursing. He is the only one who can kill and raise up again. Fear none but God, fear not those Turks, whose influence over you has forced you to conceal the truth; are you not fighting with a people who have changed their belief, and who have already denied the Prophet? Why should you fear them when you know that their lives are in the hands of God? God has said, "I shall honour them who rely on me." If you have the true light in your hearts, and

believe in my Mahdiah, and in my being the successor of the Prophet, and that I have come to revive the true religion, then cast aside the pleasures of this perishable life, do only that which will do good to your souls, and be not deceived by the adornment of this life. This world is not worth thinking about, its happiness is ever followed by sorrow, its gatherings by separations.

Had it been of the slightest importance, then God would not have deprived His prophets of it, nor would He have allowed the unbelievers, to delight themselves in its pleasures. God has said, "Cursed be the world and all upon it," except His chosen people. He has also said, I am sending you to destroy the world, not to rebuild its ruins. Seek therefore the world to come. The Prophet has said, those who collect money and treasures shall lose the honour of being a true Moslem; therefore, my brethren, cease your connection with this vain world and its evil ambitions, and fight for God and His religion, that you may be included amongst those of whom God says, "The true believers are those who keep themselves faithful to God," and perform their duties towards Him. My mercy and pity for you have induced me to advise you to fight for the love of God, in order that you may not fall under His anger.

On the arrival of this my letter, assemble all those on whom you can trust, join . . . and fight with him against the enemies of God, follow him wherever he goes, and lay siege to Khartum. The heart of the true believer seeks religion, such is not the case with Shelkawi, who does not fight for God, but merely joins the faithful in order to obtain leadership and money. He stops fighting if he does not get what he wants, and may be numbered amongst those of whom it is said, "they worship God for their worldly benefits." Take therefore this chance, and obey the voice of one sent you from God. Do not miss this chance. There is no good deed which can be compared to fighting for the true religion, and which is the highest gift which God bestows on those whom He loves. It is said, "God loves those best who fight for Him." I do not guide those whom I love, but it is God who guides those whom He wills.

This is quite sufficient for such a man as you, to whom Providence has been granted.

The following letter was written by the Mahdi to Sheikh El Minneh Ismail, who, it will be remembered, took a prominent part in the capture of both Bara and El Obeid. It appears that he fell in favour—most probably because he had appropriated some of the "booty taken in war"—and was in consequence replaced as emir by his brother, and was shortly afterwards "despatched to the world to come":—

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO HIS BELOVED EL MINNEH ISMAIL

My Beloved—You have advanced far in holy life. You are aware from the sayings of God and His Prophet that this world is but a shadow, and that all its pleasures are passing away. You should therefore be one

of the first to quit the world, and devote yourself wholly to the world to come; you should not therefore regret your removal from the leadership, and it should be a matter of indifference to you as to whether the command is in your own hands or in those of your brother, provided that your mutual object is one and the same, viz. to uphold the cause of God, and the holy laws of His Prophet; if this be carried out, directly under your own command, or under the command of your brother, it can make no possible difference. You are also aware that God dislikes him who prefers himself to his brother.

Knowing this, and being also anxious for your own good, of which I am a better judge than yourself; for you know, my only desire is for your eternal happiness; it is therefore necessary that you should submit to this arrangement and be obedient to my orders. You should also thank God for being relieved of the responsibility of leadership, and as you are such a good and devoted servant of God, you should be especially happy and grateful.

This was his death-warrant. He was executed a few days after this letter had been written.

MANIFESTO OF THE MAHDI TO THE INHABITANTS OF KHARTUM

In the year 1300. In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate. Praise be to God, the bountiful ruler, and blessing on our Lord Mohammed, and his successors with peace. From the servant of his Lord Mohammed the Mahdi, son of Es Sayid Abdullah, to his beloved in God the believers in God, and in His book the Kuran.

The change (disturbance) of the times is not hidden from you, nor the forsaking of the Sunnas; and he who has the (true) faith and understanding will not be pleased thereat, but will leave all he needs and his native place (house and home) in defence of religion and the Sunnas; and therefore jealousy for Islam will not delay to possess in full strength (the heart of) the believer.

Now, O my beloved! as to what the most high God, to whom be praise, has willed in His eternity and in His decrees to grant to His servant, the humble and lowly, in (bestowing on him) the great khalifate—

The eminent Lord (Mohammed), on whom be blessing and peace, several times informed me that I am the Mahdi, the expected one, and (appointed) me (as) successor¹ to himself, on whom be blessing and peace, to sit on his throne, and (as successors) to their excellency the four khalifs and princes (of the faith), and to El Khudr,² on whom be peace; and God gave as my helpers the angels, (who are) the cherubin, and the saints from Adam to this our day, and also the believing jinns,³ and in

¹ The word here used is the one from which khalifa is derived.

² This word primarily means the pole or axis of the Universe, etc. The saint who is supposed to be immortal, and to have appeared first as Elijah and afterwards as Saint George.

³ The Mohammedans divide the jinns (or demons) into believers in Mohammed and unbelievers.

the hour of battle the eminent Lord, the bountiful One, on whom be blessing and peace, will in person go with them before my hosts, as also the four khalifas and the princes (of the faith), and El Khudr, on whom be peace. And he gave me the sword of victory of his excellency (Mohammed), on whom be blessing and peace; and it was made known to me that none of either race, human or jinn, can conquer him who has it.

Then said he, on whom be blessing and peace, "God has given to thee a sign that thou art the Mahdi," which (sign) is the mole on my right cheek, and he likewise gave to me another sign, namely, that there should go forth before me in the hour of battle a banner of light borne by Izrail, on whom be peace, that by it God should convince my friends, and terror should fall upon the hearts of my enemies, and (that) God will destroy whoever should encounter me in hostility.

Then he, on whom be blessing and peace, said to me, "Thou art created out of the effulgence of my innermost heart," and he to whom happiness (is granted) will believe I am the Mahdi, the expected one, but God has put hypocrisy (wickedness) into the heart of those who love vain pomp, and they will not believe, being greedy of their vain pomps.

Then he, on whom be blessing and peace, said: Love of wealth and pomps cause hypocrisy to spring up in the heart as water causes the herb to spring up; and it is found in the Ithar (traditional sayings about Mohammed) if you see worldlings loving this world, charge them with it. And it is found in some of the ancient books (saying): Do not ask of me a world intoxicated with love of earthly things, for it will close against thee the way of my love. And these (are they who like brigands) stop the way of (true) service (of God).

And when there came to me, O my beloved, from God and His Prophet the decree of the great khalifate, he ordered me to (take my) *hejira*¹ (flight) to Jebel Gedir close by Masat, and he commanded me to write thence to all entrusted with public offices. I wrote thus to the emirs and sheikhs of religion, and the wicked denied (my mission), but the righteous believed; even those who do not mind any hardship they may encounter for God, nor what they fail to attain of their dearest wishes; but steadfastly regard the promises of the most high God, to whom be praise, in which He said that He will reserve that other world for those who do not desire exaltation in this world, nor (its) corruptions. Now since it is for God to decree, and since He was willed to bestow the office of Mahdi upon His humble and insignificant servant Mohammed the Mahdi, the son of Sayid Abdullah, it behoves us to submit to the will of God; and, seeing that it is unanimously agreed by the present and past generation to attribute supreme knowledge to God, and as His knowledge, to whom be praise, is not limited by control of rules nor by the knowledge of the malevolent, and since God will blot out (abrogate) or establish what He wills, and since He is the source of the book (the Kuran) of which none can understand anything save what He wills, and since with Him is the key of the unknown (future),—none knows it but He, nor is He to be questioned as to what He does,—He created what

¹ This *hejira* is an evident imitation of the flight of Mohammed.

He will,—He chooses and bestows His mercy on whom He will. Sheikh Muhiy ed Din Ibn el Arabi especially says, in his commentary on the glorious Kuran, that knowledge of the Mahdi is like knowledge of the hour (of resurrection), and that hour none knoweth but God Most High. And Sheikh Ahmed Ibn Idris said, fourteen generations of the generations of the people of God have denied the (coming of the) Mahdi. Then he said : He will come forth from a place that they do not know and in a condition which they will disown.

It is not hidden from your knowledge that the writings about the (coming of the) Mahdi are among others the Ithar and the Keshef el Ulema and others ; and the conclusion of them all (is), and I understand from them, that God will blot out (abrogate) what passages He will, and some of these are the hadith (traditional sayings), and among them Ed Dayif and El Maktua and El Mansukh and El Maudua. The Hadith Ed Dayif is superseded by the Hadith Es Sahih word for word. The Ayat also are replaced by other Ayat. And the truth as to this is not known save to people of deep thought and insight.

Further, this is what the eminent lord (Mohammed), on whom be blessing and peace, said to me : "He who doubts that thou art the Mahdi has blasphemed God and His Prophet." This he, blessing and peace be upon him, declared to me thrice. All that I have told you about my succession to the office of Mahdi was told to me by the eminent lord (Mohammed), on whom be blessing and peace, when I was awake and in perfect health, free from all transgressions of the law, not in sleep, nor in (a state of) hallucination, or drunkenness or madness, but accounted to be of sound mind, following the traditions of the Prophet, on whom be blessing and peace, in ordering what he ordered and forbidding what he forbade.

And my hejira (flight) to the aforesaid places was necessary, according to the book (the Kuran) and to the Sunnaa. The Most High God has said, those who have had to flee (make a hejira) for the sake of God after having been persecuted, He will give them good things in the world, and the reward in the next will be greater. And he, on whom is blessing and peace, said, one who has fled from land to land, even though it be but a handbreadth of land, has deserved Paradise, and has become (in so doing) a partaker with ¹ Abraham, the friend of God and of Mohammed, on whom be blessing and peace.

Thus also in other passages of the Hadith.

And the duty of listening to God and His Prophet is binding : the Most High God has said, "Follow the way of those who are sincere to Me."

If you have understood this, we order all the chosen ones to flee (make their hejira) unto us for the Jehad (Holy War) in the cause of God, to the nearest town, because God Most High has said, Slay the infidels who are nearest you ; and he who holds back from this has

¹ Verses ; usually applied to verses of the Kuran :

"Inasmuch as Abraham, the friend of God, as a pilgrim who left his land and his father's house by divine command to escape the idolaters."

come within the threat uttered by the Most High. Say if your fathers, your sons, your brethren, your wives, your tribes, the wealth you have gained, the merchandise you are in fear of losing, or the dwellings you delight in, are dearer to you than God and His Prophet and the Jihad (Holy War) in His cause, then wait till God shall come with His sentence (against) you. (So far) the Aya (verse).

The Most High has also said, "O you who have believed, why do you cleave to the earth when called upon to fly to the war for God? Do you love the life of this world better than that of the next? But the possession of this world will be less than nothing in the other world."

The Most High has also said, "O you who have believed, why do you cleave to the earth when called upon to fly to the war for God? Do you love the life of this world better than that of the next? But the possession of this world will be less than nothing in the other world."¹

He has also said, "Seek not to fly." He will torment you with eternal torments, and accept others in your place. Now, if you have understood the foregoing, hasten to us, and fear none save God, for fear of the creature shows lack of trust and confidence in God, from which may God preserve (us).

The Most High has said, "Fear ye not man, but fear ye Me;" and the Most High has said, "Dread them not, but dread Me, if ye be believers."

The Most High has said, "God is worthy to be feared"; and especially because God has promised in his precious book (the Kuran), victory to him who contends for the faith. The Most High has said, "If you fight for God, He will fight for you and establish your goings."

And the Most High has said, "If you do not fight for him, the Mahdi, God fighteth for him." Because you have known this, if you do not respond to him who calls (in the name) of God and hasten to fight for the faith, you must receive punishment from God, inasmuch as you are the light of creation, its strength, and its head.

Whoever among you is anxious about his faith and zealous for the commands of his Lord will answer the call, and will join with those that fight for the religion of God. Be it known unto you that I am of the family of the Prophet of God, on whom be blessing and peace. My father is a Huseini, on his father's side; and his mother, and my mother likewise, on the side of both father and mother, are Abbassides, and God knows that I am of the blood of Husein, and these excellent indications will suffice for him who has been touched by His grace and (by) the faith. It will not be wonderful if some do see and do not believe it.

Fear God and join the righteous, and help one another in righteousness, and in the fear of God and in the Jihad (Holy War) in cause of God, and stand firm within the boundaries of God, for he who transgresses those boundaries will injure himself.

Know that all things are in the hand of God. Leave all to Him and rely on Him. He who makes God his support has been guided into the straight way. Peace (be with you).

¹ This paragraph is thus repeated in the original.

A short time after the capture of El Obeid, a delegate from the Senussi came down through Waddai, nor was a lengthened survey of matters necessary. The moral and industrial training of the Senussi revolted from the slaughter and rapine he saw around him. The sincere conviction of the regeneration of the world by a Mahdi whose earnest piety should influence others to lead wholesome and temperate lives, the dignity of honest labour and self-restraint, these were the sentiments which filled the mind of the emissary from Waddai. He saw a city sacked and ruined, he saw a treasury filled with stolen goods, with broken ornaments,—the very grain was stained with blood. He saw a clever man of eloquent speech indulged in the wildest debauchery by a brutal master, whose illiterate mind knew no desire but boundless dominion.

To the Senussi, Mahdiism was no miraculous gift to fall from heaven and be established by fire and sword. In his view, the regenerator of the world, by patient industry, by blameless conduct, should spread his influence abroad and be acclaimed the Mahdi, perhaps only after death. There was no sympathy with this in all he saw around him at El Obeid, in the information brought by his emissaries throughout the Sudan; nor did the Egyptians whom this Mahdi came to regenerate appear to see life and religion as the Senussiyeh saw it.

There are a great many things which go to the establishment of a prophet, and the Senussi, besides a natural chagrin at finding the Mahdi name dragged through the mire by this voluptuary, must have marvelled to find him master of a province with countless armies at his command.

Had he the foresight to see that a prophet must be established by opposition, even as a saint by martyrdom, he must have wished on his master's behalf for a few Egyptian garrisons, abandoned by their leaders and scattered wide over the desert.

The Senussi delegate returned to the court of the Sultan of Waddai. He must have felt that his master's manifestation was indefinitely postponed, for the strength of superstition increases as its object becomes vague by distance, and the wealth and power once collected in one hand, the rest is comparatively easy. As time went on and the death of the

Mahdi was conducted so exactly with regard to precedent, he must have felt that the newly established khalifate had a long reign before it. One ray of hope, however, he saw in this.

By their geographical position, no less than from political necessity, too much intercourse with Mecca was dangerous.

While the imposture was young, the Mahdi's operations prevented all pilgrimage from Africa to Mecca. The Red Sea is as a river between Africa and Mecca, and the crossing-place established by long custom was at Suakin. Here then was a lever by which something might be done, and soon the cry was raised that the pilgrimage to the holy places was stopped. On this ground, a considerable and growing sympathy was raised in Waddai, and in the surrounding kingdoms, which bore fruit later on.

Mohammed Ahmed was not, however, to be put off by a delay in the Senussi's reply; he concluded that his first letter had miscarried. He well knew the importance to his cause of the co-operation of this powerful confraternity—he therefore addressed another letter to him, again appealing to him to take the vacant khalifa's chair. It runs as follows:—

In the name of the God, etc., from the poor servant of his God, El Mahdi, the son of Es Sayid Abdullah, to his beloved in God, the Khalifa Mohammed el Mahdi, the son of Es Senussi. May God help him, amen.

Thou most loved and true believer in the law of the Prophet, thou the honourable guide of God's worshippers, thou knowest the changes that have taken place in these latter days, and the neglect into which the true religion has fallen. Such a state of affairs does not satisfy the faithful and intelligent servants of God, who would prefer to abandon relatives, home, and country, in order to revive the true religion and law. They would not hesitate for a moment. The zeal for Islam which is inborn in the true believer would force him to do so. Be it known to you, my beloved, that I and my ansar have been expecting you to revive true religion before Mahdism was inspired in me, who am but an humble servant. I wrote to you when I heard of your straightforwardness and your devotion to God and the law of the Prophet, your readiness and desire to take up the cause, in the hope of uniting with you in the work. But you did not answer me, therefore I conclude my letter did not reach you.

I spoke and wrote to the sheikhs of religious orders, and to some of the emirs, but they refused on account of their indifference towards the true religion, and their love for their own property and lives. Their faith was weak. Those only of low degree have believed in me, and have united with me in reviving the faith, according to the wish of the

Creator, and they are happy and contented with their position in this life, clinging to their faith, for they know the happiness which must be theirs after death.

These poor people had up to that time led godless lives, but when the grand Mahdiism was inspired in me, a humble servant of God and His Prophet, they at once showed their desire for the increase of the faith. God is all-powerful and does what He will.

I was told by the lord of creation, Mohammed, that I am the expected Mahdi, and he placed me on his throne several times in the presence of the four khalifas, the Aktab, and the Khudr; he also girded me with his sword in the presence of the saints, the Aktab, the angels, and the Khudr. I was told that none could gain a victory over me, having received the sword of victory from him.

He told me that God had made a mark in proof of my Mahdiism, which is a mole on my right cheek, and also another sign, which is a flag of dazzling white carried by Izrail (the angel of death) which appears during the battle. On the appearance of this flag the hearts of my followers are strengthened, and fear enters the hearts of my enemies, so that none can oppose me, for it is God's will that they should fail. The Prophet also said to me, "You are created from the light issuing from the centre of my heart."

He therefore for whom happiness is decreed should believe that I am the expected Mahdi. God has planted deceit in the hearts of those who love influence and money, so that they can neither believe nor can they permit themselves to be guided, lest they should lose their worldly power. The Prophet has said that the desire for power and money produces deceit in the heart just as water produces grass. It is said in the *Ithar* (religious book), "If a learned religious man love this world, suspect him and his religion." It is also said in the old books, "Do not make inquiries about me from ulema, who are full of the love of this world, lest they turn you aside from the path of my love; such people are hindrances to my true worshippers."

Well, my beloved, when God and His Prophet the lord of creation, Mohammed, inspired me with the khalifate, He ordered me to see Him, in a mountain in the west, named Gedir, near Mount Kassa, and there He ordered me to write a general order to all tribes, informing them of my khalifate. This I did, communicating with the emirs and sheikhs of religious orders; those miserable beings refused to believe in me, but all the rest believed. Those who believed did not mind the hardship they encountered, nor the worldly pleasure they gave up, for they clung to the promise of God contained in His sayings, "The world to come is, for those who desire not the pride of this world nor its wickedness, a glorious death is the portion of the pious." Those who disbelieved pretend to know that everything is subject to the will of God, but the Almighty's will was to inspire me with Mahdiism, I, his poor and humble servant, Mohammed el Mahdi, the son of Es Sayid Abdullah.

Therefore on investigation it does not seem that they realised the fact that they must submit to the will of God. Our ancestors and forefathers have all admitted that everything is subject to the will of God. The

will of God is neither bounded by laws nor by the opinions of learned men. God abolishes some things and establishes others according to His will. He is the origin of holy books which contain only such things as He has willed. He is merciful to those to whom He is merciful. God is the great Benefactor. Whilst I was receiving the instructions of God and His Prophet, I was always thinking of you, and was informed by the Prophet that you are one of my vizirs or ministers. Whilst I was awaiting your arrival I was informed by the Khudr concerning your belief and your present life ; subsequently a vision took place in which the Prophet and his special disciples, who are also my helpers, were present. Then one of my helpers took his seat on the chair of Abu Bakr es Sadik, and another on the chair of Omar, but the chair of Osman was left empty, and concerning this the Prophet said, "This chair is for the son of Senussi, and is kept for him until he comes forward sooner or later." He then seated one of my helpers on the chair of Ali. May God bless them all.

And besides this, your soul was present with me and my beloved friends who are the successors of the Prophet in many subsequent visions. Let it be known to you, even if you are aware of it, that Mahdiyyism is like time. No one understands its real nature but God the Almighty ; this fact is verified by learned men, of whom Es Sayid Ahmed Ibn Idris is one : he said, "Fourteen books written by the true believers in God on the subject of Mahdiyyism have been proved to be incorrect ;" he has also said, "He (the Mahdi) shall appear from a place unknown beforehand to them, and under conditions difficult to be understood by them." Another, the Sheikh Muhiy ed Din, has also said in one of his commentaries the same thing. Many others too have testified to this fact. It is also known to me from many books written on the subject of Mahdiyyism, such as *El Ithar*, *Kashf el Awalia*, etc. etc., that God abolishes some things and establishes others according to His will. Reference to this fact has also been made in the various ahadith (traditions), such as those of *Ed Dayif*, *El Maktua*, *El Mansukh*, and *El Maudua*. The true hadith is transformed by a true hadith just as a verse is transformed by a verse. Facts remain unchanged and are only known to wise people. Mahdiyyism could not be a mere pretence on account of its numerous and powerful enemies ; indeed, when it was inspired in me, I was amongst the enemies themselves, and very weak ; had it not therefore been directly inspired by God, I should not have lived in the world for a day, for my enemies were powerful and I was weak. I was surrounded by them from all directions, but God put fear into their hearts and drove them off in despair.

When we proceeded to *Jebel Gedir*, close to *Kassa*, the Turks assembled their forces and fought against us several times, but God destroyed them and burnt their bodies with fire. These events are known far and wide, and are proofs of my Mahdiyyism. The lord of creation, Mohammed, said that he who doubts my Mahdiyyism is a renegade from God and His Prophet, and this he repeated three times. He exhorted me to fight against the Turks, against those who would not believe in my Mahdiyyism, and against those who unite with them in fighting against me. He called them infidels, and even worse than that,

for they were endeavouring to extinguish the light of God. He also announced to me the good news that my followers would rank as his followers, and that those of lowest degree would have the same degree as Sheikh Abd el Kader el Gilani. This favour is both an inward and outward comfort to the followers. God is the great Benefactor. All that I have told you regarding my Mahdiyyism has been revealed to me by the lord of creation when I was wide awake and in good health. I was not asleep, nor hallucinated, nor drunk with wine, nor mad, but I was in full possession of all my mental faculties. Follow the example of the Prophet, obey his orders, and shun what he forbids.

The "setting forth" is a sacred duty, described as such in all holy books and laws. God says, those who have "set forth" for the sake of God, even though they have wronged their Prophet, shall have a good reward in this world and a better in the world to come; the Prophet also says, he who "sets forth" for the sake of his religion, even one span from one country to another, shall inherit Paradise, and become one of the disciples of Abraham, the friend of God and of Mohammed.

Other verses and ahadith all point to the same end. Obedience to God's chosen is a necessary duty, for God says, "Follow the path of my representative." He who cares for the faith, and has compassion towards his religion, complies with this call, and unites with us in spreading God's religion. He in whose mind God permits neither doubt nor suspicion of my Mahdiyyism, and yet who still disbelieves, must fail in this world and in the world to come, unless he is specially chosen hereafter by God. Let it be known to you that I am a lineal descendant of the Prophet. My father is a Husseini, both on his father's and mother's side, and my mother is also Husseiniyeh on her mother's side and an Abbasside on her father's side. God knows that I am descended from Hussein.

I am to tell you that God has conquered many countries through us, and large numbers of those who are governed by the Turks have followed us.

As soon as you receive this my letter, you have either to fight for the cause of God in your own provinces, marching down to Egypt and its neighbourhood, if they (the Egyptians) do not surrender to you; or you are to "set forth" to us, but your "setting forth" is preferable to us; you cannot be ignorant of the advantage of "setting forth" and joining us when possible.

Whatever you decide, send us an answer, informing us whether you decide to fight or "set forth."

A hint is sufficient to a personage like you.

Dated, RAGAB 1300 (May 1883).

To this last appeal the Senussi did not deign to reply; but his emissaries were at work in the distant kingdoms of Waddai, Bornu, etc., warning the people against following the new creed; but it was not till some three years later that any active operations occurred between the rival Mahdis, and even then the Anti-Mahdiists merely assumed the guise of Senussiism

to add prestige to their movement, and it is now unquestionable that the Senussi did not himself authorise any hostilities in the Sudan. In the meantime the wave of rebellion had gradually spread northwards.

Abd el Kader Pasha was doing all in his power to quell the revolt between the Blue and White Niles, and leaving Khartum on the 2d January he proceeded to Messalamieh and assumed command of the troops operating in that district. A few unimportant skirmishes occurred, and if anything the rebels were the more successful, and defeated a force of Egyptian troops at Karasa on the 18th January.

On the 27th, however, Abd el Kader Pasha met and defeated them at Maatuk, killing some 600, and also gained a small success at Baatuk on the road to Kaua. He then concentrated his troops at the latter place and returned himself to Khartum.

The news of the fall of Bara and El Obeid did not reach Khartum till 11th February. Two days later Abd el Kader rejoined his troops at Kaua, and at the head of three battalions of infantry, 600 irregulars under Saleh Bey Shanga of Galabat, and some Shukrieh horsemen, he advanced towards Sennar, which was still being besieged by the emir Ahmed el Makashif. The latter, on hearing of the approach of the Egyptian troops, advanced against them with a force of 10,000 to 12,000 Arabs. A stubborn fight took place on the 24th February at Meshra ed Dai, in which the Makashif was defeated with a loss of 200 men, the siege of Sennar raised, and communications once more established between that town and Khartum. In this battle Abd el Kader Pasha was slightly wounded.

The rebel forces in this district now dispersed into three parties—one party surrendered to the Egyptians at Sennar; the second took up a position at Jebel Sekhedi under Ahmed el Makashif, and were completely routed by a force of 1200 irregulars under Saleh Bey on 4th March; while the third, under Abd el Giaffar, returned to Karkoj.

Abd el Kader Pasha was preparing to march against this latter, when on 20th February he was superseded in his military capacity by Suliman Niazi Pasha, while the civil government was vested in a Turkish cavalry officer, Ala ed

Din Pasha, who was on 26th March proclaimed the Governor-General of the Sudan.

But to revert to the effect produced in Egypt by all these disturbances. On the receipt of Abd el Kader Pasha's appeal for reinforcements, it had been decided that the disbanded soldiers of Arabi Pasha should be gathered up and the reinforcements should be sent. Officers to command were not far to seek—English, of course—for it was a desperate venture; but it may be imagined that recruitment of the rank and file for this service was unpopular. The recruits wept in their chains. But by December 1882, 5000 were poured into the seething cauldron of revolt; and by the 4th March 1883 the ill-fated General Hicks found himself with nine other European officers at Khartum at the head of 10,000 weeping soldiers with the usual proportion of officers, many of them ignorant and incapable men. Then, that no embarrassment might be wanting, jealousies were stirred up among the various high officials.

Hicks Pasha was an able and a dauntless man. He set to work to make his army out of very unpromising material. One point soon became apparent—his soldiers were strangers in the land, and in that very strangeness they possessed a signal advantage over those whom Abd el Kader, Geigler, Rashid, and Yusef Pasha had led into the field.

Of these the regulars, long domesticated in the Sudan, had many ties among the Arabs; but the irregulars, who formed the larger portion of the force, were themselves Sudanese. Suddenly dismissed by Raouf Pasha in search of economy, they were as suddenly re-engaged. They were of the same class as the irregulars of the Mahdiists. For fighting they as a rule only required to be on the stronger side; but now the case was different.

Nothing is more extraordinary in the campaigns of Gessi Pasha in the Bahr el Ghazal than the facility with which the troops fought alternately on his side and on the side of Suliman Zubeir. Gessi would have one day 15,000 men in his army; but on the mere report of a stronger force being opposed to him, on the mere report that Suliman had found some means of success, 10,000 of these would be arrayed against him in Suliman's army. And in like manner, when he inflicted a

defeat upon Suliman, sometimes even before, so keenly did they watch the scale, he would at once enrol almost the whole of the army opposed to him.

Gessi's campaigns against the slavers deserve to be written by a master-hand. For the moment the brief reference may illustrate the conditions of warfare in the Sudan.

Another well-known instance may be quoted in illustration. When Gordon, in his first commission, was about to punish the tribes on the western frontier of Abyssinia, he began by making a treaty with King John for the passage of these tribes through Abyssinia; for he said, if they are unable to run away, they will fight like demons and beat my troops.

The troops of Hicks, with every other drawback that troops can have, had this advantage, that they were strangers to the land—compromise with the Mahdists was beyond their reach.

Accordingly, after a month's vigorous drilling, Hicks set off on a reconnaissance in force towards Sennar. After some manœuvring and slight skirmishes he met the Makashif at Marabieh on the 29th April. The forces were nearly equal, some 5000 men being engaged on either side. Hicks's artillery and his breech-loading rifles got fair play on the Arabs, merely armed with spears. The victory was as decisive as in the absence of cavalry it could be, and the Makashif and most of his leaders were slain. The victory cleared the country between Khartum and Sennar. Many tribes returned to their allegiance, and Hicks was able to turn his attention to the seat of rebellion in Kordofan.

He was, however, at first engaged in combating the intrigues set on foot against him by the high officials at Khartum the moment immediate danger was removed. These struggles lasted during May, June, and July, and it was not until Hicks forwarded the letter resigning his command that Cairo removed the principal obstruction—Suliman Niaz Pasha—and confirmed Hicks's appointment as commander-in-chief of the projected expedition to Kordofan.

During August much disaffection showed itself in Khartum, and the greater part of the inhabitants were found to be in constant communication with the Mahdi at El Obeid.

Hicks set off on the 9th September and joined Ala ed Din,

his second in command, at Duem on the 20th. The following European officers accompanied the force :—

Colonel Farquhar, Chief of the Staff; Majors Seckendorff, Warner, Massey, and Evans; Captains Herlth and Matyuga; Lieutenant Morris Brody (late Sergeant-Major Royal Horse Artillery); Surgeon-General Georges Bey and Surgeon-Major Rosenberg; Mr. F. Power,¹ Correspondent of the *Times*; Mr. O'Donovan, Correspondent of the *Daily News*; and Mr. Vizetelly, Artist of the *Graphic*. Colonel De Coetlogon did not accompany, being engaged in patrolling the Nile and hindering the further passage of rebels into Kordofan: and Colonel Colborne, Major Martin, and Captain Forrestier-Walker, were absent on sick leave.

¹ Mr. Power, being attacked with dysentery, was subsequently compelled to leave the force at Duem.

FORMATION OF HICKS PASHA'S ARMY ON LEAVING KHARTUM.


Paraded at Khartum on Saturday, 8th September 1883 :—Infantry, 7000 ; Bashi-Bazuks, mounted, 400 ; with 10 mountain guns, 4 Krupp, and 6 Nordenfelts ; Cavalry, 500 ; 100 Cuirassiers ; 2000 camp followers.

.....
TWO GUIDES
* *
.....

SCOUTS
.....

 x
GENERAL x x x x STAFF
 x x x x
 x x x x


.....
ONE BATTALION
.....



INFANTRY

ARTILLERY

INFANTRY



.....
ONE BATTALION
.....

.....
CAVALRY
.....
TRANSPORT OF 5500 CAMELS
UNDER BASHI-BAZUKS
.....

.....
IRREGULAR CAVALRY
.....

The order of march was a square. The artillery was placed in the centre, and the whole was led by Hicks Pasha and his officers, accompanied by a chosen guard of fifty cavalry. In order to follow the line of advance, a slight description of the country through which the ill-fated expedition passed is now necessary.

South of latitude 13° the rolling steppes of barren friable soil give place to more tenacious earth. Along the southern boundary of Kordofan run three great mountain masses named from the east, Tagalla, the Dair or "circle" cluster, and the Nuba hills. The drainage on the north of these hills forms the only river, or approach to a river, in Kordofan. The Khor Abu Habl runs in the rainy season from June to September for a distance of 190 miles to the east before it is absorbed in the porous soil. In years of excessive rain it is said to feed the Nile. In its course it forms three shallow lakes at a distance of thirty miles one from the other, and named in order from the east as follows:—Shirkeleh has an area of 3900 acres; Rahad, near which is a small town, and where the Kashgil torrent joins the Abu Habl, has an area of 3000 acres; El Birket, "The Lake," where also is a town and a military station, has an area of 1350 acres. Rahad sometimes retains its water throughout the year, but the others dry up and water must be dug for to a depth of six or eight feet, as it must be dug for in the torrent bed from October to the rains of the succeeding year.

The mountain masses are inhabited by negroid tribes of ironworkers, whose stout resistance in their inaccessible retreats formed a constant source of danger to the Mahdi. The Arab forces spent many months of fruitless siege at the base of these mountains, which further harboured all those who resisted the Mahdi's will. King Adam of the Tagalla group more than once defeated Mohammed Ahmed; and Mek Kumbo of Jebel Dair to the last defied Abu Angar's most desperate attacks. Rahad was thirty miles distant from Melbeis by a waterless route passable by the Arabs but not by troops.

Melbeis is on the verge of the settled country, and ten miles from El Obeid. Two well-established routes led from Rahad to El Obeid. The upper ran due west along the Kashgil torrent bed. From here the road ran twenty-eight miles through

villages to El Obeid. The lower route ran through an almost waterless country thirty-four miles to Birket. At sixteen miles from Rahad there is a village called Alluba, while Birket is eighteen miles south of the Kashgil crossing.

It had been Hicks Pasha's intention to proceed direct from Duem to Bara by the northern road, a distance of 136 miles, and thence to El Obeid, establishing posts on the way, to be supplied from the depot at Duem; but on Ala ed Din Pasha representing that water was more plentiful on the southern and more circuitous route *via* the Khor Abu Hahl, a distance of 250 miles, Hicks Pasha was induced to change his mind, and decided to advance by the latter route, especially as Ala ed Din represented that water could be found between Duem and Nurabi, a distance of between eighty and ninety miles—a fact which had been unknown to Hicks Pasha.

An advanced party, consisting of the 4th Regiment under Ragab Bey, a squadron of Bashi-Bazuks under Sanjak Yehia Agha, and some artillery, advanced from Duem and seized the wells of Shatt, sixteen miles distant, on the 24th September. The main body now followed, and after a stay of three days at this station, started in a south-westerly direction for Zeregga. Here the force rested five days. A difference of opinion now arose between Hicks and Ala ed Din, the latter wishing to give up the chain of posts which it had been decided to hold; while Hicks, for obvious reasons, was most anxious to take no such steps. The guides, of whom there were fifteen, the principal being

Ahmed Abu Isbeh,
Ahmed Abu Kashawa,
Hakim el Mahassi,
Mohammed el Baggari,

were now questioned separately as to the roads in which the best supply of water could be found. The Mahass guides had already guaranteed, at Duem, to lead the army to Serakna, and that there should be no lack of water on the road, while the Baggara guides guaranteed the remainder of the road from Serakna to El Obeid. The Mahass guides, on being questioned, now admitted that there was insufficient water up to Serakna; they were consequently made prisoners. A guide, however, named Ahmed Abu Domeh volunteered to proceed to Serakna

and see for himself. Permission was granted, and he returned the following day, bringing a sample of the water with him, but could not say whether it was sufficient for the whole force. Hicks therefore advanced with half the force to the wells of Drefissa, and on ascertaining that there was sufficient water, he sent back a party to bring up the remainder of the army. The bearer of this order, buluk bashi Mohammed Agha, after delivering his message deserted, while the five men who had accompanied him, on returning, being suspected of having made away with Mohammed Agha, were made prisoners by Ala ed Din's orders.

Hicks Pasha, writing from near this station, and some twenty-eight miles distant from Serakna, says :—

The army has arrived within twenty-eight miles from Serakna, which place is twenty-two miles from Nurabi. We have depended upon pools of rain-water for supply, which we have fortunately found. A reconnaissance made to-day insures us water as far as Serakna; guides' information is vague. I regret that I have to abandon my intention of establishing military posts and line of communication with base at Duem. The Governor-General assures me that the Arabs will close in on my route after the army has passed in sufficient force to prevent posts forwarding supplies. Besides, the pools of rain-water, the only supply, will dry up; water not to be obtained by digging wells. . . . I have no information regarding water between Serakna and Nurabi, nor reliable information of the supply there. This causes me great anxiety. I quite expected Serakna to be occupied by the enemy; but the reconnaissance to-day found the place evacuated. The Arabs had left this morning. The health of the troops is on the whole good, which is fortunate, as we have no sick carriage. The heat is intense.

While in his despatch, the last ever received from him, and dated Camp, near Serakna, 3d October 1883, he says :—

On leaving Duem, on the White Nile, to march by the Khor en Nil to Melbeis and Obeid, I decided that my line of communication should be secured by posts of 200 men each, left in strongly-fortified positions at the following places :—

	Miles distant.		Miles distant.
Shatt	16	Abli	28
Zerega	16	Beliab	22
Serakna	32	Um Sheikh	12
Nurabi	16	Rahad	14
Aigella	24	Kasghil	14
Johan	32	Melbeis	25

At all these places I was informed that water would be found.

Large quantities of biscuits were to arrive at Duem ; and as we were unable to leave a single camel at the base, 1000 were ordered to be purchased and forwarded to Duem. H.E. Ala ed Din Pasha had already at Khartum 300, and gave orders for the remaining 700 to be purchased and forwarded to Duem without delay. The biscuits would then, with ammunition and other stores, be pushed on to the front from post to post. Depots would be formed at each post, and in case of a reverse a line of retreat secured, the troops falling back upon these depots, where we should be certain of finding supplies of food, ammunition, and water.

We marched to Shatt, and formed the first post and depot there ; but before reaching Zeregga I was informed by the Governor-General of the Sudan that it was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pushed up from Duem ; that the soldiers left at the post would not guard the convoys—in fact, that they would be afraid to do so ; that to insure supplies being forwarded an army would be required with each convoy. The Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would return after we have passed, and that they would be numerous, and the garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves strong enough to forward the supplies, that it would be dangerous, and I would find that they would not run the risk. ✓

The Governor-General requested me to abandon the idea of having this line of posts, to give up my line of communications and line of retreat, and to advance with the army "*en l'air*" with fifty days' supply of food only, the Arabs closing in on our rear.

I am naturally very averse to this ; but if, as H.E. assures me, it is a fact that the posts will not be supplied from the base of Duem, and supplies would not be forwarded through them, I should in garrisoning these posts be only weakening my fighting force without gaining any advantage. I have, therefore, called a council, have had the matter explained, and requested the members to record their opinion.

W. HICKS, Lieut.-General.

The following were the opinions of the officers of the council :—

H.E. Ala ed Din Pasha states that he feels convinced that the Arabs will collect in such numbers on the route after the army has passed that the garrisons of the posts would not pass on provisions or stores, and that we cannot count in the least on obtaining supplies from Duem ; that the posts would only be a source of weakness, as we should leave in them 2500 men we require. Also that some of the posts would be attacked and taken, that the garrisons could not be depended upon to hold them, and that no soldiers would be induced to leave with a convoy.

H.E. Hussein Pasha Muzar wishes to retain the posts as far as Nurabi "or half-way to Obeid," but the Government must send troops from Cairo, and meanwhile Khartum must send a battalion to escort provisions and stores.

[In the margin : *N.B.*—Time does not admit of the arrival of troops from Cairo, and Khartum has a too weak garrison as it is.]

Ragab Bey is of opinion that, desirable as it is according to military rules to retain the lines of communication, under the circumstances the intention of establishing the posts must be abandoned.

Abbas Bey is of the same opinion as Ragab Bey.

Colonel Farquhar, chief of staff, considers that under the peculiar circumstances the retention of the posts and line of communication must be abandoned.

Nota.—After Obeid has fallen, and the country is in consequence more settled, it is expected that a small force can be sent from Obeid by the shorter route towards Shatt to meet an escort coming from Duem with provisions, etc. Water for a small force will probably be obtainable on opening the wells.

W. HICKS, Lieut.-General.

The final decision to abandon the posts was now carried into effect, and with the exception of the following few lines from Mr. O'Donovan, correspondent of the *Daily News*, and dated Sanga Hamferid, forty-five miles south-west of Duem—

We have halted for the past three days owing to the uncertainty of the water supply in front. Here we are entirely dependent on surface pools. A reconnaissance of thirty miles forward yesterday by Colonel Farquhar ascertained that the pools were barely sufficient for a rapid march to the village of Serakna, now deserted, where there are a few wells. The enemy is still retiring, and sweeping the country bare of cattle.

—no further news was ever received from any of the Europeans connected with this ill-fated expedition, which was subsequently annihilated almost to a man.

Many accounts have appeared from time to time, but probably the most authentic one is that given by Mohammed Nur el Barudi, of whose varied career a brief reference may be given. This individual accompanied the late General Gordon as cook in his first mission to the Sudan, travelled with him through the Equatorial Provinces to Uganda, Abyssinia, etc., was successively in the service of the Governor-Generals who succeeded, and eventually became cook to Hicks Pasha. He accompanied him in his last expedition at the battle of Shekan, received a bullet through the body, and a sword-cut almost through the hand. When dragged from the thicket in which he thought to die, some Arabs were plundering the medical stores. He stopped them from eating some ointment, and applied it to his wounds. Though declaring he was a cook, he was disbelieved by a people whose women do all their cooking. He was brought before Wad en Nejumi, and followed the fortunes of this leader for five years in the capacity of chief doctor to his force. A few days before the action of Toski, in August 1889, he escaped to General Grenfell's force, and was

of considerable use in the intelligence department. His statement has been corroborated by many of the Arab emirs who were present at the battle of Shekan, and who have also given the information of the enemy's movements during Hicks Pasha's advance into Kordofan, which has been amalgamated with the following account. His story is taken up from Drefissa station, whence the last authentic news was received :—

Guide Ahmed Abu Domeh now set off for the next station with twenty-five horsemen to see whether the water was sufficient. The horsemen returned a few hours afterwards, and reported that the guide had left his rifle by the water, and had gone back to fetch it ; but after waiting for some time he did not appear, so the army advanced to the next station, and on arrival the guide was found under a tree with his hands cut off. He said he had been attacked by some rebels when he had separated from the horsemen, and they had cut his hands off.

The army halted here two days, and on the 7th October we marched to the fifth station, Nurabi (Sanga Hamferid), guided by the Mahass guides, who were still in chains so that they could not desert. On the 10th October the advance was continued to the sixth station, Geleben Har, and here a Baggara woman was caught, who said that the buluk bashi who had deserted from the army at Zeregga, had joined the emir Abu Girgeh, who was in the neighbourhood collecting the Baggara Gowameh. Letters were given to this woman calling on the tribes to join the Government troops, and then she was let go.

On the 11th October the army moved on to Aigella ; but on the march three camels which had lagged behind were seized, and the camel-driver killed, and then it was known for the first time that a band of rebels must be following in our footsteps. Here some of Genawi¹ Bey's men, who had gone out to collect firewood, were attacked and lost two men. Hicks Pasha then sent out 1000 men and three guns, but the rebels retreated on seeing the soldiers. That night it rained very heavily, and a shot was heard in the neighbourhood. The whole camp was alarmed, and fired for half an hour without seeing anything.

On the 14th October the army reached Shirkeleh, and we found there a man who pretended to be deaf and dumb. As he would say nothing, he was shot by the patrols who took him. Hicks Pasha was very angry, and ordered all prisoners in future to be brought before him.

The next day while marching towards Johan a skirmish occurred between the irregular horsemen on the left rear and a party of the enemy, in which the Arabs succeeded in capturing eighteen horses ; but on being reinforced the Arabs were put to flight, and two of the horses were recaptured. Here again a difference arose between Hicks and Ala ed Din Pasha about the position of the irregulars, Hicks wishing to keep them in the square

¹ An Arab freebooter and slave-trader, who had been of use to Gessi, and who had accompanied the expedition with fifty of his men, it being the intention of the governor-general to appoint him mudir of Bahr el Ghazal after the recapture of El Obeid.

as they were not trustworthy troops, while Ala ed Din had placed them on the flanks without Hicks Pasha's orders. It was eventually decided that they should keep close to the square but not inside it.

The army remained here two days, and left on 17th, halting for the night in the desert, and moving on the next day to Abli. From here two sheikhs, who belonged to that part of the country and had accompanied the army from Khartum, left to collect some of their tribe as reinforcements, promising to meet the army again at Lake Rahad with their men.

The guide Koua belonged to the tribe of these sheikhs.

The next day we left for Beliab, and passed through a large forest where the guide lost his way; so we encamped for the night on the top of a hill, and arrived at Beliab the next morning. We then advanced to Om Sheikh, where there is a large *chor*,¹ and at the other side we could see a party of the enemy camped. We exchanged shots with them, and fired rockets at them.

On 20th we advanced to Lake Rahad, and as we left our last camp we saw a number of Arabs entering it. We fired a shot from one of the guns at them, and then continued our march, reaching Rahad about noon. Here a large *zariba*² was made and a trench dug round it, and the whole army encamped inside the *zariba*. That day one of the European officers' servants, a man called Klootz,³ was out collecting wood and was captured by the enemy's patrols. I heard afterwards that he was sent to El Obeid, and had to become a Mahdiist. His name was changed to "Mustafa."

Hicks Pasha, thinking he had lost his way, sent parties of cavalry in every direction, but without success. We halted at Rahad six days, and on the fifth day a party of Arabs were seen on the opposite side of the lake waving a white flag. Ala ed Din Pasha thought these must be the two sheikhs and their men who were to meet us as arranged, and so he tied a handkerchief on a stick; but the Arabs took no notice of it, but drew their water and then went away. Hicks Pasha then sent off a party of fifty horsemen after them, and following a short distance they saw great numbers of the enemy camped under the trees.

But to return for a moment to the plans and movements of the Mahdi: and here the account of chief clerk Hassan Eff. Habashi is of interest as corroborating the foregoing statement of Barudi. Hassan Habashi, a former Government official in El Obeid, had perforce, on the capture of that place by the Mahdi, to throw in his lot with the rebels. He became chief

¹ A word corresponding to gully or *nullah*, though its actual meaning is an intermittent stream. A *chor* is often called a *wadi*, when it means a deep ravine, and is sometimes used to designate a whole river valley, as Khor Baraka.

² *Zariba* signifies a fence or paling, and in addition to its meaning of "an entrenched or fortified camp," it also applies to settlements enclosed by palisades or hedges, whether forming a single farmyard or a large village.

³ Adolf Klootz, formerly a sergeant of Prussian Uhlans, and servant to Major Seckendorf.

clerk to the emir Abd el Halim, and up till August 1889 followed the varied career of his master. A few days before the action of Toski he escaped and gave important information to General Grenfell of the strength and movements of Wad en Nejumi's army, and proved of considerable use during the recent operations on the Nile.

He states that Mohammed Ahmed, on hearing of the departure of the army of Hicks Pasha from Khartum, sent spies to watch their movements, and on learning that the latter had arrived at Duem, and intended advancing on El Obeid, he sent a force of 3000 men under the emir Abd el Halim and Abu Girgeh to follow in rear of the Egyptian army and close up the wells as they advanced, so that retreat would be impossible. Hassan Habashi accompanied Abd el Halim's force, which first sighted Hicks Pasha's army near Abu Gwei, in the Baggara Gowameh country, where they were collecting the tribesmen. From here Abd el Halim sent Habashi back to El Obeid to inquire of the Mahdi whether he was to attack the army; and a message was sent back to Abd el Halim that he was on no account to fight, but to follow up the army to Rahad, where he would receive full instructions. Habashi was not the bearer of this message, but remained at El Obeid. By this time Abu Girgeh had collected several thousand of the Baggara Gowameh under their chief, Asakir Abu Kalam, and, in company with Abd el Halim, followed the army of Hicks Pasha as far as Rahad, occupying his camps as he left them.

Abd el Halim, on arrival at Rahad, at once rode off to El Obeid and personally informed the Mahdi of the strength and probable movements of the Egyptian force. On receipt of this news Mohammed Ahmed forthwith despatched all his fighting men towards Rahad to join Abd el Halim's force, but on their way they met Abd el Halim retiring from Alluba, and having joined him, the whole force, amounting to some 40,000, encamped in the forest of Shekan, some twenty-eight miles to the north-west of Alluba, and there awaited the advance of the Egyptian troops, while the camp followers, women and children, who had followed the Arabs from El Obeid, proceeded to Birket.

In the meantime (to continue the statement of El Barudi), after

halting for six days at Rahad, we advanced on the 26th October to the west side of the lake, where the Arabs had been seen taking water, and on looking back at our old camp it was seen to be already occupied by the enemy. Fire was opened, and the Arabs again retired. On the following day (the 27th) we made a short march of five miles, and on the 28th a halt was ordered at a place eight miles from Alluba.

On that night a rich merchant called Abderrahman Abu Neka was found writing a letter to his father, whom he knew to be with the rebels, asking his advice as to whether he should desert. On this discovery Hicks called a council of his officers, and it was decided that all the civilians accompanying the force should be disarmed. Amongst these latter were Genawi Bey, Hamed Bey Tilib, Busati Bey, Doctor Georges Bey, and Mahmud Bey Ahmadani (late mudir of Khartum).

From this station a guide called Sheikh Mohammed, a native of Jebel Dair, accompanied by the black servant of the guide Koua, was sent to El Obeid to try and discover the strength of the enemy there. The next morning (29th October) the army arrived at Alluba. The village there was deserted, but there was plenty of water, and it was decided to remain here until the spies returned. A force of the enemy was seen in the trees not far distant, and a zariba was quickly made, whilst a strong force was sent to drive the Arabs off. This they succeeded in doing, and for five days no signs were seen of them. A Kenuz and Baggara guide were now sent towards Birket to find out the strength of the rebels there, and on the fourth day of our stay at Alluba the black servant who had gone to El Obeid returned with the following letter from the Mahdi to Hicks and Ala ed Din and others, and some thousands of small pieces of paper, on which was written the Mahdi's name and exhortations to all to follow the true religion. These the guide had been instructed to distribute about the camp, but Ala ed Din Pasha collected and burnt them all.

The letters to Hicks, etc., ran as follows:—

In the name of God the Merciful, the Compassionate, praise be to the bountiful ruler, and blessings with peace be upon our lord Mohammed and upon his posterity.

From the servant of God, who stands in need of God's mercy, and relies wholly upon his guard, Mohammed, the Mahdi, son of Abdullah, to all who will listen among the expeditionary force, to all who have understanding.

Every intelligent person must be aware that God rules, and his authority cannot be shared by muskets, cannons, or bombs, and no one has any strength except he whom God Almighty strengthens.

If ye understand this, know further that God is one. Do not, therefore, transgress with your arms nor with your hosts, wherewith ye seek to war against God's hosts, for nothing but God has strength.

If ye say that our mission as Mahdi is false, know that this contestation of its genuine character emanates only from those who love this world, fear the Creator, and belittle the power of God.

If ye understand this, be not led astray by the words of your law-

doctors, for the Turks whom I have killed complained to the Supreme Judge, the Almighty, saying, "O our Lord God, the Mahdi has killed us without exhortation and warning."

But I say, "I did warn them, O Lord, but they would not listen." And there was present at this pleading the Lord of all created things, the prophet, on whom be God's peace and blessing, and he said to them, "The Imam, the Mahdi, warned you, but ye would not listen to him, but listened to the sayings of your learned men, wherefore your blame is upon yourself." Then some of them advanced upon others, reproaching them. Then those who had felt their own witness said to those who had been overweening, "Had it not been for you we should have been among the believers," and the overweening said to the weak, "Did we stop you from the right path after that the Mahdi had come to you? Nay, ye were guilty."

If ye have light ye will believe in God, in His Prophet, and in the next world, and will accept the truth of our mission as Mahdi, and will come out to us surrendering yourselves. He who surrenders shall be saved. But if ye refuse and persist in denying my divine calling, and trust in guns and powder, ye are to be killed, even as the Prophet foretold many others before you.

Peace.

The guide also said that Sheikh Mohammed had been killed by order of the Mahdi, who had sent on his force to Birket, and was himself following at once.

Shortly afterwards the other guides returning confirmed this news. The original intention was to march to El Obeid *via* Birket, but now that the Mahdi was known to be at Birket with a large force, Hicks and Ala ed Din consulted whether it would not be better to return to Rahad and march to El Obeid by the Kashgil torrent, and thence to Melbeis.

The guides were now summoned. Koua, who so far had shown that he knew the road well, advised that, instead of returning to Rahad, they should make straight for Kashgil, and thence to El Obeid, taking two days' water supply with them from Alluba; the guides, however, who were completely swayed by Genawi Bey, and had shown great ignorance, advised that the army should be divided, and part go as Koua¹ suggested, while the remainder should return to Rahad and advance by Melbeis. Ala ed Din Pasha was in favour of this latter arrangement, but Hicks Pasha strongly objected to dividing his forces, and after much discussion it was decided that Koua's proposal should be adopted. Accordingly, on the morning of Saturday, the 3d November, the army advanced from Alluba towards Kashgil, and after a march of ten miles through dense woods, he halted and formed a zariba. Just as night began a few shots were fired by the enemy, and at once the order was given to extinguish all lights. The next morning, Sunday, the march was continued towards the forest

¹ Koua was a Ghodiat Arab, most of his tribe had become Mahdists; it is therefore very probable that in giving this advice his intention was to betray the army into the Mahdi's hands. He eventually escaped just as the battle of Shekan began and joined the rebel forces.

of Shekan, but before an hour was past the Arabs suddenly attacked the square in rear. At this time the 4th battalion formed the rear face, the 1st the front, and the 2d and 3d battalions the left and right faces respectively, while all the stores and ammunition marched inside the square. A few of the Arabs penetrated, but the 1st battalion wheeling round to the support of the 4th drove them back, leaving four of their number killed within the square. Amongst them the Mahdi's clerk named Fauzi Eff, who had been a Government official at El Obeid, was recognised. Ragab Bey, commanding the 4th battalion, and a few soldiers were killed in this attack; also a number of camels, and what was more important than all, many of those carrying water had fallen outside the square, and so hot was the enemy's fire that it was impossible to recover the water-skins.

The army was now halted, and, according to the guides, Shekan was only two miles distant. A zariba was made, and now it was clear that the rebels were in great force all around.

The merchants all assembled at Ala ed Din Pasha's tent, and asked what the intention now was. Ala ed Din sent them to Hicks, and the latter sent them back to Ala ed Din; but instead of going they clamoured against the treatment they had received, and openly said that they had merely been brought to be killed.

In the meantime the enemy continued firing at the zariba from behind the trees, and it was here that Doctor Georges Bey was wounded in the body and died half an hour later.

Hicks Pasha now summoned all the commanding officers, merchants, etc., to consider the situation. He asked them if they had any suggestions to make, but no one answered. Genawi Bey then asked how much ammunition was left, and it was found that in all each man would have 240 rounds. He then remarked that as they would have apparently to fight their way to El Obeid, still thirty miles distant, he thought it was not sufficient. On hearing this the other merchants became excited. Some were for fighting their way to Kashgil, while others begged that a retreat might be made back to Alluba. Hicks Pasha was obliged to dismiss the meeting, and told them that they had better think over the matter and let him know in the evening. The merchants, however, repaired to Genawi Bey's tent, and, on the advice of the latter, it was decided that an attempt should be made to seize some of the arms which had been taken from them, and that they, under the direction of Genawi Bey, should break out of the zariba and make the best of their way back. This decision was actually carried into effect the next morning; but one of the merchants, Busati Bey, had previously warned Ala ed Din Pasha of their intention, and the matter reaching Hicks Pasha's ears he sent an English staff officer to bring them back. The latter succeeded in bringing back Genawi, but his men, some fifty in all, refused to return.¹ Hicks Pasha now decided to advance, and at 10 A.M. on Monday morning, the 5th November, the troops marched out of the zariba and formed

¹ This incident was probably the foundation for the report, for a long time believed as authentic, that a large portion of the army had separated from the main body and had escaped into the hill country to the south.

up in three squares, the whole formation resembling a triangle. Each square had its own transport and ammunition in the centre. Hicks Pasha with his staff led the way, followed by four guns of the artillery, then the first square, which was supported to the right and left rear by the other two squares, some 300 yards distant from the square and from each other.

Ala ed Din Pasha commanded the right square and Selim Bey the left. The exposed flanks of the squares were covered by cavalry, and a detachment of horsemen brought up the rear.

In this formation the troops steadily advanced, and half an hour later reached a fairly open valley, interspersed here and there with bush, while on either side were thick woods full of the enemy.

But to revert for a moment to the movements of Mohammed Ahmed. Learning from spies that Hicks had decided to advance towards Kashgil, he despatched the emir Abu Angar, with the bulk of his fighting force, to Shekan, some six miles north of Birket. (The attack made on the 4th had been conducted by this emir.) Mohammed Ahmed himself, with the remainder of his force, and accompanied by the Khalifas Abdullah Taashi, Ali Wad Helu, Sherif Mohammed, and the emirs Yakub (Abdullah's brother), Adam, and Wad en Nejumi, proceeded to the valley through which the troops must pass, and here concealed themselves in the woods on either side, while a few of them hid in a wooded depression in the midst of the plain, which in all probability the troops would cross. Nejumi was sent with his force to head the advance, while Abu Girgeh and Abd el Halim, who had never ceased to dog the footsteps of the doomed army, were instructed to attack the rear.

Now all was ready, and Mohammed Ahmed patiently awaited the arrival of the troops, which could already be seen advancing in the distance. He assembled his emirs for the last final instructions, and, rising from his prayer, drew his sword, shouted three times, "Allahu akbar," "You need not fear, for the victory is ours."¹

On came the squares. The first had reached the wooded depression when up sprang the Arabs with their fierce yells. Startled and surprised, the square was broken in a moment. The flanking squares now fired wildly at the Arabs fighting hand to hand with the Egyptians, and in their efforts must have killed numbers of their own comrades. But almost at the same instant the Arabs simultaneously attacked from the woods on both sides and from front and rear. The wildest confusion

¹ The spot where the Mahdi knelt in prayer is now marked by a small mosque.

followed ; squares fired on each other, on friends or enemies. While the surging mass of Arabs now completely encircled the force and gradually closed in on them, a massacre of the most appalling description took place. In little over quarter of an hour all was over.

Hicks Pasha with his staff, seeing that he could do nothing, cut his way through on the left and reached some cultivated ground. Here he was surrounded by some Baggara horsemen, and for a time kept them at bay, fighting most gallantly till his revolver was empty and then committing terrible execution with his sword. He was the last of the Europeans to fall, and one savage charge he made on his assailants is memorable to this day in the Sudan, and a body of Baggara who fled before him were called by their tribesmen "Baggar Hicks,"¹ or the cows driven by Hicks. But at last he fell, pierced by the spear of the Khalifa Mohammed Sherif. His cavalry bodyguard fought gallantly, and though repeatedly called on to surrender replied, "We shall never surrender, but will die like our officers and kill many of you as well." And soon all were killed.

Ala ed Din Pasha was killed trying to make his way from the right square to join Hicks Pasha.

Genawi Bey lay dead in the square beside his horse. It is said that as he fell mortally wounded he with his own sword hamstrung his horse, saying, "No other shall ever ride on you after me."

The whole force, with the exception of some 300 men, and most of these wounded, had now been completely annihilated. Of the rebels not more than some 500 had been killed, and the whole force, satiated with their victory and loaded with plunder and loot of every description, now scattered to their various homes—some 12,000 returning with the Mahdi to El Obeid. Amongst the prisoners were Abderrahman en Neka and two of the Mahass guides.

The news of the Mahdi's victory now spread far and wide, and if there had been some doubts previous to what was now termed a miracle, the complete annihilation of a whole army soon dispelled them, and everywhere from Dongola to the Equator, and from the Red Sea to the confines of Waddai, the belief was universal that at last the true Mahdi had appeared.

This appalling massacre took place so far away from Cairo that it was not understood aright.

The Egyptian ministers drew up a note saying that to establish Egyptian authority in the Sudan they required the temporary use of 10,000 troops, but to the ears of their European advisers the news rang with a true significance, and they at once recommended the abandonment of the Sudan.²

¹ A play on the words Baggara and Baggar, the former being the herdsmen and the latter the cows.

² An interesting confirmation of this account of the annihilation of the Egyptian army under Hicks Pasha has been given by Major Mahmud

In confirmation of this account the following extract from a letter sent by the mudir of Khartum with an explanation to General Gordon is of interest.

APPENDIX F (JOURNALS OF GENERAL GORDON)

Private

FROM THE MUDIR OF KHARTUM TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SUDAN

This report was made by H. E. Hussein Pasha, mudir, in the neighbourhood of Aloob¹ in Kordofan, and it remained passing from hand to hand among the rebels till we heard of its existence. We demanded it and received the following copy, which I transmit just as it is.

On Saturday, 2d of Moharram 1301,² was accomplished the arrival of the detachment of troops in the vicinity of Aloob, which is near the Government seat of Kordofan, by the will of the Creator.

On inspection of them—the troops—it was found that they had suffered from excessive thirst, and the not finding sufficient proper drinking water for the detachment, on account of the loss, six days before, of the guide who was appointed to lead the way, and on account of ignorance of the places where drinking water was to be found.

The consequence of which was to throw the square into a state of confusion, to the extent that privates could not recognise their companies nor officers their men. The transport also was scattered—I mean that the animals were scattered singly—without control. It was then that Monsieur Hicks, commander of the detachment, ordered the men and officers to collect in order. But as one of the commanding officers of the detachment disobeyed, he referred the matters to Ala ed Din Pasha, to see to bringing the detachment into order. But his excellency answered him that he himself was the commander, and responsible. The consequence of which was to cause universal weakness and paralysis. We met a body of troops and were all surrounded in one place, and on account of what I have said—and for want of water until Sunday, as we did not find enough to last till then—and thus it was impossible to escape destruction.

But oh ! alas for the Government authorities, who are—themselves—secure from danger. But if the will of the Most High God has ordained our death,—so far delayed,—it will be from thirst and not from anything else.

I, the writer of this report, am called Hussein Pasha, mudir, an

Abdullah el Mehallawi—a former official in the Bahr-el-Ghazal province, who on its surrender was sent in company with Lupton Bey to El Obeid. Arriving there some six months after the battle of Shekan, he and Lupton Bey were by the Mahdi's orders sent to look at the battlefield, the description of which tallies in all points with Barudi's statement. Lupton Bey, it is said, made a sketch of the field, but as he has since died it is not probable that this drawing has been preserved.

¹ i.e. Alluba.

² i.e. 3d November 1883.

officer of the home government in the army, a native of Egypt—one of those raised from the ranks; and I adjure you by God, who may see what I have written, if you are believers in God and His Prophet, that you will make this known to the Government authorities.

The will of God be done, and there is no escape from the decree of God, who hears and knows all things. May your life be prolonged.

Written Friday, 19th September 1884, 8 o'clock 12 minutes.

Marked in the centre 77.

SUAKIN, 1883.

While Hicks was marching into the wastes of Kordofan, one of the ablest slave-traders was besieging Suakin and the neighbouring garrisons of Tokar and Sinkat. This was the redoubtable Osman Digna. He was of Turkish extraction, his ancestors having come from Constantinople 300 years before; but the family had intermarried with the Hadendowa tribe and Osman had assumed that nationality. He with his brother Ahmed had lived for some years as merchants and slave-dealers at Suakin, and in the interests of his trade he was in the habit of visiting the interior of the Sudan. The Anglo-Egyptian slave convention was a serious deterrent to slave-dealing, and in 1882 Osman went to Khartum and thence to Kordofan, where he threw in his lot with the Mahdi and was appointed an emir by him in 1883. He was then despatched with the following proclamation to the Eastern Sudan.

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO ALL HIS BELOVED, THE BELIEVERS IN GOD AND HIS BOOK

Beloved, bear in mind that real wealth consists in obeying God, and following in the footsteps of those whom God has guided into the right path. The happy man is he who is guided by others, and the foolish man is he who follows after his own ideas. God has distinguished this holy faith by holy war. Any man who takes part in this holy war will be considered a true believer; but any man who refuses to join will be considered as one of those at enmity with the Prophet. (Here follow many verses from the Kuran and Ahadith.) Why, therefore, do you disobey the Almighty God? Have you not seen how I have gained victories over the Turks and infidels, whose bodies have been burnt wherever they have been pierced with spears?

Do you seek a greater miracle than this? It is just as the miracles of the Prophet. They (the Turks) are well armed with rifles and held strong positions, but not only were they defeated, they were utterly destroyed. The cause of their destruction is, that I am a light from God, and the Prophet has confirmed me as Mahdi, and has made me sit

several times on his own seat in the presence of all the khalifas and prophets, and Elias was present too with all the angels, and every believer from Adam up to the present time. In battle, the Prophet and those above mentioned are with me ; he has given me the sword of victory, and has promised that not even the Thakalain (i.e. half man half jinn)¹ can defeat me. The Prophet also informed me that God has placed a mole on my right cheek, as a mark that I am the Mahdi. He has also given me another sign, which is a banner of light carried by Izrail (the angel of death), who walks before me in time of battle. In this manner I have been enabled to capture Kordofan and all the surrounding countries, and God will also open your country for me, and by His will the whole world will submit to me, accepting me as the true Mahdi. Woe, therefore, to those who do not believe in me, for they will all be destroyed. Why did you not set forth as soon as you heard of me, in order to help in the holy war ? Are you afraid of the Turks and their strength ? Are you not aware that all their armies must fall into my hands ? Do you not know that all the infidels will be destroyed by us ? Do you not believe that I am the expected Mahdi ? Do you not believe in the holy writings which speak of me ? (Here follow several verses of the Kuran, etc.).

Remember that I have come by order of the Prophet. He has sent me to be your saviour, and you should therefore believe in me. The Prophet has told me that any one who disbelieves in me disbelieves in God and in His Prophet. I have quoted his own words, and he repeated them three times to me. You are aware that I am descended from the family of the Prophet. I am begotten of the forehead of his father and mother, and the father and mother of my mother are descended from the Abbassides. I am lineally descended from El Hussein (the Prophet's grandson).

I made my hejira (flight) to Masat, in the mountain of Gedir, by order of the Prophet, and by his order I came into Kordofan. From there I sent my several proclamations, and I now send this one to you. On receiving it, leave the Turks at once ; do not hesitate to leave your property and children behind you ; leave them, and come even to the nearest village, and fight against the Turks with all your strength. (Here follow several verses from the Kuran.).

I send you Sheikh Osman Digna, of Suakin, as your emir, in order to revive the true religion. On his arrival, join him and obey his orders, advance against the Turks, and drive them out of your country. All God's people before you have quitted their country and children, in order to conquer the land of the infidels. They did not mind death nor fatigue. The present time will now prove whether you are truly God's people. This you will be if you obey the orders of the Mahdi ; but if you disobey, then you must expect nothing but the sword, and your fate will be that of all those who have disobeyed us.

Osman on his arrival at Erkowit detached Mustafa Hadal

¹ The Arabs people the world with countless spirits, demons, genii (jinn),—some good, some evil, some Moslems, some not.

for the capture of Kassala, and devoted himself to the neighbourhood of Suakin.

On 5th August an attack was made on Sinkat, which was repulsed; and on 9th September the governor, Tewfik Bey, again defeated the enemy at Handub on the Erkowit Road.

On 16th October a reinforcement of Egyptian troops bound for Sinkat was attacked in a defile by the rebel tribes, and all but twenty-five were killed.

Thus Sinkat was completely cut off from Suakin, and the last success made Osman so confident that he had now won over the tribesmen to his side, that he left them to continue the siege while he himself turned his attention to Tokar, which was now surrounded; and on 4th November a half-hearted expedition of 550 men was sent from Suakin under Mahmud Pasha Taher, commanding the troops in the Eastern Sudan, to relieve the garrison of that place. They left Suakin at 8 A.M., and were put to disgraceful flight an hour later by some 150 of Osman's men. Leaving 148 dead on the field, they returned to spread panic at Suakin.

It was in this disaster that Commander Lynedoch Moncrieff lost his life; the day before, and from the same cause, as Hicks, 600 miles away.

It was now decided to open the Suakin-Berber route. If Egypt was ever to have an army, her men must be trained in the use of arms, and have confidence in their officers, before they were sent to wild lands to battle for their lives.

Sir Evelyn Wood's recruits of eleven months could undertake no such service as the expedition to Berber, but the constabulary was composed chiefly of old soldiers; and in their chief, General Valentine Baker Pasha, fresh from his successes in Turkey, these men had all confidence.

On the 26th November 1883, H.H. the Khedive reviewed the constabulary selected for the Suakin service, and after the review the Turkish officers went in a body to Baker Pasha and refused to go. Baker told them he was going himself, and called for volunteers. The call was promptly responded to, such was the influence of Baker Pasha's prestige.

Meanwhile another disaster had taken place at Suakin. Osman Digna's men kept up a harassing attack on the town every night, and on the 2d of December Kassim Effendi sallied

forth with 200 Bashi-Bazuks and 500 blacks to drive the enemy away; they were attacked in a defile near Tamanib. The Bashi-Bazuks fell in a panic back upon the blacks, who, fighting to the last, were all cut to pieces by some 3000 Arabs.

Panic reigned supreme at Suakin, and the one piece of good fortune in this miserable chain of disaster was that the first detachment of Baker Pasha's troops arrived in time to prevent the surrender of the town and the massacre of all its inhabitants.

Mahmud Pasha Taher was now relieved of his functions as governor, and was replaced by Suliman Niazi Pasha, who, it will be remembered, had been removed from the command of Hicks's force, in order to give the latter the supreme command.

Baker's force on leaving Cairo comprised 2000 infantry, 520 cavalry, and 100 volunteers from the European police. His English officers were Colonel Sartorius, Captain Harrington, Captain Holroyd, Captain Giles, Morice Bey, Dr. Leslie, and Captain Forrestier-Walker; Colonel Hay (staff), and Captain Harvey, A.D.C. Colonel Burnaby joined as a volunteer.

On Christmas day General Baker reviewed all his troops at Suakin, and put them under a strict course of drill for the great enterprise he had on hand.

On the 17th January 1884 the news arrived that the Sudan was to be abandoned, and the kadi,¹ the most influential man in Suakin, went instantly over to Osman Digna.

Baker Pasha now undertook the relief of Tokar, which was still besieged. He marched out from Trinkitat on the 4th of February 1884, having previously thrown up a fort three miles from the landing-place, where he left 300 men, and advanced with a force of 3700 men towards Tokar, with a view to effecting its relief.

The following was the formation during the advance:—

Three infantry battalions in echelon, marching in columns of companies—artillery and cavalry on the front and flanks, while cavalry and vedettes were thrown out a mile in advance—in rear followed the baggage column of 300 camels.

The cavalry, having driven off small bodies of the enemy, suddenly came upon a number of spearmen when near the wells of El Teb, and was forced to retire closely followed by them.

¹ This kadi was Osman Digna's brother-in-law.

General Baker now attempted to form square, but two of the infantry battalions, panic-stricken, refused to move. A square was at length formed, but the rear face was an irregular mass of camels, horses, and mules; and in the midst of this confusion the retreating cavalry, dashing into the square, increased the panic.

Large numbers of the enemy concealed in the bush now rushed down on the square. The Egyptian battalions broke at once, and forced the animals on to the rear of the untrained Sudanese, who, after standing for a time, soon became completely disorganised.

Panic reigned supreme. The troops, throwing down their arms, fled, but numbers, huddled together in a surging mass with camels, horses, and mules, could not extricate themselves, and were massacred without even making an attempt to resist. Of the Europeans, eleven were killed fighting gallantly and endeavouring to rally their men, and of the remainder of Baker's force less than 1400 succeeded in reaching Trinkitat. Few of them had arms or clothes, and Baker, seeing that all attempts at opposition were hopeless, re-embarked with the remnant of his force and returned to Suakin.

Four Krupp guns, two Gatlings, half a million cartridges, and 3000 rifles and carbines fell into the hands of the Arabs, whose entire force at the time of the attack did not exceed 1200 men.

And now only a small force of demoralised troops, with the assistance of the British men-of-war under Admiral Hewett, held Suakin.

To the south, the walled town of Harrar, seated in its coffee gardens like an island in the sea of camel-owning Issa and Gadobursi Somalis, was yet peaceful, though measures for the removal of its garrison were being discussed.

The long siege—it lasted twenty months—of Kassala was begun in November 1883. Mustafa Hadal, a lieutenant of Osman Digna, leagued with Sheikh Ahmed Ibn, Sheikh Mussa and his Hadendowas,¹ established their headquarters at Gugnam, four hours north of Kassala. The Governor of Kassala (a

¹ The tribal name Hadendowa is derived from the Bega words *Hada* (chief, master) and *endowa* (people); hence it means "Chief" or "First People," a title flattering to the pride of these Bedawin.

walled town of 13,000 inhabitants) was at first assisted by the Beni Rid Arabs, and obtained great supplies of corn; but in January 1884 he made a sortie or expedition through the district held by them, and they fell upon his rear and cut 900 soldiers to pieces. The Governor then shut himself up in the town. He disposed of 18 mountain guns and mitrailleuses. Of troops he had 1600 regulars and 2300 irregulars. He had ample store of provision, added to from time to time by the hitherto faithful Shukrieh Arabs.

This is one of the two instances, from the fall of the first to the fall of the last garrison, in which the Egyptian received any aid or sympathy from the Sudanese. The Shukrieh were at last, however, induced to sell their grain to the besiegers.

The complete inaction of the Government convinced them that they were supporting a falling cause, that they were making quixotic efforts in furtherance of an object already abandoned by the original promoters, and their allegiance was transferred, though perhaps more in name than in fact, to the rapidly increasing stream of Arab fanaticism.

Thus the year 1884 opened badly for the garrison of Kassala.

By this time it was computed that the Mahdi had gained possession of over 20,000 rifles, 19 guns, and a vast store of ammunition.

DARFUR, 1883.

At the close of 1882 Slatin Bey had been harassed at Darra by the emir Madibbo, and had temporarily checked the rising of the tribes near El Fasher, which had been instigated by the Sultan Durbenga and the Sultan Gaddo; but early in 1883 the tribes had again collected, and the stream of Mahdism had now permeated even the most distant parts of his province. Soon the towns of El Fasher, Darra, and Kebkebieh were in a state of siege, and communication between all these places was almost cut off.

Said Bey Guma, mudir of El Fasher, had twice tried to clear the neighbourhood of the rebels, but the last time the forces of the Government which he despatched for this purpose were almost annihilated, ninety-nine men only returning. This defeat occurred in August 1883.

In the early part of the year orders had been sent from Khartum to Slatin Bey to concentrate his garrisons at El Fasher, to nominate as king one of the deposed native sultans, and to retire to Khartum. This message never reached Slatin, for in June he wrote from Demitala to Khartum in distress. He had fought twenty-seven battles, and killed the emir Bakir, but his own men had undermined his authority. They spread reports that Arabi had driven all the English out of Egypt.

At the commencement of the rainy season Slatin moved to Omshanga, which he put in a state of defence, and ordered up the garrison of Foga to reinforce this place, and then returned to Darra.

But now his own officers and officials had become thoroughly infected with the spirit of revolt. He himself had nominally adopted the Moslem religion in the hope that his influence to preserve order would be increased, and according to his own showing this was for a time effectual. Soon, however, he was obliged to abandon all prospects of inducing his garrison to make a stand against the ever-increasing wave of revolt, and now had recourse, as a last resource, to a stratagem. It was then October, and news had reached him of the advance of Hicks Pasha's army on El Obeid; if he could only prevent the Mahdi from sending more reinforcements to the besiegers by whom he was surrounded, he might temporise with the latter for a time in the hope that Hicks's approach would enable him once more to take the offensive with the prospect of speedy relief. He therefore summoned a council at which the situation was discussed, and it was unanimously decided to voluntarily surrender the province to the Mahdi, but at the same time to write to Hicks Pasha informing him of the situation, and begging him to hurry on with all possible speed. The letter to the Mahdi surrendering the province and that to Hicks were confided to Mohammed Khalid, surnamed Zogal—the mudir of Darra—but who was at the same time closely connected by family ties with Mohammed Ahmed. Zogal, quitting Darra, succeeded in passing safely through the lines of the enemy and delivering the letter; he then proceeded to El Obeid, where he presented the letter of surrender to Mohammed Ahmed. Similar letters were also written by

Said Bey Guma from El Fasher, and by Adam Effendi Emir from Kebkebieh, with the result that the besiegers now relaxed their efforts in the investment, and a period of anxious expectancy ensued. On the one hand Slatin was hoping that relief would shortly appear, while the besiegers but waited for the Mahdi's final instructions to take possession.

Shortly after Zogal's arrival at El Obeid the terrible disaster occurred at Shekan, in which Hicks Pasha's force was annihilated; and now, whatever may have been Zogal's original intentions, he became forthwith a Mahdiist heart and soul. Indeed, so violent was he in his protestations of loyalty to his new chief that the latter despatched him without delay and with a considerable force to take possession of the Darfur province in his name.

Now nominated emir of Darfur, Zogal started from El Obeid early in December, and reaching Omshanga about the middle of the month, he communicated to the garrison the news of the defeat of Hicks Pasha, and that he was now the Mahdi's governor of Darfur. The garrison surrendered without firing a shot. Zogal then continued his advance to Darra, and halting a short distance from the town, he despatched a letter to Slatin informing him of the change which had taken place owing to the defeat of Hicks Pasha, and to add conviction to his statement sent in three Egyptian soldiers who had been wounded at Shekan, together with some of Hicks Pasha's documents and clothing of the British officers. He strongly advised Slatin to yield, representing that resistance was useless, for the whole country as far as Khartum was in the Mahdi's hands, and that it was hopeless to think any relief could reach him.

Slatin, on the receipt of these incontestable proofs of the recent defeat, took counsel with the officers and officials, and it was unanimously decided that the town should be surrendered to Zogal, and on the following day the latter entered Darra and handed to Slatin the Mahdi's proclamation, in which he was told to renounce the name of Slatin and adopt that of Abd el Kader, and adding, "Sheikh Abd el Kader is a good man. He is to be treated with every consideration and sent to El Obeid, and should be paid all the honour due to him."

The town passed peacefully from the hands of the Government into those of the Mahdi.

Slatin then wrote a letter to Said Bey Guma of El Fasher, and to Adam Effendi, emir of Kebkebieh, recommending them to surrender, as it was hopeless to expect any reinforcements after the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's force, and that they should hand over the keys of the treasuries to Zogal.

At the same time Slatin wrote the historical two lines to Lupton, "I send this man Hadgi¹ Mustafa Karamallah to you." This Karamallah eventually became emir of the Bahr el Ghazal.

Such was the state of affairs in Darfur at the end of 1883.

Meanwhile the Mahdi, at El Obeid, was busy establishing his authority over all the surrounding country. Amongst others he wrote letters to Rabih Zubeir, calling on him to submit. This individual was a former slave of Zubeir Pasha, and who had, on the death of Suliman Zubeir, fled with a considerable following towards Borgo; he had two conflicts with the sultan of that place, who, finding him a powerful adversary, thought it more politic to make peace with him and permit him to settle on the boundaries of his territories to the north of Omshanga. Mohammed Ahmed also claimed allegiance from the sultan of Borgo, but the latter, as well as Rabih Zubeir, stoutly refused to have anything to do with this adventurer, and, as they were far distant from the present sphere of operations, they were not further troubled till some years later.

BAHR EL GHAZAL, 1883

But to return to events in Bahr el Ghazal. Lupton Bey, it will be remembered, was, at the end of 1882, combating the steady wave of Mahdism which had been pouring into his province ever since Mohammed Ahmed had established himself at Jebel Gedir. After the fall of El Obeid, his Danagla were more than ever ready to follow a leader who freely permitted the illicit trade which was their very life-blood, and now the spread of the revolt received fresh impetus.

To the north-west Major Mahmud Effendi Abdullah had

¹ *Haj* signifies the Mecca pilgrim, a title of honour prefixed to the name of all Mohammedans who have made the pilgrimages to the holy cities, Mecca and Medina.

successfully coped with the attempt of Sheikh Madibbo on Tel Gauna, and after his success near that place, he advanced against Sheikh Shegara of the Shat tribe, who, having allied himself with portions of the Dembo, Bongo, and Lawa tribes, had openly declared hostility to the Government. A detachment of regulars under Ali Agha Bishara, and 200 Bazingers under Mohammed Azrak, succeeded in surprising the Arab camp, and after a short resistance captured it and some 4000 prisoners, mostly women and children.

On the 27th January 1883 Major Mahmud Effendi now returned ill to Lupton, who was then at Dembo, leaving Ruffai Agha in command.

Shortly afterwards this latter received news of an intended attack on Liffi by Sheikh Jango, who had returned with a considerable number of Madibbo's men; Ruffai Agha, therefore, returned post haste with his men towards Liffi. *En route* he learnt that they had attacked and sacked a village near Foroga; and pushing on rapidly on 1st February he came up with the Arabs a few miles from Liffi and fell on them, dispersed them with some loss, and entered Liffi. Here he received orders from Lupton to proceed forthwith against the Janghe tribe, who with some of the Tuj men threatened to attack Dembo. Ruffai Agha left Liffi without delay, but on approaching Dembo and hearing that the enemy was in considerable force he entrenched himself in a zariba, but the enemy melted away and Ruffai Agha continued for some months in this position, making constant raids on the surrounding tribes. While in this position Lupton Bey inspected his station, and blamed him for establishing friendly relations with the tribes, warning him rather to be on his guard. But all this time the Arabs were secretly collecting, and in September made a determined attack on the zariba; regardless of the fire, they rushed up to the palisades, and clambering over the dead bodies of those who had already fallen, succeeded in breaking through it and massacring the troops almost to a man, including Ruffai Agha.

The victorious troops now intended to attack Dem Zubeir, but the rains coming on they were unable to carry out their intentions.

Meanwhile Slatin had constantly written to Lupton for reinforcements, which the latter could not give.

In July the road to Meshra¹ or Rek was completely blocked, owing to the revolt of the Dinkas, and all communication with the north was shut off.

On 15th August a steamer arrived at Meshra, but the despatches on board did not reach Lupton at once, as he was at that time at Jur Ghattas, but he subsequently proceeded to Meshra or Rek, disembarked the stores and sent the mudir Sati Bey to Khartum in the steamer to get arms and ammunition.

The Dutch traveller Schuver had attempted to force the road between Meshra and Jur Ghattas, but was intercepted and killed by the Dinkas.

Lupton had previously warned Doctor Junker, then exploring the Welle, of the disturbed state of the country, and at his advice the latter now gave up all attempts to go north and turned his steps to the Equatorial Provinces, reaching Lado on the 23d January 1884, while Captain Casati, who had also been exploring to the west, had already arrived there some months previously.

Lupton in a note to Emin, dated August 1883, says—
“The Arabs are, I am told, in company with Gellabas,² determined to attack us at Dem Zubeir;³ slaves are bought and sold now for ammunition, three packets will buy a boy—five a girl—two girls a Remington.”

Lupton returned to the capital a short time before the defeat of Ruffai Agha, but the rain prevented him from revenging this slaughter, and it was not till towards the end of December that he was able to move out. He then proceeded with all his available troops to the scene of the late disaster, and entrenching himself in a zariba, with double ditch and palisade, he called on the revolted tribes to surrender the arms and ammunition they had captured. The latter, however, replied that they would attack him the following day; and this they did, but were repulsed with loss.

The enemy now retired to collect reinforcements, and

¹ *Meshra*, though described as a landing-place, is more properly a watering place on the banks of a river.

² More correctly *Gellabun*, the plural of *gellab*, i.e. a packman or itinerant dealer, in contradistinction to the *tajer* or settled trader. The trade of these people eventually became synonymous with slave-dealing.

³ Also called Dem Suliman. *Dem* signifies town or large village.

Lupton, finding that he was running short of ammunition, thought it better to retire on Dem Suliman; he had at this time at his disposal four companies of Bashi-Bazuks, besides a large number of Bazingers.

Such was the state of affairs in the Bahr el Ghazal at the end of 1883.

EQUATORIAL PROVINCES, 1883

The early part of this year was uneventful. The last steamer had arrived on 16th March and left on 14th April. As yet the insurrection in the Bahr el Ghazal had not penetrated to the Equatorial Provinces, but the country was not entirely free of local disturbance.

The Danagla, here as in Bahr el Ghazal, were the disquieting element. They had made numbers of their Farukh¹ or gun-boys freebooting chiefs, who by force of arms had usurped the power of the real chiefs; these latter had established a chain of robber nests to the west between Ansea and Wandī, and another along the line of the Dingu, and had thus cut the road to Monbuttu. These independent raiders had no doubt heard of the disturbed state of the country north, and at once commenced freebooting expeditions throughout the country. To check them Emin Bey had personally visited the disturbed districts, and succeeded in partially restoring tranquillity; but in the midst of his travels he was apprised of a revolt of the Dinka in the northern part of his province, and he hurried back to his capital (Lado), passing *en route* through Makaraka, the mamur Ibrahim Mohammed Agha of which place he instructed to proceed at once to the Rohl Province, and, collecting reinforcements at Amadi, to do what he could to quell the disturbances.

Arrived at Lado on the 23d August he fell seriously ill.

The revolt which had occurred during his absence was a serious one.

The stations, it must be remembered, as was the invariable custom, were largely supported by raids made on the neighbouring tribes.

In retaliation, the Dinka of Agar, on whom the last serious

¹ *Farukh* is the name given to the traders' gun-boys, and it is also applied to mercenaries hired as irregular troops at Khartum.

raids had been made, surprised the garrison of Rumbek on 27th July and succeeded in massacring the garrison of seventy men, including the commandant, Captain Abdullah Agha es Sudani. Shambah too was attacked shortly afterwards, and the garrison of 150 men put to the sword.

These events had alarmed the garrison of Ayak, who sent to Bahr el Ghazal for reinforcements, and Emin on his arrival at Lado had also begged him to send troops to reinforce his northern posts.

Meanwhile, the mamur of Makaraka had arrived at Rohl, and on the 6th October reported that he considered 150 men sufficient to restore tranquillity in the province, and that Shambah and the neighbourhood were quiet.

On the 15th December he succeeded in recapturing Rumbek and hoisting the Government flag there. Also a large supply of grain was thrown into Shambah.

Towards the end of the year Emin remarks that it is not in the Bahr el Ghazal alone that the negroes are disaffected, but things also begin to look lively in his province; the chief Loron had been busily intriguing, and there was little doubt that the stream of rebellion was gradually flowing south. Loron (Sir Samuel Baker's Loro), it appears, had invited the chiefs of Behiman and Lokoya of the Bari tribe to make a combined attack on Lado, where it was known there were few arms and a small supply of ammunition.

The year 1883, therefore, closed on Emin in no small anxiety as to the future.

He had received no news from Khartum since the last steamer, which had left Lado on the 14th. He had heard of the fall of El Obeid, but not of the annihilation of Hicks. He knew that Lupton was in difficulties, and had been deserted by some of his men, and he was aware that his own supply of arms and ammunition was insufficient for any lengthened operations; but with all this anxiety he is still busily making collections in the interests of natural history.

The respective positions of the Egyptian and Arab forces at the end of 1883 are shown on the accompanying map.

BOOK V

THE EGYPTIAN POSITION IN THE SUDAN UP TO THE END OF 1884, WITH THE SIEGE OF KHARTUM DURING THAT YEAR

Beginning of the siege of Khartum—Panic of the inhabitants—De Coetlogon makes the lines of defence—Sennar besieged—Decision to abandon the Sudan—General Gordon arrives in Cairo with the object of proceeding to the Sudan to withdraw the garrisons—Gordon's arrival in Khartum—The suppression of the slave trade abolished—Troops massed in Khartum—Gordon applies for Zubeir Pasha—Public opinion averse to his being sent—Gordon prepares to stand a siege—The battle of 16th March—Two pashas executed in Khartum—The Mahdi summons Khartum to surrender—His letter to Gordon—Gordon's reply—The decision of the inhabitants to trust Gordon and resist—Saleh Pasha and a steamer captured at El Mek—The siege pressed more closely—Events in the Eastern Sudan—British Government decides to defend Suakin—Mohammed Tewfik, governor of Sinkat, makes a sortie and is cut to pieces—General Graham is despatched with 4000 British troops to relieve Tokar—Sir Evelyn Wood volunteers to send some of the troops of the new Egyptian army—The battle of El Teb and Tamai—Proposal to open the Suakin-Berber road—The Hadendowa and Amarar in open revolt—Berber besieged—Captain Kitchener and Lieutenant Rundle despatched to the Sudan—Stopped at Assuan—They raise Arab levies to defend the country between the Nile and the Red Sea—Alarm at Assuan—Meeting of the Bisharin Sheikhs—Nile patrolled by British blue-jackets in sternwheelers—The expedition along the Arba'in road—The fall of Berber—The emir Heddai advances towards Dongola—Description of the mudir of Dongola—The uncertainty in Egypt as to his loyalty—Heddai is defeated at Debbeh—Retires to the desert and demands reinforcements—Captain Kitchener volunteers to go to Dongola—His arrival at the capital—His report of the mudir's attitude—The Mahdi despatches the emir Mahmud to Heddai's assistance—The Mahdi's letter to the mudir of Dongola—The battle of Korti—Heddai and Mahmud killed—Mudir gains the victory—Captain Kitchener negotiates with Saleh of the Kababish—The Nile Expedition under Lord Wolseley for the relief of Khartum—Gordon defeats the emir Abu Girgeh—The mountainous districts of Kordofan still resist Mahdism—Events in Darfur—Said Bey Guma resolves on resistance at El Fasher—Zogal arrives and three times unsuccessfully assaults the town—Slatin advises surrender—Fall of El Fasher—Slatin's letter to General Gordon—Zogal despatches a force from El Fasher to subdue

the Sultan Dudbenga—The Mahdiist forces severely defeated—Dudbenga besieged at Jebel Marra—He capitulates—Zogal supreme in Darfur—Events in the Bahr el Ghazal—Lupton applies to Slatin for reinforcements—He collects and stores grain—The emir Karamallah arrives on the frontier—Summons Lupton to surrender—Decision of officials and troops to make no resistance—Lupton writes three despairing letters to Emin—The fall of Bahr el Ghazal, from the statement of an officer who was present—Karamallah's brother describes the circumstances of the fall—Karamallah's official letter on the subject to the Khalifa Abdullah Taashi—Events in Equatoria—The meeting of Dr. Junker and Emin—The disputes in the Rohl province—Emin receives Lupton's letters—An attempt to relieve Shambeh fails—Emin on learning of the fall of Bahr el Ghazal and the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's force decides to surrender his province—The fire in Lado and its effect on Emin's intentions—He describes the situation—The surrender mission proceeds to Bahr el Ghazal—The kadi's instructions to Emin—The governor of Makaraka deserts but is killed—Rumbek and Ayak abandoned—Redistribution of the garrisons—Karamallah attacks Amadi—Emin sends reinforcements—The garrison of Bohr almost exterminated—Makaraka district tranquil—Emin's conclusions at the end of 1884—The siege of Sennar—Jealousy between the governor and commander of the troops—The governor writes to Gordon—The emir el Merhdi invests Sennar—Events in the Eastern Sudan subsequent to the battle of Tamai—Suakin in a state of siege—Major Chermiside arranges with King John of Abyssinia for the relief of the Egyptian garrisons on the Abyssinian frontier—The "Hewett Treaty"—The siege of Kassala—Bogos handed over to Abyssinia—The fall of Gedaref—Events in the province of Harrar—The mission of Major Hunter and Radwan Pasha—Radwan Pasha and Lieutenant Peyton arrive at Harrar—They begin the evacuation—The government handed over to Mohammed Abd esh Shakur—Installation of the new emir—All troops and families reach the coast in safety.

FROM Auxomis aforesaid to the Roman frontier in Egypt is thirty dayes journey: where are the Blemmyes and Nobates and other numerous people. The Blemmyes are seated in the midland, but the Nobates on the Nile. This was not formerly the Roman frontier, which was seven dayes journey beyond. But Diocletian finding their tribute a trifle and their country narrow, being most taken up with the rockes of the Nile, and the garrisons in it (being many) burdening his treasury with their charge: and considering how the Nobates then dwelling about the city of Oäsis spoyled the towns near them, he drew them from that place, that they might no more trouble the country about Oäsis, by giving them fair Roman cities, and a large country, all from Elephantine on both sides of the Nile, which he thought they would now guard and beat off the Blemmyes (as being their own land) and other barbarous nations.

He gave them also, and to the Blemmyes, a pension in gold, not to prey upon the Roman territories, which they still receive, yet overrun the provinces. So impossible is it for barbarians to keep faith with Romans but for fear of the souldier.¹

¹ From *The History of the Warres of the Emperore Justinian*—written in Greek by Phocopius of Cæseria and Englished by Hen. Holcroft, Kt.: London 1653.

Khartum had been virtually in a state of siege since July 1883. Hussein Pasha Sirri and Colonel de Coetlogon, one of Hicks's officers left in charge of the depot, busied themselves in putting in order such defences as were possible for an area at once extensive and, what made more difficulty, of a greatly varying extent. Coetlogon personally attended to a work of great importance. He "drove a deep ditch and parapet, 1530 yards long, across the level space or plain left dry by the subsidence of the river." "But for him," adds Power, keenly alive to the insecurities of the position, "this broad avenue into the town would have been left open and unprotected," and there is no doubt that Power was correct. The gate of an Egyptian enclosure is ever placed where it will least affect the access to that enclosure. In that land of contradictions, modern as well as ancient "enclosures" are frequently inferred from the existence of a lordly gateway, or massive pylon.

The news of Hicks's massacre created a panic amongst the population. Consuls and Europeans hastened from the place. The Austrian consul, Hansal, who owned much property in Khartum, remained, together with Power—British consul and newspaper correspondent—and De Coetlogon. Two Austrian families, too poor to leave, completed the roll of Europeans left in the doomed city. Their view of matters was telegraphed in November as follows:—

We have not food for more than a month, and only 2000 men to defend nearly four miles of lines. It is perfectly useless to attempt to hold this place where the population is a slumbering volcano. The land line of retreat is now closed, the river line of retreat may be closed to-morrow.

Great efforts, however, were made, and three weeks later the town was provisioned for a year, while the garrison of Fashoda, numbering 1300 regulars, arrived on the 26th December, and other small outposts were got in by the end of the year.

The town of Sennar, too, shut itself up within its walls. Outside the towns the Mahdi's adherents were supreme in the neighbourhood of Khartum. Their avowed intention of proceeding north was a menace to the tranquillity of Egypt. It was decided that the British troops should remain, and

that the Sudan should be abandoned. Egypt must abandon the Sudan because she could not stop there. To this His Highness the Khedive agreed. His ministers, with what patriotism they knew, produced a forgotten rescript from the Sultan of Turkey and resigned their posts because "they were prevented from governing according to the constitution." Their successors proposed that Abd el Kader Pasha should proceed to Khartum and bring away the troops. That officer declined without hesitation. The Sheikh Morghani, chief of a religious brotherhood widely spread in the Sudan, went to Suakin and excommunicated the Mahdi. Osman Digna invited him to a conclave, and the sheikh returned to Cairo. Nothing seemed to succeed, and the prospect was gloomy for those who looked to the peace which alone could ensure the steady growth of the hundred millions invested in the country. A further consideration was intruding itself with daily increasing urgency. The hundreds of thousands of fanatical Arabs might not march north and blight the tender plant, but who was to save those 30,000 helpless soldiers? Their true condition of sheep among wolves was now apparent. They must be massacred if not rescued, and Gordon's arrival on the scene was a relief to ministers, taxpayers, and to the Egyptian Government.

General Gordon's departure from London was as characteristic as was his arrival in Cairo. The Duke of Cambridge, it is true, and Lord Wolseley were at the railway station, but for all the public knew, two gentlemen might have been seeing a third off to a dinner party. At Cairo, when the special train came in, one solitary passenger alighted, a small man in a black greatcoat, with neither servant nor portmanteau.

Gordon had left London with the mission to report on the condition in the Sudan. On board the steamer he drew up and telegraphed home the arrangements he wished made, the powers he wished to take, and the decrees he wished issued. These on his arrival were all in Sir Evelyn Baring's hands.

He was to collect the garrisons of the Sudan, establish what government might be possible, and return with the troops. Such was the task which Gordon set himself. A dark cold evening saw him at Bulak station, and the dim light of the carriage showed the cheerful faces of Gordon, Stewart,

and Graham, as the train rolled away into the night, while Burton led a scanty cheer for his gallant countrymen.

Thus it was that, accompanied by Colonel Stewart, Gordon was sped upon his long journey to Khartum, there to loose the bonds of every system he had laboured to construct, to authorise the slave trade which he had fought so many battles to suppress, and, if it might be, to collect the scattered sheep and lead them home to their own pastures.

General Graham quitted General Gordon at Korosko, and returned to battle with Osman Digna on the eastern coast, while General Gordon and Colonel Stewart proceeded on their journey to Khartum. Here they were received as the lifeboat is welcomed by the sinking ship.

The superseded governor-general, Hussein Pasha Sirri, left before Gordon's arrival. A rough justice was now done, much mercy was shown, and a proclamation that the suppression of the slave trade by Egyptian means was once for all abandoned followed the announcement that the country was now an independent kingdom with Gordon for governor-general. A stream of emigration northwards was set running, and Colonel Duncan at Halfa passed to their homes some thousands of refugees.

The negro troops were collected in Khartum, while the white troops were massed in the outlying fort of Omdurman, ready for the long march north, as soon as the ruler could be found to hold the country when they turned their backs. In Gordon's opinion there was but one man possible. Though England could have summoned many men to do Gordon's work, it was well if the Sudan could produce one man to rule the tumult which must ensue when all semblance of restraint disappeared with Gordon's departure.

Zubeir was the one ruler. A quiet far-seeing thoughtful man of iron will—a born ruler of men.¹

The Khartum townsmen welcomed Gordon's arrival on the 18th of February. The enthusiasm was great at his assumption of power, at his remission of past and reduction of future taxes, and it lasted about nine days. All who had not joined

¹ Zubeir, it will be remembered, had conquered Darfur, and had risen to very great power in the Sudan. One of the Gemaab section of the Jaalin tribe, he was descended from the oldest family of that race, which claims descent from the noble Koreish tribe, through Abbass, uncle of the Prophet.

the Mahdi were wavering and looking earnestly for an alternative, and when one was presented, men with much to lose examined it closely. An English governor-general, but under what singular circumstances. Cut off from and independent of Egypt, not anxious about revenue, and cheerfully authorising the slave trade. Rumours were rife that the English had taken Egypt, and had decided to abandon the Sudan. Proclamations to this effect had, it was said, been drawn up, and the Sudanese judged that the rumours were correct, and that the English governor-general was but a device for the time. Then who was to replace him? The natural ruler of the Sudanese was Zubeir. If he were coming all would go well. But the tribes were threatening and impatient. They had already tasted blood and victory and thirsted for more. Zubeir must come at once. But the fact that Zubeir had been a notorious slave-dealer stood in the way, and those who were most interested in the slave trade vetoed the plan. Zubeir did not go, and from this arose grave consequences.

These consequences were sure and swift. At Khartum the troops were quickly recalled to reline the forts, and all preparations for an early march home were abandoned. The situation of Gordon and Stewart after the refusal to send up Zubeir was very striking.

Sheikh after sheikh was clamouring that Khartum should be handed over to him. Mohammed Ibn el Basir, the Sheikh el Obeid, the Fiki Gow, the emir Fiki Medawi, all clustered round Khartum, with their thousands of followers. It was a race who should first seize the ownerless town.

Gordon said that there was no hope of the people rallying round him, and he prepared for war. On the 16th of March he ventured to fight. His men ran like hares and were massacred. The survivors, the two commanding officers, were executed for treachery.

A week later the Bashi-Bazuks,—and if they would not fight, who in Khartum would?—refused to obey orders, and were disarmed. One searches in vain for a single circumstance hopeful for Gordon. When the eye wanders over the huge and hostile Sudan, notes the little pin-point garrisons, each smothered in a cloud of Arab spears, and remembers that Gordon and Stewart proceeded to rule this vast empire already

given away to others, one feels that the Sudanese view was marked by common sense. And when it is remembered that one of these Englishmen sat resolute there for eleven months, and that no one could dislodge him, one is proud beyond measure of the exploit.

Previous to the defeat of the 16th of March and the execution of the traitors, the town was summoned in due form in the name of the Mahdi by Sheikh Abd el Kader the judge of Kalakala, a village on the White Nile about five miles south of Khartum. Gordon called a meeting of notables and townsmen to discuss the summons, which is here given *in extenso* :—

FROM THE SERVANT OF HIS GOD, MOHAMMED EL MAHDI IBN ES SAYID
ABDULLAH, TO THE DEAR ONE OF BRITAIN AND OF THE KHEDIVE,
GORDON PASHA.

In the name of God, etc.—Your letter has been received and its contents have been read and understood. You say you wish the progress of the Moslems, and that you are desirous of opening up the road to enable them to visit the tomb of the Prophet. You also express your desire to establish friendship between us and you, and ask us to set free the Christians and Moslems, promising also to declare me ruler of Kordofan. In reply I state that while I confess that the order is with God, I have preached to the people in order to reform them and to make them come nearer to God, to teach them to distinguish between the vanities of this world, and of the world to come, and to make known to them those things which must lead to their salvation.

When at Abba, I wrote to the government of Khartum, informing them about my call to the true faith, and that my Mahdism comes direct from God and His Prophet, and is not a stratagem whereby to obtain property, money, and influence.

I am a humble servant, a lover of poverty and of the poor, one who hates the pride and haughtiness of those rulers whom I wish to lead into the way of truth. These rulers have been brought up to love money, power, and children, all of which are great obstacles in the way of reformation, and deprive them of the blessings which they might otherwise have obtained from God. They seek after things which vanish, instead of those things which remain for ever.

They are taken up with the vanities of this world, and are forgetful of the sayings of God and of His Prophet. They never think of those who have lived in the early centuries, and who received no benefits from the things of this world, but on the contrary were rather grieved than pleased. God has therefore chosen me as an exponent of true Mahdism, in order that I may show them the path to God, and advise them to relinquish temporal pride and vain pleasures, and seek rather everlasting pride and endless pleasures, in the land of eternal prosperity.

I do not think that he who hankers after the pleasures of this

world can believe in his heart that he is pleasing God, nor can he hope to have a share in the world to come. Jesus has said, "Ye disciples, ye build up your worldly abode on the waves of the sea, and do not therefore take it as your permanent abode." He who goes into the sea and thinks he will not be wetted, will be deceived, and one can liken unto him the man who collects the treasures of this world, clinging to its ambitions and pride, and still hoping to be admitted into the world to come. Build up therefore for yourselves that which will lead you to the Almighty God, obey Him, and seek for prosperity in the world to come. Do not consider this world as your abode which you must work to obtain.

How is it possible for one who is not a follower of the Prophet of God to wish to open the road to his tomb for pilgrims?

The Prophet has no desire to be visited by dogs, for it is said, this world is a carcase, and those who seek after it are dogs. The Prophet cares not for those to visit him who worship other gods and who forget that God is over all, and knows every word he says, and is one who seeks the vanity of this world. If you pity the Moslems you should pity your own soul first, and save it from the anger of its Creator, and make it a follower of the true religion, by following our lord the Prophet Mohammed, who has by his coming renewed that which was destroyed, and had fallen into disuse, which had been first preached by the Prophet of God and his messengers. He came to fulfil what was written in the book which he carried in his own hand. Had all the prophets been present they would not have followed any but his religion, they would all have desired to become his followers, and to have joined those who were his companions at that time. God will not accept any religion except that of the Prophet. Come, therefore, and join his religion, and then you can pity his people, and guide them in the fulfilment of his laws, then only can you be considered a man of pity. Unless you do so, no true believer can be your companion. God has said, Ye true believers, believe not in the saints of the Jews and Christians; their saints are considered as true saints by them only, and those of you who believe in their saints will be considered as of them, and not as of the true believers. God does not guide the oppressors. He has also said, Your only saints are God and His Prophet. The true believers are those who fulfil the prayers and pray for charity whilst kneeling: those who believe in God, His Prophet, and the true followers, they are the people of God and shall be saved.

We have therefore obeyed the orders of God. We believe in Him, and in His prophet, and in His followers, and we shall be victorious as God has promised. God has promised victory to the true followers, and therefore none other can gain the victory. If you would abandon your present belief, which is not contained in the religion of the Moslems, give yourself up to God and His Prophet and choose everlasting life. We would then accept you as a true believer and a brother, and the friendship which pleases God and His Prophet will exist between us. You will then be one of those who has obeyed the orders of God and His Prophet. Consider the promises and preaching contained in His sayings: "If the believers of the holy books become pious and true believers, their sins will be forgiven them and they will be admitted to a

paradise of everlasting happiness." Although they follow the Bible, the Gospel, and other holy books, yet it is necessary for them to hear the preachings and the promises. Let, therefore, friendship and love exist between us, and then you will be a true believer, by following our prophet Mohammed and abandoning the belief in Jesus Christ, and all other prophets and saints; and by so doing you will gain everlasting happiness. Again, you already know God's saying, that the people of God who believe in Him and in His Prophet, and who are true believers, shall be victorious as He has promised; some of them will be sent to you to detach you from those with whom you are allied. You have watered with your doctrines the property of His people and His land. The land is His, and He will give it to His pious worshippers.

As regards the Moslems and Christians, whom you wish me to set free and send to you, I am desirous of their good, and that they obtain the blessings of God and the inheritance of eternal life, just as I wish the same for you, and for all God's creatures. I shall not therefore deprive them of Paradise, and send them to affliction and trouble. God has endued me with the feeling of mercy for His creatures, and has sent me to save them from the destruction which would have been their lot, had not God in His mercy sent me to them.

Be it known to you that I am without pride, the promised Mahdi and the successor of the prophet. There is no need for me to be sultan or king of Kordofan, or any other country, nor have I any desire for the benefits or adornments of this world. I am a servant, and my duty is to show the way to God and to His kingdom. He who wishes to be happy should hear and follow me, but he who wishes to be miserable should turn away from my guidance; him shall God remove from his position, destroy, and torment perpetually.

God has given me the power to revive His religion, assisted by the prophets, messengers, angels, and all saints and believers.

The Prophet has informed me that those who declare enmity against me shall fail, and be conquered by the power of God, even should both the human race and the race of jinns combine. Deceive not yourself, else will you perish like your brethren. Take heed, therefore, and give yourself up to us that you may be saved. As regards the present you sent me, if it is sent in good feeling, God will reward you with His blessing, and guide you to righteousness: but let it be known to you that as I have already said, I do not care for the good things of this world, nor for its adornments, which worldly people strive after, and which have nought to do with God. Your present is therefore returned to you, and I am sending to you some articles of the dress worn by me and my followers, who look for eternal life, and who shall gain happiness in Paradise. This was the dress taken into use by all the prophets and messengers of God, and by all His pious servants. You are well aware of these facts, which you may also learn from the life of Christ. He said, I have shown you the vanity of this world, do not therefore cling to it. It is evident, therefore, that the priests, monks, and other followers who do not adhere to His sayings, are not following the right path, but are deceived by the worldly benefits of this life, which are truly but a carcase, bringing grief, misery, and repentance upon those who neglect their ever-

lasting welfare. We have abundance of goods of the same description as your present, but in our desire to seek after God we have laid them all aside. Let me say to you as our Lord Solomon said to Belkissa (Queen of Sheba), "You bring me money, but what God has bestowed upon me is preferable to your gifts. You are a people who delight in presents—I shall come upon you with an invincible army and drive you out of the city, despised and miserable."

Be it known to you, that if you yield to us, we will welcome you, and enlighten your heart, and all your ambition for this world will cease; and later on, if you show that you possess good intentions towards Moslems, we will appoint you a governor as we did Mohammed Khalid, late governor of Darfur, who, when he saw the light, rejoiced and joined us, repenting of all his former misdeeds. He was instructed in the true religion, and his heart was comforted in God. His devotion to God and his desire to attain everlasting life have moved us to appoint him Governor of Darfur. Also Abd el Kader, sultan, who communicated with us and gave himself up, was welcomed by us, and is now being taught the true religion, and is living in happiness. Also Said Guma, late governor of El Fasher, was brought to us by Mohammed Khalid in accordance with our orders, in order to be instructed. We are informed that Dimitri Sagada has also been converted, and is a follower of our doctrines, endeavouring to make himself worthy of eternal life. All the emirs of Darfur have followed the example of their governor, in giving themselves up to us for the love of God and His Prophet. Melik (King) Adam of Jebel Tagalla has just come to us, enlightened with the truth. He is now a faithful follower and a true believer. We welcomed him and he is now living in happiness. Many others have also followed in their footsteps.

Every person who desires to be happy must come to us from all quarters of the world. He who refuses shall be forsaken by God and tortured in the world to come, as our Lord the Prophet has said.

Be it known to you, Pasha, that all who have been killed through me received due warning beforehand. I send you herewith a copy of the warning I sent to Wad esh Shellali, in reply to his letter to me, also copies of the public warnings and private letters I sent to Hicks and the heads of his army. The Pasha of El Obeid killed our messengers when we sent him the warning, but when he fell into our hands, we treated him kindly, and gave him a dress (Mahdi uniform), hoping that it would make him faithful to God. We continued our presents and kind treatment towards him, in the hope of his becoming a true believer in God, but he would not believe, and persisted in giving himself up to sins, for which he deserved death. But we continually forgave him, until his days ended and he died. Owing, however, to his having lived for some time with me, he has received pardon in the world to come, and is now living in perfect happiness in Paradise.

The only object should be to inherit eternal life; to gain this should be the desire of every one. No good can arise from the pleasures of this life, which bring in their train only sorrow and grief in the day of resurrection, and are great obstacles to gaining eternal prosperity and salvation.

I have preached both by word and deed to all the chiefs, that they may duly value the kingdom of God, and cast off all vanity.

All the principal people who have fallen into our hands have been treated with kindness and generosity, and those who have become faithful to us are now enjoying wealth and honour.

If after all this explanation you will deliver yourself up and become a follower of the true religion, you will gain honour in this world and in the world to come, and by so doing you will save yourself and all those under you. Otherwise you shall perish with them, and your sins and theirs will be on your head.

If true light exist in your heart, then you will believe that I am the successor of the Prophet of God, you will never question my right to guide the people to God, nor will you give ear to the false doctrines of the oppressors, whose sole object is to extinguish God's light; but God's light must for ever remain shining.

The Prophet has said: Let those who doubt the mission of the Mahdi read the Word of God, who has sent His Prophet to revive true religion, and raise it above every other religion in spite of the fury of the infidels.

God has said that every fire set up by them for war shall be extinguished by me.

Our pity for you has induced us to write you this letter.

God is the only reformer. Much explanation will not produce reformation.

May God lead us and all his creatures into the right path.

13th Jamad Awal 1301 (10th March 1884).

Accompanying this letter were certain articles of clothing, and the following short letter:—

FROM THE SERVANT OF HIS LORD, MOHAMMED EL MAHDI IBN ABDULLAH,
TO GORDON

In the name of God, etc.—On reading my answer to your letter you will understand me. Herewith a suit of clothes, consisting of a coat (jubbeh), an overcoat (ridaa), a turban, cap (takia), a girdle, and beads. This is the clothing of those who have given up this world and its vanities and who look for the world to come, for everlasting happiness in Paradise. If you truly desire to come to God and seek to live a godly life, you must at once wear this suit and come out to accept your everlasting good fortune.

I return you your messenger, accompanied by some of my messengers as you request.

To both these letters General Gordon sent the following reply:—

FROM GORDON PASHA TO MOHAMMED AHMED

I have received the letters sent by your three messengers, and I understand all their contents; but I cannot have any more communication with you.¹

¹ It is interesting to note that this correspondence in Arabic only reached

The vote was unanimous to trust to Gordon and resist. The people declared that this was a false Mahdi, and God would defend the right. Gordon accepted the trust.

It was to this trust that he so often referred when refusing to abandon the town, and it was in the faith of this trust that his faithless and mutinous soldiers served him so well and truly in his long defence. In those of the townsmen capable of it, Gordon inspired a sincere feeling of confidence and affection. Others, and they were the most numerous, viewed him as the Trojans viewed the statue of Pallas. Gordon was never allowed to leave Khartum. Even on the most trifling boat journey he was always accompanied by vigilant townsmen.

Soon the Arabs were reinforced by the redoubtable ex-Nile boatman, Abu Girgeh, and on the 15th of April they captured Saleh Pasha, his steamer the *Mohammed Ali*, and his Shaggieh¹ post of 1400 men at El Mek on the White Nile, twenty-two miles south of Khartum. This they effected by a trick, assuring the pasha that Khartum had fallen. Gordon, who had little confidence in Shaggieh troops, never knew how far Saleh Pasha was deceived. At El Mek the Arabs built a fort which, as the river was narrow, commanded the Nile.

Soon afterwards Sheikh el Fudhl came from the White Nile, and joining the forces led by Abd el Kader, the two built a fort on the south front of the lines. This they manned with Krupp guns and rockets, and it was so near that many of the projectiles fell in the town.

To return now to matters in the Eastern Sudan.

After the defeat of Baker, England herself took up the burden of relieving the garrisons of the Eastern Sudan. A Cabinet Council of the 6th February decided to defend Suakin, and Admiral Hewett undertook this at once. Of the

Cairo in April 1890. It had been confided by General Gordon to a faithful messenger to take to Berber, whence it was to be telegraphed to Cairo, but when the messenger arrived at Berber the town had fallen, and he was taken prisoner—not, however, before he had succeeded in hiding the correspondence in a wall. Kept captive for some years, he at length escaped, and returning to Berber, found the letters where he had hidden them, and a few weeks later faithfully delivered them to the governor at Suakin.

¹ The Shaggieh, occupying the banks of the Nile between Korti and Berti (Dar Shaikiyeh), and a part of the Bayuda steppe, are a Semitic tribe claiming Arab descent through a sheikh Shayig Ibn Hamaidan.

two beleaguered garrisons, Sinkat had made a most gallant resistance. Mohammed Tewfik, name of good omen for Egypt, made for six months a most determined stand, and after being reduced to straits only less desperate than Khartum suffered later on, he spiked his guns and cut his way out. Fighting most desperately along a mile and a half, he and his men were cut absolutely to pieces on the 8th.

On this news reaching England, a second Cabinet Council was held, which resolved, if possible, to relieve Tokar.

A well-equipped expedition of 4000 British troops, under General Sir Gerald Graham, V.C., arrived at Suakin, and on the 27th February they summoned the chiefs. Graham told them that, instead of trying to fight Englishmen, they should send delegates to Khartum to discuss their grievances with Gordon.

Sir Evelyn Wood, anxious to give the young Egyptian troops an opportunity of taking part in the defence of H.H. the Khedive's possessions, asked to be allowed to send a battalion to join the expedition. Lord Granville pointed out that the newly organised Egyptian army was recruited for service in Egypt, not in the Sudan, and suggested that some should be sent to Assuan to guard the frontier. And it may not be amiss here to remark, that even the frontier obeys the law of contradiction of Egypt, and stands out at right angles to the country instead of running along the edge.

A few English and Egyptian officers of Sir Evelyn Wood's army were, however, allowed to join the expedition, and all possible assistance in the shape of guns, horses, and camels was provided from the Egyptian army. The battle of El Teb, fought on the 29th February, showed hard hand-to-hand fighting. Six thousand of the slave-dealers' troops hurled themselves upon the British squares with desperate courage and tenacity, and left 1500 dead upon the sand. Tokar, when reached, had surrendered, or rather (Egyptian war methods are unique) the garrison had managed some compromise, by which besiegers and besieged held the fort together. The situation was grimly comic. The former, infected perhaps by the indecision of the latter, had not yet massacred them, and 600 men, women, and children were removed to Cairo.

Shortly afterwards, on the 13th March, Graham caught

the Arabs in still greater force, 12,000 according to careful estimate, and, after a fierce and obstinate fight at Tamai, he killed 2000 and brushed the remainder into the hills.

After the victory of Tamai it was thought an attempt might be made to assist Gordon, telegraphing earnestly from Khartum that the road might be kept open. The weather was cool, the wells on the road were full, and everything pointed to an advance to Berber. There was, however, considerable controversy as to the feasibility of the march, and the idea was eventually abandoned.

With all prospects of reinforcement by Suakin at an end, the tribes, the Hadendowa and Amarar, along almost the whole line, from Berber to Suakin, were in open revolt, and communication with the coast completely severed.¹

The importance of the town of Berber had not been overlooked. General Gordon, on his way to Khartum, had stopped there, and had communicated to Hussein Pasha Khalifa the terms of the proclamation authorising the abandonment of the Sudan. Hussein Pasha had held the post of mudir of the Berber province for some time—he was the head sheikh of the Ababdeh tribe, which stretched to Korosko, and even farther north. It was therefore to his interest to hold the

¹ The difficulties experienced by the subsequent expedition from Korti to Metemneh give but a slight idea of the risk which would have been run in despatching a force from Suakin to Berber after the fall of the latter place.

In the Bayuda Desert expedition there was a fairly ample supply of water along the whole road, and the last wells of Abu Klea are only twenty-four miles distant from the river at Metemneh. On the Suakin-Berber road, the last wells at Obak are fifty-eight miles from the river, and contain a very meagre supply of water. At Mahobeh there is also a well, seven miles from Berber, but at most it could only supply enough water for 300 men and animals. When, however, the various routes for an expedition for the relief of General Gordon were subsequently under consideration, the situation had materially changed between March and June. Early in the latter month Berber fell into the hands of the enemy, and was strongly held by them. They would have had ample warning of a British advance from Suakin, and could have massed in such enormous numbers at or near Berber as to seriously imperil the safety of a moderately strong British force debouching on the Nile after a long and trying desert march, even had the conditions been such as to enable a force of this description to get near Berber without encountering very serious difficulties regarding the water supply. It should also be borne in mind that at that time the great Hadendowa and Amarar tribes, who hold the route from Suakin to Berber, were Mahdists heart and soul. They would have impeded the advance, held the wells, and most seriously threatened the long line of communications extending over upwards of 240 miles of desert.

town for the Government, and assure the loyalty of his tribe.

But with the capture of El Mek the spirit of rebellion had permeated the country north of Khartum, and now the Shaggiéh tribe—between Berber and Khartum—had revolted, and, led by the emir El Heddai, were preparing for an attack on Berber.

Meanwhile the necessity of holding Berber and securing the communication between Cairo and Khartum, was fully realised by the authorities in Egypt, and eventually it was decided to despatch Captain Kitchener, accompanied by Lieutenant Rundle, to Berber, to advise Hussein Pasha Khalifa. These officers left Cairo early in March, but the state of affairs in the vicinity of Abu Hamed had become so critical, owing to the revolt of the Robatab Arabs between that place and Berber, that counter-orders were despatched to Assuan to prevent them proceeding farther on their journey. Their services had, however, been utilised to raise a force of 1500 Foggara and Ashiabab and Ababdeh Arabs, with whom it was hoped Berber might be opened; but the project having fallen through, this force of Arabs was now extended along the eastern desert as outposts as far as the Red Sea; for with the spread of the rebellion northwards, the safety of Korosko and Assuan was menaced, and already a scare, almost amounting to a panic, had occurred in the latter town. Mahdi emissaries were busily employed endeavouring to raise the Bisharin and Ababdeh tribes, and Captain Kitchener made several expeditions into the desert with his Ababdeh, to intercept the leader of the insurrection—one Fiki Shemmami; he also received a firman from H.H. the Khedive authorising him to enter into negotiations with the Bisharin tribe, which lay to the east of the Ababdeh, and extend from near Suakin north almost to the same latitude as Kené, and who, had they joined in the revolt, must have seriously menaced the safety of Egypt, which would have thus been insecure on its eastern flank. The establishment of the desert posts, however, a satisfactory meeting with the Bisharin sheikhs, and the various reconnaissances made by Captain Kitchener and Lieutenant Rundle in the Eastern desert, all helped to reassure the tribes, and the spirit of insurrection made little way northwards.

The Nile, too, was constantly patrolled by armed steamers, manned by bluejackets, and commanded by naval officers, which went far towards reassuring the riverain population north and south of Assuan.

As early as April it had been also decided to fortify Wady Halfa and Korosko, and to establish the main body of the force at Assuan. Wady Halfa was at this time garrisoned by the 3d Egyptian battalion, while the Royal Sussex Regiment, which had been despatched previously to Assiut, was, on the 26th June, sent to Assuan, and a few weeks later the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry proceeded to Keneh.

An expedition, too, was made into the Western Desert by Lieutenant Stuart Wortley with 500 Jowazi Bedawin. It had been thought possible that an invasion of Egypt might have been attempted along the Arba'in road.¹ Information as to the supply of water along this route was not reliable. Colonel Colville was therefore sent to accompany Lieutenant Stuart Wortley and report on the road.

The route traversed was through Beris and Selima to Sakyet el Abd on the Nile, and thence to Halfa; and the general conclusion of these officers was that the road was impracticable for a force of over 1000 men.

Meanwhile Berber was being steadily invested by the Shaggieh under Heddai, while a few officials, attempting to make their way north, were checked on their journey by the Robatab tribe, and forced to return. This last circumstance proved to Hussein Pasha that his communications with the north were completely severed. He therefore prepared, with what ability he knew, to defend the town. He cleared the country in the immediate vicinity, so as to secure an open field for fire, but unfortunately did not demolish the garden of a certain religious sheikh just beyond the walls. And it was here, in this garden, that the besiegers, after a short siege, collected, and knowing that the portion of the fortifications in the vicinity of the garden was manned by Ababdeh—who were, so to speak, their own flesh and blood—they anticipated little resistance, and a determined attack made in the early

¹ The *Darb el Arba'in*, meaning "the forty days' route," is the desert road leading from Kordofan and Darfur through Selima and the Khargeh oasis to Assiut.

morning of the 26th May placed the town in their hands. One who was present thus describes the event:—

Hussein Pasha Khalifa had collected a number of his tribe and made them the garrison of the quarter of the town known as Sheikh Zemi el Abdin. Before sunrise on the 26th of May we heard a shot fired from this direction, and at once the rebels rushed into the fortifications. Our colonel fought them gallantly and killed many, but seeing that victory was impossible, he killed his slave, his horse, and his donkey, and then committed suicide.

At last the officer commanding the cavalry ordered us to form square on the river bank, and we remained there for about two hours. We were not attacked. We saw the door of the treasure room open and heard the Arabs asking where was the money.¹ They were told that Hussein Pasha had taken it away. Hussein Pasha sent us orders to lay down our arms, and we did so. Our losses were 1100 men, besides a large number of merchants and inhabitants. We killed a large number of the enemy.

The above account does not describe the terrible massacre which lasted for two days after the fall. Hussein Pasha's defence appears to have been half-hearted, though there is no doubt he did make a stand. Unnerved by the fatal proclamation which gave the Sudan away, he evidently despaired of success. During the attack he was wounded in the leg, and for the two days following he shut himself up in a house, but was subsequently permitted to live in the town.²

After the fall of Berber Mohammed el Kheir was appointed emir of the province, while Heddai with his victorious troops now held the Mahdi's commission as emir

¹ General Gordon had demanded a sum of £80,000 to be placed at his disposal. It had reached Berber, but communication with Khartum being cut, it had remained in the Berber treasury, and was eventually seized by Mohammed el Kheir, the sheikh of the Robatab, and who was afterwards appointed emir of Berber.

² Hussein Pasha lived in Berber for some time after the fall, then went to Omdurman, but eventually succeeded in escaping. He imposed upon the Mahdi by pretending to have had a vision in which he had been urged to go to his own tribe, the Ababdeh at Korosko, to bring them to the true faith. So convinced does the Mahdi seem to have been of the truth of the vision, that he permitted Hussein Pasha to leave, and at the same time gave him proclamations for H.H. the Khedive, the Ababdeh, and others, as well as a firman appointing him emir-in-chief of the Ababdeh. He was also the bearer of a letter from the European captives in Khartum, but it had been so palpably dictated to them by their ruler, and written by them under compulsion, that as an authoritative statement it was worthless. Hussein Pasha arrived in Cairo on the 12th July 1885, presented his credentials, was tried by court-martial, and acquitted, and died a few months later in Cairo.

of Dongola, and advanced to the capture of that populous and thriving district.

The mudir of Dongola was at this time a certain Mustafa Pasha Yawer—a Circassian by birth, and who had had a varied career—having been originally imported to Egypt as a slave, and sold to the Khedive, Abbas Pasha; he received a good education, but in 1864, when Ismail Pasha did all he could to free the country from the Mameluke class, Mustafa Yawer was despatched to the Sudan. He left as a lieutenant, on arrival at Khartum was promoted captain, and remained for several years as a civil official in Kordofan, and in 1877 was appointed mudir of Dongola. On General Gordon's arrival the governorship of both Berber and Dongola was vested in Hussein Pasha Khalifa, and the mudir of Dongola dismissed, but shortly afterwards he was reinstated. He had long devoted himself to religious studies and had obtained a great reputation for asceticism and piety, but withal he was a man of considerable administrative and eastern diplomatic capacity.

On the Mahdi establishing himself at El Obeid, Mustafa Yawer was amongst the number who received letters calling on him to submit to the new rule; his well-known sanctity appears to have influenced the Mahdi to inform him that he must retain his position as emir of the province, and that merely a substitution of his allegiance was necessary.

Mustafa Yawer, though possibly in sympathy with the Mahdi regarding the decadence of the true Moslem religion and the necessity of a religious revival, does not appear to have been prepared to accept Mohammed Ahmed as the divine guide sent to fulfil the mission of which the world stood in so much need. He, however, sent a temporising answer; for it must have been evident to him that his nationality alone would have been sufficient to prevent his ever retaining his high position in a community whose motto was "Death to the Turk."

Already the spirit of revolt was busy in that part of Dongola which bordered on the Berber province. Sheikh Taïb of Korti, together with Wad Kinkain¹ of Merawi, had raised the inhabitants of these districts, which soon

¹ Captured at the action of Toski, 3d August 1889.

became quite out of hand. The sub-mudir Gaudet Bey, was sent with a small force to restore order, but was driven back to Debbah, where he was reinforced and succeeded in inflicting some loss on the rebels; but so far the disturbances were merely local, and in a series of complicated telegrams which Mustafa Pasha Yawer sent to Cairo descriptive of the state of affairs in his province, he so completely perplexed the authorities that it was quite impossible to say whether Mustafa Pasha was loyal, or was merely an agent of the Mahdi's, temporising so as to enable the whole province to become overrun with rebellion. This perplexity daily increased; orders were sent to the mudir to leave the province with all who wished to return to Egypt, but he persistently refused, saying that if Dongola were evacuated, General Gordon's retreat from Khartum must be cut off.

Meanwhile Heddai had arrived in the neighbourhood of Merawi, and began to march down the river bank, through the Dongola territory, collecting numbers of that populous district on the way. The same uncertainty which pervaded at the time the town of Dongola, seemed to pervade the whole district, and it was the general impression of those of the inhabitants who had become followers of Heddai, that they were proceeding to the capital to attend a great durbar or reception, in which the Mahdi's firman as emir and governor of the province should be handed over to Mustafa Pasha Yawer. Heddai's real intentions to make himself master of the province did not long remain veiled in significance, and a loyal inhabitant who had been swept along with the mass of Heddai's followers, escaped to Debbah, and warned the Bashi-Bazuk garrison of Heddai's approach and intentions, and here Gaudet Bey, the sub-mudir, and Nur ed Din Bey, the commandant of the troops, made all preparations to give the invaders a warm reception. Heddai with his force arrived in front of Debbah at 3 A.M. on the 5th July, and was met by a hail of bullets from the walls of the fort; for the soldiers, who had been guilty of many a cruel raid on the inhabitants, well knew that they could expect little mercy from the Mahdiists, should they fall into their hands.

A fierce onslaught was made by Heddai, but he was repulsed, and after losing heavily was forced to retreat again

towards Merawi, followed by Gaudet Bey in the steamer, who again met the retiring force near El Hettani,¹ and drove them into the desert.

The inhabitants now returned to their homes, and the Government authority was once more established in the revolted district. Heddai retired to the hill country in the Bayuda Desert, whence he wrote to the Mahdi informing him of his ill success and begging him to at once despatch reinforcements.

Meanwhile Mustafa Pasha Yawer's action was becoming more and more obscure to the authorities in Cairo, even the result of the fight at Debbah was questioned, and Kitchener Pasha at Korosko volunteered to proceed to Dongola and report personally on affairs there; permission was accorded him, and he set off at once, leaving the care of the Bedawin tribes to Lieutenant Rundle. He arrived at Dongola on the 1st of August and was well received by the mudir, and on his report it was at length admitted that the mudir, whatever may have been his previous proclivities, was now genuinely loyal, that the people were with him, and that his victories were undoubted. Major Kitchener a few days later proceeded to Debbah, where he personally inspected the recent battlefield, which gave ample proof of the mudir's success. Shortly afterwards he inspected the country as far as Ambukkol, being accompanied by the mudir, who took this opportunity of preaching to the people to abstain from revolt, and at the same time administered summary punishment on those of the villagers who had been implicated in the recent events.

Meanwhile, the Mahdi had received Heddai's appeal for reinforcements, and forthwith despatched the emir Mohammed Mahmud with 800 men from Rahad to proceed at once to Heddai's assistance, and at the same time despatched the following letter to the mudir of Dongola, which, owing to subsequent events, was not received until some time later:—

It is no hidden matter that I am the Khalifa of the Prophet. I previously wrote you twice calling you to God, desiring you to share in His grace in this and in the future world, and I placed you in supreme authority over all the inhabitants of your country, bound by the condi-

¹ Also known as Tani, where British troops were stationed previous to their recall in 1885.

tions that you should both inwardly and outwardly tender me your submission. Tear yourself from the government of the infidel Turks, combat them with animosity, sever all ties of friendship, and act in concert with your subjects, the people of Dongola, and embrace my cause, which is the way of God and of His Prophet.

A lengthy period has since elapsed, and I have been vainly expecting the pleasure of a reply from you in the execution of my orders and hopes ; but you have not even sent me a verbal acknowledgment, and I also learn that you continue in the service of the Lord's enemies, the Turks, and that you maintain your previous state, and are in constant telegraphic communication with them, the line being still intact, a complete contrast to those places whose inhabitants have rallied round me to render the faith of God Almighty triumphant. Besides this you are levying taxes on the Moslems in your province. Still, in spite of your non-performance of my conditions, and all I hear, I have never entertained an idea as to the rapture of the compact between us, nor nourished an evil thought against you ; but I have respected our treaty and preserved my good opinion of you, and hoped to have an excuse for your silence. Nor did I hearken to accusations against you attributing malignity and perfidy, urged by my extreme pity for you ; and learning that the wakil of Ahmed el Heddai is in your vicinity, having marched with his army from Berber, and fearing, for your sake, sedition and treachery might arise, resulting in an unlawful effusion of blood between you, who are all my followers.

I have nominated the bearer of this letter, Mahmud, son of Mohammed, to be emir over both you and El Heddai, to raise the hand of the latter from off you. He will test your allegiance and your sincerity of submission. He goes with my orders, and is a man distinguished for his high intellect and superior qualities among my comrades and friends. Therefore on his arrival, if your submission is real and you are zealous for the favour of God, and faithful to him, and tendering submission to me, and sincere in following me, and devoid of falsity, you will instantly obey my envoy, resigning to him the government, and arms, and soldiers. As for yourself, you will act according to the previous contract, but write out an explicit list, giving it to the emir Mahmud, make a copy, and come here to me yourself, with as many of the people and their families and property as you can transport, accounting the same as an exodus in the path of God, and a meritorious act. Leave the remainder, first nominating a deputy over them. I have ordered Mahmud to protect all your rights. My intention in summoning you is not only to substantiate your potency, but still further to render you honour, after which you will return exalted and praising me and grateful. Therefore hasten up to me and be zealous in obeying me. Beware of turning astray after earthly gains and splendour, whose ignorant votaries are rejected and far from God.¹

¹ This letter was found on the body of the emir Mahmud, nominated Governor of Dongola, and slain at the battle of Korti. The letter is addressed to the mudir of Dongola by Mohammed Ahmed, the Mahdi, and is dated the 9th of Ramadan (2d July 1884).

Mohammed Mahmud joined Heddai near Merawi early in September, and together they began again to descend the river.

The mudir collected his troops at Korti, and there inflicted a signal defeat on the rebels.

The following interesting account of the fight is given by Nur ed Din Bey and other officers present :—

12th September 1884.

We have the honour to state as follows :—

After the fight, which took place at El Hettani, between the troops and Ahmed el Heddai's band, the latter was obliged to fly beyond the limits of the mudirieh. Such of the inhabitants of Merawi and Ambukkol as had been won over by this chief abandoned his cause, and the troops of the mudirieh were therefore able to return to the various posts they occupied before the fight.

However, this rebel again succeeded in seducing the population, who had heard of the arrival of Mahmud Haj Mohammed, appointed emir of Dongola by the False Prophet.

On hearing this the mudir hastened to collect all the forces at his disposal, and went to Abu Gussi, whence he sent out scouts to ascertain the number and position of the rebels.

After an interview, Ahmed el Heddai and the last envoy came to an agreement to join their forces against the governor.

On hearing this understanding, the mudir went to Debbeh, whence we had accompanied him with a portion of the troops of the true cause, and a detachment of regular troops.

The two rebel chiefs advanced to Korti, where they collected over 3000 men. It was there that they received a visit from Hassan el Abadi, of the tribe of Hussein Khalifa, ex-mudir of Dongola and Berber, who is at present with the False Prophet commanding a body of rebels.

Hassan el Abadi is an emissary of the False Prophet, who has appointed him governor-general of all Egypt and its dependencies. He is accompanied by several persons who are destined for high office in Egypt, having with him an emir for Esneh, another for Keneh, and indeed one for each of the central points of Egypt. He has even got a governor for Tripoli.

Having met and deliberated, they unanimously decided to massacre all the troops here, and afterwards to march north to carry out the orders given them by the False Prophet. They have all sworn on the Kuran to fall upon us and spare no one. On our arrival at Et Taker, opposite Ambukkol, on the 12th Zulkada 1301 (31st August 1884), the mudir left the troops at that place, then seizing on the boat that was found at the Mudirieh, and taking with him Nur ed Din Bey and some of the troops, he fell, by night, on the rebels encamped at Korti, with whom he had heard there were a number of people who had been forced to accompany them. In the evening the mudir interviewed some of these latter, in order to obtain information about the state of affairs, and to decide on the measures to be taken against the enemy.

The mudir then returned in order to reach his camp at Et Taker two hours before daybreak.

He then marched to the west, where he found everything ready by sunrise—boats, soldiers, dromedaries, and fifty horses, requisitioned from the inhabitants of the various districts of the Mudirieh.

The mudir then gave orders for the attack, and, after having harangued the troops, put himself at their head.

The encounter took place at the extremity of the island of "Oud," between Ambukkol and Korti.

The soldiers who had received the order to disembark were 400 in number, posted as follows: on the right wing cavalry and camel corps, in the centre the infantry, and on the left wing the soldiers of the Fourth Ordeh.

The mudir was in the centre with the cannon.

The enemy were drawn up at "Dro," to the north of our army.

Their forces were partly composed of the soldiers of the mudirieh of Berber, armed with Remington rifles, together with the men armed by Eah Sherif Mahmud, appointed emir of Dongola, and by Hassan el Abadi, appointed emir of Egypt and its dependencies. But our mudir prudently ordered the troops not to open fire upon them; he kept their attention occupied with skirmishers, who threw themselves either on the centre or the flanks of the enemy, until their cavalry received the order to charge. Our troops then opened fire upon them, the emirs mentioned above threw themselves on the centre of our army, to carry off our cannon, and capture or kill the mudir. The mudir allowed them to advance up to within 150 yards, then ordered the troops and artillery in the centre to fire grapeshot, and the soldiers on the left flank to fire upon those who were entrenched in the houses and upon the roofs.

Thanks to our mudir, we gained the victory in spite of our small numbers, and the large numbers of the enemy, the vigour of attack, and the oaths their chiefs had sworn. Our mudir was everywhere inspiring and encouraging the troops. His energy and intrepidity were great.

The enemy took flight, leaving upon the field of battle all the emirs mentioned above—Mahmud, emir of Dongola; Hassan Abadi, emir of Egypt; the emir of Tripoli, and other emirs. Babakr Kaukiz also lost his life. The body of Ahnied el Heddai was taken by his men and buried at Eali, with that of Babakr Kaukiz.

Our troops, urged on by the mudir on horseback, pursued the enemy until fatigue overcame both men and horses, when they returned.

Our losses are: one soldier of the 4th corps killed; Majors Hassan Agha, Suliman Agha, five soldiers, and seven others on dromedaries were wounded. The wounds of Hassan Agha are serious but not mortal.

Such is the story of the battle.

When this engagement occurred, Major Kitchener was at Debbah, where he had been ordered to remain, while Mustafa Yawer proceeded against the rebels.

At this time Sir Evelyn Wood, the sirdar of the Egyptian army, was at Halfa, and a few weeks after the fight a party

bearing two gruesome heads, stuck on spears, beneath which were notice boards to the effect that the heads were those of the emirs of Tripoli and Egypt, who had been slain at the battle of Korti, arrived at Halfa.

In a letter from the mudir to the sirdar, he requested him to despatch one of the heads to His Majesty the Sultan, and the other to His Highness the Khedive. In reply to this letter, Sir Evelyn Wood politely remarked that, while appreciating the valour of his Excellency and his troops, it was not customary to forward such trophies. The heads were therefore consigned to a convenient burying-place at Halfa.

Major Kitchener subsequently entered into negotiations with Sheikh Saleh of the Kababish, whose tribe extended from Dongola towards Kordofan, with a view to securing the co-operation of this powerful tribe, as well as a means of communication with the Sudan.

The result of this negotiation bore fruit later on, and in the meantime Major Kitchener turned his attention to making preparations for the assistance of the British expedition which had at length been decided upon for the relief of General Gordon in Khartum.

The events connected with this memorable expedition have been so fully described elsewhere that it is not here intended to dilate further on them. Every event in connection with that attempt to relieve General Gordon remains imprinted on the memories of all.

The concluding paragraph of Lord Wolseley's final despatch best describes the gallant endeavour to reach that beleaguered town which had fallen two days before help arrived. He says :—

In conclusion, I would only add that, though the expedition was not crowned with success, the spirit and behaviour of the troops which took part in the operations, whether on the Nile or at Suakin, may be viewed with satisfaction by every Englishman. The army under my command was unable to accomplish the object set before it, and to save the lives of the gallant General Gordon and of the garrison of Khartum. But this was from no fault of its own, and no lack of courage, of discipline, of dash, or of endurance. It overcame physical difficulties of the greatest magnitude ; it swept from its path in every encounter an enemy almost its equal in bravery, and greatly its superior in numbers, and its advanced guard reached the outskirts of Khartum only two days too late. No one can regret more than I do the fall of that place ; but in common

with all my countrymen, I look back with pride to the gallant struggle made by our troops to save Khartum and its heroic defender.

It may, however, fairly be said that, in the history of the world, no expedition has ever been pushed continuously forward with utmost exertion, 1500 miles into the interior of a country in which accurate information could not be obtained as to the movements of a numerous and fearless enemy, and which was almost entirely devoid of supplies of every sort. The British soldier here did a service which has at present no parallel.

It is not proposed here to follow the successful advance of this expedition over cataract and desert: the narrative will be taken up from the time the troops arrived within striking distance of the enemy; but while it is toiling laboriously up the Great Nile, we will follow the events which meantime were transpiring in the immediate vicinity of Khartum.

With the fall of Berber on 20th May all telegraph communication was cut off, and a veil closed down on Gordon, Stewart and Power cheerfully setting to work to hold out till Providence should relieve them. Glimpses came through for a time. "Might Gordon try and arrange matters personally with the Mahdi?"—"He might not." "Might Baker ask rich men for money to hire troops?"—"He might not."

Baffled on all sides, he turned to work, and with his long-suffering troops held out against a siege with a courage that soldiers of all nations have admired.

Early in May happened the first piece of good fortune that fell to Gordon's share. The date is uncertain, but the bantering letter which Gordon wrote about it reached the Mahdi about the 13th of May. "Abu Girgeh, whom you sent to take Khartum, is dead. Send another general." Abu Girgeh was not dead, but lived to take Khartum. He had left El Obeid in March, and was in hopes that he would capture Khartum without difficulty. On arriving at the White Nile, his numerous army began crossing the river at Kalakala to take up a position on the south front. Gordon seized the opportunity. Although the river was low, his steamers could move freely as far as Kalakala. On the night of the 2d or 3d of May a large force both by land and river secretly left Khartum. At dawn they fell upon the enemy in the middle of his crossing opera-

tions. The attack was a complete success. All those who had already landed on the eastern bank were killed, and the troops returned to Khartum with a loss of only forty men. This cheering victory avenged the defeat of the 16th of March.

Throughout May, June, and July, Gordon had no news from the north, and he longed earnestly for the coming inundation which should at once push his enemies back, and bring into action his great preponderance of strength in steamers. And so matters dragged on, for it was not till early in August that preparations for a relief expedition were begun.

EVENTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE SUDAN UP TO EARLY IN 1885

While Khartum was being besieged, and the wave of Mahdiism rolled over the wide countries from the borders of Waddai to the Red Sea and from Dongola to the tenth parallel of latitude, it dashed with violence against the mountain masses of southern Kordofan, it lost itself in the morasses north of the Equatorial Provinces, and it soon began to pour northwards along the valley of the Nile. The troubles with the mountains began immediately after the defeat of Hicks. Some negro troops escaped the slaughter and fled to Jebel Dair. Mek Kumbo was summoned to give them up. He replied that there were others in the Tagalla hills, and that he would consent only if King Adam gave up the refugees who were with him. Mohammed Ahmed well knew that he had to do here not merely with two small independent kings, but with the owners of huge natural strongholds utterly opposed to Mahdiism. He strained every nerve to dislodge the mountaineers, and one after another three large armies returned from the assault baffled and disordered. The successes in Darfur, however, more than counterbalanced these reverses.

EVENTS IN DARFUR, 1884

At the end of 1883 the emir Zogal was preparing to march to El Fasher, which had already nominally submitted.

In due time the replies to Slatin's letters calling on Said Bey Guma and Amer Effendi of Kebkebieh arrived, and with

them the keys of the treasuries and information to the effect that they had taken the Mahdi uniform into use.

Zogal, in the first days of January, set out for El Fasher with his force, but ere he arrived there a curious change had taken place. The bearer of Slatin's letters to Said Bey was a certain fiki, by name Khalifa Abderrahman, of Zogal's following. He had formerly been fiki at El Fasher and a friend of Said Bey Guma. But now, thoroughly imbued with the doctrines of Mohammed Ahmed, he did not hesitate to inform Said Bey that he should refrain from smoking cigarettes. Though a trifling circumstance, this rebuke appeared to have so annoyed the irascible mudir, that he ordered the fiki to be shot and the garrison to reclothe themselves in their uniforms and fight against a religion which imposed such stringent conditions on its followers; his change of purpose also appears to have been influenced by the knowledge that in spite of the protestations of Zogal at Darra and Omshanga, that if the garrisons of these places yielded they would suffer no harm, they had subsequent to their surrender been cruelly treated, and submitted to great indignities. Fiki Abderrahman was not shot, but was subsequently released, and wrote to Zogal informing him of what had taken place. The latter now hurried on to El Fasher, where he found the garrison ready to oppose all attempts to make the town surrender. The town was three times attacked by Zogal, who was repulsed each time. He then sent for Slatin from Darra, and for Adam Effendi Amer from Kebkebieh, and ordered up reinforcements from both places, while he himself set to work to collect the local Arabs, and now the town was closely beset. The garrison at this time consisted of over 1000 men, with ten guns and one machine gun. Zogal took up a position on the hill on which stands the old dwelling of Sultan Ibrahim, and bombarded the town, but the guns of the latter soon silenced the Arab artillery. The siege was, however, pressed closely for some days; and on 14th January Zogal succeeded in filling up the wells, close under the walls, from which the inhabitants and garrison had drawn their water; the supply of water within the walls was now quite inadequate for the garrison, and it is said Slatin wrote to Said Bey, counselling him to surrender, as resistance was useless. On the following day, 15th January, the

town capitulated. Many of the officers were cruelly treated; two of them, Captain Said Agha el Fuli and Major Ibrahim Agha Binul, on being threatened with a flogging unless they produced the money supposed to be hidden, succeeded in committing suicide, while the fiki, who had been the primary cause of the siege, was executed, and it was only through the influence of Slatin Bey that Said Bey Guma's life was spared. The garrison was now distributed amongst the Arab tribes, while Zogal installed himself at El Fasher as emir of the province, and soon afterwards despatched Slatin Bey and Said Bey Guma to the Mahdi at El Obeid. The following letter, written by Slatin Bey to General Gordon, and received by the latter on 16th October, when besieged in Khartum, will perhaps best explain the position in which Slatin found himself before surrendering his province¹:—

... I therefore take the liberty of informing you of the true state of affairs as they are and as they have been, and beg that you may form your opinion on me accordingly.

Since my appointment as governor of Darfur I have been engaged in warfare with Sultan Harun Dubbenga, and when the revolution caused by Mohammed Ahmed broke out, I was left in Darfur without officers—some of them had been killed, some had been dismissed by the government, and the few remaining ones were not fit to take a command. At the first outbreak even of hostilities which were simultaneous with those of Ahmed el Arabi in Egypt, I was compelled personally to take a command. After several battles, all more or less unsuccessful, the Arab officers, who bore me a grudge and firmly believed in the victory of Ahmed el Arabi over the Europeans, gave out among the soldiers as their opinion that the cause of my defeat lay in my being a Christian. In order to stifle these injurious opinions, I gave out that I had for some years already practised the Mohammedan religion, and now publicly proclaimed my conversion. By this step I had regained the confidence of my soldiers, inspired them with hope, had given them a happy confidence, uprooted malicious intrigues, and conducted several successful battles until the annihilation of the army in Kordofan commanded by Hicks.

¹ Slatin Bey subsequently accompanied Mohammed Ahmed to Khartum, was present at the fall of that place, and on the Mahdi's death in June 1885 became a mulazim, or one of the bodyguard of his successor, Abdullah Taashi, and is still acting in that capacity, and closely confined to Omdurman, which he was never permitted to quit. Said Bey Guma was for a time imprisoned, but during the siege of Khartum was employed to work the rebels' guns directed against the town. It is said that it was a shot aimed by him which disabled the steamer *Husseinieh*, sent by Gordon to attempt the relief of Omdurman on 12th November 1884, and in consequence of this Said Bey was raised to the command of the Mahdi's artillery. He is stated to be still at Omdurman.

Whether by conversion I committed a dishonourable step is a matter of opinion. It was made more easy to me, because I had, *perhaps unhappily*, not received a strict religious education at home.

I commanded at Darra against the tribes known to your excellency as Razagat,¹ and in spite of great loss of life and want of ammunition, we were full of glad confidence in Hicks's reserves ; but after the annihilation of the latter the demoralised troops refused to fight any longer. I had now at my disposal about 700 soldiers counting sick and wounded, and for each gun ten or twelve dozen cartridges. Officers and men demanded capitulation, and I, standing there alone and a European, was compelled to follow the majority and compelled to capitulate. Does your excellency believe that to me, as an Austrian officer, the surrender was easy ? It was one of the hardest days in my life.

Zogal, now firmly established at El Fasher, had at his disposal a force of some 1400 Sudanese and Bazingers under the emirs Babakr, Wad el Hagg, Omar Wad Elias,² and Ali en Nur Imam ; and besides these a large force of Arabs, computed by some as over 20,000. With these troops he now proceeded to quell the various local disturbances with which Slatin had been coping with varying success for the last few years, and which, it must be remembered, were quite distinct from any of the Mahdi movements.

His first undertaking was directed against the Sultan Durbenga, son of Sultan Babakr, and brother of Sultan Ibrahim, and to effect this an expedition was despatched to Jebel Marra from El Fasher towards the end of June 1884, under the command of the mudir (now emir), Adam Amer. The Sultan, on being called upon to surrender, is reported to have replied : "I have stood my ground against the Egyptian Government, which is stronger by far than you, ever since the death of Sultan Harun, and your emir Zogal was only a slave in my father's time. The sword alone must be the judge between us." And with this he prepared to do battle with the invaders. His stronghold was on the top of a hill, which Adam now attempted to storm, but was repulsed with a loss of more than half his force. Collecting his shattered forces, he wrote to Zogal for reinforcements, which in due time arrived, and after a siege of two months Durbenga was captured and sent to El Fasher (September 1884), whence he was despatched by Zogal to the Mahdi.

¹ Rizighat.

² Son of Elias Pasha, late mudir of Kordofan, and brother of Mohammed Pasha Imam.

With the subjugation of Jebel Marra resistance to the Mahdi's authority in Darfur practically ceased for a time, and Zogal is reported to have established a just rule throughout the province, though he is said to have amassed a considerable fortune.

The distance of Darfur from the headquarters of the Mahdi's authority, now transferred to the neighbourhood of Khartum, was the reason of Zogal being left in uninterrupted possession of that province up to the death of Mohammed Ahmed, which occurred in June 1885. But following on that event Darfur became the theatre of many fierce fights, and it is interesting to note that that which was true of the mountains south of Kordofan was true also of these western provinces. Though the Arabs who pastured their herds in every valley and nook of the mountains were Mahdists heart and soul, still the negroes and negroids in the mountains never for a moment wavered in their hostility. The two races were like vinegar and oil, and the events of past years have shown that except where coerced by superior cunning or by force of numbers the sturdy negro has retained to the last his contempt for the Arab.

Forewarned, the negro is forearmed. His numbers had not been reduced by slave raids without leaving some experience in the rest, and in 1885, when Mohammed Ahmed was master of Khartum, and the last vestige of Egyptian authority had disappeared, the rocks of Kordofan, of Darfur, and Kebkebieh still rear their heads above the flood of Mahdism, manned by "the animals who fight, eat, and drink, but never pray."

BAHR EL GHAZAL, 1884

At the end of 1883 Lupton Bey had returned to his capital, Dem Zubeir. A few days after his arrival news reached him of the annihilation of Hicks Pasha and his army.

This news spread terror throughout the mudirieh, and Lupton, surrounded by difficulties with the local tribes and with the certainty of a speedy advance of the conquerors of Hicks, now made every effort to sustain a prolonged siege, which he now knew was inevitable. Of arms and ammunition he had but a meagre supply. He had already despatched

the mudir to Khartum in the steamer *Ismailieh*, which reached that town on 14th January, but never returned. Lupton, however, is continually hoping that reinforcements will arrive. Slatin, he knows, must be in almost greater straits than he is; he can, therefore, hope for little assistance from Darfur. Again, in the south Emin is suffering from the local disturbances in his own province, and has begged Lupton to send a force to assist him in quelling them. Danger is steadily closing around. He despatched his chief officials to collect grain from the various districts: El Fahl Effendi to Kawaki, Mohammed Effendi Karkasawi to Dem Guggu, and Abu Jiriou to Bekko; but ere they returned he received news from Hassan Agha nazir of Liffi that a certain sheikh, Karamallah Mohammed,¹ had arrived on the frontier with a force of 5000 men, with the Mahdi's firman as emir of the Bahr el Ghazal, and had called on him to surrender; and he asks Lupton for instructions.

Simultaneously with this letter another arrived from Mohammed Agha Ketenbur to the same effect. On receipt of these alarming missives Lupton at once summoned these and the other sub-governors to the capital, with orders to bring with them the garrisons of the outlying districts. But the next news which reached him was to the effect that the governors of both Liffi and Bekko and all their men had joined the rebels. And following on this news came letters from Karamallah for Lupton Bey, for his wakil, and for other officials. That to Lupton Bey was merely a summons to surrender, accompanied by a copy of the Mahdi's proclamation to Karamallah, appointing him emir of Bahr el Ghazal. Lupton Bey now summoned a meeting of all the principal officials and discussed the situation. He represented that they had now in the town some 1200 regulars, 4 guns, and 4 rocket tubes, and he appealed to them to make a stand against the Mahdi's hordes; but the troops openly declared they did not intend to resist; while the sub-governors, all of whom were Dongolese,

¹ This emir had formerly been a well-known merchant in Bahr el Ghazal. He was a Dongolawi, and had some time previously embraced Mahdism rather in the interest of the slave trade than of religion. He had assisted at the battle of Shekan, after which, owing to his knowledge of the country and his acquaintance with the officials, he had been nominated by the Mahdi to bring that province into subjection.

represented that already two of their number had joined the rebels, and they intended to follow their example. Lupton was alone in his wish to hold out, and, perforce, had no option but to sign the document drawn up by his officers and others, handing over the province to Karamallah and adopting Mahdiism.

The wretched suspense endured by Lupton Bey during this trying time is depicted in the following letters despatched to Emin Bey. The first, dated from Meshra er Rek on 12th April, runs as follows:—

DEAR EMIN—The Mahdi's army is now camped six hours from here. Two derwishes have arrived here, and want me to hand over the mudirieh to them. I will fight to the last. I have put the guns in a strong fort, and if they succeed in capturing the mudirieh I will hope, from my fort, to turn them out again. They come to you at once if I lose the day, so look out. Perhaps this is my last letter to you. My position is desperate, as my own men have gone over to them in numbers. I am known now by the name of Abdullah. I win the day or die, so good-bye. Kind regards to Doctor Junker. If steamers come to you, write to my friends and let them know I die game.—Yours truly,
(Signed) F. LUPTON.

The next letter, dated eight days later, shows the difficulties have increased rapidly:—

20th April 1884.

DEAR EMIN BEY—Most of my people have joined the Mahdi's force. Nazir Bucho and Nazir Liffi, with all their men, have gone over with Government grain. Do not know how it will end. Wazzi Uller Effendi I have sent to the Mahdi's camp. Hardly know if I am Lupton Bey or Emir Abdullah. Write you soon as Wazzi Uller returns. Enemy are armed with Remingtons, and have four or five companies of regular troops with them, and some 8000 or 10,000 Orban¹ and Gellabas, but will give you their correct strength as soon as I am certain about the matter. Slatin wrote me two lines. He only said: "I send this man, Haj Mus-tapha Karamallah, to you. He is now Emir Abd el Kader."—Yours truly,
(Signed) F. LUPTON.

The third letter shows that the end has come at last, and the news it contained was of dire import to Emin, equally cut off from all hope of assistance:—

28th April

DEAR EMIN—It is all up with me here. Every one has joined the

¹ The plural of *Arabi*, i.e. an Arab. The word is usually employed in the Sudan in talking of free Arabs in general, in contradistinction to the *Awlad el Arab*, or Arabs confined to towns.

Mahdi, and his army takes charge of the mudirieh the day after tomorrow. What I have passed through these last few days no one knows. I am perfectly alone. The man who brings you this will give you all particulars. I hear that an army was never so totally defeated as was that of General Hicks. Out of 16,000 only 52 men are alive, and they are nearly all wounded. Look out you. Some 8000 to 10,000 are coming to you, well armed. Hoping we shall meet.—Yours truly,
(Signed) F. LUPTON.

And so the last vestige of Government authority disappeared in the Bahr el Ghazal.

Doctor Junker, too, who, it will be remembered, was in this neighbourhood, describes how during the critical circumstances of that time Lupton Bey's conduct was most admirable. His letters, dated from every part of the province, attest that he was ubiquitous in the pursuit of the fugitive adversaries, and his eighteen months' war with the Dinkas was more desperate and murderous than the subsequent encounters with the Mahdists in the Equatorial Provinces. The actual circumstances of the surrender are thus related by Major Abdullah Effendi Mehallawi :—

The day following the despatch of the letter surrendering the province (21st April 1884), at eight o'clock in the morning, Karamallah, who had been at Biri, four hours distant from the capital, appeared in sight. We and the whole garrison went out to meet him, and halted about a mile from the town. The rebel cavalry, with Karamallah at their head, then dashed up to us at a gallop, and shook their swords in the air over our heads, and then galloped back to the spearmen in the rear. This they did three times. Then Karamallah dismounted, and we all dismounted, and greeted each other as friends. Still the cavalry kept shaking their swords over our heads, so elated were they at their success. We then all returned to the town, and Karamallah with his emirs entered Government House, while all his men were assembled around outside. He then summoned Lupton Bey and all the officers and officials, and, producing the Mahdi's original letter to Lupton, he handed it over to him, and called on him to join the faith of Islam, and to assume the name of Abdullah, which the Mahdi had written he should be called. Lupton replied to Karamallah that he had already adopted the Mohammedan religion, but Karamallah was not satisfied and insisted that he should openly adopt the new creed, and bade Lupton repeat after him, "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is the Prophet of God," and while Lupton was repeating this the emirs drew their swords, and when he had finished shouted in one voice, "Hold to your faith, you are now one of us (ansars) as we are of you ; we are brothers in the faith."

Then the same was gone through with the two Coptic clerks, Gibrail Effendi and Saleh Effendi Shenuda. Then Lupton asked Karamallah

for permission to pay his allegiance to the Mahdi, and three days afterwards, after bidding farewell to Karamallah, Lupton Bey and I, with a number of the officials and our families, set off under charge of an escort for Shakka, which we reached in fifteen days, and staying there eleven days, we again set out for El Obeid, which we reached twenty days afterwards, and there were met by the emir Abd el Kader, who took us round the battlefield of Shekan, and there we saw all the slaughter that had taken place. Lupton Bey made a sketch of the battlefield. The Mahdi had already started for Omdurman before our arrival, so we followed about three weeks later, and arrived in the Mahdi's camp near Omdurman about the beginning of August.

The following letter from the former moawin, Karkasawi (brother of Karamallah), to his friend Ahmed relates the events already described from a rebel point of view :—

. . . As to the information which we have to give you, (it) is that on the arrival of the emir Karamallah Sheikh Mohammed in the parts of Bahr el Ghazal and the neighbourhood of Sirkua, your servant had been appointed to the office of gathering in the crops ; and we had not received news of his arrival, excepting from the letter which reached us from the emir Abdullah,¹ surnamed Bilbitin, in which he asked my presence at the seat of the mudirieh. On my arrival at the seat aforementioned, I got to know positively about that, and after that I tried, with the emir Abdullah, to obtain the consent and surrender of the people there without delay. In the interval there came two derwishes from the emir Karamallah ; in their hands were several letters to us and to some of the brethren, and to the emir Abdullah.

After these letters had been carefully read by us, the emir Abdullah stopped the (carrying out of the) surrender to the emir (Karamallah), because no letter had been sent to him to his (own) address by his Highness.

So we and all the brethren used our utmost efforts with him, (urging) the desirableness (of his) sending a letter from him to the Emir Karamallah, requesting him (the latter) to send (on) the letter of his Highness that it might be considered, and as to settling the mode of surrender, and this was done. When the letter was written, I received it, and went with it in company of the two derwishes above named, and with us went the Sheikh Wakia Allah Idrisi and Mohammed Salim Esh Sherif ; and Haj Omar, all of them of the inhabitants of this seat (of the mudirieh), they being appointed with me by order of emir Abdullah for bringing quickly the proclamation written by his excellency the Mahdi.

On our arrival (at the place of) Karamallah, and on his reading the letter of the said emir (Abdullah), he ordered copy to be made of the proclamation and gave it to me. Those appointed with me of the inhabitants of the seat (of the mudirieh) also wrote a message as they remained with the emir Karamallah. On receiving the letter from the

¹ Lupton Bey's assumed name.

aforenamed, I came back with it to the emir Abdullah, who on reading it with intelligence, in the presence of the brethren, all of them became delighted and filled with happiness and joy which could not be exceeded.

Especially the emir Abdullah obeyed and accepted (the terms of) the proclamation of his Highness; and so everything was settled with the help of God, the Lord to whom worship (is due).

All the brethren are longing to see his Highness, and so the letters were written from the emir Abdullah and the brethren in the form of a deed (compact) of submission by them, and of obedience to the Emir Karamallah, appointed by his Highness the Mahdi, which I took, and went to the town of Yanika, the place where the aforenamed emir was encamped; and I delivered it to him, and on his reading and understanding it, his countenance expressed joy thereat. And he wrote a letter to the emir Abdullah, informing him of his being about to leave the town of Yanika, and to come to the seat of the mudirieh on Tuesday, the 25th of Jamad el Akhar 1301, and he gave the safe-conduct for all—for themselves, their families, and their property. And, praise be to God Most High, on the day named we and the emir Karamallah, and the troops with him, arrived at an hour's distance from the seat (of the mudirieh). And the emir Abdullah and all the notables and the brethren came to meet us outside of the wooden stockade surrounding the seat (of the mudirieh). The meeting was like the meeting of dear friends with each other, and it was a memorable day for all that was accomplished therein, and for the filling up of (our joy).

On our entering the Mahkamah (court of justice) of the mudirieh, and on the friends and emirs being seated, the emir Abdullah rose, and, standing upright, uttered the two declarations of testimony, saying, "I testify that there is no God but God; and I testify that our Lord Mohammed is the prophet of God, blessing be upon him, and that the Sayid Lord Mohammed, son of the Lord Abdullah, he is the Mahdi and Khalifa of God and His Prophet." Likewise after this the two Copts, Gabriel B'Abal and Saleh Shenuda, became Moslems, and uttered the two testimonies before the emir Karamallah (who received their profession of faith).

After which all (the property) which was in the stores of the mudirieh, situated in the seat (thereof) and elsewhere, became the property of the Treasury of Islam, as stated in the letters of the emir Karamallah sent to his Highness.

And we pray God Most High, to whom be praise, that He may soon grant us the favour of a journey (Hejira) to the honoured place, that we may be blessed with sight of his excellency the Mahdi, and that we may be included in the number of the warriors on the way (for the truth) of God.

I send from me to their excellencies (the hanifa) the nobles, and emirs, and friends, and acquaintances who fight for God, thousands of salams of God so long as I live.

(Signed) MOHAMMED SHEIKH MOHAMMED.

Written 17th Ramadan 1301.

11th July 1884.

While the following despatch from Karamallah to the Mahdi's

chief khalifa and successor, Abdullah Taashi, is descriptive of events in the Bahr el Ghazal subsequent to the fall, and is interesting as indicative of the delight of the writer at being freed from the trammels which had so long been imposed on slave traffic:—

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his lord the fakir Karamallah, Sheikh Mohammed at Bahr el Ghazal, to the relation of the Mahdi and emir of the army of the Mahdi, the Khalifa Abdullah of the Sayid Mohammed. May his glory be prolonged. After paying our dutiful salutation and respectful compliments, if you inquire about us we can say all praise to the Most High, all is well, and I have the honour to announce to you we have captured a large number of female slaves as booty, and that about 1360 head of slaves have already been sent to Shakka, including 200 slaves of Genawi, of Alyoo, which family passes to the Moslems' treasury (*i.e.* their value); and this (was done) in three divisions the first time (under convoy of) the fakir Ahmed Mohammed, the Shaigi; the band (party) which is considered the most numerous (under convoy of) our brother Mohammed Sheikh Mohammed Karkasawi, and the third under the convoy of the conductor Mohammed Saleh et Tome, (being) needed for buying (barter for) horses for use of our auxiliaries, with the knowledge of our brother Mohammed el Karkasawi. And those which may be sent to your honour to the noble camp (*i.e.* the Mahdi's camp) will be also with his knowledge, as he has already been appointed from here for that purpose. Also all the fakirs, our auxiliaries, have been distributed in the different zaribas in order to collect the booty, and, please God, all that can be got will be sent to Shakka by degrees as captured. And Mohammed Sheikh Mohammed Karkasawi is my brother (son) of my father and mother, older than I, and he it is who helped us to take the town of Bahr el Ghazal; and in consideration of his good management we have appointed him to go to Shakka to barter slaves for horses. And the slaves which may be sent to your honour will be with his knowledge and by his instructions. And as the slaves taken as booty are exceedingly numerous in this part, and are continually arriving at the camp of the mudir, we are much pressed in despatching them and in looking after them.

If it is agreeable to your honour (please) to write to Sheikh Manzal Hamid, and the sons of Hamad Dodao, about their gratuitous assistance and their surrendering the booty to our brother Sheikh Mohammed Karkasawi. We are at present awaiting the orders of your Excellency (whether) to remain here or to come to you, or to wait for the drying up of the waters of the rain, out of compassion (in consideration for) the believers (the slaves) who have little infants.

And we pray the most high God, to whom be praise, to bring us soon together with your Excellency.

Salam.

(Signed) KARAMALLAH MOHAMMED.

Dated 22d Shaban 1301.

17th June 1884.

And now we will quit the province of Bahr el Ghazal, which after the 21st April became an integral part of the Mahdi's steadily increasing dominions. In this vast province, five times as big as England, not a shred of Egyptian authority remained; all had been submerged under the waves of Mahdism, which now rolled placidly over its broad plains, bearing on their way vast bands of slaves for the greatly enlarged households of Mohammed Ahmed, his khalifas, and his emirs.

EQUATORIAL PROVINCES, 1884.

Emin Bey at the close of 1883 was at Lado, surveying with no small anxiety the growing insurrection in the Bahr el Ghazal, which he felt must inevitably ere long descend into his province. On 23d January Dr. Junker arrived at Lado, and Emin Bey's delight at welcoming him was unbounded. In the Rohl province matters were fairly satisfactory, but a dispute had arisen between the mamur and his clerk regarding the cause of the recent disturbance at Rumbek, the latter declaring that the retaliation of the Agar people had been brought about by the mamur's instructions to the troops to raid cattle from them, though they had hitherto been perfectly loyal to the Government; the dispute waxed hot, and Emin Bey was obliged to send Captain Elhem Effendi to settle matters; the latter sided with the clerk; so the mamur called on Emin to settle matters; the latter despatched the sub-mudir, Osman Effendi Latif, who on investigation reported that both were to blame. This incident is merely mentioned to show that there was no small friction between the various officials which subsequently developed serious consequences. On 18th February the sub-mudir wrote to Emin Bey from Rohl, saying that he had received a reinforcement of 450 men from the Bahr el Ghazal, and with them he hoped to be able to open up the road from Rumbek to Gok el Hassan. Emin Bey on receipt of this news ordered the sub-mudir to proceed at once to Rumbek and thence to Shambeh, taking with him as many troops as possible; the officer commanding the Bahr el Ghazal detachment refused to join in this expedition without orders from his own governor, and as rumours were prevalent that the tribes in the neighbourhood of Shambeh had risen in

revolt, the sub-mudir therefore returned to Rumbek, which he put in a state of defence.

Meanwhile Emin had received letters from Lupton on 27th March, informing him that his province was in a state of revolt, and that many of his stations were in distress. He therefore sent instructions that the officer of the Bahr el Ghazal detachment should return forthwith, taking with him a number of cattle for the support of the garrisons, and at the same time instructed his sub-mudir to assist Bahr el Ghazal as far as possible with food.

On the 28th March another letter arrived from Lupton giving the news of the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's army, the surrender of Slatin Bey, and that he himself was making what preparations he could for the defence of his province. This serious news was a terrible blow to Emin, who on the following day despatched orders for the withdrawal of various of his outlying stations. The garrison of Latuka was to retire on Ayu, that of Foweira to Wadelai, and that of Fadibek to Duffileh. Instructions were also sent to the garrison of Bohr to do all that was possible to keep open the road to Sobat.

During this interval a second attempt had been made by the mamur of Rohl to proceed to Shambah, but the revolt of the tribes precluded all possibility of reaching that place; the sub-mudir now returned to Lado, and while *en route* at Ayak received letters from the emir Karamallah, who wrote from Bahr el Ghazal, summoning Emin to surrender the province, and informing him of the surrender of Bahr el Ghazal, Darfur, and Kordofan. The five letters were addressed to Emin Bey, the mamur of Makaraka, the wakil of Shambah, the wakil of Rumbek, and the sub-mudir. The latter sent all the letters to Emin at once, and himself halted at Ayak. Previous to this Emin had received the three letters from Lupton Bey informing him of his approaching surrender. Now with this last summons from Karamallah received by Emin on 27th May, it seemed to him almost hopeless to attempt to resist the Mahdi's forces, but it is well here to quote extracts from his letters which describe the events immediately following the receipt of the summons from Karamallah. Emin says—

The Bahr el Ghazal mudiriah has surrendered to the army of the Mahdi after Lupton had been deserted by all his men. Sheikh Karam-

allah, commander-in-chief of the army of occupation, writes to me that the whole Sudan is lost, Khartum besieged, and that Hicks and Ala ed Din have fallen with 36,000 men, and he invites me to come to him at once and surrender. It would be folly to fight without rifles, without ammunition, without men that I can depend on, with Danagla before and behind me. I shall therefore go to Bahr el Ghazal on Monday.

Junker has decided to try the route to Zanzibar through Mtesa's residence. God guide him.

I am sending this letter by him. Kindly keep a place for me in your thoughts.—Yours sincerely,

DOCTOR EMIN BEY.

27th May 1884.

This letter was evidently written after the breaking up of the meeting of the officials which he had assembled to discuss the situation. But writing more calmly on the 14th August, he describes what happened at the meeting, and how he was prevented from going on his mission to Karamallah. He says:

Now just think of my position. For fourteen months I had had no communication with Khartum, or news from there. The magazines were quite empty of clothes, soap, coffee, etc., and though I had repeatedly pressed by letter for a consignment of a couple of hundred of Remington rifles and a sufficient supply of ammunition, I had not received them; the whole of Makaraka, Rohl, and part of Monbuttou were full of armed Danagla; in Lado itself there was a rabble of drunkards and gamblers, most of them fellow-countrymen of the rebels—the clerks of my divan. The prospect was not brilliant. My soldiers, of little account under any circumstances, were scattered over a wide extent of territory, and their withdrawal had to be accomplished with the greatest circumspection.

Accordingly, I asked my officers here in open council whether they considered it more desirable to submit or to prepare to fight. There could be no doubt what the answer would be—the purport of it was submission. A letter in that sense was therefore drawn up, and then we consulted as to who should deliver it. The choice fell on myself, the kadi, the schoolmaster, and a few other men of this place, among them one of my clerks, whose family possessed a great influence among the Danagla. Now, I knew very well that my removal would leave the way clear for anarchy, and that a descent of the Makaraka-Danagla on Lado would plunge the whole province into ruin. On the other hand, it was imprudent to reject the mission assigned to me, though it was evident beforehand that I should never return if I once went to the Bahr el Ghazal, but should have to go to Kordofan like Lupton. Amidst all these perplexities, which were aggravated by scarcity of corn, a fire broke out in June, dangerously near the magazine, and in a short time destroyed a large group of houses and huts chiefly inhabited by Coptic clerks. Whereas previously every one lent a hand on such occasions, fanaticism now showed its worst side. I had to have recourse to the soldiers to get the fire put out, and when I asked a Mohammedan clerk why he did not

help us, he answered, "They are Christians there ; let them be." In face of such symptoms I bestirred myself, and in another assembly I laid the state of affairs before the people, proving to them that my absence could only be productive of mischief, and proposing that the kadi should be named the chief of the mission in my place. This man, strange to say, supported me, and so the deputation was sent off. Its instructions were as follows :—The *status quo* was to be maintained in the province until steamers and boats could be sent to carry us to Khartum ; the province was to be exempt from invasion under any form ; above all, no violence was to be permitted against the Sudanese soldiers. This clause was inserted in consequence of the arrival of certain letters, which threw a light of their own on the situation. They came at the same time as a letter from Karamallah to Dr. Junker, inviting him to repair immediately to Wau and take charge of his collections left there by Bohndorff, if he did not wish them to be given up to the negroes. There were letters from Karamallah to various officials (Danagla) ; they were copies of the one sent to me, but being directed to them, were manifestly invitations to disregard the constituted authority and desert with their men ; then there was a letter in English from Lupton Bey to Junker containing the information that Fashoda had been given up by the Government ; and, lastly, an official letter from the commander of my station in Ayak. He wrote that three brave Sudanese soldiers had fled to that place, and had even brought their rifles with them, one of them being Vonni, Lupton's late orderly, a trustworthy man who properly belongs to this province, but had followed Lupton to the Bahr el Ghazal. Well, these soldiers related at an official audience that Lupton had been betrayed by his own men, who had been in league with the rebels for a long time ; that the Danagla, directly after they had occupied the mudirieh, had burnt all the books and government documents, had opened and plundered the magazine, had seized all the arms and ammunition which they found in store or in the hands of the soldiers and sold them to the highest bidder for money or slaves, and finally had put the soldiers in slave chains. The latter had their scanty food thrown down before them into a trough scraped out in the ground, and within the next few days were either reclaimed by some of the Danagla as their former slaves, or were publicly sold. You may imagine how I congratulated myself on my decision not to go to the Bahr el Ghazal.

The general impression of those present at the meeting was that Emin should temporise with Karamallah, in order to gain time to collect his forces, and the explanations given in the above extracts are more or less confirmatory of this view. On the 3d June the surrender mission for Karamallah left Lado. It was composed of—

The kadi, Osman Haj Hamed ;
The chief clerk, Osman Arbab, cousin to the Mahdi ;
Clerk, Mohammed Baba ;
Late mamur of Latuka, Ibrahim Agha ;

and was escorted by a party of Sudanese soldiers under second lieutenant Mussa Agha Hamad.

It is said that the kadi, before leaving, "instructed Emin Bey in writing that, as the whole of the property in the province now belonged to the Mahdi, he should issue nothing but grain, honey, and oil."

The sub-mudir, still at Ayak, was now ordered to withdraw the garrison of Rumbek to Amadi, if he saw that it was impossible to hold it against Karamallah, who was now reported to be advancing. Ibrahim Agha, the mudir of Makaraka, who, it will be remembered, had been despatched to Rumbek and Shambah in the early disturbances, now returned to Lado and obtained permission to go to Makaraka. On his arrival there he proceeded to Wandi, pillaged the stores, then sank the boat on the Yei, and started off with some of the Danagla through Makaraka Sogheir and Kabayendi to Kudurma, where he halted for a time preparatory to deserting to the Bahr el Ghazal to join Karamallah. Later on he proceeded to Doggorou in the Tonj district, where it appears a rising of the Farukh (gun boys) against the Danagla and Arabs of the Jur Ghattas district had occurred; these latter, led by Bringi Zubeir, a former sanjak¹ of Zubeir Pasha, had sacked Tonj, and now intercepted Ibrahim Agha at Doggorou, and killed him.² In the meantime reinforcements were called up from Duffileh, Laboreh, Muggi, Kiri, and Makaraka, to Amadi. The stations of Rumbek and Ayak were ordered to be abandoned and the garrisons withdrawn to Amadi, while instructions were sent to the outlying garrison of Gurguru (Monbuttu) to concentrate at Makaraka.³ And now all preparations were made to offer a stubborn resistance to Karamallah's advance on Amadi. The troops of these stations now numbered some 1100 men, four guns, and a rocket battery, the whole under the command of Morghan Agha ed Denassuri.

¹ A Persian word, originally meaning banner, standard; then standard-bearer; then a body of troops enrolled under one standard; lastly, the captain of such a corps; and this rank is adopted amongst the Bashi-Bazuk troops of the Sudan.

² It is related by some that Ibrahim Agha was killed by the garrison of Goza, who knew him to be a deserter.

³ Owing to disturbances in the Monbuttu, this garrison did not reach Makaraka till some months later.

The garrisons of the remaining stations were now approximately as follows :—

At Lado 100

At Makaraka 200

under Captain Farag Agha Yusef.

At Duffileh 200

under Adjutant Major Hawash Effendi Muntassir, while the other stations farther south had garrisons of from thirty to fifty men each.

Shambeh was now considered as lost, and there had been no news of the Bohr garrison for more than a year; but on the 24th August Emin Bey was relieved by the arrival of a small detachment from that station, who gave good accounts of the garrison there, and stated that the barge which Emin had sent with provisions for the relief of Shambeh had arrived undamaged at Bohr, and that a portion of the Shambeh garrison had also effected a retreat to that station. There were rumours too, the commandant of Bohr wrote, that several steamers were on the Nile; but they had been obliged to return to Fashoda, owing to the river being blocked by the suds. Emin made use of this information by issuing proclamations throughout the provinces that reinforcements were coming from Khartum.

Meanwhile the garrison of Rumbek, retiring on Amadi, had arrived at Ayak, and learning that a force of rebels was at Sayadin, an attempt was made to turn them out, resulting in the loss of a considerable quantity of war material. In spite of this slight reverse, the garrisons of Rumbek and Ayak all reached Amadi safely by the 19th November.

During this interval a portion of the rebel force had already been despatched by Karamallah to Amadi under Abdullah Abd es Salam (late mamur of Bahr el Ghazal) and Taher Agha, accompanied by a large number of Bazinger, all armed with Remington rifles. An attack was made on the town on 11th, which was repulsed. It was renewed again on 14th, and this time the rebels lost considerably, and two officers, Elajab Agha Saleh and Surur Agha Ibrahim, late deserters from the mudirieh, were killed. On the 17th another attack was made, which again failed. And on 2d December the garrison made a sortie, stormed the enemy's camp, and inflicted great loss on them, but were forced to give

way before superior numbers, losing twelve officers and men killed, and eighteen wounded.

The Agar negroes had on this occasion joined the Danagla, and also lost considerably. The garrison, however, made good its retreat to Amadi, and safely brought back the wounded. Emin, towards the end of December, despatched reinforcements from Lado of 165 Bazingers and soldiers armed with rifles, and 800 Bombeh, Moru, and Makaraka men armed with spears and shields, with which he hoped to drive away the rebels besieging Amadi. He also about this time received a letter from Karamallah, sending him a Mahdi's dress consisting of jubbeh and takia. But the officers at Amadi, believing they contained some magic influence, destroyed them before they reached him.

On December 26th came the alarming news that the garrison of Bohr had been almost exterminated in a foraging raid, and Emin at once despatched two sailing boats with corn, men, and ammunition, with the remark that he is doubtful if they will arrive in time to relieve the station. Up to the present the Makaraka district had been comparatively tranquil, which was probably, in a large measure, due to the presence there of Captain Casati, who had been travelling in Monbuttu; but, when disturbances had occurred there, he had been advised by Emin to return nearer headquarters.

At the close of the year Emin is still hoping that, "in spite of all the past events he shall at length be released by the arrival of a steamer from Khartum."—He had transformed Lado into a respectable fortress with deep moats, high ramparts, bastions, drawbridges, etc., and remarks, "If we are to die at last, we will at least die the honourable death of soldiers, and I believe it is not far off."

SENNAR, 1884

A brief reference is here necessary to events which were happening in the neighbourhood of Sennar, which, it will be remembered, had now been more or less closely besieged since 1883. In May 1884 a number of tribes in the vicinity of the town collected under the emir Abu el Husna, and endeavoured to cut off the supplies. In July the mudir Hassan

Bey Sadik attacked the rebels, and for a time cleared the neighbourhood, and collected a considerable quantity of corn. On August 7th Bakhit Bey Betraki, who had been despatched by Gordon to obtain supplies, arrived at Jadane, twelve miles north of Sennar, where he met the mudir, and, thoroughly stocking his steamers, returned to Khartum.

At the end of September Nushi Pasha arrived in the same neighbourhood, and was also supplied with quantities of corn. Meanwhile, however, Gordon had received complaints against the mudir, and had sent instructions by Betraki Bey to Nur Bey, then commanding the troops, and one of his former officers, that he should assume supreme command, and further instructed him that, in the event of the mudir showing any signs of disaffection, he should be sent to Khartum.

Towards the end of October Gordon received the following letter from Hassan Sadik :—

FROM THE MUDIR OF SENNAR, TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE
SUDAN AND ITS DEPENDENCIES, TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE HONOUR-
ABLE

We stated to your excellency that on 6th October 1884 we had the honour to receive the order of your excellency, dated 24th September, announcing the arrival of nine regiments of the braves of the English army and Moslems of India—artillery, cavalry, and infantry of the army—experienced in passing mountains, plains, and rough places, with new cannons and powerful horses. And our reading it to the public and publishing it in the country produced great rejoicing and happiness in all, and they augured all good and every benefit, and they are all praying for victory and success for you and for the army, and please God they are arrived at Berber, and have taken possession of it, and have arrived at Khartum. Everybody at Sennar and the neighbourhood—ulema, merchants, citizens, notables, officers, and soldiers—kiss the hands of your excellency; and we proclaim about your excellency, that by the power of God and His protection, and by the help of our Prophet, on whom and on his people be the best of blessings and peace, the disturbances of the Sudan and the pretensions of the Mahdi are stopped, and nothing remains thereof but little trifles in some parts. And they will all submit to the sword of the Government.

To God belongs success, and help is in Him.

(Signed)

HASSAN SADIK,
Mudir-General of Sennar.

Dated 18 Zu'l Hejjeh 1301

(9th October 1884.)

Postscript.—To his excellency. We beg your excellency to give orders for the quick despatch of a steamer with what we asked for in our letter laid before you, No. 39/14.

But in spite of the satisfactory state of affairs here described, jealousy was at work, and in November 1884 Nur Bey made the mudir a prisoner in his house.

In this month another gathering of the rebels took place under the emir el Merhdi¹ Abu Rof; towards the end of this month Nur Bey with a force of 700 men attacked El Merhdi, but was obliged to retire again to Sennar with a loss of some officers and men. The rebel emir now advanced on Sennar, and, taking up a position at Kebosh, cut off all communications, and the town was once more besieged.

EVENTS AT SUAKIN SUBSEQUENT TO EL TEB, ETC.

But to revert to course of events in the Eastern and South-Eastern Sudan.

On the withdrawal of the British troops of General Graham's expedition, Major Chermside was appointed governor of Suakin on May 10th, 1884. Osman was still active in the neighbourhood; while the few friendly tribes were practically powerless against the Hadendowa federation. The garrison of Suakin consisted of the first battalion of the newly organised Egyptian army, a few cavalry and artillery, supported by the marines of the British men-of-war, and these were barely sufficient for the defence of the town.

For some months the record is one of constant night alarms, in which the young Egyptian troops acquitted themselves well, and showed a capability for defence which preceding events had scarcely warranted.

A few months later one of the important tribes in the neighbourhood, the Amarar, took up hostilities against the Hadendowa, and several intertribal conflicts took place with varying success. Thus, though Suakin still continued in a state of siege, Osman Digna had not sufficiently recovered from the effects of Teb and Tamai to be able to attack the town in force.

Meanwhile, Major Chermside was engaged in a task of considerable difficulty and delicacy. This was, to induce King

¹ This was the chief of the Rufa's Arabs. His name had been originally El Mahdi, but on Mohammed Ahmed announcing his divine mission, he ordered this worthy to change his name to El Merhdi.

John of Abyssinia to undertake the relief of the Moslem soldiers at Gera, Amadib, Kassala, and Galabat. King John, while making the most of grievances which he knew would not be removed, was careful to give the pledges necessary to obtain some 10,000 rifles, ammunition, and some 300,000 dollars. He was quite willing to fight Arabs, and after excessive correspondence and patience on the part of Major Chermiside, Ras Alula, the Abyssinian general, seemed to be ready for action.

Major Chermiside's action in this matter was based upon what has been called a treaty made by Admiral Hewett and Mason Bey with King John. The Admiral left Massawa for the interior of Abyssinia on the 7th April 1884; and the treaty, which was signed at Adua on the 3d June 1884, provided that the king should receive the territory of Bogos, in which lay the garrison of Senhit or Keren, and which territory had previously been Abyssinian. He should receive this territory and the buildings and stores in Senhit when he had facilitated the evacuation of the garrisons of Kassala and Amadib; and it was thought that his anxiety to repossess Bogos would hasten the evacuation.

KASSALA DURING 1884

In the meantime the mudir of Taka, Ahmed Bey Iffat, writing from Kassala on March 29th, 1884, urgently demanded reinforcements, stating that Gordon Pasha has told him British troops are coming. He and the inhabitants are much pleased at the prospect; he further reports that Bakhit Bey of the Beni Amer has, with his Arabs, given him the most loyal assistance.

Writing again in May the mudir stated that the siege was being pressed more closely, that he was almost cut off from communication; that the treasury was empty, and he had no money to pay the troops. On June 21st the rebels attacked Khatmieh, a suburb of Kassala, but were repulsed by the garrison under Sheikh Osman el Morghani, and Sheikh Eguel, chief of the Homran tribe, the latter capturing the Arab standard and killing the standard-bearer. In August the mudir received instructions to retire, through Mason Bey, then governor of Massawa, who, however, stated that the

difficulty in evacuating Kassala arose from the presence of 1000 Bashi-Bazuks, who would not surrender; and two months later Captain Speedy, once more in the country so long familiar to him and retained to assist in carrying out the Abyssinian treaty, wrote that, half the garrison being natives of the district, the governor could not evacuate.

On September 12th, 1884, in accordance with the treaty, Bogos was handed over to the Abyssinians; but the withdrawal of the garrisons of Amadib and Senhit was delayed, as they might be of assistance to the Kassala garrison when on its way through Abyssinia.

About this time Sheikh Bakhit of the Beni Amer arrived at Massawa from Kassala, and stated that he did not believe the evacuation of Kassala possible without the assistance of troops. This chief, up to that time, had rendered most valuable assistance to the mudir at Kassala; but the disturbed state of the country, and the rumours that his neighbours, viz. the Habab and Rasheida, had become disaffected, obliged him to return to look after the interests of his own tribe.

In November King John expressed his willingness to despatch a force for the relief of Kassala, but was informed that the relief of the Galabat garrison was of greater urgency; he therefore made preparations with that object.

GEDAREF

In April (1884) the mudir reported that the garrison of Gedaref or Suk Abu Sin,¹ consisting of 200 men under Mohammed Pasha Agha and Captain Mussa Effendi Hassan, had made terms with the rebels; and five Christian merchants who were there at the time were obliged to embrace Islam. The Arab leaders in this district were Mohammed Effendi and Sheikh Abdullah, son and brother respectively of Awad el Kerim Pasha, chief of the Shukrieh. This latter preserved his loyalty to the Government throughout, eventually dying in chains at Omdurman.

¹ The chief town or market-place of the Shukrieh, so called from the family name of the sheikh of the tribe—Abu Sin (the man with the tooth)—a nickname with reference to a long and ugly tooth by which he was distinguished.

Gedaref is, properly speaking, the name of the province, but is often applied to its capital, Suk Abu Sin.

HARRAR

In the long story of disaster which attended the evacuation of the Sudan, the restoration of the tranquil coffee garden and walled city of Harrar to a son of a former ruler is a pleasing episode. Under the respectable supervision of a British consul the enterprise was a mere exchange of compliments. The town of Harrar was handed over to Mohammed Abd esh Shakur, and the British consul gave a receipt for the two ports Berbera and Zeila.

Harrar is 150 miles from the coast, and lines drawn between Berbera, Zeila, and Harrar form a triangle, with the right angle at Zeila.

Radwan Pasha started from Suez on the 13th September 1884, equipped with £5000 for the necessary transport expenses, and on the 23d reached Aden, where he met with Major Hunter.¹ The pasha's satisfaction at finding Major Hunter's opinions on the evacuation to be exactly the same as his own was modified by surprise at finding that their respective instructions coincided to the letter. Radwan Pasha proceeded to Berbera on the following day, and read the orders of His Highness the Khedive to a garrison delighted at the prospect of return to civilisation. Thence he went to Zeila, deposited the cash in the treasury, posted instructions to the governor of Harrar, and returned to Berbera.

Here he proceeded to sell by auction the moveable property of the Government, and handed the buildings to the British consul against a receipt.

On the 12th October everything was ready for their departure for Harrar. Major Hunter deputed Lieutenant Peyton to accompany the pasha, and the two marched inland by easy stages. Arrived at Harrar, the troops and notables received them with every demonstration of joy. Here they produced the firman from His Highness, examined the accounts, paid the troops five months of arrears, released some Arab prisoners, and summoned every available camel in the neighbourhood. Government stores and machinery were sold by auction. A valuation of the houses and coffee gardens was quickly put in progress, and by the end of October 1000

¹ Major F. M. Hunter, Bombay Staff Corps.

troops were well on their way to Zeila. By the middle of November 2700 were despatched, and with them the government archives, which, when kept by Coptic clerks, are prodigious, and in this case filled forty-seven large chests.

By this time the claims of the inhabitants upon the officials had become numerous and pressing. A commission quickly investigated and satisfied them. Major Hunter, accompanied by Major Heath, reached Harrar on the 13th November with 40,000 rupees, and while the evacuation rapidly and easily proceeded, these officers gave their attention to the establishment of a new government. They built a fort, collected a force of 3000 Somalis, armed them with rifles and two Krupp guns, and taught them, as far as might be, the use of these weapons.

In December, while the evacuation and the establishment of a new government were going on *pari passu*, a feeler, as it were, was thrown out by the native tribes in the vicinity. Some Bashdins and Waragoso complained to Radwan Pasha that the Babli tribe had attacked and slain some of their number. Radwan Pasha marched forth with five battalions and a proportion of artillery and cavalry. The Babli fled, leaving their huts to be plundered and burned. No further incident broke the steady stream of troops to the coast.

By February 1885, Major Hunter was back at Zeila, and all Harrar was ready for the installation of the new Government. Fifty-six of the leading men were summoned in council and unanimously approved the election, as governor, of Abdullah Mohammed Abd esh Shakur, son of the ruler who had been deposed by Egypt. They also elected a council of ten to defend the public right, and four other notables to direct the finance, the customs, the police, and the small army.

At this point two German travellers, Dr. Hardy and Paul Deksi, arrived on the scene and made a number of exhaustive inquiries. Their curiosity was not, however, satisfied in any way, as the wily Radwan Pasha ascertained that they bore no credentials from any authority. *Post hoc si non propter hoc*, on the 23d February the European merchants presented an energetic protest against the withdrawal of the Government, under the protection of which they had commenced their various occupations. They were satisfied when told that if they were

not ready to leave in two months, the time at which Egyptian rule would terminate, they could remain two months longer under the protection of Lieutenant Peyton.


On the 25th April the final ceremony of installing the new emir was performed, the firman of His Highness the Khedive was read in public, followed by an exchange of the Egyptian for the emir's flag, and a salute of twenty-one guns. The British gave a receipt.

The next day Radwan, under considerable emotion at the inhabitants' grief at his departure, left Harrar with the last of 6500 men, all of whom safely reached the coast and embarked for Egypt.

On the 13th May 1885 Lieutenant Peyton handed to the new governor Government buildings to the value of £7000, and coffee gardens valued at £400, and followed the pasha to the sea-coast.

The foregoing account of the evacuation of Harrar is from the diary of Radwan Pasha. It is so pleasant and easy that one wishes there were more.

A reference to the British official correspondence gives them an entirely different complexion. In this correspondence Radwan Pasha is mentioned certainly, but merely as a disinterested spectator of the diplomatic feats of the British political agents. Upon what volcanoes of strained relations, of anarchy, of bloodshed and civil war, this innocent pasha had been treading, is no matter for history.



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BOOK VI

FALL OF KHARTUM

Abyssinian and Khartum Relief Expeditions compared—History of the siege—The Nile rises—Mohammed Ali Pasha's expedition up the Blue Nile—He defeats the emir Abd el Kader at Gereif—Gordon congratulates him—The "Fighting Pasha" clears the whole neighbourhood of the rebels—He defeats the Sheikh el Obeid at Halfiyeh—Clears the river as far as Shendi—But is defeated and killed at Om Dubban—Colonel Stewart leaves Khartum in the steamer *Abbass* to meet the British—The wreck of the *Abbass*—Stewart and party land at Hebbah—Are treacherously murdered by Suliman Wad Gamr—Correspondence between Khartum and the Mahdi—The reply of the ulemas discussed—Gordon writes to Sennar—He despatches three steamers under Nushi Pasha to Metemmeh to await the English—The work done by the steamers—The heroic conduct of the ladies Fatima and Nefisa at Metemmeh—News of Stewart's death reaches Khartum—The fall of Khartum discussed from four standpoints—The story of the besieged—The early stages of the siege—Scarcity of corn—Khartum searched for corn—Omdurman heavily besieged by Abu Angar—Gordon attempts to relieve it—Faragallah Pasha—The commandant receives Gordon's orders to surrender—The capitulation of Omdurman—Famine in Khartum—The dead fill the streets—Sanjak Omar Ibrahim deserts—Gordon sends to the Mahdi all the inhabitants who desire to quit Khartum—The Mahdi fires a salute of 101 guns—Perplexity of the besieged—Gordon tells them that the English are coming at once—The despair of the besieged—Wad en Nejumi's army crosses the parapet and ditch which the Nile had destroyed—The fall of Khartum and death of General Gordon—The movements of the Relief Expedition—Sir Charles Wilson starts on 24th January with the steamers *Bordein* and *Telahawieh*—The difficulties of navigation—Delay caused by accident—Fire opened by the enemy—Report of General Gordon's death—Preparations for running the blockade—First view of Khartum—Tuti Island in enemy's hands—Khartum found to have fallen, steamers retire—*Telahawieh* aground for a short time—Heavy fire on the steamers—Crews show signs of disaffection—Difficulties of situation—Wreck of the *Telahawieh*—Letters from the Mahdi—Answer to the Mahdi's letter—Disaffection among native troops—Passage of Shabluka—Descent of last rapid—Wreck of *Bordein*—Mernat Island—Lieutenant Stuart Wortley starts for Gubat—Sir C. Wilson's dispositions—Desertions—The *Safieh* sighted—Sir Charles Wilson quits Mernat Island and marches down to the *Safieh*—The voyage of the *Safieh*—Fort at Wad Habeshi—The boiler struck—Dangerous position of the *Safieh*—Repair of the boiler—Relief of Sir Charles Wilson's party.

THE expedition to Abyssinia relieved eight men and cost eight millions. They were Englishmen imprisoned while in the execution of their duty in a remote and hostile country. The success of the expedition was, humanly speaking, a matter of chance, for it depended upon the caprice of a ferocious king, modified by what skill, intrigue, and tact the prisoners might, in their forlorn position, bring to bear on that caprice. The proper season of the year once selected, delay might or might not have been fatal. Baird and his comrades lived under similar conditions for nearly four years in the historical dungeon of Seringapatam. General Gordon's condition at Khartum was wholly different. To innumerable enemies flushed with victory and ardent fanaticism, Gordon opposed a skill and experience in savage warfare which few could equal. Ill provisioned in a place naturally and artificially weak, Gordon for months preserved an undaunted front. Neither treachery in the besieged nor the stratagems of the besiegers caused the fall of Khartum. The town fell through starvation, and despair at long neglect.

There were no elements of chance in the success of the expedition to relieve General Gordon. It was sanctioned too late. As day by day no English came, so day by day the soldiers' hearts sank deeper and deeper into gloom. As day by day their strength so wasted that finally gum, their only food, was rejected, so day by day the Nile ebbed back from the ditch it had filled with mud, and from the rampart it had crumbled, and left a broad path for who should dare to enter.

To resume, however, the history of the siege. The long-looked-for inundation arrived at last. The Nile rose slightly in June, rapidly in July, and continued rising during the whole of August. The plan on page 197 shows the change made by the gradual submergence of the environs of the town. At high Nile, Khartum is practically a strip along the Blue Nile on which the palace and arsenal are placed.

Towards the end of August everything was ready for a great blow at the closely encircling throng of besiegers: Mohammed Ali Pasha, Gordon's "fighting pasha," set forth up the Blue Nile with a large and well-equipped force both by land and water. At Gereif he encountered the Arabs and completely defeated Abd el Kader, capturing 1600 rifles and great

1000 1000
1000 1000

numbers of swords and spears. Gordon went out on a special steamer to meet him on his return, congratulated him heartily, and promoted him to the rank of general. Next day, the 30th August, Mohammed Pasha returned, and after another engagement in which the sheikh's brother was killed, he cleared the whole triangle south of Khartum, of which the base is a line drawn from Kalakala on the White, to Gereif on the Blue Nile.

On the following day the pasha, elated at his success, set forth northward. At Halfiyeh he encountered the Sheikh el Obeid. This also was a brilliant victory. He defeated the sheikh utterly and cleared the river on both banks as far north as Shendi. Corn, cattle, butter, and eatables of every description poured into the town, and prices sank to their normal level. The town was wild with joy. But alas! these successes begat a confidence which brought disaster in its train, the dreadful defeat at El Fun.¹ Gordon, when explaining his despatch to Berber of Colonel Stewart, Power, Herbin, and other Europeans who had re-entered the town in February, writes that the situation at Khartum was, humanly speaking, desperate after the defeat which succeeded the victory of El Fun.

El Eilafun is on the east bank of the Nile, some twenty miles to the south of Khartum. Here the Sheikh el Obeid and the emir Medawi had collected their forces, shattered at Halfiyeh, and here Mohammed Pasha on the 4th September attacked them. The sheikhs were defeated and drew inland to Om Dubban. Mohammed Pasha, leaving his second in command, Faragallah Pasha, entrenched on the river, and after receiving a fresh supply of ammunition, followed the sheikh to Om Dubban. Gordon says he wished to plunder the sheikh. Bakhit Bey Betraki was despatched from Khartum with Stewart and reinforcements, but, without waiting for them, Mohammed Pasha started on his fatal expedition. At dawn, when his men were tired and in disorder—for they had lost their way in the darkness—the sheikh fell upon them with crushing effect. They fought bravely. The general, proud of his new rank and of his late success, refused to yield an inch.

¹ Properly called El Eilafun, but constantly mentioned in the journals as El Fun.

"He stood on his fur" as the expression is; that is, he placed the sheepskin from his saddle on the ground and refused to move from the spot. He was cut down fighting, and with him 800 men, the half of his force; 980 Remington rifles were lost at the same time. The steamer with the reinforcements brought back Farag Pasha, not to be confused with Farag Zeini Pasha, and his small post.

Gordon had long promised to himself that on the flood of the river he would send down a steamer to Cairo. This steamer should carry down the fullest possible details of what had passed, and should leave no doubt possible in the minds of the Government as to what steps should be taken. The defeat of El Fun led to the immediate despatch of the *Abbass*. Herbin, the French consul, volunteered to go in charge, and, on consideration, the advantages were perceived of placing an European in charge of the mission, which might be made more important than was at first proposed. If an European went, then Colonel Stewart, a British officer, could speak to British officers with more effect than any one else; accordingly Colonel Stewart, after some honourable scruples about leaving Gordon, embarked with Herbin, Power, and a bodyguard of Greeks. The *Abbass* was escorted by other steamers until safe past Shendi and Berber, but the Arabs there were under no temptation to attack, for the steersman of the ship could wreck them first and ensure a bloodless capture. Thus they sped safely past Berber, and over mile after mile of rushing stream and tangled rocky passage. Their skilful steersmen relieved each other at the wheel and won golden opinions. Hearts beat higher, and worn faces brightened as the familiar Mograt Island was reached and they drew near Abu Hamed. Here they cut adrift the four boats they had towed so far and steamed ahead.

On the 18th September, eight days after leaving Khartum, they observed with curious eyes large numbers of natives hurrying along either bank, and soon—it was still early morning—they ran upon a rock. The steamer sank, Colonel Stewart landed at a village, friendly but fully armed, and here at Hebbah they were invited into a house and murdered. The journals and information which they carried have not yet been obtained; they fell into the Mahdi's hands, and subse-

quently into those of his successor. Their value has, however, been discounted, as the history of events has been gradually pieced together.

In the meantime desultory correspondence had been going on between Gordon, Abd el Kader Ibrahim, and Wad en Nejumi. The two latter did all in their power to obtain the surrender of the town before the Mahdi's arrival, but neither Gordon nor the inhabitants swerved from their original resolve to hold the town at all costs and await the arrival of the English.

Amidst the mass of correspondence which took place, the reply of the ulemas of Khartum to the Mahdi is instructive, as showing the views of the orthodox Moslem as opposed to those of the divine reformer. The reply was drawn up by the chief doctor of the mosque, Sayid Hussein el Majdi, and was duly sent out to Abd el Kader.

The learned Sayid Hussein searched his authorities to some purpose. He pointed out that the Mahdi was the son of Hassan el Askeri, was born in 255 A.H., and must be now over 1000 years old, whereas Mohammed Ahmed was obviously not a tenth of that age. He hurled back the quotations with indignation. You may quote your ancient books to the ignorant, but we know that there is no Mahdi mentioned in them; but if this is the expected one, where then is El Khorassani, who shall first pacify the world? Where the Melik es Sufian, who shall rule before him? Where the drying up of the "Euphrates" and the discovery of the mountain of gold? The theology of one side was as good as the divinity of the other, but when was the reasoning of the besieged acceded to by the besiegers? When did a theological argument avert a battle? The arguments employed by the mullahs of Khartum cannot but strike thoughtful minds as an illustration of Islam in the Sudan. These men were arguing, if not for their lives, yet they were arguing in circumstances under which it behoved them to do their best. Yet they do not seem to have risen to the emergency except on the score of lengthiness.

It is instructive to go through their letter. The Egyptian is incapable of abstract reasoning, and in his language it is difficult to make any statement that cannot be construed in

more than one way. Putting aside, therefore, involved and meaningless sentences, the arguments may be taken in the following order :—

“The Kuran says the religion is complete. Therefore, there can be no revelation.

“If there be a new revelation it must be set aside if it involves breach of chastity, murder, or apostasy from religion.

“Following the Mahdi involves all these things.

“A Mahdi ought to have a number of Persian or foreign vizirs. This Mahdi has none.

“Gordon is addressed in this Mahdi's letter by the title of ‘Saadat,’ and in the same letter he is called ‘an unbeliever ;’ the writer is inconsistent, and cannot be the real Mahdi. ‘Peace be on him’ : this is written after the Mahdi's name, and yet Abd el Ghani says that this formula is reserved for the prophets.

“In no ancient book is there any reference to a Mahdi. Shia', however, pretend that one is coming. If this be he, then where are those who prepare the way, where the directing arm ? Where the ‘Euphrates’ drying up to display a hill of gold ?

“A Mahdi will not shed blood nor awaken the sleepers.

“This Mahdi does both.

“They then turned to the ancient books and quote the following :—

“The Prophet, on whom be peace, announced to me that this book will remain until the appearance of the Mahdi, on whom be peace. And his followers will profit by it, and by it they will be able to dispense with the advice of the Mahdi in most matters of religion ; for when he, on whom be peace, is come, he will do away with contradiction and difference of opinion on the earth, so that in his days there will remain none but the true faith, and the body of the ‘ulema in his day will be secretly hostile to him.

“They allege that in the traditions it is written that the Mahdi will do nothing that the Prophet would not have done, and that he will suppress all imams. But, they add, this Mahdi knows nothing of the six sciences in which the profound knowledge lies.

"Esh Shara'ni says that the Mahdi will be born in the year 255, that is, 1046 years ago; but this Mahdi is clearly not a tenth of that age. ✓

"The Mahdi will claim sovereignty because people will follow him. But this Mahdi is only followed because he kills those who refuse.

"The Mahdiists should not adduce as proof of their genuineness the slaughter they have made in Kordofan, for that is nothing compared with the slaughter described in the sacred books."

A general had once thirteen reasons for not bringing up his guns. The first was that he had no guns. Thus, the first argument against the Mahdi is that there is no Mahdi.

The arguments are halting and self-contradictory. But, indeed, Islam face to face with a new prophet, Mahdi or other, is and has ever been in a difficult position. For nothing has been clearly laid down. Islam itself was hardly believed in for nearly 200 years after the Prophet's death, and until then its shape was vague through the haze of 200 unrecorded years. During these years many difficult questions were left undiscussed, nor has it attracted to itself minds capable of clear discussion. Because Aristotle and Euclid came to us through the Arabic language, the Arabs have received credit for understanding those works. But the translations were made by Syrians, whom the khalifas, while tolerating them, stigmatised with the contemptuous title of "filsouf" or philosophers.

There are few original Arabic works which can be read for instruction, nor are there Arabs who can put the relations between Islam and Mahdism on an intelligible basis. A Mahdi will succeed or fail entirely apart from arguments drawn from religion.

But to return from this digression. In September Gordon had written to Hassan Sadik, mudir of Sennar, that an English expedition was on its way to relieve the garrisons, and on the 27th October a reply was received, which elicited from Gordon the remark, "So Sennar depends on me to see after it."

Three weeks after the departure of Colonel Stewart, and while still in ignorance of his fate, Gordon had despatched three well-armed steamers under Nushi Pasha. These steamers had orders to cruise about Shendi and Metemneh, and to meet

the English expedition, whose speed Gordon miscalculated, and whose whereabouts he was intensely anxious to learn. On the 29th September they left for Shendi. Shendi was the stronghold of the Shaggieh¹ (Shaikiyeh) tribe, whose faithlessness as a people throws into relief the plucky conduct of Khashm-el-Mus, one of their leaders, who stuck to Sir Charles Wilson and Lieutenant Stuart Wortley in their retreat from Khartum. The town was in the hands of the emir Ahmed Hamza, against whom two heroic ladies, Fatima and Nefisa (the mother and daughter of Sidi Osman el Morghani of Taka), maintained a resolute opposition. Cheered by the arrival of the steamers, they used every effort to rouse the people to join the Government, but the emir was too near and the steamers too distant to prevent the Shaggieh from swearing fidelity to the ladies and from proceeding at the same time to join the forces of the emir.

A fourth steamer arrived, and a desultory conflict was maintained between the boats and the town until the 10th October, when news was received of the death of Stewart, and a steamer was despatched to carry the information to Khartum. This steamer returned, and with it a fourth vessel, and the attack on Shendi was continued. It was continued for more than three months, during which islands and villages were plundered for provisions. Steamers passed and repassed to Khartum, running the gauntlet every mile of the distance and sustaining every kind of injury from rocks, from sandbanks, and from the enemy's guns. Men fell daily in action, but no duty was neglected. Wood for the furnaces was obtained only with loss of life. Voyages north in search of news could hear nothing of the expedition. Letters came at last and were carried on by the *Bordein*, whose arrival at Khartum on the 25th November is thus described by Gordon:—

Only one steamer in sight. The Arabs held the gun at Halfiyeh against the incoming steamer. For the last half-hour the firing on the part of the Arabs on the advancing steamer has been most furious with guns and musketry, we replying. I am grateful to say that after this hot reception she has got in safe to Mogrim (Mukran). If any officer of the expedition is on board he will know what it is to be in a penny boat under cannon fire.

¹ A Semitic tribe claiming Arab descent through a sheikh Shayig Ibn Hamaidan; they occupy the banks of the Nile between Korti and Berti, with a part of the Bayuda steppe.

There was no officer of the expedition on board, but the Egyptian troops were contented under these circumstances, and returned to Shendi with a fresh mail as soon as it was ready. The letters brought under such risk (two of the Halfiyeh shells burst on the steamer, wounding seven men) were cyphers, of which the key had been sent away with Stewart, and a telegram cancelling the fatal proclamation abandoning the Sudan. Such was the work done by Nushi's steamers. The *Safieh* on the 15th December received a shell through her boiler. The damage was made good under a hot fire. The *Telaharwieh* had a similar mishap, but all were kept afloat and in fighting trim except the *Mansura*, which was sunk by a shell on the water-line.

By the end of December the Nile was very low, and to safely pass the Bishara Rocks it was judged well to land the troops and re-embark them below. Thus, for the last time, they found themselves at Metemmeh, and on the 9th January saw the Arabs under Abu Safia and the emir Wad Mussa marching down to defeat at Abu Klea.

But it is necessary to return to Khartum and the disastrous defeat of El Fun, and here the diary of one of the townsmen of Khartum may take up the tale.¹ The fall of Khartum will then be described, first, by the records of those within the town; and secondly, from those of the expedition to relieve it; and thirdly, from the statements of those who besieged the town and took it.

The following is an extract from the journal of Bordeini Bey, an eminent Khartum merchant, who willingly gave up his large stores of grain to Gordon for the supply of the garrison. He says—

Abd el Hamid Bey, who was sent as a scout, telegraphed to Gordon Pasha announcing the defeat of El Fun. Hearing the news, Gordon telegraphed to all parts of the fortifications to be on the alert and never to be negligent. On that day, one hour before sunset, Faragallah Pasha

¹ General Gordon's last journals describe all events fully up to the 14th December, which are in the following statement merely touched upon; but the description from a civilian's point of view is interesting, and, moreover, fills up the gap between the 14th December and the fatal 26th January, when the town fell. The events which occurred during the actual attack are so fully described in the proceedings of the court-martial, and tally so exactly with Bordeini Bey's statement, that for the sake of brevity that portion of his diary relating to these events has been omitted.

arrived with the steamers, and the news of the defeat was spread over the city. The inhabitants fell into despair and distress and wept for their state. Gordon Pasha, seeing them in such distress, wept with them too. This was the first and last time I ever saw Gordon Pasha in tears, but he tried to strengthen them and calm them by all means in his power. He appointed special men also for this purpose.

The next day after the defeat the Mahdi sent Abderrahman en Nejumi with 100,000 men, accompanied by his brother, Hassan en Nejumi, Abd el Kader, Wad Madrah, the emir of the Hassanat tribe, Abdullah Ibn en Nur, Abd es Salam, Ibn Hasballah, and other emirs of the rebels, to Kalakala, and circulated a proclamation to all tribes in towns and deserts east and west calling them all to the siege of Khartum, and threatening those who delayed with confiscation of all their property.

All tribes submitted to his order, and they hurried in numbers to the siege of Khartum. They fired projectiles from the guns, rockets, and firearms of all descriptions, which fell on the town from all sides. From time to time the troops made sorties out of the city to drive them off, but almost each time their efforts proved fruitless, and they had to return to the garrison, for the projectiles of the rebels were numerous.

In spite of all this danger by which he was surrounded, Gordon Pasha had no fear. I remember one night some of the principal men in Khartum came to my house and begged me to ask Gordon Pasha not to light up the rooms of the palace, as they offered a good mark for the enemy's bullets. When I mentioned this to Gordon Pasha he was very angry, saying, "Who has said Gordon was ever afraid?" A few evenings afterwards I was with Gordon in the palace, and as the rooms were still lighted up I suggested that he should put boxes full of sand in front of the windows to stop the bullets. Gordon Pasha was then more enraged than ever. He called up the guard, and gave them orders to shoot me if I moved; he then brought a very large lantern which would hold twenty-four candles. He and I then put the candles into the sockets, placed the lantern on the table in front of the window, lit the candles, and then we sat down at the table. The pasha then said, "When God was portioning out fear to all the people in the world, at last it came to my turn, and there was no fear left to give me; go, tell all the people in Khartum that Gordon fears nothing, for God has created him without fear."

At last the head rebel, Mohammed Ahmed, came down with his troops to a place called Abu Si'id, in the vicinity of Omdurman, and heavily reinforced the besiegers.

Before his arrival, Mohammed Ahmed sent a suit of clothes to Gordon Pasha, and sent back the suit which Gordon had formerly sent to him, with a letter asking him to give up the city of Khartum. The suit sent by Mohammed Ahmed to Gordon Pasha was a coat of dammur (cloth made in the Sudan),¹ a girdle of goos (straw), a cap of goos, and two sandals.

¹ *Dammur*, a twilled-cotton fabric, known also as *tob*, and at one time largely exported from Sennar. Almost all the inhabitants of the Sudan are now clothed in dammur, and it is said that the uniform worn by Gordon at the time of his death was of this cloth: his own uniform, having been left at Berber, fell into the hands of the rebels.

Gordon Pasha, much provoked with the letter and the suit, stood up, pushed aside the suit with his foot, and ordered Ibrahim Bey Rushdi to frame an answer to the effect that there should be no communication between them but by arms. The Mahdi's messengers returned with the answer, and were conducted by an officer and forty men beyond the fortifications.

The rebels then drew nearer, and put their guns in batteries near a place called Hillet Hamed, from which they fired on the citadel, on the saraya (palace), and on the town itself.

In order to keep them off, Gordon Pasha made the soldiers fire from the top of the saraya, and he sometimes used to take mines with him, and go down in a boat and bury the mines in a place to which the rebels used often to come, and he used to attach to them red flags. The rebels coming to seize the flags, the mine used to explode and kill them all. This stratagem was at last discovered, and had to be discontinued. The enemy also made a fort at Khojali, in which they placed a gun and used to fire at the saraya. Sometimes the shots hit it, and sometimes they fell short in the river.

When all the corn I had was finished, for I had sold it all to Gordon Pasha, he ordered a certain quantity of corn to be distributed amongst the poor from the commissariat, and sometimes he ordered a thousand, sometimes two thousand ardebs (an ardeb equals three bushels) of the commissariat corn to be sold to the inhabitants for paper money. He occasionally ordered parties of soldiers and civilians to search the town and bring all the corn they found to the commissariat.

At that time the commandant of Omdurman telegraphed to Gordon Pasha, asking him for a gun to strengthen his fort. Gordon Pasha sent for him, and gave him command of part of the Khartum fortifications, and sent Faragallah Pasha to command Omdurman in his stead, and told him that the rocket battery which he had there must do instead of a gun.

Omdurman was then besieged by a force sent by the Mahdi under the command of a tall Sudanese named Hamdan Abu Angar, accompanied by his brother and many emirs, and all communication with Khartum was cut off. As soon as Gordon Pasha discovered this by signalling he sent three steamers and a large force to relieve the garrison of Omdurman. The rebels met them, and a furious battle took place, lasting several hours, from morning till noon, on the 12th November. The rebels lost very heavily; and on our side one steamer, the *Husseinieh*, was struck by a shell and sank near the island of Sheikh Abu Zeid. Captain Mustafa Effendi, some soldiers, and some servants who were wounded, were lost here. After the fight the rebels retained their position round Omdurman, made forts between Omdurman and Khartum, and put machine and Krupp guns in them, and rockets, and kept continuously firing on Omdurman and Khartum. They also established watch-posts on the river bank, so as to fire on the steamers. Gordon Pasha also made forts on the opposite bank, and watch-posts as well. He also built a fort on Tuti Island, and there was continuous cannonade on both sides for fifty-four days. On the fifty-fourth day the commandant of Omdurman signalled to Khartum that provisions and ammunition were exhausted. Gordon Pasha signalled back to them

that he would send them all that they required, and the next morning he sent two steamers laden with provisions and ammunition, under the command of Mohammed Bey Ibrahim. In the meantime a soldier deserted from Omdurman to the rebels by night, and informed them of the state of affairs there, and of Gordon Pasha's intention to send help. The rebels therefore sent a force to harass the steamers, while the main body attacked the troops which had come out of Omdurman, drove them back to the fortifications, and completely hemmed them in. Mohammed Bey Ibrahim fought the rebels, but could not pass, and had to return to Khartum.

At this crisis Faragallah summoned all his officers to consider whether he should capitulate. They decided to ask Gordon Pasha, and on signalling to him on the 5th January, he replied that they had better surrender. Faragallah Pasha therefore wrote to the Mahdi to that effect, and sent the letter by the hands of the imam (priest) of the battalion and an escort.

The Mahdi then sent an answer by his treasurer, Ahmed Suliman, and sent with him Yusef Mansur (late mamur of Kordofan, and who commanded the Mahdi's guns), saying that he would assure the garrison their lives and property. Together with the letter he sent a coat of dammur to Faragallah Pasha.

The latter now surrendered himself and his men to the enemy. The treasurer of the Mahdi and Yusef Mansur took possession of all that was in the fort, and the soldiers, both Sudanese and Egyptian, were taken prisoners.

Khartum then fell into a dangerous state. The rebels surrounded it from all sides, and cut off all supplies. The crops on the island of Tuti were sown and reaped under the fire of the forts, and then stored in the commissariat. They produced altogether about 200 ardebs of corn, and each ardeb was bought by Gordon Pasha for twelve pounds. This corn was distributed amongst the soldiers, and when it and all the biscuits were finished, Gordon Pasha ordered me and the Greek consul and two adjutant-majors and forty soldiers to search the town through and through for corn, and store all we found in the commissariat. We found a little corn in some of the merchants' stores, and some we found buried under the ground, and we took it all to the commissariat. Every corn-owner was given a receipt for the corn taken from him. We used to search daily for about three hours, until we were certain that there was nothing left in the possession of any of the inhabitants. But soon all that had been collected in the commissariat was finished, and then the inhabitants and the soldiers had to eat dogs, donkeys, skins of animals, gum, and palm fibre, and famine prevailed. The soldiers stood on the fortifications like pieces of wood. The civilians were even worse off. Many died of hunger, and corpses filled the streets; no one even had energy to bury them. Gordon Pasha then ordered four guards, one guard for each quarter of the town, to bury the dead. But even these could not carry out the duty, so he issued an order that any one who buried a corpse should receive a reward of two dollars, but even this proved of no avail. The soldiers suffered terribly from want of food: some of them deserted and joined the rebels. Gordon then held a meeting, of which I was a member,

to consider some plan of alleviating the distress, and it was unanimously decided that all the cattle in the town and in the fields should be collected for the troops. The party who had to carry out this order were myself; the mudir Ahmed Bey Ali Jalleh; Nicolo Leontides, the Greek consul; Ibrahim Bey Fauzi; Fathallah Jehami of the transport; and Nicola Bey, the medical inspector-general of the Sudan.

We gathered together all the cattle found in the city, slew them, and distributed them amongst the soldiers; that is to say, a meat ration was issued to the soldiers once every three days; about twenty-eight cattle in all were killed.

Gordon Pasha was satisfied with my services, and granted me the Rutbeh Sanieh (a rank).

In the meantime, on the 19th January, a sanjak named Omar Ibrahim, and a major of Bashi-Bazuks named Mohammed Abdullah, deserted with some of their men, and with them a merchant named Mohammed et Tome. They also joined the rebels, who learnt from them the state of Khartum and the weakness of the soldiers and all of us.

A few days previous to this, Gordon Pasha, seeing the miserable state the inhabitants were in, ordered the dockyard authorities to place a steamer and some boats at the disposal of the inhabitants, so that those who wished might cross over to the other side and join the enemy; so every day hundreds and even thousands used to go.

On the 20th January the rebels fired a salute of 101 guns, which is their signal for having won a victory, but we could not believe it possible that they had beaten the English: Gordon Pasha had seen through his telescope crowds of women weeping, and knew it must have been a stratagem on the part of Mohammed Ahmed. Besides, he used to employ a woman of the Shaggieh tribe as a spy; she generally crossed over in the night in a small boat from Khartum to Omdurman, and she used to talk to the rebels and obtain information. It was she who brought news that the English had defeated the Arabs at Abu Klea, and that the Mahdi had fired the salute only to delude the garrison. The same night Gordon Pasha ordered a council consisting of Farag Pasha ez Zeini (commandant of the troops), Mohammed Pasha Hassan (chief of the treasury), Ibrahim Bey Fauzi, Mohammed Bey Ibrahim (sub-governor), Nicolo Leontides (Greek consul), Dr. Nicola Bey, and myself, to assemble in Farag Pasha's house. Gordon sent his chief clerk, Giriagis Bey, to represent him; he himself did not attend the council. On the council assembling Giriagis Bey addressed us, saying that Gordon Pasha had sent him as his representative, that he wished them to know that he had received information that the English were approaching, and that in two or three days they would arrive at Halfiyeh; but they must remember that the officer commanding the British force was of very high rank, and that his (Gordon's) rank was in comparison very small. It was not probably the intention of the British force to enter Khartum, the principal officers would come in a steamer and would moor off the palace, and they would then order him (Gordon) to come on board the steamer and visit the English commander-in-chief. Gordon Pasha, therefore, wished the officers present to put on their full uniform when the steamer approached and attend at the palace. When the English officers should ask Gordon

✓ to accompany them, the Egyptian officials were to protest against Gordon leaving the town, and if the English officers insisted, then the principal officials should embark on the steamer and proceed to the commander-in-chief and protest violently in his presence that they would not permit Gordon to leave Khartum. Should the English still decide not to come into Khartum, the garrison and people of Khartum might rest perfectly satisfied that he (Gordon) would not leave them, but would stay and die with his soldiers. The impression I received at this meeting was that Gordon merely said this to encourage us to hold out, but we did not doubt that the information that the English were coming was correct, and we were all greatly pleased. We then became full of hope, daily expecting the arrival of the English ; but as day by day passed, and we neither saw nor heard anything of them, we began again to despair. Gordon Pasha used to say every day "They must come to-morrow" ; but they never came, and we began to think that they must have been defeated by the rebels after all. We all became heartbroken, and concluded that no army was coming to relieve Khartum. If a steamer had come and we had known the truth, and that help was so near, we should have taken fresh courage ; and though we were starving, still we should have made a good resistance, as we all knew we should be badly treated by the rebels if we fell into their hands, and we had heard how they had treated those whom they had captured at El Obeid. Besides, Gordon Pasha had promised officers, soldiers, and civilians great rewards if we held out till relief came. So we had every inducement to hold out till despair seized upon us. But up to the end Gordon Pasha used every stratagem to keep up hope. About the 23d, when we were all in despair, a rumour was spread through the town that a spy had arrived with letters. Ahmed Eff. Bedawi received a letter from Mustafa Pasha Yawer from Dongola, enclosing some money ; a merchant found a piece of newspaper lying on the road, in which it said that the strength of the English force was 15,000. This news stirred up some hope, but I knew afterwards that this was only a plan of Gordon's, and that he himself had had the letters written, the money enclosed, and the paper printed.

Some time previous to this Gordon Pasha had ordered all the ammunition, powder, etc., to be removed from the arsenal and magazines, and to be placed in the Catholic church, which is not far from the palace and was a strong stone building. The principal reasons for doing this were that the ammunition would be in greater safety, and less liable to destruction by the enemy's fire ; besides, Gordon Pasha wished to have the ammunition close at hand, so as to destroy it if necessary, in case the Arabs should capture the town and make themselves possessors of large supplies. With this latter object in view he prepared a large mine full of explosives, which he placed in the midst of the ammunition, and he had made arrangements to lay a train of slow match between the church and the palace, but on the day of the fall of Khartum the train was not completed as far as the palace. He also kept the small steamer *Mohammed Ali* moored just beyond the palace garden walls. It was stocked with about 500 oke of biscuits. As far as I know, it was Gordon's intention to hold on to Khartum till all hope of saving the town was over, and then with a chosen few to make his escape, though I doubt if Gordon

Pasha himself would have done so. Some time previously he declared in council that he would never surrender, and he emphasised his words by stamping his foot violently on the ground. I think he probably intended to secure the escape of as many of the principal people as he could in the *Mohammed Ali*. All these arrangements, both as regards the blowing up of the ammunition and the steamer, were kept very secret. Gordon had specially detailed all the Greeks as a guard, and they and their consul were in the secret, which they naturally kept, as they knew their lives depended on it; the only Egyptian they told was their doctor, Ahmed Effendi Fahmi. Gordon Pasha also told his plans to me and to Mohammed Pasha Hassan, Ibrahim Bey Fauzi, Suliman Eff., Kasharol, and Consul Hansal; Hassan Pasha was also to come, but he was not to be told till the last moment. The engineer of the steamer was also warned to be prepared to get up steam at a given signal from Gordon Pasha. In addition to all these arrangements Gordon Pasha did everything in his power to keep up hope, and about a week before the fall he issued an order that every day's delay from that date would count as a year for pay and service; but, as I said before, when three days had passed since the last council and there were no signs of the English coming, we all again began to despair. We were heartbroken, the people and soldiers began to lose faith in Gordon's promises, and they were terribly weak from famine. At last, Sunday morning broke, and Gordon Pasha, who used always to watch the enemy's movements from the top of the palace, noticed a considerable movement in the south, which looked as if the Arabs were collecting at Kalakala. He at once sent word to all of us who had attended the previous meeting and to a few others to come at once to the palace. We all came, but Gordon Pasha did not see us. We were again addressed by Giriagis Bey, who said he had been told by Gordon Pasha to inform us that he noticed much movement in the enemy's lines, and believed an attack would be made on the town; he therefore ordered us to collect every male in the town from the age of eight even to the old men, and to line all the fortifications, and that if we had difficulty in getting this order obeyed we were to use force. Giriagis said that Gordon Pasha now appealed to us for the last time to make a determined stand, for in twenty-four hours time he had no doubt the English would arrive; but that if we preferred to submit then, he gave the commandant liberty to open the gates and let all join the rebels. He had nothing more to say. I then asked to be allowed to see the pasha, and was admitted to his presence. I found him sitting on a divan; and as I came in he pulled off his tarboush (fez), and flung it from him, saying, "What more can I say, I have nothing more to say, the people will no longer believe me, I have told them over and over again that help would be here, but it has never come, and now they must see I tell them lies. If this, my last promise, fails, I can do nothing more. Go and collect all the people you can on the lines and make a good stand. Now leave me to smoke these cigarettes" (there were two full boxes of cigarettes on the table). I could see he was in despair, and he spoke in a tone I had never heard before. I knew then that he had been too agitated to address the meeting, and thought the sight of his despair would dishearten us. All the anxiety he had undergone had gradually turned his hair to a snowy white. I left him, and

✓ this was the last time I saw him alive. He warned me if the attack was made to stay in my house till he sent for me. I then went away from the palace and gathered all the people I could find who were able to stand, and we lined the fortifications. We did not expect to be attacked over the broken-down part of the parapet, for the ground was soft and the ditch was full of wet mud. We thought the attack would most likely take place between Buri and Messalamieh Gate, and we put more men there than anywhere else, but I could see despair written on every face. I would overhear the men talking, "The pasha has deceived us at last, and yet we have listened to him and believed all he said for almost a year of siege." I remember Gordon Pasha used often to say to me, "If only a couple of English soldiers of the advancing force could be paraded about the lines of Khartum, I should not fear the enemy's attack." But it was not to be, and heavy despair settled down over all. It was a gloomy day, that last day in Khartum; hundreds lay dead and dying in the streets from starvation, and there were none to bury them. At length the night came, and, as I afterwards learnt, Gordon Pasha sat up writing till midnight and then lay down to sleep. He awoke some time between two and three A.M. The wild war-cries of the Arabs were heard close at hand. A large body of rebels had crept in the dark close up to the broken-down parapet and filled-up ditch, between the White Nile and the Messalamieh Gate, which was under the command of Hassan Bey el Bahnassawi. The soldiers never knew of the enemy's approach until about twenty minutes before they were actually attacked, when the tramp of feet was heard, and the alarm was sounded; but they were so tired out and exhausted that it was not until the sentries fired that the rest of the men suddenly started up surprised, to find swarms of Arabs pouring over the ditch and up the parapet, yelling and shouting their war-cries. Here they met with little resistance, for most of the soldiers were four or five paces apart, and were too feeble to oppose such a rush. The Arabs were soon within the lines, and thus able to attack the rest of the soldiers from behind. They were opposed at some points, but it was soon all over. Farag Pasha, who was commandant of the whole line, was in Buri when the attack was made. He at once rode down the lines encouraging all to fight, but as he approached the Messalamieh Gate he could see the rebels had crossed the ditch, and were, as it were, rolling up the line, hundreds had already got into the S.W. end of the town; he thought that opposition was useless, and seizing a civilian's coat he threw it over his uniform, proceeded to the Messalamieh Gate, which he ordered the sentry to open; the sentry, who was a Sudanese soldier, refused, saying, "I will not disobey Gordon Pasha's orders, and I do not take orders from you in civilian clothes." Farag Pasha then cut the sentry down, opened the gate himself, and escaped. The opening of this gate was practically of no importance, for by that time the town had fallen, and the stream of entering Arabs was farther west.

Farag Pasha surrendered to the rebels, but was killed three days later by Makin Wad en Nur,¹ in revenge for the death of his brother Abdullah

¹ This emir died of wounds the day after the action of Toski, and is buried in the hills above the temple of Abu Simbel.

Wad en Nur, who had been shot by one of Farag Pasha's soldiers in a skirmish some week previously. Mohammed Bey Ibrahim was then commanding the station at the Messalamieh Gate, and was in charge of all the civilians. He made a square with his soldiers, and fought the rebels bravely till he and all his men were killed. Bakhit Betraki, the commandant of Buri, also fought the rebels till he and all his men were killed. The soldiers who were stationed on the fortified barges on the White Nile showed a slight resistance. The rebels, having taken possession of the town, rushed to the palace.

Meanwhile Gordon Pasha, on being roused by the noise, went on to the roof of the palace in his sleeping clothes; he soon made out that the rebels had entered the town, and for upwards of an hour he kept up a hot fire in the direction of the attack. I heard that he also sent word to get up steam in the steamer, but the engineer was not there; he had been too frightened to leave his house. As dawn approached Gordon Pasha could see the Arab banners in the town, and soon the gun became useless, for he could not depress it enough to fire down on the enemy. By this time the Arabs had crowded round the palace in thousands, but for a time no one dared enter, for they thought mines were laid to blow them up. Meanwhile Gordon Pasha had left the roof; he went to his bedroom, which was close to the divan, and there he put on a white uniform, his sword, which he did not draw, and, carrying his revolver in his right hand, stepped out into the passage in front of the entrance to the office, and just at the head of the staircase.

During this interval, four men more brave than the rest forced their way into the palace, and once in were followed by hundreds of others; of these latter the majority rushed up the stairs to the roof, where, after a short resistance, the palace guard, servants, and cavasses were all killed; while the four men,—Taha Shahin, a Dongolawi, whose father was formerly in my service; Ibrahim Abu Shanab, servant of George Angeletto; Hamad Wad Ahmed Jar en Nebbi, Hassani; and a fourth, also a Dongolawi, servant of Fathallah Jehami,¹—followed by a crowd of others, knowing Gordon Pasha's room, rushed towards it. Taha Shahin was the first to encounter Gordon beside the door of the divan,² apparently waiting for the Arabs, and standing with a calm and dignified manner, his left hand resting on the hilt of his sword. Shahin, dashing forward with the curse "*Mala'oun el yom yomek*" (O cursed one, your time is come!), plunged his spear into his body. Gordon, it is said, made a gesture of scorn with his right hand, and turned his back, where he received another spear wound, which caused him to fall forward, and was most likely his mortal wound. The other three men, closely following Shahin, then rushed in and, cutting at the prostrate body with their swords, must have killed him in a few seconds. His death occurred just before sunrise. He made no resistance,

¹ These four men had long been followers of the Mahdi, and had been with him from the beginning.

² Divan or diwan is a Persian word, current also in Turkish and Arabic; it denotes the Council of State, the place where it meets, and in general any sumptuous state apartment. In ordinary language every council chamber or assembly room is a divan.

and did not fire a shot from his revolver. From all I know I am convinced that he never intended to surrender. I should say he must have intended to use his revolver only if he saw it was the intention of the Arabs to take him prisoner alive ; but he saw such crowds rushing on him with swords and spears, and there being no important emirs with them, he must have known that they did not intend to spare him, and that was most likely what he wanted ; besides, if he had fired it could only have delayed his death a few moments, the wild fanatical Arabs would never have been checked by a few shots from a revolver.

Gordon Pasha's head was immediately cut off, and sent to the Mahdi at Omdurman, while his body was dragged downstairs and left exposed for a time in the garden, where many Arabs came to plunge their spears into it. I heard that the Mahdi had given orders for Gordon to be spared, but what I have stated was told me by the four men I have mentioned ; and I believe the Mahdi pardoned them their disobedience of orders. When I escaped from Omdurman they were still living there amongst the "ansar." I myself saw little of what happened. Soon after the attack a number of Arabs entered my house, took me prisoner, and drove me out of the town naked. For some time I was badly treated, but shortly afterwards got into favour with the Mahdi by means of my niece, whom he took as one of his wives.

I saw Gordon Pasha's head exposed in Omdurman. It was fixed between the branches of a tree, and all who passed by threw stones at it. The first to throw a stone was Yusef Mansur, late mamur of police at El Obeid, whom Gordon Pasha had dismissed for misconduct, and who afterwards commanded the Mahdi's artillery.

A great number of the inhabitants of Khartum and the soldiers were massacred. The Arabs killed and looted for about six hours, until at last the Mahdi ordered them to stop.

Such is the statement of those within the city.¹

To return now to the movements of the Relief Expedition. On the 17th January 1885 the unlooked-for but decisive battle of Abu Klea was fought against the Arabs. The British troops, exhausted and with their leaders killed or wounded, struggled to the Nile, defeating on their way at Abu Kru on the 19th another Arab contingent under Nur Angara, and leaving Metemmeh on their left flank, which at the time was but weakly held, they made for the river, which they struck near Gubat, some two miles south of Metemmeh, on the evening of the 19th. On the 21st they met Gordon's steamers. These four steamers, armed to the teeth and well provisioned, had held their own upon the Nile for 112 days. The engines were in fair order. The steersmen knew every inch of the

¹ This statement is corroborated by many others present in Khartum during the siege.

river. At Gubat a delay of three days occurred, which were spent in overhauling the steamers and removing the Egyptians, etc., who Gordon had specially stipulated should not return to Khartum, making a reconnaissance towards Metemmeh, which the Arabs had reoccupied in force on perceiving that the British had encamped at Gubat, and making a further reconnaissance in the steamers towards Shendi.

It was not, therefore, until the 24th that the British embarked, and proceeded cautiously towards Khartum. They reached it in four days, only to find it had fallen two days previously.

Here the wording of the official history of the Sudan campaign, relating to the events of this memorable and perilous journey, may best take up the tale.

THE VOYAGE TO KHARTUM

At 8 A.M. on the morning of 24th January 1885 Sir C. Wilson started for Khartum in the *Bordein*, accompanied by Khashm-el-Mus Bey, Captain R. F. T. Gascoigne, ten non-commissioned officers and men Royal Sussex Regiment, one petty officer, one artificer R.N., and 110 Sudanese troops.

The *Bordein* was accompanied by the *Telahawieh*, having on board Captain L. J. Trafford and ten of the Royal Sussex Regiment, including a signaller, Lieutenant Stuart Wortley, one artificer R.N., Abd el Hamid Bey, and eighty Sudanese troops. She had in tow a nugger¹ laden with dhurra for Khartum, and about fifty additional Sudanese soldiers.

The steamers were small wooden boats of about the size of Thames "penny steamers"; but they had been rendered bullet proof by a casing and breastwork of boiler-plating, and were also fitted with bullet-proof turrets in the bows and amidships. Neither the turrets nor sides were, however, proof against artillery fire. A bullet-proof "crows' nest" had also been rigged at the mast-head. They were armed with nine-pounder brass howitzers, two on each vessel. In consequence of General Gordon's request all Egyptians had been removed, and the crews and native troops were entirely composed of blacks and Shaggieh.

¹ The name given to large native sailing craft in the Sudan.

When opposite Sheikieh a portion of Fiki Mustafa's force was observed on the left bank, but, with the exception of a few stray shots, it offered no opposition to the passage of the steamers. This force had left Omdurman two days after that under Nur Angara, which was encountered on the 19th, but, on hearing of the result of that action, it had halted, and finally took up a position at Wad Habeshi.

The voyage was then continued without incident till dark, when the steamers were made fast to the right bank near Gos el Basabir.

A start was made at daylight on the following morning, but a halt of some duration had to be made before noon to take in fuel, of which the steamers, whose machinery was of antiquated pattern, consumed a vast quantity. These halts were of frequent occurrence, and as the fuel had to be obtained by pulling down houses in the native villages, each stoppage for this purpose occupied a considerable time.

At about 4 30 P.M. on the 25th the enemy's fort at Wad Habeshi was passed. All was made ready to run past it under a heavy fire, but it was found to be unoccupied.

The steamers then ran on without difficulty till about 6 P.M., when the *Bordein* ran hard on a rock; and although the whole crew was kept at work until nearly midnight, they were unable to move her.

The Sixth Cataract consists of a maze of channels running between the many islands which here dot the river. Of these channels two are usually used for navigation, that on the right bank during high Nile, and that in the centre at low Nile. As the steamers had come down the right or eastern channel, the reis imagined that he could proceed up it, and did so without difficulty until the *Bordein* struck. The *Telahawieh* completed the passage without accident.

On the following morning, stores, ammunition, etc., having been taken off the *Bordein*, with considerable difficulty she was hauled off, and when reloaded proceeded up the channel.

But after proceeding a short distance she again ran aground on a sandbank. By great exertions she was again hauled off, and then the reises said that, owing to the difficulties of the navigation, it was necessary that they should combine to take up each steamer separately. The reis of the *Bordein*

accordingly went over to the *Telahawieh*, and having taken her to the mouth of the pass, said that it would be impossible to take his ship by the same channel. The *Bordein* was accordingly dropped down some distance and proceeded up the middle channel, the head of which she reached shortly before sunset.

The result of these accidents was that twenty-four hours were practically lost, the steamers on the night of the 26th January being only three miles nearer Khartum than they were on the evening of the 25th. A start was made at daylight on the following morning, and the gorge of Shabluka was passed without difficulty. This pass, which is from three to four miles in length, is bordered on each side by high and steep rocks, barely 300 yards apart at their bases, and the position is one which could be guarded with ease by a handful of good shots. Great surprise was therefore felt by all on board at no opposition being offered here.

At Gos Nefisa, at the head of the passage, a halt was made for wood, and while this was being collected firing was kept up by the inhabitants of the village from the surrounding hills. But with this exception little opposition was encountered till about 2 P.M., when the enemy's fire from the left bank became hotter, and was continued persistently up to sunset. During the afternoon a man on the bank called out that Khartum had fallen, and that General Gordon was killed. This information, however, was not believed by those on board.

At dark the steamers were made fast to the bank near the village of Tamaniat, where as much wood was taken on board as the steamers would carry.

At 6 A.M. on the morning of the 28th the steamers got under way, as it was then believed for the last time before entering Khartum. The orders, given with a view to running the blockade, were that the *Bordein* was to lead, and the *Telahawieh* to follow close astern and conform to her movements, both ships going full speed ahead. The detachment of the Royal Sussex had orders to fire exclusively at the embrasures of the enemy's batteries, which were also to be engaged by the guns.

The Sudanese troops were to keep up an independent fire

on the enemy. Lieutenant Stuart Wortley, and a signaller he had with him, were to try to attract General Gordon's attention by means of the heliograph.

Seg et Taib, a steep hill close to the river, where the enemy had formerly had a battery and some guns, was passed without opposition at 7.30 A.M. Here another native hailed the *Telahawieh* and stated that Khartum had fallen.

At about 11 A.M. the first view of Khartum, still some miles off, and partly screened by Tuti Island, was obtained.

At this point another native called out from the bank that Khartum had fallen and that General Gordon had been killed. As Fighiaiha was approached a sharp fire was opened by the enemy. Half a mile farther up the steamers got abreast of Halfiyeh, and encountered a heavy fire from four guns and a great number of rifles.

This fire was vigorously replied to by guns and rifles, but probably with little effect, as the enemy were firing from behind good cover. Sir C. Wilson directed the operations from the midship turret, which from its height made an excellent conning tower, while its position made communication easy with the reis and engineers.

When opposite Halfiyeh it was noticed that it had been completely wrecked, and that some large boats were lying off the bank. As it was known that the Mahdi had no boats, it was assumed that General Gordon's troops must be there, a supposition which was, however, speedily proved to be fallacious by the heavy fire which was opened on the steamers.

On coming abreast of the lower end of Tuti Island the fire almost entirely ceased, and as the smoke cleared off the Government House of Khartum was clearly visible above the trees. As it was known that General Gordon always kept the Egyptian flag flying on this building, an eager search was made for it through glasses, but no sign of it could be observed. On reaching the upper end of the island a very hot fire was encountered from both banks, and at the same time four guns opened fire from the fort at Omdurman.

The fire from the right bank was at a range of from 60 to 200 yards; that from the left about 1000 to 1200 yards. Owing to the slope of the bank, especially on the Omdurman side, the enemy was afforded but little cover, and the fire of

the steamers must have done great execution among the crowds who lined the bank.

It was now evident that Tuti Island was in the hands of the enemy, but as it was still possible that Khartum might be holding out, Sir C. Wilson pushed on till, on rounding the south-western point of the island, the town came full in view. It was then observed that no Egyptian flag was flying in Khartum, although the town was searched carefully with glasses, and the steamers were near enough to allow of an ensign, had there been one, being seen with the naked eye. A number of nuggers and troop-boats were collected under the left bank at Omdurman, and it was known that General Gordon had always kept these moored under his guns at Khartum.

Neither of the steamers that General Gordon had retained came out to co-operate. Khartum itself was firing on Sir C. Wilson's steamers. A number of the enemy, with banners and spears, were collected on the shore on the Khartum side of the White Nile, ready to oppose any attempt to land. No firing was heard in Khartum itself. Government House and the buildings near it were completely wrecked.

These facts, together with the heavy fire from Tuti Island, convinced Sir C. Wilson that Khartum had fallen, and, considering that it would be a useless waste of life to attempt a landing, he ordered the *Bordein* to be put about, and at once ran down stream.

The *Telahawieh* had in the meanwhile run aground, and was for some time in a very precarious position. However, a few moments after the *Bordein* passed she shoved off, swung round, and followed her consort. As the steamers turned the enemy's fire was redoubled, and it was under a hail of bullets and shell that they sped down stream. Both ships were struck by shell, but not dangerously.

Just after the steamers turned a native on a camel was seen on the Omdurman shore waving a flag of truce. As, however, the enemy's fire did not abate, it was considered inexpedient to stop for the purpose of communicating with him.

At 4 P.M. on the 28th January, after having been continuously engaged for four hours, the steamers got clear of the enemy's batteries. Their escape had been little short of mar-

vellous. The chief danger now lay in the disaffection of the Sudanese crew, who, thoroughly disheartened at the loss of their families in Khartum, were at best unwilling to make any further exertion, while many of them, considering that the Mahdi's was now the winning side, showed every inclination to join the enemy.

The steamers continued their course without opposition till dark, when they made fast to an island about twelve miles south of Jebel Rojan.

From this place messengers were sent out to ascertain the fate of General Gordon, and on their return stated that the town had fallen on the morning of January 26th through the treachery of Farag Pasha, and that General Gordon had been killed. The town had been given over to a three days' pillage.

There was much to be done that evening and on the following morning; the wounded had to be attended to, bullet holes had to be plugged up, and a paddle-wheel to be repaired; above all, a plan of operations for descending the cataract had to be decided on. This was no easy matter; the *Telahawieh* and *Bordein* were larger than the steamers which it is usual to send down the Nile at this season, and they were in addition heavily weighted with iron plates and guns, and were laden with a large quantity of dhurra, which had been taken up for the garrison.

The Nile, too, was falling rapidly. It had, indeed, been observed to diminish in height three feet in a single night at Gubat, and it is possible that the reises had not noticed this. They were at first inclined to say that the task before them was an impossible one; but a promise of £100 to each of the captains, and half of that sum to each of the reises, if they succeeded in getting the boats down safely, caused them to modify their opinion. All the dhurra was thrown overboard, the boats were generally lightened and got into as good trim as possible, and at 7 A.M. on the 29th January the flotilla again started for the north.

After about an hour and a half of steaming the *Bordein* struck on a sandbank, but was got off again without any great difficulty. At 12.30 the head of the cataract was reached, and here it was determined to concentrate the whole available

navigating skill on one vessel at a time. The *Bordein* was therefore brought up while her captain and reises took the *Telahawieh* down the first reach of the cataract. This operation was performed in safety, and the *Bordein* was in her turn taken down to join her consort.

At the foot of the upper rapid a reach of open water was gained, and all was apparently going well when, at 4:30 P.M., the *Telahawieh* struck heavily on a sunken rock opposite Jebel Rojan, and immediately began to sink.

The *Bordein* was at once brought up against a little island close at hand, and assistance was sent to the wrecked vessel. This, however, was scarcely needed, for by the time Captain Gascoigne arrived at the scene of the wreck in the *Bordein's* boat, all the men, the two guns, and most of the stores, had been removed by Captain Trafford and Lieutenant Stuart Wortley to the nugger which was in tow. All the gun ammunition and most of the small-arm ammunition was, however, lost.

A few shots had been fired at the steamers during the day, but they did no damage, and were not thought worth replying to.

In the evening a messenger from the Mahdi appeared on the bank, and was received on board the *Bordein*. He handed Sir C. Wilson a letter, of which the following is a translation:—

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate, praise be to the bountiful Lord, and blessings be upon our lord Mohammed and on his family. From the servant who stands in need of God, and on whom he places dependence, Mohammed, the Mahdi, son of Abdullah, to the British and Shaggieh officers and their followers: 'God direct them to the truth. Surrender and you will be spared. Do not disobey, or you will rue it, as I briefly warn you. Perchance God Almighty may put you upon the path of the righteous. Know then that the city of Khar-tum and its surroundings are like the garrison of a stronghold; God has destroyed it and other places by our hands; nothing can withstand His power and might; and by the bounty of God all has come into our hands. As you have become a small remnant, like a leaflet within our grasp, two alternatives are offered to you. If you surrender and prevent the shedding of your blood, and the blood of God's creatures who are under your leadership, well and good. Grace and security from God and His Prophet and security from us will be upon you; but if you do not believe what we have said, and desire to ascertain the truth of the killing¹

¹ The word translated "killing" is only applied to a man or animal.

of Khartum (Gordon), send a special envoy on your part to see the truth of what we say ; and to your envoy is given the security of God and His Prophet till he comes to us and sees, and returns under a guard from us, to see and be warned of God. Even God says, "If any one of the heathen seek help of thee, help him that he may learn the word of God Almighty." You are offered the choice of fighting or surrendering to the command of God, and returning to Him. Were it not for pity for you we would not write to you in this manner ; and if you pay heed, on receipt of this my letter to you, fear nothing, for nothing will happen to you after the (granting) of the security of God and His Prophet to you ; but if you refuse you shall taste evil, in that you turn away from the path of God to the torment of the other world, for it is known that the victory is unto the believers, even as God has promised them in his revealed book. Do not be deceived and put confidence in your steamers and other things, and delay deciding until you rue it, but rather hasten to your benefit and profit before your wings are cut. Much reasoning will not convert, and He lets who will go astray, and you will find no ruler over Him. What has been said is enough for him who has been reached by God.

(Sealed)

THERE IS NO GOD BUT GOD.

MOHAMMED IS THE PROPHET OF
GOD.

MOHAMMED, THE MAHDI, SON OF
ABDULLAH, SLAVE OF GOD.

1293.

The bearer of this letter was a certain Fiki Abder-rahman, a Dongolawi, the same man who had appeared on the bank at Omdurman with a flag of truce.

Sir C. Wilson was averse to sending any answer to the letter, but Khashm-el-Mus pointed out that the steamer would be completely at the mercy of the enemy while passing the narrow gorge of the cataract, and begged permission to gain time by writing a letter to the effect that he dared not give himself up unless a special safe-conduct were given him, but that if this were sent he would deliver the English and the steamer over to Fiki Mustafa, who was then at Wad Habeshi with a force. Sir C. Wilson, taking into consideration the gravity of the situation, gave Khashm-el-Mus leave to write this letter, taking care that no promise was made on the part of himself or the English officers.

Fiki Abderrahman's conversations with the Shaggieh officers and men had a very bad effect, which was immediately marked by the first desertion among the natives.

At daybreak on the morning of the 30th January the *Bordein*, followed by the nuggers, again made a start, and passed the various rapids in safety, and, to the surprise of every one on board, met with no opposition in the narrow gorge of Shabluka.

The intricate and difficult passage between the islands which had caused so much delay on the 25th had still to be passed, and it was considered necessary to lower the steamer down, stern first, by hawsers made fast to anchors, a tedious operation, which would have been almost impossible had any numbers of the enemy been in the neighbourhood. In spite of all precautions the *Bordein* was driven on to a shoal by a strong blast of wind, and was only got off after considerable labour. This caused such loss of time that she had to be brought up for the night in the cataract.

Symptoms of disaffection among the Shaggieh were growing more and more apparent. Abd el Hamid Bey's manner was especially suspicious, and during the night it was reported to Sir C. Wilson that he was engaged in a conspiracy to wreck the ship, which had only been stopped by the interference of Khashm-el-Mus. Fortunately at this crisis a false but opportune report reached the natives that Metemmeh had been taken by the English, whose reinforcements were swarming across the desert. The effect of this was at once apparent, and it undoubtedly did much towards deciding the wavering Shaggieh to remain loyal.

At daylight on the following morning (31st January) the descent of the last rapid was commenced, and by 10 A.M. was successfully accomplished, leaving a clear stretch of unbroken water all the way to Metemmeh. The one difficulty ahead was the running the gauntlet at Wad Habeshi, where it was known that Fiki Mustafa had a large force and a battery. Every precaution was taken to protect the boilers as much as possible from shell, and it was hoped that by running past the fort at full speed the enemy's not very accurate shell fire would be evaded. Sir C. Wilson also believed that the large

reward which he had promised the reises in the event of success would induce them to do their utmost. A full stock of wood was laid in to enable the steamer to keep up full speed for a good hour after passing the fort.


As in the case of the *Abbass*, all was apparently going well, and the worst of the dangers were thought to be over, when at 3.30 P.M., while steaming along in smooth water, the *Bordein*, as she was descending the channel to the west of Mernat Island, struck heavily on a sunken rock and immediately began to fill. Sir C. Wilson at once gave orders to lay her alongside a small sand-spit running out from an island situated about fifty yards from the larger one of Mernat. This was successfully done, and all possible steps were taken to repair the damage, but without avail. All hands were set to the pumps and buckets, and carpenters were directed to investigate the hole, which was found to be of great size. Below the water-line is a difficult place to get at, and the water was soon several feet above it.

The sketch plan illustrates the operations of Sir C. Wilson after the wreck of the *Bordein*, and shows the position of Mernat Island with regard to Wad Habeshi.

Guns, ammunition, and stores were landed as soon as possible, and Captain Gascoigne was sent to select a suitable place for a zariba on Mernat Island, which commanded the smaller island against which the steamer was beached.

Mernat Island was about three-quarters of a mile wide, by two miles long, and was covered with trees and long grass. The channel to the east of the island was found to be only about 300 yards wide. The point opposite the wreck of the *Bordein* was about three-quarters of a mile from the north end of the island. Sir C. Wilson considered the position so impossible for defence that he at first determined to make a forced march in the night down the right bank to opposite Gubat, and to send Lieutenant Stuart Wortley on to that place in the small boat, to inform the garrison of the disaster, and to beg that a steamer might be sent up to protect their flank. Finding, however, that it was impossible to do anything with the native troops, and believing that they would be worse than useless in the event of an attack, the alternative was forced on him of making himself as secure as circum-

SKETCH PLAN
to illustrate
THE WRECK OF THE "BORDEIN"
and the relief of
SIR C. WILSON'S FORCE
BY LORD C. BERESFORD.



REFERENCES

- A. Sir C. Wilson's force landed after breaking up Zeriba.
- B. Nigger waited here for Sir C. Wilson with land force.
- C.C. Hilllooks occupied by Sir C. Wilson and Capt. Ouscoigne on landing.
- D. Sir C. Wilson's force halted and communicated with Safieh.
- E. Nigger grounded afternoon of 31st.
- F. Nigger ran on rock on night of 31st.
- G. Island under which Lieut. Stuart Wortley's boat gained shelter on night of 31st of January.
- H. Point where Sir C. Wilson embarked on the 'Safieh' on the 4th Feb.

to you!
CARRERA

stances would permit, and awaiting the arrival of help on the scene of the wreck.

At 6.45 P.M. on January 31st, Lieutenant Stuart Wortley started in the ship's boat to row to Gubat, having with him four English soldiers, including the signaller, and eight natives. His start was timed to enable him to pass the enemy's fort at Wad Habeshi in the interval of darkness between sunset and moonrise. He rowed on to within about half a mile of the fort, and then, shipping his oars, ordered the crew to lie down in the bottom of the boat, which, floating down stream, gradually approached the enemy's position. So near did it drift to the shore that the men's faces could easily be distinguished as they sat over the camp fires, and they were heard discussing whether the black object which they saw upon the stream was a boat or not. Suddenly their doubts were dispelled by the rising of the moon on the eastern horizon in a straight line behind the boat, which was at once rendered plainly visible. The shout which followed this discovery soon warned the crew that further concealment was useless, and springing to their places, they gave way with a will amidst a rain of bullets which ploughed up the water on every side, but fortunately did no damage. A few hundred yards brought them to another island, by following the right side of which they were enabled to continue their journey under cover for a considerable distance, and on again emerging into the main channel they found that they were only followed by a few camel men who were apparently unarmed with rifles. At 3 A.M. on the 1st February they reached Gubat. On the receipt of Lieutenant Stuart Wortley's report, Lieutenant-Colonel M. Wilson, Scots Guards, commanding at Gubat in place of Lieutenant-Colonel Boscawen, who was in hospital, at once ordered relief to be sent to Sir C. Wilson. At 2 P.M. on the same day (1st February) Lord Charles Beresford started for Mernat in the *Safieh*.

Sir C. Wilson had in the meanwhile, on the departure of Lieutenant Stuart Wortley, established a small post on Mernat Island, leaving his stores and ammunition and the main body of his men on the smaller island for the night. On the following morning the stores and main body were transferred to a strong zariba which was formed on the west side of Mernat, opposite the *Bordein*. The smaller island was

occupied by an outpost of native troops, to prevent the chance of annoyance from any of the enemy's riflemen who might land there, were it left unoccupied.

The zariba was formed in a semicircle on the edge of the bank, which was here some twenty-five to thirty feet high, and very steep. Along this bank ran a belt of trees, which, while securing the occupants of the zariba from view, would not have impeded their fire on an advancing enemy. The four guns were put in position in the zariba. The north end of Mernat Island was about three miles above Wad Habeshi. With the exception of a visit from some Shaggieh who confirmed the news of the fall of Khartum, and who stated that Lieutenant Stuart Wortley had safely passed the enemy's batteries, the day and the following night were passed without incident.

On the following morning an episode that occurred showed the remarkable conditions under which Sir C. Wilson's small force existed. This was the visit to Mernat of Fiki Mustafa, the enemy's commander at Wad Habeshi, and an interview between him and Khashm-el-Mus in which he endeavoured to induce the latter to desert. This Khashm-el-Mus refused to do; Abd el Hamid Bey and his company of Shaggieh went over to the enemy.

The night passed without incident, but soon after daylight on the morning of February 3d the report of a gun down stream told that the expected help was arriving from Gubat; and shortly afterwards the look-out man on a neighbouring tree-top announced that the English steamer was in sight. The effect of this information on the depressed native troops was almost magical, and the men who, a few moments before, had been too indifferent to move even when urged with blows, were now all energy and anxiety to please. Sir C. Wilson at once ran up a signal to show his position to the steamer, the only immediate effect of which was to bring down a sharp fire from the enemy on the opposite bank. Noticing that the steamer's fire was being kept up for a suspiciously long time, Sir C. Wilson sent Captain Trafford to try to ascertain the state of affairs. On that officer's return he reported that he had seen her enveloped in smoke, and that she had apparently met with a serious accident. Sir C. Wilson then went himself to obtain a view of her, and saw her swinging at anchor

opposite the enemy's battery, with which she appeared to be heavily engaged.

Under these circumstances Sir C. Wilson determined to attempt to effect a junction with the crew of the steamer. He therefore at once gave orders for the zariba to be broken up, and for the guns, stores, and wounded to be put on board the nugger, in command of which he placed Captain Gascoigne, with orders to float down and await the arrival of the remainder of Sir C. Wilson's force alongside the right bank, opposite the north end of the island. At the same time the small boat was sent down to take Sir C. Wilson and the land force over to the right bank from the north end of the island.

In spite of a sharp fire from the enemy the zariba was broken up and the stores were embarked without any serious casualties, and a landing was effected on the right bank without opposition. The force then marched down and established itself opposite to the disabled steamer, which was about 500 yards from the right bank, and the nugger dropped down stream to the same point. After some difficulty, owing to the party not having a proper signaller, communication was established by signal with the steamer; and it was ascertained that she was hit in the boiler, but had hopes of being able to mend it. As, however, there was some doubt as to the accuracy of the message, Captain Gascoigne volunteered to go over to her in the small boat, and succeeded in doing so, and returning without any casualties. He brought a message from Lord C. Beresford requesting Sir C. Wilson to keep up a fire on the fort and thus to divert the enemy's attention from the steamer while the boiler was being repaired, and in the morning to move down two or three miles to some spot on the bank where embarkation would be easy, and there await the arrival of the steamer, floating the sick and wounded, twenty-five in number, down in the nugger during the night.

Thereupon part of Sir C. Wilson's force, under Captain Trafford, was sent down to select and prepare a camping-place. Sir C. Wilson himself, having got one gun out of the nugger (there was little ammunition, most having been lost in the wrecks), remained with this and the native artillerymen opposite Wad Habeshi. This gun engaged the enemy's fort till dark, after which, owing to the exhaustion of the men, it

was spiked and thrown into the river. An attempt was also made to move the nugger down the right bank under shelter of a sandbank, which partly screened it from the enemy; but it ran aground, and all except the very badly wounded had to be landed; it was after sunset before it was again afloat. Sir C. Wilson then, considering that he could be of no further use, left his position opposite the fort and joined Captain Trafford at the zariba which had been formed about two miles lower down.

It will now be necessary to go back for a few hours and narrate the adventures of the *Safieh*. Lord C. Beresford had with him a portion of the Naval Brigade under Lieutenant E. B. van Koughnet, twenty non-commissioned officers and men of the Mounted Infantry, and two Gardner guns and two four-pounders. He was accompanied by Lieutenant Stuart Wortley.

After leaving Gubat no incident of any importance occurred on the 1st or 2d February; but at 7 A.M. on the morning of the 3d the enemy's earthworks at Wad Habeshi were sighted, and beyond them was observed the *Bordein*, aground near Mernat Island.

When within 1200 yards of the fort, Lord C. Beresford opened fire with his bow gun, and was shortly afterwards answered by the enemy. He then ordered all fire to be directed at the embrasures of the work, and proceeded to run past it, being obliged, owing to the shallowness of the water, to pass within eighty yards of it. So heavy was the fire brought to bear from the steamer with the machine guns and riflemen, that the enemy were unable to fire the two guns in the central embrasures, which bore directly into the steamer when she was abreast of the work. When, however, she had passed the fort about 200 yards, the angle at which it lay prevented so heavy a fire being brought to bear on it. The enemy, thus being enabled to work the guns in their upstream embrasures, succeeded in sending a shot through the *Safieh's* boiler. Observing that the paddle-wheels were still moving, Lord C. Beresford headed her towards the right bank and anchored, but within 500 yards range of the enemy, who kept up a continuous fire. The *Safieh* was now lying stern on to the fort—a position which, although causing her to afford

a smaller target for the enemy, reduced her own fire-action considerably for some time. By cutting off the trail of one of the four-pounders, and cutting a hole in the afterside of the stern battery, one gun and one machine-gun were, however, after a time brought to bear on the fort.

From 7.30 on the morning of February 3d till past sunset, so heavy and continuous a fire was kept up from the ship that the enemy was never able to get his gun to bear on her; and although a smart fusilade was kept on her during these twelve hours by the enemy's riflemen, their firing was mostly wild and did but little damage. As, however, under cover of the night the enemy would have ample opportunity of moving his guns into a position which would render their fire certainly fatal to the steamer, Lord C. Beresford saw that it was imperative to have the boilers repaired by the morning, and also, if possible, to delude the enemy into a belief that he had deserted his ship, and thus make them think it not worth their while to shift the position of their guns. With this latter object in view, he hauled his four boats alongside, as if for the purpose of escaping in them, and at dark ceased firing, and remained perfectly still throughout the night.

The work of repairing the boiler had been commenced by Mr. Benbow, chief engineer, as soon as it had become sufficiently cool, *i.e.* at 11 A.M. on the morning of the wreck. The artificers and nearly every one in the stokehold having been severely scalded by the escape of steam when the boiler was struck, Mr. Benbow had to do nearly all the work with his own hand, under fire. Lieutenant van Koughnet was wounded and a petty officer was killed.

By 9 P.M. on the same night the work was completed, and at 5 A.M. on the following morning Lord C. Beresford gave orders for the fires to be lighted, but for every precaution to be taken to prevent the escape of sparks which would betray his presence to the enemy.

The day was just breaking when the occupants of the fort perceived that the steamer was not abandoned, and that their chance of capturing her was lost. This discovery was notified by a yell of defiance from the Arabs and by a hail of bullets. Lord C. Beresford was, however, prepared for this emergency, and, before the enemy's guns had been brought to bear properly

on the steamer, he had weighed anchor and was going full speed ahead. After proceeding up stream for about 200 yards, to a part of the river where there was more room, he turned round and again ran the gauntlet of the fort. Bringing all his available fire to bear on the embrasures as he did so, this operation was conducted without accident, and the party on board were just congratulating themselves on the fact that their difficulties were at length over, when, in the dim light, the nugger was seen to be hard and fast on a rock about 400 yards below the enemy's battery. On board her were Captain Gascoigne and some sick and wounded. They had, on the previous evening, towed the nugger some little distance up stream from where it had been aground, and had then dropped down with the current; but, after floating safely past the fort, they had run on this rock, and all their efforts to move the nugger off it had been unavailing.

Lord C. Beresford again anchored the steamer as near to the wreck as he could, and at once despatched Sub-Lieutenant C. R. Keppel, R.N., and a party of men, in the small boat to Captain Gascoigne's assistance. After removing the greater part of the stores, the nugger was finally hauled off under a smart fire from the enemy, and she and the steamer proceeded to the zariba down stream. Sir C. Wilson and his party were embarked about a mile below this at a convenient spot. At 5.45 P.M. on the same day the party safely arrived at Gubat. Sir C. Wilson had lost altogether two Sudanese killed and twenty-five wounded.

During Lord C. Beresford's action, 5400 rounds were fired from the Gardner, 2150 rounds from Martini-Henrys, and 126 rounds from the howitzers.

BOOK VI—(continued)

FALL OF KHARTUM

The third statement—The fall of Khartum from a besieger's point of view—The emir fiki Medawi's story—The early stages of the siege—He defeats Said Bey and Hassan Bey Ibrahim—Abu Girgeh and Wad Basir defeat Saleh Bey—The dispositions of the Arab forces besieging Khartum—Abu Girgeh, the emir of emirs—Wad en Nejumi arrives—The Mahdi arrives—Abu Safia sent to attack the English at Abu Klea—The effect of the defeat on the Mahdi—He has a vision in which the Prophet tells him to go to Kordofan—His cousin, Abd el Kerim, insists that Khartum should be attacked—The Mahdi agrees—Disposition for the attack—Nejumi's instructions—News arrives that the steamers have started from Metemmeh—The Mahdi's orders that Gordon's life should be spared—The Mahdi addresses his "Ansar"—Nejumi's force crosses the broken-down parapet and filled-up ditch—The attack—Farag Pasha opens the gate and gives himself up—The death of General Gordon—The massacre—The steamers appear in sight—Death of Farag Pasha—The fourth statement—The court-martial on Hassan Bey Bahnassawi commanding that portion of the lines through which the Arabs entered—Remarks on the court-martial—The two plans of Khartum—The plan of the prosecution and the plan of the defence—Hassan Bey honourably acquitted—The charge of treachery falls through—The question of the position of Fort Mukran—Its importance in relation to the trial—A *résumé* of the several statements—Starvation won the race—Subsequent operations of the desert and river columns—General Buller proceeds to Metemmeh—Lord Wolseley's plans—The battle of Kirbekan—Death of General Earle—Destruction of Suliman Wad Gamr's property—General Brackenbury ordered to retire on Merawi—General Buller retires to Abu Klea—The breakdown of the camel transport—The plans changed—Sir Evelyn Wood retires the desert column—Distribution of the Expeditionary Force along the Nile—Preparations for an expedition to Suakin.

LET us now consider the situation as viewed from a besieger's point of view.

The Arab who makes the following statement was an important emir of the Mahdi's force. He was the first man to lay siege to Khartum, was present during most of the pre-

liminary engagements, and took an important part in the assault and capture of Khartum. On the death of Mohammed Ahmed, some months afterwards, he joined in the dispute regarding the claims to the succession of the Khalifa Abdullah Taashi, and was obliged to fly the land. He escaped to Abyssinia, where he remained for some three years, and was one of those whom the Khalifa Abdullah was particularly anxious to recapture, and on several occasions wrote to King John demanding that he should be given up. King John, however, gave him a safe convoy through his country, and some three years later the fiki Medawi, returned to Cairo, received the pardon of His Highness the Khedive, and is now a respected teacher in the Azhar University.

He states as follows :—

After the defeat of Hicks Pasha at Shekan almost all the people in the Sudan believed that Mohammed Ahmed was the Mahdi, and I amongst the number. He wrote to me at the same time that he wrote to the sheikh El Obeid, of the Kadri order, to gather all our men, and besiege Khartum from the east on the Kubba side. At the same time the Mahdi had appointed his father-in-law, Mohammed Wad el Basir¹ of the Halawin tribe, to collect the people and join the siege; the latter met Saleh Bey, who was coming from Sennar, at a place called Fedasi, and hemmed him in. He was soon in great straits for food, and wrote to the Mahdi to say he would surrender to an emir sent by him, but not to Wad el Basir. The Mahdi therefore sent Abu Girgeh, and Saleh Bey surrendered to him in May 1884.

Previous to this, in March, the sheikh El Obeid had advanced with a force of 30,000 men to lay siege to Khartum. Gordon Pasha had already arrived there, and had written kind letters to all the tribes to quiet them, but without success. It was too late. Mahdism had spread over the whole country, and all the people were anxious to fight the Jihad, "the Holy War," for God and for His Mahdi.

I joined the sheikh El Obeid with my force at Kubba, east of Khartum. Three days after our arrival Khashm-el-Mus Bey, Hassan Ibrahim esh Shellali, and Said Bey, with about 4000 men, crossed the Blue Nile and advanced against us. We too advanced against them, and after a short fight drove them off with a loss of 400 men. Said Bey and Hassan Bey Ibrahim were, on their return to Khartum, tried by court-martial and shot because they had sounded the "retreat." But it was natural they should have feared us, for we were fighting the Jihad, and had no fear of death.

Meanwhile Abu Girgeh and Wad Basir, after the capitulation of Saleh Bey el Mek, advanced with their forces to Gereif, and laid siege to Khartum on the Blue Nile.

¹ See Mahdi correspondence, p. 40.

The emir Fudhl and sheikh Abd el Kader (Wad Om Mariam) also came with a large force and besieged Khartum at Kalakala on the White Nile; and the emir Mustafa Ibn el Fiki el Amin, with a force of 5000, also besieged Khartum from the west bank of the White Nile. Thus Khartum was besieged on all sides.

Gordon Pasha's steamers continually attacked us from all directions, especially the force of Abu Girgeh, and after a time they drove us all off and cleared the neighbourhood, laying in a fresh stock of provisions.

Abu Girgeh was the chief emir of all the besiegers, and as I had a difference of opinion with the sheikh El Obeid, he sent me to see the Mahdi, who was then putting down a revolt at Jebel Dair. I accompanied the Mahdi as far as Shatt, and then returned with a letter for Abu Girgeh to say I should not be interfered with, and so I became reconciled with the sheikh El Obeid.

At this time our forces had retired in various directions, mine to Om Dubban, Abu Girgeh and Fudhl to Wad Shukrallah—twenty-four miles south of Khartum—and fiki Mustafa to Islang, north of Khartum.

Previous to my return Mohammed Ali Pasha had been sent to attack the villages of Gereif and El Eilafun, and then advanced to Om Dubban, where my men met him, and defeated him with great slaughter. He himself was killed, and only a remnant of his force returned to Khartum.

When Mohammed Ahmed, the Mahdi, heard that the besiegers had retired some distance from Khartum, he sent a force of 20,000 men, under Wad en Nejumi, who was instructed to take command of all the troops besieging Khartum; the emirs Wad Gubara and Abdullah Wad en Nur accompanied him.

On his arrival Wad en Nejumi took his men to a place midway between Gereif and Kalakala, and here Abu Girgeh, Wad el Basir, Fudhl, and Abd el Kader joined him.

Soon afterwards the Mahdi arrived, and fiki Mustafa also came from Islang.

Sheikh el Obeid, or rather his son, Wad sheikh el Obeid (for his father was a very old man) and I, then returned to our former post at Kubba. And now Khartum was heavily besieged on all sides, and communication with Omdurman was cut. The garrison of this fort soon afterwards surrendered from want of food (5th January). Khartum, however, was strongly held, and it was the Mahdi's intention to make it capitulate from starvation.

When he heard that the English were approaching Metemneh for the relief of Khartum, he sent a large force of all his best fighting men, under Mussa Wad Helu and Abu Safia, to attack them. A great battle took place at Abu Klea, and another at Abu Kru, in which Nur Angara was defeated, and at last the English reached the river at Gubat, driving the Arabs before them. The news of the defeat at Abu Klea reached the Mahdi on the 20th January, and made great consternation in the camp. He at once ordered a salute of 101 guns to be fired, which is the signal for a victory, and by which he thought to delude the garrison in Khartum. The Mahdi was alarmed for his safety, and after afternoon prayers he assembled a meeting of his khalifas—Abdullah Taashi, Ali

Wad Helu, and Mohammed Sherif, and his favourite emirs (who were all relations of his), namely, Mohammed Abd el Kerim, Said Abd el Kader, Wad Setti, Ahmed Sherafi, and Yakub (Khalifa Abdullah's brother), and then he told them secretly that he had had a hadra (vision), in which the prophet told him that he should make a hejira (flight) to El Obeid. For, he argued, if one Englishman, Gordon, has been able to command the Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers and keep us at bay for almost a year, how much more will these thousands of English who have defeated our bravest men at Abu Klea be able to crush us and drive us away. He then asked his khalifas and emirs for their advice. All agreed to the Mahdi's wish except Mohammed Abd el Kerim, who advised that an attempt should be made to attack Khartum. "For," he said, "if we succeed and enter Khartum then the English will not dare to come on; and if we fail, then we shall have time to retreat." I was not present at the meeting, but Abd el Kerim was a great friend of mine, and told me word for word what took place. After this several meetings were held. The Mahdi had full information of every movement of the English; the delay in their advance gave us all fresh courage, and we knew too that the garrison in Khartum were in despair when day after day passed and the steamers did not come. If they had come on at once when we were all alarmed by the defeat of Abu Klea, the Mahdi might have carried out his intention of making a hejira south, but the delay strengthened Abd el Kerim, and when, on Sunday the 25th, a messenger arrived from Gubat with the news that the steamers had started on the morning of the 24th, another council was held, in which it was decided finally to accept Abd el Kerim's advice, and to attack Khartum the following morning before the steamers should arrive, consequently, when the meeting was over, the Mahdi sent word to all the camps that he had seen a vision, in which the Prophet had assured him that God had put the lives of all the garrison of Khartum into his hands, and that the attack should be early on Monday morning (the 26th January), and that the attacking force should fear nothing, for no harm could happen to them. He then sent for the chief emirs on the south side, Wad en Nejumi, and Abu Girgeh, and told them what he had decided to do. I had orders to send some men down the river to harass the steamers as they came. Fiki Mustafa's force also received orders to proceed down the river, and everybody was warned to fire on the steamers when they appeared. We also received orders to attack Tuti and Ras Rasikh from Kubba at the same time as Nejumi attacked from the south.

That night, the 25th, the Mahdi crossed over from Omdurman with all those who wished to join in the jihad, and went to Nejumi's camp, and there he addressed all his force and told them to make a bold attack, that they should never fear, for all who fell would go at once to Paradise. He told them to make the attack in the very early morning, and on no account to kill Gordon Pasha, and then he returned with all his force to Omdurman.

The next morning, or rather about an hour and a half after midnight, the force left Kalakala under Wad en Nejumi. It was divided into two parts—the advanced portion was to attack the lines between the White

Nile and the Messalamieh Gate, which were known to have been partly destroyed by the Nile, while the other part was to attack towards Buri : but it was decided that if the attack towards the White Nile succeeded, the second portion of the force, instead of attacking Buri, was to follow in the track of the first portion of the force, and that is what happened. A few riflemen as skirmishers led the way, then followed the mass of sword and spearmen, and behind them came the rest of the riflemen ; the cavalry were on the rear flanks and well behind. The orders were to march as silently as possible till close up to the fortifications, and not to attack until the soldiers fired from the lines. Many of the Arabs carried angaribs (couches) and bundles of straw, which were intended to be thrown into the ditch if it was too deep to cross. The advance continued quite silently till close up to the lines, for the ground was soft and the men's feet bare ; at last the ditch was almost reached, and when it was seen that it was partly filled up with mud and the parapet broken down, the Arabs did not hesitate, but shouting their war-cries, dashed into the ditch and up the parapet ; many fell and were trampled under foot, some shots were fired from the lines, but in a few minutes it was all over : the soldiers, seeing that the Arabs were on them, made little resistance ; some were killed, while others escaped. The Arabs, having gained possession of this part of the line, then rushed along the whole length of the inside of the parapet, and met with some resistance at various points ; while the stream of Arabs, still pouring in where the first attack had been made, entered the town. Farag Pasha, who was at the Messalamieh Gate, when he saw that it was useless to fight—for by this time our men were in thousands inside the lines—gave the order for his men to stop firing, opened the Messalamieh Gate, and surrendered. A number of Arabs came in by this gate, and a great many of the soldiers also escaped in this way and gave themselves up : but by that time resistance was useless, for Nejumi's attack over the broken-down part of the parapet had been quite successful. Khartum was then in our hands ; the Arabs had broken into the houses, and were massacring, pillaging, and looting everywhere. A small party of Arabs arrived at the palace, and, rushing in, dashed up the steps leading to Gordon Pasha's room ; they found him standing by the door of the office at the top of the staircase, and he asked them who was their leader ; but they took no notice of what he said, and one of them rushing up, stabbed him with a spear, the others then followed, and soon he was killed. His death took place just before sunrise. It was a party of Wad en Nejumi's men who killed Gordon ; but Nejumi was not with them at the time. He came up shortly afterwards, and seeing that his men had killed Gordon, he was very angry. He ordered the body to be dragged downstairs into the garden, where his head was cut off, wrapped in a handkerchief, and taken to the Mahdi. I saw the head being carried to the Mahdi about an hour and a half after sunrise. Gordon's body lay in the garden all that day, and many Arabs came and stabbed it with their spears ; the next day I heard that it was thrown into one of the wells. The bodies of all those killed near the river were thrown into the river, and those killed at a distance were thrown into the wells. After Gordon's head had been cut off, Nejumi assembled his men on the bank of the river near the palace, and asked them which

of them had killed Gordon; one Arab stepped out of the ranks and said, "It is I," thinking he would be rewarded, but on learning that Gordon's death was in disobedience of the Mahdi's orders, he denied his statement. This man was afterwards taken before the Mahdi, and pleaded that he was but one of a number who had attacked Gordon on the top of the stairs, and the Mahdi pardoned him.¹ As far as I know Gordon was killed by spear and sword wounds only, and I never heard that he made any resistance. He was attacked suddenly, and by wild men who knew no discipline. All his kavasses and the people of his household were massacred in the same way. Resistance would have been useless; besides, it was almost quite dark, and there could have been little fighting, for only one Arab was killed in the palace.

The garrisons of Tuti and Ras Rasikh made no resistance when they saw that the town had been captured, and all surrendered.

The massacre in the town lasted for about six hours, and some 4000 persons must have been killed. Consul Hansal was killed in his house, but Consul Nicolo and Ibrahim Bey Fauzi, the secretary of Gordon Pasha, were taken prisoners.

Two days afterwards (the 28th) we saw the steamers approaching Khartum, and opened fire on them. They reached the south-west corner of Tuti island at about 11 A.M., and seeing Khartum in our hands they turned back. The Mahdi's intention had been to make Gordon capitulate through starvation—the failure of his (the Mahdi's) attack on El Obeid made him fear to attack Khartum, and had it not been for Abd el Kerim's advice, he would have raised the siege, for he knew that if one steamer should arrive with English soldiers on board, the garrison would regain courage, and his attack would fail.

Farag Pasha was made a prisoner and taken to the camp outside. Three days afterwards he was killed by one of his old servants in revenge for something he had done to him a long time ago; he was not killed by order of the Mahdi, and he did not betray the town nor open the Messalameh Gate until Khartum was actually in our hands.

Such is the statement of a noted besieger, and it is corroborated in almost every detail by the numerous Arab prisoners and others who have arrived in Egypt from the Sudan.²

¹ One arrival from Khartum states that Gordon was killed by Awlad el Mek of the Saadab tribe of Gezan on the west bank of the White Nile, just south of Omdurman, in revenge for the death of one of their tribe whom Gordon had ordered to be shot as a spy. Others state that Mussa Agha Tayallah and Ali Wad Rahma of the Gemaab tribe were the murderers, and that they killed Gordon in revenge for the death of Suliman Zubeir, son of Zubeir Pasha; but the evidence in confirmation of the emir Medawi's statement is overwhelming.

² The system adopted in obtaining the statements of those within the town of Khartum as well as of those besieging it will, it is hoped, assist the reader in forming an opinion as to the accuracy of the details described. Each statement has been given in the name of one individual only—Bordeini Bey and the emir Medawi—and the probable criticism that neither of these individuals could have been in a position to describe authoritatively all the events set forth in their

Let us now turn to the events which occurred on the fatal Monday morning, the 26th January, an accurate description of which can be gleaned from a perusal of the evidence taken at a general court-martial held in Cairo in June 1887, and of which the following notes are added in explanation of the statements made therein.¹

Hassan Bey Bahnassawi, the colonel commanding the 5th regiment, escaped from imprisonment after the fall of Khartum, and after every variety of perilous adventure he reached Cairo. Here he was tried by court-martial, for his regiment had held the western half of the line of defence, viz. that portion of the fortifications through which the enemy had first entered.

The charges against him were three,—the main one, that he treacherously delivered up his post to the enemy.

The evidence taken before this court-martial is remarkable. It pictures the state of matters inside the fortress with clearness, and adds reality to the description by the emirs of what took place beyond the lines.

The court-martial, moreover, had a value wanting in some courts-martial. It was no inquiry by generous officers into what had been the conduct of a brother officer, under circumstances of extreme difficulty. Large sums depended on the finding. The matter stood thus. If the officers and men who arrived daily from the Sudan had done their duty, they were

several narratives is a perfectly just one. These two individuals were selected as being admittedly the best informed and most reliable men who have reached Egypt up to the present time. The narratives of their own experiences were carefully noted in the first instance, after which the details of events in which the narrators themselves were not participators were corroborated or denied in their presence by refugees and by Arab prisoners of war who claim to have been eye-witnesses. Thus a consecutive and, it is believed, fairly accurate result has been arrived at; but to avoid the confusion and elaboration which would have been inevitable had each individual statement been separately related with the depositions of cross-examination, the writer has embodied the numerous narratives of besiegers and besieged into the statements of two individuals only, while the number of persons actually examined cannot have been less than fifty. At the same time it should be understood that the two individuals in whose names the statements are given are agreed as to the accuracy of each and every detail related.

¹ A full text of the proceedings, which are of great interest, as giving an idea of the straits into which Khartum had fallen, and the conditions under which it was attacked, is given in the Appendix.

entitled to pensions and long arrears of pay. Were treachery or neglect proved against them they were entitled to nothing. The officials at the head of the Ministry of Finance were at once a safeguard against unfair dealing, and an assurance that the matter should be sifted to the bottom. There was even zeal against the officers and soldiers. An able subordinate of the Finance Ministry, in his efforts on behalf of a straitened treasury, incurred the official rebuke of a Court who sat upon the claims of Nushi Pasha, the commander of Gordon's steamers. Two plans of Khartum were placed before the court-martial which tried Hassan Bey Bahnassawi. The prosecution in their plan did not hesitate to move Fort Mukran from where it stood east of Omdurman. They carried it two miles, and placed it in the track of the entering Arabs. They placed this fort in contact with the boats on a river which was receding several yards daily. One statement was made in support of the charge of treachery. An ex-clerk of the Khartum treasury stated that Hassan Bey received an allowance from the Mahdi. The evidence to the contrary was conclusive, and that he had been beaten severely, while his wives and daughters had been taken as concubines by the Mahdi and his officers.

Major Owen Quirk, in the summing up, pronounced that the prosecutor had failed to produce one tittle of evidence to prove one word of the charge against the prisoner. The Court honourably acquitted him.

The following notes will add to the interest in the evidence of the witnesses at the court-martial, which is given as it stands in the original minutes of the proceedings.

The mistake made in the frontispiece of the *Journals of General Gordon at Khartum* is a mistake concerning the position of Fort Mukran, and it is as singular as it is important. In itself it is almost sufficient to prove a charge of treachery, for it is admitted that the Arabs entered Khartum at the end of the line where Fort Mukran (Mogrim) stands in this map which was used by the prosecution, and they must on the face of it have walked through, or close by, the fort. This map shows a Fort Mogrim in a spot which will be spoken of as position "A." The true position of Fort Mukran will be spoken of as position "B."

The publisher of Gordon's Journal could, after the death of

KARTOUM

— 1884 —

drawn from rough sketches
made by the late
Major-General C. G. GORDON, C.B.


Scale of Miles



Population of Kartoum, 40,000

A.A., Armed Boats (Santals)


B.B., Breastworks.



Stanford's Geog. Inst.


This map was used by the "Prosecution" in the General Court Martial on Hassan Bey Bahnsawwi.

London: Macmillan & Co.





KHARTUM AND ENVIRONS.



A. Indicates the false position of Fort Mahran
B. ... approximately true position.
Scale of Miles

Sir Henry Gordon, obtain no information as to the authority of the map. It was probably constructed from an inset plan on the War Office map, No. 381, and marked "Revised, June 1885." This inset plan has not been traced, for the compilation was made in such haste that no record was kept of the material employed. Here is a Fort Mugrim nearly in the position assigned to it in the frontispiece. It is on the edge of the Nile, and at high Nile must have stood in several feet of water, and it must have quickly created an island. It is an impossible position.

Several witnesses have been examined as to the existence of a "*Mugrim*" as distinct from a "*Mukran*" fort. Khashm-el-Mus, Nushi, the emir Medawi, Mustafa Pasha Yawer, and Ibrahim Bordeini Bey, have all drawn, not one, but several maps at several times. Their evidence is overwhelming that there was but one fort, it was called "*Mukran*," and it was in position "B," and that there was no fort at position "A."

The etymology may be stated as given by Mustafa Pasha Yawer, in support of his ridicule of the theory that Mukran could be elsewhere than in position "B." The root "*kurn*" means "he joined one thing to another," "he yoked"; "*Makran*," the place of the yoke; "*Mukran*," the bar across the necks of two oxen; "*Mukran el Bahrein*," a term common in Arabic geography, the yoking or confluence of two rivers.

The Egyptian map of the fortifications of Khartum, as made by Abd el Kader Pasha, and dated 1881, calls "B" "*El Mukran*." There is no fort in position "A," which is marked as subject to inundation. Another War Office map, No. 332, dated December 1883, has an inset plan of Khartum, with sections of the fortifications, heights, and dimensions. Fort "*Mugrim*" has entirely disappeared from this plan, nor does any fort appear at "*El Mukran*."

The witnesses before mentioned describe "*Mukran*" as being about ten minutes' walk from the Blue Nile, and at the highest inundation washed by the White Nile. There is no doubt that the fort stood at the "*Mukran el Bahrein*," the yoke of the two Niles.

This may be supported from Gordon's Journals. On page 340 (original edition) "*the Husscinieh* lies just off the division of the Blue and White Niles;" and on page 318 Gordon

from his palace telegraphs to Mogrim to know "if *Husseinieh* is sick."

Khashm-el-Mus, describing his arrival with Sir Charles Wilson on the 28th January, writes: "The enemy kept on firing at us till we got to Halfiyeh. Also we were fired upon from Tuti and Mukran."¹

A third plan, which is shown on the opposite page, is a facsimile of the plan used by the "defence" in this trial.

From a study of the proceedings of this court-martial, the whole story of the events narrated therein appears to lead to but one conclusion, which may be summed up in a very few words.

We know now what was the effect of the battle of Abu Klea upon those inside and outside Khartum, where the English victory was known by the 20th of January. Disheartened by their long and fruitless siege and without provisions, the Arabs on the west bank had long clamoured to be led away. The battle of Abu Klea crushed them. A council of emirs was held, and the first decision come to was to announce a victory. A salute of 101 guns was fired. Mohammed Ahmed determined to instantly withdraw to Kordofan. At the council of emirs the withdrawal was almost agreed to. The Mahdi urged that to take the starving town would be an empty victory; to hold it for a day, and then to be besieged in it without provisions by the English, would be suicidal folly. Messengers arrived from Gubat saying that the English did not move. The defeat of Abu Klea was forgotten. Confidence revived. It was the English who had been beaten, and at last it was agreed that those on the south, Abu Girgeh and Wad Nejumi, should make one final effort. If successful, then so God wished it. If it failed, then the siege should be raised. For Nejumi had marked the slowly-falling Nile, the slowly-hardening mud, and knew the soldiers lay about the lines with swollen legs, and bodies distended by gum and water.

¹ A curious confirmation of this theory has just come to hand in the shape of an untelegraphed message from Mr. Power, *Times* Correspondent at Khartum, to Mr. Moberley Bell, *Times* Correspondent in Egypt, which runs as follows:—" . . . We have, besides the line of fortifications, four fortified posts. 'Mukran,' at the junction of the two Niles, Omdurman opposite, a fortified house on Blue Nile *vis-a-vis* to the palace, and Buri, a fortified village on the extreme left of our line of fortifications . . ." This message forms part of the correspondence which reached Cairo only in 1890, under the peculiar circumstances narrated in the footnote on page 115.

LA CHUTE DE KHARTOUM

PROCÈS DE HASSAN BEY BEHNAÏOUI

CROQUIS

PRÉSENTÉ PAR LA DÉFENSE

*Donnant la situation de Khartoum, de ses forts,
de la ligne de défense et des positions des Mahdists.
(25 Janvier 1885)*

N.B. - Ce croquis a été dressé à l'aide:


1° De la carte du Soudan Égyptien établie

par l'Intelligence branch of the War Office

2° Des croquis du Journal de Gordon.

3^e Du Journal de Gordon et d'es

témoignages entendus par la Cour.



London: Macmillan & Co.

Stanford's Good Estate



And inside the city the people gazing across the river tried in vain to read the signs before them. A salute for victory, and yet such crowds of women weeping round Omdurman.

The salute did not mean much, for in that long siege every trick and stratagem had been exhausted. Gordon's ramparts had for months been manned by dummy men, a ruse which has given rise to talk of British helmets placed on spikes. What was clear was that a battle had been fought, and Gordon, who never deceived his people, said on Thursday, "The English will be here to-morrow." No English came. On Friday he said, "They must be here to-morrow." On Saturday the men said, "Gordon himself despairs, he tells us lies." Sunday came and went. The men said, "The Arabs won Abu Klea, or the English had been here." Gordon's prayers must have gone earnestly out to those steamers now at last creeping slowly forward.

And then the end came.

The Blue Nile is eating away its west bank, which has a low cliff strengthened artificially. The White Nile is eating away its east bank, and on the Khartum side the bank is a long flat slope over which the Nile advances, much as it advances over the sand beds at Assuan. The space between Khartum and the lines is a plain dotted with cemeteries, powder magazines, and slaughter-houses. It was this space that on the dark morning of the 26th was suddenly filled with Arabs, who, armed for the most part with naked steel, dashed over the soft mud of the dissolved bank and filled-up ditch which De Coetlogon had dug. They met with but slight resistance at the point of attack, and massed rapidly behind the starving soldiers looking wearily over the parapet. Squares were formed at a few points, but all resistance was soon at an end. The wild Arabs scattering over the town massacred, pillaged, and looted for six hours, then all was over.

Of the emirs who besieged Khartum, Nejumi was killed at Toski, Abu Girgeh is at Tokar, and the emir Medawi, who commenced the siege and commanded the forces on the east bank up to the end, is in Cairo.

The tale is now complete. Of treachery there was none. Only the cruel river filled the ditch with mud and ebbed away. The race was fairly run. Help was at hand, only one short hundred miles away—but hunger and despair decided the issue.

FOR THE GRAVE OF GORDON.

"I had rather be dead than praised."—C. G. G.

"By those for whom he lived he died. His land
Awoke too late, and crowned dead brows with praise.
He, 'neath the blue that burns o'er Libyan sand,
Put off the burden of heroic days.
There, strong by death, by failure glorified,
O, never proud in life, lie down in pride!"

TENNYSON.

On the news of the fall of Khartum reaching Lord Wolseley at Korti, it was decided that the desert column at Gubat—now under the command of General Buller (who had been sent to replace Sir Herbert Stewart after the latter had been seriously wounded)—should capture Metemmeh and proceed thence to Berber to co-operate with the river column under General Earle, and effect the capture of that strategical point. The primary object of this latter column—before it was known that Khartum had fallen—was to push on to Abu Hamed, opening a supply route to Korosko, at which place Lieutenant Rundle had a convoy of camels ready to take across as soon as Abu Hamed was taken.

Earle was then to advance to Berber in order to push on, as fast as possible, supplies for the desert column operating towards Khartum. But on the arrival of the news that Khartum had fallen, the river column, then half-way through the Monasir country, was halted until a decision should be taken on the future operations. The decision to overthrow the Mahdi's power at Khartum was communicated to Lord Wolseley on the 7th February, and instructions were then sent to General Earle to push on to Abu Hamed, there to await further instructions. On the 10th of February was fought the successful action of Kirbekan, in which General Earle lost his life, the command of the column thus devolving on General Brackenbury.

The column then advanced towards Abu Hamed, destroying on the way the property of Suliman Wad Gamr and Fakri Wad Etman, the murderers of Colonel Stewart; but on the 24th, when within thirty miles of Abu Hamed, instructions arrived from Lord Wolseley that, owing to the retreat of the desert

column from Gubat towards Jakdul, he had abandoned all prospect of reaching Berber before the autumn ; he was therefore to retire on Merawi with his whole force. General Brackenbury effected this retirement by the 5th March, and, leaving a small garrison at Merawi under Colonel Butler, left with the remainder of his column for Korti, where he arrived on the 8th March. Meanwhile the desert column, which was to have advanced on Berber after the capture of Metemmeh, remained at Gubat for ten days after Sir Charles Wilson's return. Sir Evelyn Wood had been despatched to Gubat to retire the desert posts after Sir R. Buller's departure ; but on the latter's arrival at Jakdul, information was received from General Buller that owing to news of a force marching down from Khartum having been received, which if true would have made it very difficult for him to keep up his communications, he had been obliged to retire on Abu Klea. This place he reached on the 15th February. From here he had hoped to march on Berber or retire to Merawi as ordered, but the complete breakdown of the camels and transport, owing to the very severe strain imposed on them in the recent operations, rendered an advance on Berber out of the question. It was therefore decided to retire altogether to the river at Korti or Merawi. Sir Evelyn Wood, from Jakdul, despatched convoys of camels to enable General Buller to effect his retreat from Abu Klea, which in the meantime had been partially invested by the enemy ; and on the 23d February the column left Abu Klea, arriving at Jakdul on the 26th. Sir R. Buller now left for Korti, and the task of withdrawing the column devolved on Sir Evelyn Wood ; but owing to the complete collapse of the transport, the whole of the troops did not reach Korti until the 16th March.

The Nile column was now distributed between Merawi, Tani, Debbeh, Kurot, and Dongola, where suitable camps were selected, and all arrangements made to protect the troops during the coming hot weather.

Meanwhile another expedition to Suakin had been planned, its object being to crush Osman Digna, occupy the Hadendowa country, make a railway as far as Ariab, and then prepare for the opening of the Suakin-Berber road, which would be effected when the Nile column had captured Berber. The operations of

the Suakin field force, under General Sir G. Graham, will be referred to in the chapter relating to events in that neighbourhood in 1885, while reference will be made to the further movements of the Nile column in the description of events on the Egyptian frontier during that year.

BOOK VII

THE ORGANISATION OF THE NEW EGYPTIAN ARMY

Native corps raised by the British from 1757—The Egyptian fellah and the Bengali, a comparison—American officers in the Egyptian army—The old Egyptian army—The Egyptian army of Arabi Pasha—The system of recruiting for the old army—Its effect on the fellahin—The recruit for the new army—The terror of the Sudan service—Sir Evelyn Wood appointed sirdar of the new Egyptian army—The officers who first join—The composition of the army—Early recruiting—Periods of service in army, police, and reserve—Early training—Egyptian ranks and their equivalent English titles—Origin of Egyptian (Turkish) titles—The pasha—The bey—The effendi—The organisation—The first brigade raised by Colonel Grenfell—The second brigade raised by Ishaq Pasha—State of the Egyptian army in January 1883—The cholera epidemic—The formation of a medical department—Conscription, a brief history of the career of an Egyptian soldier—Army and police service compared—Selection of native officers—The rank of a British officer on joining—H. H. the Khedive, the commander-in-chief—His war minister—The sirdar and his functions—The headquarter staff—The adjutant-general and the quartermaster and surveyor-general—The departments, the central administration—The military school—Sir Evelyn Wood's system of training—The effect of Hicks Pasha's disaster on the army—Failure to form a Turkish brigade—New English officers join—The first Sudanese battalion raised in 1884—Details of organisation—Difference between organisation of Egyptian and Sudanese battalions—Work done by the Egyptian army in the Nile expedition; and at Suakin—Sir Evelyn Wood resigns, and is succeeded as sirdar by General Grenfell—Various increases in the Egyptian army—Its strength early in 1886—Colonel Hallam Parr becomes adjutant-general—His report on progress made—Strength of the Egyptian army in 1890.

THE capacity of Englishmen for the organisation and effective employment of troops recruited from races which, without English assistance, have remained unwarlike, is indicated throughout the East by a long list of regiments, battalions, and troops called proudly by the soldiers after the name of their commanders.

From the twelve regiments of the Bengal Native Infantry raised in 1757-1796 to Wood's irregulars in South Africa, a space of 150 years is filled with the achievements of such troops as the "Lal Pultan," "Hodson's Horse," "Skinner's Horse," "Baker's Horse," "Jacob's Rifles," and many others.

Probably the secret of success is what an eminent statesman pronounced to be the secret of success in other matters—the Englishman's power to inspire confidence.

The German is taught to have confidence in his discipline; the Frenchman in his success; and the Englishman in himself; and when each has to teach what he has learned, there is no doubt that the last obtains the greatest practical success.

A like climate, a like soil, produce a like race, and the inhabitants of the fertile valleys of the Ganges may be not inaptly compared with the dwellers in the rich delta of the Nile. As England began in Bengal, so she is now continuing in Egypt. As the Bengali was a byword for a lettered gentleness, so the Egyptian was thought incapable of self-defence.

Previous to 1882 the army had been trained by American officers, soldierly men of varied experience; but they were permitted to have little or nothing to do with the actual training of the men; they were chiefly employed on staff duties in connection with topographical and other work, and in explorations in the Sudan, and in the deserts between the Nile and the Red Sea. It was, however, disorganised by Arabi Pasha, and hordes of raw levies were added to their number before the catastrophe of Tel el Kebir. Those who were at Kafr ed Dawar the morning after that battle saw with astonishment the serried lines of tents, neat and orderly; between each row of tents the rifles accurately piled; the standard in its place; the whole occupying several acres of ground; but not a soldier to be seen. Hastily divesting themselves of every sign of military equipment they filed, in joyful crowds, along the railway line, each to his village home. But later on in the day came a regiment of veterans from the fort of Abukir, who had until now believed that their guns would destroy the English fleet. Here the French had landed in 1798; here the English in 1801; and here surely would Lord Wolseley come. These old soldiers marched in silence

up to the long line of railway trucks, halted in silence under the level ranks of the Shropshire and Sussex regiments, and there disarmed. They hurled their rifles into the waggons, tore off their accoutrements and flung them after them, then turned and marched sullenly away without a word. Sir Evelyn Wood was there, and perhaps he marked these men's demeanour. Whether so or not, he never had the slightest doubt as to what kind of soldiers he was going to make.

As the army owed its success to the confidence inspired by its English officers, so in its turn the army has been the most powerful means of spreading throughout the people of the land a confidence in the honesty and fair dealing of the English servants of His Highness the Khedive; and the recruit of the new army returning to his village on his annual furlough is perhaps one of the most effective means of impressing this fact on the peasant classes of Egypt. Formerly a soldier received his pay only at long intervals, and perhaps not at all. Once drafted into the army, he was looked upon as a man doomed never to return, and was accompanied to the outskirts of his village by his weeping friends and relatives, who bid him a long and last farewell; knowing full well that he would in all likelihood be despatched forthwith to the terrible Sudan, where his father, uncles, cousins, and perhaps his brothers, had gone before him, to lifelong exile, if not to present death. To the simple fellah, who is perhaps one of the most domestically inclined individuals in the world, the prospect of being wrenched from his beloved village, his fields, and his cattle, was as the sword of Damocles, forever hanging over his head; he would commit any crime or submit to any torture to escape this call to the colours. Instances were frequent in former days of bodily mutilation being resorted to, so as to escape from military service. It was no uncommon occurrence for a man to cut off his right forefinger, and so incapacitate himself from pulling the trigger of the rifle; but of far more frequency was the practice of destroying one or both eyes, and even up to the present day it is still carried out; but the numbers of such cases are greatly reduced, and doubtless when the present *régime* has been continued a few years longer, these practices will die out altogether.

The fact, therefore, of a recruit who had left his village

but a year ago, returning again, well clothed and set up, and with a few pounds in his pocket with which he kept the village coffee-shop open for a week at his own expense, was beyond measure astounding! he would be surrounded by his relatives and friends, questioned on every possible point, and, wonder of wonders! he actually admits that he is contented in his regiment or corps; he is well clothed and fed, regularly paid, and treated with justice by his commanding officers, and on the expiration of his furlough he no longer bemoans the sad fate which drags him once more away, but returns happily enough, and perhaps inwardly rejoicing to escape from the squalor of his native home back to the clean and airy barracks or camp. Such a change as this could not but strike the humble fellah, and by degrees the hatred with which service in the army was ever viewed has steadily though gradually diminished. But it must take long years of careful and just administration to obliterate from their memories the evil days which preceded the new *régime*, when whole families were ruthlessly seized, regardless of the regular laws of conscription, brought to the training depots in chains and swept off to the Sudan, there to remain for an indefinite time, or fall victims to the climate or the innumerable petty wars in which the troops in the Sudan were continually engaged. It was strange to note with what terror the fellahin recruits heard the name Sudan mentioned.

In the early days of the organisation a threat that a repetition of an offence would involve transfer to a battalion or corps in the Sudan was a certain guarantee that no such offence would ever be repeated.

But to return from this digression, on the 20th December 1882 appeared the decrees of His Highness the Khedive disbanding the old army and appointing Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., etc., as sirdar of the new army. Permission was given for the appointment in Egypt of officers serving on full pay in the Queen's army, and the following officers were provisionally selected :—

Rank in English Army.	Name.	Regiment.	Rank and Appointment in the Egyptian Army.
Major-General	Sir Evelyn Wood, V.C., G.C.M.G., K.C.B.	Staff	Sirdar and Chief of the Staff of the army
Lieutenant	E. Stuart Wortley	King's Royal Rifles	Major, Aide-de-Camp to his Excellency the Sirdar
Lieut.-Colonel	T. Fraser, C.M.G.	Staff, Royal Engineers	Colonel, Adjutant, and Quartermaster-General of the army
Captain	F. G. Slade	Staff, Royal Artillery	Lieut.-Colonel, Assistant-Adjutant, and Quartermaster-General of the army
Colonel	F. Grenfell, C.B.	Staff, King's Royal Rifles	Brigadier-General, commandant of a brigade of infantry
Lieut.-Colonel	F. Duncan	Royal Artillery	Colonel, commandant of the artillery
"	A. M. Taylor	19th Hussars	Lieut.-Colonel, commandant of a cavalry regiment
Major	H. C. Chernside, C.M.G.	Staff, Royal Engineers	Lieut.-Colonel, commandant of a battalion
"	H. H. Parr, C.M.G.	Staff, Somersetshire Light Infantry	Lieut.-Colonel, commandant of a battalion
"	C. M. Watson	Staff, Royal Engineers	Colonel, Surveyor-General
"	A. S. Wynne	King's Own Light Infantry	Lieut.-Colonel, commandant of a battalion
"	C. H. Smith	King's Royal Rifles	Lieut.-Colonel, commandant of a battalion
Captain	J. Wodehouse	Royal Artillery	Major, commandant of a battery of artillery
"	J. O. Quirk	Welsh Regiment	Major, second commandant of a battalion
"	A. B. Shakespear	Royal Marine Artillery	Major, second in command of a cavalry regiment
"	H. Kitchener	Royal Engineers	Major, commandant of a battery of artillery
Lieutenant	C. S. Parsons	Royal Horse Artillery	Major, supernumerary
"	C. C. Turner	Shropshire Light Infantry	Major, second in command of a battalion
"	C. B. Pigott	King's Royal Rifles	Major, supernumerary
"	C. F. Davidson	Cameron Highlanders	Major, second in command of a battalion
"	A. Sinclair	First Beloochee Regiment	Major, supernumerary
"	A. C. Haggard	King's Own Borderers	"
"	H. M. Rundle	Royal Artillery	"
"	D. Carter	Royal Artillery	"
"	R. A. Marriott	Royal Marine Artillery	"

The composition of the army was the subject of grave discussion between Sir Evelyn Wood and Lord Dufferin; and it must have been matter of interest to the former to find his excellency stating, with apparently an open mind on the question, "Many persons argue that Egypt requires no army at all." The number was fixed at 6000 men, Lord Dufferin pointing out, with a sagacity justified later on, that this was irrespective of events in the Sudan. It was to be a fellahin army, but, in view of the high reputation of Turkish soldiers, it was decided that it "would be wise to introduce a certain amount of professional backbone into the invertebrate ranks of the fellahin soldiers by the admission among them of the descendants of those hardy warriors who carried the standards of Mohammed Ali from Cairo to Konia."

It is matter of common remark how many things, some people say all things, in Egypt are done in a manner exactly contrary to that employed in other countries. An argument for this might be found in the fact that the new army was recruited first, and the recruiting regulations drawn out some years afterwards. Such in fact was the case, and the number of men having been decided upon, the governors of the fourteen provinces were instructed to send from each province a number proportioned to the population. And it is to the credit of the country that the men thus arbitrarily obtained were of a finer stature and greater suitability than those obtained since.

The original conditions of service were four years with the colours, but this was subsequently altered to four years in the army, four years in the police, and four years in the reserve; and in 1888, finding that with the continual chances of active service in the field it would have been most unwise to have dispensed with the older and well-trained soldiers, the period of service was again altered to six years in the army, five in the police, and four in the reserve.

The men were collected in a depot at the Barrage¹ and

¹ The Barrage is an extensive dam constructed across the Nile where it branches off to form the Delta. Being of defective structure it was until recently practically useless, but of late years has been most successfully taken in hand by Sir Colin Scott-Moncrieff and his irrigation engineers, who have now completed this vast engineering enterprise with the best results for the improved irrigation of Egypt. The head of the Barrage is protected by large earthworks which formed a recruiting depot for the army in the early days of its reorganisation.

thence drafted, after due enforcement of sanitary regulations, to the large barracks of Toura and Abbassieh in the neighbourhood of Cairo. Two brigades were formed, consisting each of four battalions. The first brigade was commanded by English, and the second by Egyptian officers.

Brigadier-General Grenfell commanded the first brigade, of which the battalions were formed by the following officers:—

Major Chermside, with Captain Quirk, formed the first.

Major Holled Smith, with Captain Shakespear and Lieutenant Marriott, formed the second.

Major Hallam Parr, with Lieutenant Pigott, formed the third.

Major Wynne, with Captain Haggard, formed the fourth.

For some time English officers employed English titles for their ranks in the Egyptian army, but later on it was found that when they were brigaded with the Queen's troops confusion arose, and they were described by the Turkish titles, of which the following are the equivalents:—

TABLE OF CORRESPONDING RANKS IN ENGLISH AND TURKISH

ENGLISH RANK.	CORRESPONDING EGYPTIAN RANK.
Commander-in-Chief	Sirdar
Lieutenant-General	Farik
Major-General	Lewa
Colonel	Miralai
Lieutenant-Colonel	Kaimakam
Major	Bimbashi
(Adjutant-Major)	Saghkolaghasi
Captain	Yuzbashi
Lieutenant	Mulazim awal
Second Lieutenant	Mulazim tani

The ranks of sirdar, farik, and lewa carry with them the title of "pasha," the ranks of miralai, kaimakam, carry with them the title of "bey." All lower ranks to second lieutenant carry with them the title of "effendi," but in this case the title has dropped into disuse when applied to British officers serving in the Egyptian army.

It will not perhaps be out of place to describe here the origin of these Turkish titles :—

Pasha is said to be derived from the Persian word "pa" (foot or support), and "shah" (sovereign), a title belonging to Turkish military commanders of high rank and the governors of provinces. It is merely an honorary title, and was originally bestowed only on princes of the blood, but was eventually conferred upon the grand vizir, the members of the divan, the seraskier (commander-in-chief), the capitan-pasha (minister of marine), the begler-begs (bey of beys), and other civil and military functionaries. The distinctive badge of the pasha is the horse-tail waving from the end of a lance crowned with a gold or silver ball. This badge is carried before them when they take the field during war; before the doors of their houses are placed one, two, or three gold or silver globes surmounted by a pink and white plume. The three grades of pashas are distinguished by the number of horse-tails or globes, three being allotted to the highest dignitaries, all of whom have also the title of vizir. The pashas of two tails are generally the governors of the more important provinces; the lowest rank, of one tail, is generally filled by the sanjaks or minor provincial governors. The pasha is military chief and administrator of justice in his province, and holds office during the sultan's pleasure. Their power was formerly absolute within their jurisdiction, and was often arbitrarily exercised, but has now been somewhat restricted. Should the growing power or wealth of a pasha excite the fears or the cupidity of the sultan, the unfortunate functionary is quickly removed, and frequently by the hands of the executioner, and his property, often the fruit of extortion, confiscated.

Such were the original functions and titles of the pashas; but subsequently the rank of pasha was subdivided into ten grades or degrees. The first grade is given to the prime minister or grand vizir, the second to ministers of the state, the third to the sons-in-law of royalties, the fourth to vizirs or advisers in general, the fifth to field-m Marshals who are not vizirs, such as governors of large provinces, and to the commanders-in-chief of the army and civilians of equivalent position, the sixth to the williat (or governors-general), the seventh to the farik or lieutenant-generals, the eighth to the

begler beg (or bey of beys), the ninth to the mirmiran (or emir of emirs), this is the title given to civilians holding the position of governors of small provinces.

The tenth to the mir lewa or emir (chief) of the lewa (brigade), a title corresponding to the English title of major or brigadier-general, and usually abbreviated to lewa-pasha.

Bey or beg, a Turkish word, signifies an emir or prince, *i.e.* the son of a king. In the early days of the Turkish empire it was a higher title than that of pasha, and was confined almost entirely to the sons of kings or sultans, and was equivalent to the Persian title of khan or shah. It was also a title given to the governors of provinces, and since the seventeenth century the Governor of Tunis has always held this title.

It is now, however, given more generally as a title of courtesy to the sons of pashas, to the principal officials, and to military and naval officers of the ranks of colonel and lieutenant-colonel.

Miralai, which is the equivalent to the English rank of colonel, is derived from "mir" (a contraction of emir, a prince or chief) and "alai" (the Turkish for a regiment), *i.e.* the chief of a regiment.

Kaimakam is the Turkish equivalent to lieutenant-colonel, and is derived from the Arabic word "kaim" (*i.e.* standing up), and "makam" or "makan" (*i.e.* a place), that is, "standing in the place of" the miralai, or the second in command of a regiment.

Binbashi or bimbashi is derived from "bin" (Turkish for 1000), and "bash" (the chief or head of), that is, the chief of 1000 men, and is equivalent to the rank of major.

Yuzbashi is the equivalent for captain, and signifies the chief of 100; derived from "yuz" (Turkish for 100), and "bash" (chief).

Saghkolaghasi is an intermediate rank between captain and major, and has been Englished into a rank called adjutant-major; it is derived from "sagh" (Turkish for the right hand), "kol" (Turkish, a column), "agha" (a Turkish title equivalent to the Egyptian effendi),¹ that is to say, the leader of the right wing.

¹ *Agha* originally means "elder brother." It is now applied to uneducated civil and military officials. In this respect *Effendi* is, in contradistinction to *Agha*, applied only to persons of some education.

Mulazim awal corresponds to the rank of first lieutenant. "mulazim" (Turkish for lieutenant), and "awal" (Arabic for first).

Mulazim tani corresponds to second lieutenant; "tani" (Arabic for second).

The title of solkolaghasi,¹ or the leader of the left wing, is that of an under officer next to second lieutenant, and may be equivalent to quartermaster.

Bash Shawish corresponds to the rank of sergeant-major, and is derived from "bash" (chief), "shaush" (Turkish for sergeant).

Buluk amin corresponds to the rank of quartermaster-sergeant, derived from "buluk" (Turkish for a company) and "amin" (Arabic, one who is faithful to), i.e. one who is charged with the care of the company.

The buluk amin works directly under the sol (contraction for solkolaghasi).

Onbashi or ombashi corresponds to the rank of corporal, and signifies the chief of ten; derived from "on" (Turkish for ten), and "bash" (chief).

The second, or native brigade, was commanded by El-Lewa Shuhdi Pasha, under whom the following battalions were formed :—

Fifth battalion under the command of—

Kaimakam Abderrahman Bey Salim.

Sixth battalion under the command of—

Kaimakam Khurshid Bey Basmi.

Seventh battalion under the command of—

Kaimakam Ibrahim Bey Khalil.

Eighth battalion under the command of—

Kaimakam Alfi Bey Yusef.

The artillery was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, R.A., with Captain Wodehouse and Lieutenants Parsons, Rundle, and Carter; while Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, 19th Hussars, commanded the cavalry, with Captain Kitchener, R.E., as second in command, and Lieutenant Sinclair. A Camel Corps was raised by Lieutenant Chamley Turner.

Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser, R.E., was adjutant-general, with

¹ In the Turkish marine service the title of solkolaghasi is used to indicate the intermediate rank between adjutant-major and captain.

Captain Slade, R.A., as his assistant; while the post of surveyor-general was held by Major Watson, R.E.

Lieutenant Mantell, R.E., joined the Egyptian army a month later, and in the topographical bureau of Count Della Sala Pasha carried out the very important work of translating the English "drill" and other books into Arabic.

The ardour for their drill among the recruits surprised every one. Much of their spare time was spent by the men in practising and repractising the elements of their exercise. Their capacity for ready imitation soon made them proficient in the bayonet exercise, but in their use of the rifle they were singularly difficult to teach. The manner of holding it, the use of the sight, the importance of the trigger, were but constantly recurring novelties to them for a long period. When it came to intricate calculations as to the allowance necessary for a side wind, the question was summarily decided by the officer in command moving his firing party six yards up wind. It is interesting to remember how hopeless musketry practice seemed seven years ago, and to contrast it with the fact that the average marksmanship efficiency in His Highness's army has now reached a standard which does not bear very unfavourable comparison with that of European troops. And it is a good example of the docility and willingness to learn of the troops under Sir Evelyn Wood's tuition.

The words of command were all originally given in Turkish, but one of the first army orders issued notes that the troops do not move off readily at the word "yuru," and directs that in future the word "march" shall be employed. But this is the sole instance in which a foreign word of command has been introduced.

In January 1883 Sir Evelyn Wood stated the following as the composition and state of the Egyptian army:—

	English Officers.	Native Officers, Priests, Doctors, etc.	Non-Commissioned Officers.	Privates, including Water Carriers.	Horses.	Clerks and Employés.	Drummers and Trumpeters.
Staff of War Minister . . .	1	11	6	11	14	44	...
General staff	4	10	1	5	10	2	...
Supplementary officers . . .	4
Artillery staff	1	1	3	1	...
Infantry staff—							
1st Brigade	1	2	4	1	...
2d Brigade	3	4	1	...
Cavalry—							
One regiment	2	23	75	417	530	1	12
Artillery—							
Two batteries of 6 guns . .	4	8	40	220	186	...	4
" " 4 "	8	30	144	130	...	4
Infantry—							
1st Brigade (4 battalions) .	8	84	343	1824	26	4	96
2d Brigade (4 battalions)	88	343	1824	24	4	96
Cavalry and Artillery band	1	7	23	21
Brigade bands (two)	2	22	68
Barrack department	3	2	1	...
Proposed to be raised—							
Camel corps ¹	1	4	20	178	6	1	2
Engineering company . . .	1	3	10	88	1	1	2
Detachment of coast artillery	...	2	10	90	1	1	...
Proposed establishment . . .	27 ²	252	896	4858 ³	972	62	216
Present on 28th January . .	18	227	808	1639	552	56	26
Wanting to complete	9	25	88	3219	420	6	190

¹ Twenty dromedaries.

² Application has been, or will be made, for the service of these officers.

³ In these totals hospital orderlies and regimental transport are included.

NOTE.—The question of forming a nucleus of an army hospital corps and army transport is under consideration.

(Signed) EVELYN WOOD, Sirdar.

Discipline and drilling were not, however, to go on without interruption. In August 1883 the cholera fell upon the land, and a medical department was rapidly organised.¹ The services of Doctor Acland were secured, and, thanks to his skill and energy, the loss from this disease was comparatively small.

¹ During the first few days of the outbreak, the want of an organised medical department was keenly felt, but several of the British officers—and conspicuous amongst them Lieutenant Chamley Turner—did what they could to tend the cholera-stricken soldiers. Lieutenant Turner was attacked by the disease and recovered, only to meet his death by drowning in the Nile at Keneh a few months later.

The services of Surgeon-Major Rogers¹ were also temporarily lent to the Egyptian army, and with his assistance hospitals were established and regulations enforced.

The arrangements to prevent the spread of the disease were placed under the special charge of General Grenfell, and everything that could be done, was done. But it was a sad day for His Highness the commander-in-chief, as he walked through the long row of beds in which his cholera-stricken soldiers lay. Perhaps he recalled it when he rode with His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, and showed the royal visitor the troops who had charged at Toski, and carried on their colours the names of more than one honourable fight.

On the 31st March His Highness the commander-in-chief reviewed his young army, and received the warm compliments of Lord Dufferin on the progress which had been made. There were on the ground 3500 officers and men, and a battery of 6 guns.

A slight sketch of the career of an Egyptian soldier from his first enrolment on the conscript list may be of interest.

Recruiting commissions, composed of native officers, and supervised by English medical inspecting officers, are quartered in the various provinces, and their duty is to examine all youths who have attained the age which renders them liable to conscription, viz. nineteen years. Previous to the commission arriving in a district the sheikhs prepare the lists in accordance with the "*daftar orneik*," or birth-books, which are then submitted to the commission, who investigate the several cases, and ballot those medically fit who are not entitled to exemption.²

Registers of each province are kept at the central recruiting office in Cairo, where the various numbers drawn are placed against the men's names. Conscripts are not called up for service until their twenty-third year, and in this manner there are always some 150,000 conscripts on the lists varying between the ages of 19 and 23. The number of recruits required yearly to replace the wastage in an army of 12,000

¹ The latter subsequently entered the Egyptian army, became the principal medical officer, and under his care an efficient medical department was soon organised.

² The laws of exemption are perhaps more liberal than in any other conscripted country. As many as 45 per cent of young men who are brought up before the commissions are exempted on religious, family, or other grounds.

men does not exceed from 1200 to 1500 men; the burden of conscription, therefore, is an unusually light one. Various other administrations obtain recruits in this manner, but their yearly demands are so slight that they need hardly be taken into consideration. A man, both before and after he has become a conscript, is granted the privilege of buying himself out; but once he has joined the colours, nothing but the production of proof that he has become a "wahidani," or only son, and therefore the breadwinner of the family, will secure his discharge.¹

A recruit, once called up to join the colours, begins his service in the depot battalion in Cairo, where he undergoes three months' preliminary training, and is then drafted off to a battalion either on the frontier, or at Suakin, or in Cairo. On first joining he receives pay at the rate of £E. 3 M.M. 60² per annum, exclusive of rations, etc. When promoted

To corporal he receives	.	£E. 4 M.M. 800	per annum
To sergeant	"	6	"
To sergeant-major	"	8	" 40 "
To warrant officer	"	18	"

And his pay is further increased should he elect to continue serving on after the expiration of his first period of service in the army. Should he not elect so to do, he is drafted into the police, where he spends his second period of service. The police service is more popular than the army for various reasons, but mainly that the men are very often drafted as police to their native provinces; and, moreover, they receive better pay, and have more opportunity for leading a domestic life. In the army there is no married establishment for the Egyptian soldiers; the majority of them are, of course, married, but their wives seldom leave their native villages.

On the completion of his police service he is drafted to the

¹ Some years after the first recruits had been called up for service it was discovered that upwards of 500 of them had been wrongly enlisted. Being only sons, they were released from further service, an act of justice which produced an excellent effect throughout the country.

² £E. signifies pounds Egyptian.

M.M. ,, millièmes.

£E. 1 = 1000 millièmes.

The value of an Egyptian pound exceeds that of an English sovereign by 25 millièmes.

first-class reserve, which is tantamount to release from service, as the reserve is seldom called out.

The police¹ is the first reserve of the army, and should a sudden emergency render it necessary to increase the number of trained soldiers, such increase would be drawn from the police, who in turn would fill up their vacancies from the first-class reserve.

The native officers for the newly-organised army were of course carefully selected from the disbanded army; but the Military School was speedily remodelled, and soon fairly well-trained cadets were introduced into the army, and if they showed aptitude they were rapidly pushed on by their commanding officers, with the result that at present the majority of those who joined in 1883 are the trusted captains of companies, trained in accordance with the English military system, and are as a rule fairly well acquainted with the British infantry drill, which, together with a large number of other military text-books, was rapidly translated into Arabic.

An English officer, on joining the Egyptian army, is, as a rule, granted the next higher rank—or in some cases two ranks higher—than that he possesses in the British service. For instance, the sirdar, who may be a major-general, is given the rank of farik pasha; a colonel is generally made lewa pasha, a lieutenant-colonel miralai bey, a major kaimakam bey, and captains and subalterns take the rank of bimbashi or major. There are, of course, certain exceptions to these rules.

In English-officered battalions there are consequently no native officers of higher rank than saghkolaghasi (adjutant-major), while promotion to the higher grades is kept open for native officers through the native battalions and corps, and also through the staff, the organisation of which may here be briefly described.

The commander-in-chief of the army is His Highness the Khedive. His war minister is at present his excellency Mustafa Pasha Fehmi; and next to him is his wakil, or under-secretary of state for war. The executive commander-in-chief is the sirdar, and his principal staff officers are the adjutant-general and the quartermaster-general. The latter is also

¹ Formerly under the command of the late General Valentine Baker Pasha, who was succeeded by General Charles Baker Pasha, V.C.

styled surveyor-general. The adjutant-general is, as a rule, the second in command of the army (at present Colonel Kitchenier, R.E.), and his office is subdivided into the office of assistant-adjutant-general (of which there are two branches—one English and one Arabic), assistant military secretary's office, assistant-adjutant-general of recruiting, and assistant-adjutant-general of intelligence. The quartermaster and surveyor-general (at present Lieutenant-Colonel Settle, R.E.) is assisted by an assistant-quartermaster-general and assistant-surveyor-general, and the various departmental offices are directly under this head office, such as the commissariat, ordnance, pay, engineering division, and several others which are special to the country. The three former offices are all under the supervision of English officers; while the engineering division, which includes the arsenals, factories, etc., is in charge of a French officer (Guignod Pasha). The whole of these offices, including the offices of the principal medical officer (Surgeon-Major Rogers), are termed the War Office.¹ The junior staff appointments, in addition to those already mentioned, are held by native staff officers; while the clerical work is carried out in the English section by British staff clerks and a staff of non-commissioned officers, of whom there are thirty-three in all, while in the native sections it is transacted by the katibs (native clerks) and translators.

In addition to the War Office there is the Military School, under the directorship of a French officer (Larmée Pasha) and a British commandant, containing some 100 cadets, who undergo a competitive examination for entry, and after two years' training and study are drafted into the various arms, the yearly demand being approximately fifty.

The bulk of the troops are at present quartered on the frontier. Two battalions and a proportion of the other arms form the garrison of Suakin, while the remainder are stationed in Cairo and Alexandria.

All the duties of the public security are carried out by the police.

¹ There was also a Sudan Bureau for transacting all work in connection with the Sudan, but gradually as that country ceased to form an integral portion of the Egyptian dominions, this office lapsed, and its Director, Mohammed Mukhtar Pasha, became Assistant-Adjutant-General of the Arabic section.

In the above sketch the organisation, as it is at present, has been briefly described, for the reason that the existing arrangements give a more correct idea of the normal state of the army than would be obtained from a description of its earliest formation; but it must be remembered that the present fairly complete military system has, it may be said, only recently reached the standard of efficient working order. In the early stages of organisation there were but few British officers, and a comparatively small number were acquainted with the language. The army was raised on the *débris* of a disbanded army, and already the Sudan revolt had begun. It was impossible to say how soon they might be called upon to take part in the defence of the country. Sir Evelyn Wood, therefore, concentrated his greatest efforts to training the army up to a standard in which they would be in a position to take the field, and from their chief downwards the British officers strove might and main to attain this end. For the first year, therefore, of its life the new Egyptian army went through a course of vigorous training, and in all the ordinary movements of drill it was soon a fairly efficient force; but there were those of experience in the country who had good reason to recollect former disasters, and who doubted the fighting qualities of the fellahin soldiers.

The complete annihilation of Hicks Pasha's force must have convinced even the most sanguine that it would be dangerous to trust entirely to Egyptian troops in the field—not at any rate without a far more extended course of training than they had hitherto undergone. The new Egyptian army, so far carefully trained under the supervision of British officers, could not fairly be compared to the untrained rabble which formed the bulk of Hicks Pasha's and Baker Pasha's force. Still, the history of the revolt only tended to confirm the statements of those who prophesied disaster if the young Egyptian army took to the field; moreover, it was contrary to the original plan that the new Egyptian army should be called upon to proceed to the Sudan. It was intended for the defence of Egypt proper, and, therefore, no matter how earnestly the British officers might appeal to be allowed to try their chance with the troops they had trained, a negative answer was invariably the result.

Still the revolt grew in the Sudan, and early in 1884 the idea was conceived of adding a brigade of Turks to the Egyptian army. Zohrab Bey was sent on a recruiting mission to Albania. Diplomatic difficulties, however, arose, and the nucleus of a battalion was formed only to mutiny and be disbanded shortly after its organisation. It was on this occasion that its gallant commander, Major Grant, followed the mutineers single-handed into a large courtyard, and succeeded in making the men lay down their arms; not, however, before several attempts had been made to bayonet him, and he had been obliged to freely use his revolver in self-defence.

Meanwhile, events in the Sudan daily growing more serious, it became imperative to propose an increase to the Egyptian army, and the following officers joined :—

OFFICERS ATTACHED TO H.H. GOVERNMENT.

RANK.	NAME.	RANK.	NAME.
Major	Hare.	Lieutenant	Ternan.
"	Trotter.	"	Gibb.
"	Grant.	"	Gregorie.
Captain	Hunter.	"	Borrow.
"	Molyneux.	"	Daubeney.
"	Lloyd.	"	M'Bean.
Lieutenant	Eager.	"	Surtees.
"	Hawtaigne.	"	Bray.
"	Hickman.	"	Coles.
"	Barttelot.	"	La Terrière.
"	Lovatt.	"	Crawford.
"	Lysons.		

The military situation, however, changed so rapidly, and already the attempt to form a Turkish brigade in anticipation having failed, it was decided to raise a Sudanese battalion for service at Suakin.

This battalion, raised on the 1st May 1884, and commanded by Major Parr, was designated the 9th Sudanese battalion, and from its earliest formation up to the present time the confidence placed in it by its British officers has never once wavered. It was the pioneer regiment of the Sudanese brigade which has since proved itself to be the backbone which the Egyptian battalions so much require, and which in combination with the

native troops has secured more than one honourable victory. It is not intended in this chapter to repeat the various events which are given in perhaps excessive detail in the other parts of this work, and in which the Egyptian and Sudanese battalions of the new army took part, but a brief reference is necessary to connect the links in the chain of the early history of this young army, which is now but eight years old, with the events that are here dealt with, and to show how satisfactory has been the record, from its early organisation by Sir Evelyn Wood up to the complete annihilation of the famous Wad en Nejumi by the same army under Sir Francis Grenfell, a record of English patience and perseverance, and a proof of the good qualities which may be developed, when least expected, by Orientals under British supervision.

The organisation of a Sudanese battalion differs considerably from that of an Egyptian battalion. The men composing it are for the most part deserters from the enemy (the Bazingers to whom frequent reference has been made), they are almost entirely volunteers,¹ and, having no settled homes, a large percentage of them are permitted to marry and receive an allowance for the maintenance of their wives. They do not pick up their drills and exercises so rapidly as the Egyptians; but, on the other hand, they have greater initiative and instincts for self-defence. Many of them, especially the Shilluks and Dinkas, are almost savages; and it has been found by experience that in action they require greater control, as their chief desire is to be "up and at" the enemy. It has therefore been found necessary to organise them into six instead of four companies, with four instead of three English officers per battalion of 759 strong.

When the Nile expedition for the relief of Khartum began in 1884, the bulk of the army was distributed on the long line of communications, and performed valuable service to which Lord Wolseley referred in his despatch on the conclusion of the operations in the following terms:—

¹ All Sudanese in Egypt proper are subject to the laws of conscription; but as a rule these men, after a long residence in the country, are considered to make less reliable soldiers than those who come direct from the Sudan; consequently, except in the case of the 12th battalion, which was raised at a time of emergency, battalions are not recruited from conscript Sudanese.

The officers and men of the Egyptian army under General Wood's immediate orders worked along this line with indefatigable earnestness, and with the best possible results to the welfare of the expedition.

It was in this expedition that the conduct of the Egyptian gunners, under a native officer attached to the British battery in the action of Abu Klea, was reported on as good and steady; and later on, at the action of Kirbekan, General Brackenbury, in a supplementary official report, states:—

In my report of the 10th instant (February 1885) on the action of Kirbekan I inadvertently omitted to mention the part taken by the Egyptian camel corps under Major Marriott, who, under fire from front and flank, lined the foot of the high hill afterwards taken by the Staffords and engaged the attention of the enemy in front.

I the more regret this omission on my part, as the plucky conduct of the camel corps, who had two killed and one wounded, was the subject of universal comment after this action.

The Egyptian troops behaved well too in the various actions around Suakin, and there were many instances of personal gallantry on the part of Egyptian soldiers; one may be mentioned in particular, when a private of the Egyptian cavalry, forming one of the reconnaissance party of British and Egyptian troops on February 3d, 1885, being hard pressed by the enemy, dismounted and picked up a sergeant of the 19th Hussars, who must inevitably have been killed, and brought him out of action; for this signal service Her Majesty the Queen was graciously pleased to bestow on him the medal for distinguished service in the field.

But both before and since this date there have been numerous instances of personal gallantry, and commanding officers in the late actions of Argin and Toski can relate many stirring tales of the personal prowess of their men.

Sir Evelyn Wood relinquished his position as sirdar of the Egyptian army in March 1885 and was succeeded by Brigadier-General Grenfell. Colonel Fraser also left, and was succeeded as adjutant-general by Lieutenant-Colonel Parr. In the meantime several increases had taken place.

On January 2d, 1886, the 10th Sudanese battalion was raised and placed under the command of Captain Donne. At the end of February 1886 the Egyptian army numbered some 10,000 men, comprising ten battalions of infantry, five

batteries of artillery, a regiment of cavalry—of two squadrons—and three camel corps. And now the bulk of this force was composed of a leaven of well-seasoned troops, who, by the constant contact with the British troops, were gradually being trained up to the much-to-be-desired standard of “standing alone.”

The following extracts from a report addressed by Colonel Parr to the British High Commissioner in Egypt in the early part of 1886 are of interest as showing the progress which had been made during the past three years:—

One of the most satisfactory results of the late fighting is the proof that the care which has been taken in selecting native officers and improving their position and morale has borne good fruit; for their conduct has been very satisfactory, and there have been many instances of personal gallantry.

The average service of the Egyptian non-commissioned officers and men now on the frontier is about two and a half years.

To turn to the relations between the English officers and the native officers and men. As I commanded a native battalion for nearly two years, and was intimately acquainted with the feelings of all ranks of my corps, I venture to speak positively on the matter.

For the first four months after the formation of the army it was uphill work gaining the confidence of the officers, the worst and most incapable of whom, if useless for good, were powerful for evil. But little by little English and Egyptian officers began to understand each other's ways and modes of thought. The bad officers were weeded out and young men trained in the military schools were brought in, and the officers who had risen from the ranks and accustomed to the habits and vices of the old army gradually disappeared.

As regards the men, fair and strict treatment, clothing and rations untampered with, and pay unmulcted, soon made them contented and happy in the service, and a very satisfactory feeling speedily sprang up between the English officers and their men, and showed itself in many ways.

When my battalion had only been formed a year, on General Baker's disaster in February 1884, when going to the Sudan was looked upon as going to certain death, I called for six volunteers to go with me to Suakin as drill instructors. I had 150 volunteers as soon as it was made known that I and the English major of my battalion were going, and I could have taken my whole battalion had it been so required.

At this time, after three years, the feeling between all ranks is most satisfactory; as for the English officers, many have become so attached to their new comrades that the matter had become the subject of good-humoured remark on the part of their brother officers of the army of occupation, and this feeling is reciprocated by the native officers and men.

Not only is there a warm feeling between the English officers of the

Egyptian army and the native officers and men, but there is a certain *rapprochement* between the English army and the Egyptian officers and soldiers.

On General Fremantle, who had been greatly liked by the Egyptian troops at Suakin, leaving Cairo last month, a large number of the officers and men who had been under his command went unasked to wish him good-bye, although the hour of his departure was more or less unexpected.

A number of Egyptian officers attended of their own accord at the funeral of the late Colonel Barrow, whose untimely death has just taken place. These may be straws, but they show which way the wind is setting.

But it is in the villages that the kindly feeling between the Egyptian rank and file and their English officers has had a remarkable effect.

The men go regularly back to their villages on leave with money in their pockets, well fed and well clothed, and tell many stories of the English officers to their people. "When a soldier in the old army used to come back to his village," said a soldier the other day to his English commanding officer, "he used to sneak back like a dog, glad if our sheikh did not strike him. When I come back the sheikh asks me in to have coffee, and begs me to tell him the news."

The change in the bearing of recruits is no less remarkable. In the first place, the well-to-do class of peasant and small tradesman has been tapped by a just and fair system of ballot, nor do the men any longer dread the recruiting ticket like a sentence of death. Only a few days ago at Abbassieh I came upon, seated on a little hillock, a party of peasants talking and smoking, watching a battalion at drill. "What are you doing here?" said I. "Oh, we are some of the new soldiers, and we are watching the soldiers there." "I suppose it is a bad time for you, leaving your villages?" "Well, some of us are sorry, but after all, we must take our turn, and the soldiers here all seem very happy." To any one who remembers the first recruit of the Egyptian army, driven up in chains by police, and followed by a screaming, weeping crowd, this is a change indeed.

No less remarkable was the behaviour of the women and relations of the soldiers when the last regiment left for the front. Instead of the women throwing themselves into all the frenzy of oriental grief, only a few were silently weeping, and these were abused by their companions. "Wish the men God speed," they said: "they must go to fight; they will be back soon."

Such language had not been heard since the volunteers, who are said to have offered themselves during the summer of 1882, when Arabi Pasha was in power, left Cairo; nor is the Egyptian army of to-day without its volunteers. Hardly a day passes but men offer themselves as recruits, while a good proportion of the men "who served with transport of the British force at Suakin in 1884, and who received their discharges as a reward," have re-enlisted of their own accord.

I may remark, in conclusion, with reference to the conscription, that in no European country does the recruiting law bear so lightly on their people as in Egypt. With an army of about 8000 men, the recruiting

returns show about 70,000 youths passed fit by the medical officer belonging to the ballotage, all exemptions allowed by law being previously deducted.

There is now little further to add; the events narrated in 1887, 1888, and 1889, all show that steady progress is being made. As the British army of occupation is decreased, so the native army increases.

On the re-organisation of the police in 1887, the Sudanese reserve was transferred to the army and became the 11th Sudanese battalion, under the command of Captain Macdonald; the 12th Sudanese was raised on November 13th, 1888, under Captain Besant; while another Sudanese battalion (the 13th) had been raised on June 21st, 1886, under Captain Smith Dorrien. Several increases had also taken place in the various other arms, and the whole force now numbers some 12,633 officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, comprising 14 battalions of infantry (including depot battalion), 5 squadrons of cavalry, 6 batteries of artillery, 2 camel corps, as well as staffs, departments, etc., distributed between Suakin, the frontier, Cairo, and Alexandria.¹

The number of British officers has been largely augmented, and now amounts to 64.²

In addition to these there are upwards of 500 on the active list,³ some 160 on the half-pay list, and no less than 1142 officers on pension.

¹ Strength of Egyptian battalion, 668.

„	Sudanese	„	759.
„	Horse Battery,		137.
„	2 Field Batteries (each),		113.
„	3 Garrison Batteries (each),		166.
„	Cavalry,		773.
„	one Camel Corps,		152.

² Of these 6 hold the rank of Pasha.

4	„	Miralai-Bey.
16	„	Kaimakam-Bey.
And 38	„	Bimbashi.

³ Of these 4 hold the rank of Pasha.

2	„	Miralai-Bey.
13	„	Kaimakam-Bey.
23	„	Bimbashi.
38	„	Saghkolaghasi.
127	„	Yuzbashi.
150	„	Mulazim Awal.
150	„	Mulazim Tani.

BOOK VIII (1885)

Khartum after the fall—The Mahdi makes it his headquarters—The reign of terror—The Mahdi transfers his headquarters to Omdurman—The death of Mohammed Ahmed—His proclamation concerning Abdullah Taashi—The Khalifa Abdullah Taashi succeeds the Mahdi—His vision—The story of the hair—Pilgrimages ordained to the tomb of the Mahdi—The Mahdi's will—The khalifa's proclamation to the people of Darfur—The effect of the Mahdi's death on the Sudan in general—The garrisons of Sennar and Kassala—Women's influence in the Sudan revolt—The siege and fall of Sennar—A sketch of the career of Wad en Nejumi—The khalifa's letter to him—The siege of Kassala—The siege of Gera—The siege of Galabat—Letter from the governor to Gordon—Colonel Chermide negotiates with King John for the rescue of the Egyptian garrisons on the Abyssinian frontier—The rescue of the Galabat garrison—Amadib and Senhit garrisons reach Massawa—General Graham's expedition to Suakin—Action of Hashin—M'Neill's zariba—Attitude of the tribes in the eastern Sudan—Attempts made to gain over the Habab to Mahdiyyism—The siege of Kassala—Sayid Osman el Morghani—Decadence of Mahdiyyism in the Suakin neighbourhood—Effect of the Mahdi's death on Kassala—Intertribal conflicts—The mudir of Kassala agrees to a three months' cessation of hostilities—Osman Digna arrives at Kassala—Ras Alula decides to attempt the relief of Kassala—The Arab challenge to the Abyssinians—The battle of Kufit—Osman Digna defeated—The Abyssinians relieve Gera—H.M.S. *Grappler* disperses the Bisharin at Khor Shenab—Kantibai, Sheikh of the Habab—Affairs at Khartum and Omdurman—Kordofan—The revolt of the old Egyptian troops—Death of the emir Sherif Mahmud—Osman Wad Adam (Ganoo) succeeds him—Abu Angar's expedition—King Adam of Tagalla—Darfur and Bahr el Ghazal—The revolt of Madibbo—Karamallah despatches Ketenbur to capture him—Equatoria—Karamallah's message to Emin—The siege of Bohr—The sortie from Amadi—A council of officers decides to evacuate the northern garrisons and concentrate towards the south—Redistribution of the garrisons—Emin goes to Gondokoro—Karamallah quits Amadi for the north—Emin's views on the situation—Negotiates with Kabarega—The local revolt at Lado—The rise of the Bari—Dr. Junker proceeds to Kabarega's—Diminished Equatoria—The invasion of Egypt—The plan—The khalifa describes the joys of paradise—The break-up of the Nile column—The frontier field force under General Grenfell—General Butler commands the advanced brigade, position taken up at Kosheh—Mohammed el Kheir and Nejumi—The collapse of the native government in Dongola—The advance of the Arabs—Dispositions of the

frontier field force—The attack on Ambigol Wells—The armed sternwheeler *Lotus*—The attack on Mograkeh—The enemy hold Kosheh village—Black rock and palm grove—The sortie of the Cameron Highlanders and 9th Sudanese—General Butler's reconnaissance—General Sir F. Stephenson arrives and takes command—The concentration of troops at Ferkeh—The plan of attack—The action of Ginnis.

FOR two days the starved and battered town was ransacked by "100,000" Arabs. Then, in the words of a townsman, "on the third day (the Egyptian day begins at night), after the fall of Khartum, at two o'clock, two steamers appeared with Englishmen on board. The rebels threw fire on them from all sides, but they having found Khartum in the hands of the rebels, drew back and disappeared."

The Mahdi had already on the 27th despatched proclamations threatening that he would not leave a single Turk alive, and presently he was engaged in securing his command over the turbulent multitudes whose discipline, never very good, had disappeared in the fury of plunder. By the help of his chief khalifa, Abdullah, he soon had matters in order. He summoned all the merchants and put before them the following alternatives:—

Their goods must either be burnt, thrown into the Nile, or placed in the Beit el Mal. The latter offer was of course accepted, and Ahmed Suliman—a Jaali—was entrusted with the control of the immense magazines, thus filled with merchandise of every kind, except provisions. The arsenals, dockyards, and all workshops were then set to work. The influence of the press was not neglected, and a lithographic establishment was put in order. Steamers were repaired, coins were struck or cast¹ (the question will be discussed later) at an improvised mint, and the cartridge factory was busiest of all.

Thus a large number of Egyptian workmen were employed, and contented; for their wages were good, and the town assumed something of its normal appearance of activity.

But among the Arabs a reign of terror was commencing. A secret inquisition was busy among them night and day, and no man dare call his soul his own. The same necessity which often compels an oriental sultan to murder his relations on

¹ See Appendix.

✓ acceding to the throne, now guided Mohammed Ahmed's efforts to consolidate his power. "*Guerre aux palais, paix au cabanes.*" The court sat day and night, hearing trumped-up charges and false witness against petty sheikhs, and many lost their heads and were succeeded in their power by their slaves. Meanwhile, disease carried away its thousands, and the deaths from smallpox, which is endemic in the Sudan, rose to the appalling number of 400 or 500 daily.

Early in February the headquarters were transferred to Omdurman, for Khartum contained no citadel where the hated but dreaded ruler might in safety take his pleasure. The mystery, so important an element in the imposture, could be more easily maintained in Omdurman, and hither secretly at night were brought the stock of cartridges which had been made each day.

At last the Mahdi and his khalifa thought themselves secure to take their rest and await with confidence the speedy fall of Kassala and Sennar.

Long addicted to prodigal excesses, this first period of respite from incessant effort was fatal to Mohammed Ahmed.

✓ The story punctuates the pages of history. A woman, daughter of a townsman who had lost children, wives, property, and all, in the long siege, submitted to outrage, and obtained a terrible revenge. On the night of the 14th June she gave the effeminate and debauched prophet a deadly poison, and after lingering in great agony he died on the 22d of the month.

Abdullah's long-looked-for opportunity had now come, nor was he slow to seize it. But no detail was neglected which might draw from the accession of the Khalifa Abu Bakr a precedent and a sanction for the appointment to supreme power of the Khalifa Abdullah et Taashi.

Long before, the cunning Abdullah Taashi had induced the Mahdi to issue the following declaration, and now it was death to any one to question his right of succession.

A PROCLAMATION.

FROM MOHAMMED EL MAHDI TO ALL HIS FOLLOWERS.

In the name of God, etc.—Know ye, O my followers, that the representative of the righteous (Abu Bakr) and the emir of the Mahdi army, referred to in the Prophet's vision, is Es Sayid Abdullah Ibn Es Sayid Hamadallah.

He is of me and I am of him. Behave with all reverence to him as you do to me, submit to him as you submit to me, and believe in him as you believe in me, rely on all he says, and never question any of his proceedings. All that he does is by order of the Prophet or by my permission. He is my agent in carrying out the will of the Prophet. If God and His Prophet desire to do anything we must submit to their will, and if any one shows the slightest disinclination he is not a believer, and has no faith in God. The Khalifa Abdullah is the representative of the righteous. You are well aware of the love of God and His apostle for the righteous, therefore you can readily understand the honourable position which should be held by His representative. He is guarded by the "Khudr" and is strengthened by God and His Prophet. If any one of you speak or think ill of him, you will suffer destruction and will lose this world and the world to come.

Know therefore that all his sayings and actions must never be questioned, for he has been given wisdom and a right judgment in all things. If he sentence any of you to death or confiscate your property, it is for your good, therefore do not disobey him. The Prophet says, that in next degree to the Prophet, Abu Bakr was the greatest living man under the sun, and also the most righteous. The Khalifa Abdullah is his representative, and by order of the Prophet he is my khalifa. All those who believe in God and in me must also believe in him, and should any one notice anything apparently wrong in him, they should attribute it to a mystery which they cannot understand, and that therefore it must be right. Let those who are present tell those who are absent, so that all may submit to him and attribute to him no wrong. Beware of doing any harm to the friends of God, for God and His Prophet curse those that behave or think badly of His friends.

The Khalifa Abdullah is the commander of the faithful, and is my khalifa and agent in all religious matters. Therefore I leave off as I have begun,—“believe in him, obey his orders, never doubt what he says, but give all your confidence to him and trust him in all your affairs.” And may God be with you all. Amen.

To further impress upon his credulous adherents that his claims to the khalifate were based on divine revelation, Abdullah issued the following curious declaration, being a vision which he states he beheld shortly after the Mahdi's death:—

FROM THE SERVANT OF HIS LORD, THE KHALIFA OF THE MAHDI, EL KHALIFA ABDULLAH, THE KHALIFA OF THE RIGHTEOUS, TO HIS FRIENDS, FOLLOWERS, AND SUPPORTERS IN THE FAITH.

In the name of God, etc.—Brethren—Since the death of the Mahdi, I have been thinking of God's most gracious favour in preferring me before all those most excellent ansar, and by appointing and confirming me in the khalifate of the Mahdi.

This very morning (Tuesday), whilst thinking on these matters, I beheld a vision.

A jinn appeared to me and begged that he might pay me allegiance. I asked him his name; he replied, "My former name is 'Mashi' (the one who walks), as I was devoid of reason, but now, since I have come to Islam, my name is 'Kashi'" (the God-fearing man). I then asked him what was the name of his tribe; he replied, "Our tribe is called 'El Aradiyun' (singular Arid): we were given this name because we turned away our faces from the truth." I then said to him, "Repeat after me 'I believe in God, in His Prophet, in the Imam el Mahdi, and in you.'" He did so.

So I accepted his allegiance, and at my request he repeated the words of the "Be'i'a," which runs as follows: "I pay my allegiance to God, to His Prophet, to His Mahdi, and to you. I love God, the Prophet, the jihad, and the shihada (i.e. the formula, There is no God but God, and Mohammed is His Prophet)."

I then asked him the name of his father, and he told me a name which I have now forgotten, being most difficult to remember, and being quite different from the names of human beings. I also asked him the name of his mother, but he would not reply, so I said to him, You must be motherless, and your father and mother are one.

I also asked him the name of his country. He said, "My country is thirty years distant from the ocean." I said, "Do you mean thirty years or thirty months?" He replied, "Thirty years." I then repeated the question to him, and he gave me the same answer.

After these questions he asked my permission to go and see his people and to call them to God, and he said, "The desire to follow in the footsteps of the Ansar has induced me to come and pay you allegiance." I granted him permission, and he departed.

Shortly afterwards another appeared. He was an old man with gray hair. His hands and fingers were turned inside out, and his shoulders were very big and high.

He asked me permission to pay me allegiance, and I said to him, "Who are you?" He replied, "I am a jinn, and was living when the prophet Moses was on earth." I then asked him why his fingers were thus changed, and he answered, "I was a magician, and was made thus by another magician of the jinns, but afterwards I changed him into a still worse shape. We were four," he continued, "and lived at the time of the Prophet, then my three companions died and I was left alone." I said to him, "Repeat the words of your belief in Islam," and he repeated them after me as the other jinn had done. He then repeated the words of the "Be'i'a," and asked for permission to depart in order to repeat his prayers. I permitted him to do so, and he disappeared.

Soon afterwards groups of jinns appeared shouting out, "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is His Prophet," and repeating "Fi Shan Allah" (in God's way, i.e. as the followers).

Some of these wore shirts, and some garments without patches. I asked them their number, and they replied, "We are 70,000."

I then asked them what was their tribe. They replied, "We are of the Shemsiyun (i.e. the people of the sun)." From this I gathered

that they were sun-worshippers. I repeated to them the words of the belief and of the "Bei'a," as I had already done with the others, and they all repeated it after me. Then they and their women, who were as numerous as themselves, came and paid allegiance to me. They then asked me to assign a place for them in the camp, and on being asked what position they would prefer they said, "The place of those brethren who come late to prayers," and this I granted them. They also asked for a place of residence, and I gave them the neighbouring mountains as their abode. They will attend prayers regularly.

One of the jinns then presented me with his daughter, but I refused to accept her, and then they all disappeared.

Then a person came to try me and said, "What would you do if the infidels came in great numbers?" I replied that should they be in numbers as the sand of the sea or the trees of the forest I would never fear them, for my whole trust and confidence is in God.

This person then said, "Tell the brethren who attend regularly at prayers that the glittering light which is seen on their arms is a witness to their owners in the day of judgment, and is a glorious sign to the combatants of the 'jihad,' to those martyrs who die in the rank of prayers."

After this I woke up and said, "In God is my refuge." This I repeated three times. I then said to myself, "Can all this be real or not?" and after performing the "wudu" (ablutions) I offered up a prayer, and kneeling down twice repeated, "Do we not all owe gratitude to you?" etc. etc. I then lay down on my angarib (couch) and covered up my head.

The Prophet, El "Khudr," then appeared to me and said his prayers, kneeling down on my "fur," and then he repeated, "Have we not delighted your heart?" etc. I listened to him till he had finished, and then I was sure that what I had seen was reality.

The "Khudr" after saluting me said, "Your Lord salutes you, the angels salute you, the Prophet salutes you, the Mahdi salutes you, and the message of the latter to you is, 'May God bless you and prosper all your undertakings,'"

He then said, "The Mahdi told me to inform you that God told Gabriel, and Gabriel told the Prophet, and the Prophet told him, that God has presented to you the whole world, from east to west, and from north to south. Those who love you and follow your sayings show that they accept this present, and consequently God will accept them. But those who neither love you nor follow your sayings are evildoers, and the end of all evildoers is hell-fire."

The "Khudr" then continued, "The Mahdi told me to tell you to tell the followers that those who attended regularly at prayers in the eight ranks, from the beginning of the creation up to now, and who love God, the Prophet, the Mahdi, and yourself, they are safe. And whenever you form a rank and regularly attend prayers, this rank will be added to those eight ranks and will share the same rewards."

I then asked the "Khudr" why he forsook me for all this time since the Mahdi's death. He replied, "Since the Mahdi's death I have been watching over one of the Mahdi's hairs, which he (the Mahdi) entrusted

to Ahmed Wad Suliman¹ for me. Ahmed Wad Suliman used to keep this hair in a secret place carefully wrapped up, and used to weep over it. Once he opened it at Khartum, and I was in great dread lest the wind should blow it away to some unclean place and it should be lost. But dust could never conceal it from me, and it could never be lost as long as I was watching over it, so I watched over it day and night until you swallowed it, and then I was relieved.

"This hair was entrusted to Ahmed Wad Suliman, and now, as he has agreed to your swallowing it, he will be rewarded for his honesty. If he did not do so he would not have been rewarded."

The "Khudr" then continued, "The heart into which this hair shall enter will be free from hypocrisy and will be full of light.

"This vision is entirely caused by the hair. The value of the whole world cannot be compared to this hair."

After all this the "Khudr" then said to me "Stay here," and then he disappeared. After a short interval he returned with an oblong-shaped light in his hand, and then said to me, "This light is sent from God. He gave it to Gabriel, and Gabriel gave it to the Prophet, and the Prophet gave it to the Mahdi, and the Mahdi gave it to me to give to you, and the latter ordered that you should divide it into four parts—one part you should swallow up, with the second part you should bathe your face, the third part you should fix in the blue flag, and the fourth part you should distribute amongst the ansar and it will enlighten them all. The Mahdi also told me to tell you that you must not listen to those who wish you to follow them. 'Safety,' he says, 'lies in the followers following you.'"

The "Khudr" also continued, "The Prophet and the Mahdi both wish you to remind the followers in time of war of God's saying, 'Beware lest we withdraw our favour from you, and so you will fall into a state of fear, hunger, and want.' Also you should remind them of the saying, 'Do you suppose you can enter into Paradise?' The Mahdi also told me to tell you that in time of war the Prophet himself will be with you. He (the Mahdi) will be with you, and the angels will be with you." Then I asked him who the angels were who should be with me. He then said, "They are Gabriel, Mikhail, Rakib, Atid, Malik, and Radwan, and the spirits of all the faithful from our father Adam up to the present time.

"God has given you the victory over all your enemies, and He is ever watching over you. The Mahdi also tells you that Sennar will never be inhabited by any of the brethren, and this he repeated three times, saying—"Those who die in it after hearing this proclamation are not of my people."

"Also Jebel ed Dabab, Kaka, Jebel Marra, and Dar et Taaish, all these places, he says, should never be inhabited or dwelt in unless the ansar go there for the purpose of plunder. But as regards Sennar, he says that it should never be inhabited, nor should any parties go there to plunder."

All this the "Khudr" himself said to me, neither a word more nor a word less.

¹ The Mahdi's treasurer.

I tell you, therefore, my brethren, for your good, how gracious God is, and how tender is His care for those whom He loves.

My brethren, this hair was in the possession of Ahmed Wad Suliman and was wrapped up in paper.

On Monday (yesterday), when the coffin appeared, the beloved Ahmed Wad Suliman, from his great love and desire for our good, wished to unwrap the hair and show it to us as a blessing, and when he first appeared with it in his hand before unwrapping it I smelt a miraculous odour. When the tip of the hair appeared I felt in my heart a sensation of extreme happiness—a feeling which none but God can comprehend. I then took it in my hand to breathe its unction, when God willed that it should enter my mouth, and so I swallowed it up.

When the beloved Ahmed asked me for it I opened my mouth that he might look for it, but he could not find it. Praise be to God for this blessing. This miracle is entirely the work of His hand.

Such is the history of the swallowing of the hair. Amen.

After the solemn interment of the Mahdi, the erection of a mosque was commenced over his body, and pilgrimages thither were ordained. Proclamation was made of a great universal parade of sorrow. Every man, woman, and child was summoned to attend on the plains to the east of the Nile, and the Ababdeh, who were suspected of Shia' leanings, were given a prominent place in the pageant.

Meanwhile a faithful band of Baggara searched Khartum and the huts. They searched the magazines and arsenals, and quietly every single weapon of war was collected into one store and placed under secure guard. Thus the difficulty was tidied over. The budding Ali faction was rendered harmless, and the Baggara remained supreme. Some skirmishes took place, and the Mahdi's treasurer, Ahmed Suliman, lost his life. But any serious dissension was avoided, and Esh Sherif and Ali Ibn Mohammed Helu (Wad Helu in colloquial Sudani) were, after a brief struggle, compelled to issue the following proclamation:—

In the name of God, etc.—From the servants of the Lord, El Khalifa Ali Ibn Mohammed Helu, the representative of El Faruk (*i.e.* Omar Ibn el Kattab), El Khalifa Mohammed Sherif Ibn Ahmed, the khalifa of El Karrar (*i.e.* Ali Ibn Abu Taleb), all the nobility (*i.e.* the Mahdi's family and all brethren).

To their friends, Mohammed el Kheir and all leaders of men under his command.

After friendly greetings, it is not out of your knowledge that this world is made by God everlasting to be as a bridge to the world to come. Every soul must sooner or later pass away to that other world, without exception—the Prophet, the saints, the pious, and all.

Our Prophet himself, who was the favourite of God, His apostle, His friend, when his days in this world were over, God sent His angels who have charge of the souls of men. They took hold of his pure soul and went with it to that everlasting world in the vicinity of the Almighty God. Being the favourite of God did not save him from this predominant and solemn decision.

Before his death, when he saw his illness becoming dangerous, the Prophet called up his companions and ordered them to take upon themselves to support the religion of God, and appointed Abu Bakr as his khalifa and leader of the faithful.

After his death the companions, in compliance with the order of their Prophet, entrusted all their affairs to Abu Bakr, who, taking the command of the faithful, continued in the way of the Prophet, had many prosperous conquests, and thus extended far and wide the territories of El Islam. Islam continued to prosper for many centuries, until the faithful became less fervent. They began to be disunited and to decline. They continued declining till the appearance of the Mahdi, the khalifa of the Prophet of God, who revived the spirit of Islam, enlightened their hearts, and directed them in the right way. He restored them to that state in which they were in the days of the Prophet. God was with him in all his enterprises, and in them all he was successful.

But when his time in this world was over, God chose to take him unto Himself on the 8th Ramadan (22d June 1885).

He fell sick with fever on Wednesday the 3d Ramadan (17th June), but seeing his illness to be dangerous, he ordered his khalifa to deliver a speech to his men, and departed on the following Monday, on the aforementioned date.

May God help us to be faithful to him, and follow in his footsteps, so that we may meet him above, with the chief of the apostles.

On the night before his death the Mahdi had a dream which he related to his khalifa thus : "To-night in a vision Sheikh el Korashi, with a number of friends, appeared to me, sent by the Prophet of God, who told me that the Prophet wished to hasten my departure from this world, and wished me to appoint my khalifa before my departure."

Thereupon the Mahdi named Abdullah Ibn Mohammed to be his khalifa, and we all accepted him, and gave him our allegiance, promising to obey him as the successor of the Mahdi. Give ye also, my brethren, your allegiance to this khalifa, and let us follow the example of the companions of the Prophet, who at once complied with the order of the Prophet, and accepted Abu Bakr as his khalifa and their commander. They fought under his command with the same spirit as they did under the command of the Prophet. They had many conquests, and by their valour and unity in action they gained many territories, and extended wide the Mohammedan countries in all directions.

Let us follow their example, and never be shaken, lest the enemy shall find a chance to crush you ; but rather have more vigour and strength and ye will be victorious, as ye are the army of God, and God says, "My army is victorious."

May God be with you all, give you strength, and make you His beloved for the sake of His Prophet and Mahdi. Amen.

The newly appointed khalifa's proclamation to the natives of Darfur is interesting, as showing to what extent the imposture was practised on the hyper-superstitious masses of the western countries.

PROCLAMATION

FROM THE KHALIFA OF THE MAHDI TO ALL HIS FRIENDS IN GOD,
THE NATIVES OF DARFUR.

In the name of God, etc.—After friendly greetings, you are well aware, that as reasonable beings we should try to approach daily nearer and nearer to God, in order to obtain the joys of Paradise after death. This world is but a place of preparation for the world to come.

Eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor hath it entered the heart of man to conceive, the joys which the Almighty has prepared for those who rely on Him, and who follow the precepts of the Prophet and his apostles.

It has pleased God to confirm me as the khalifa of the Mahdi, of whose noble works and victories you are well aware. The story of my confirmation to this holy duty is briefly as follows. One day in the month of Rajab in the present year, the Mahdi, some time previous to his death, came to me, and while in conversation said that all divine secrets are found in the letter ب ("B," the second letter of the Arabic alphabet). He wrote this letter with his holy finger, and said that the man upon whom God has chosen to mark this letter is the receptacle of all divine secrets. On being asked by one of those present to point out the one whom God had chosen he pointed to me. Then those others looked at me, and saw the same letter marked on my right cheek which you shall all see when you come.

Again, on the night of the Mahdi's death I saw, as if in a dream, a hand of dazzling light stretched down from Heaven; it took hold of my right hand, and I made my vows for the defence of God's cause and His holy religion. On the same night wonderful things appeared to me, which I could not comprehend.

Most of you, too, were aware, from the sayings of the Mahdi during his lifetime, that I was to be his khalifa. Know, therefore, that the hand of God which is supporting us has not been withdrawn by the Mahdi's death. "Izrail" is still holding up the flag of victory. The Prophet Mohammed is still at the head of the army, and the sword of victory has been handed down to me by the Mahdi and is now in my hands. This will make all true followers of the faith victorious, neither the Fairies nor the Jinns are able to subdue them.

Now, my friends, on receipt of this letter I desire you to come here. Obey the instructions of your chief governor, to whom I have already written to this effect. Come down therefore, my brethren, be faithful to your religion and obedient to your leaders.

The effect of the Mahdi's death on the long-tried garrisons

of Kassala and Sennar was instantaneous and encouraging. It is intended that the character of these garrisons shall be gathered from their action under extreme difficulties rather than from descriptions and the employment of adjectives.

Sennar and Kassala had so far been in less straits than Khartum. Each was supported in its resistance, intermittently if not steadily, by a Bedawi tribe. Again, it was not by artificial means that the ancient kingdom of Sennar had reached its splendour and celebrity, but owing to the natural fertility of its soil and climate. It was impossible almost to impoverish Sennar. The country round Kassala received the drainage from the Abyssinian mountains and was hardly less fertile than that of Sennar, but by close besetment of innumerable foes these garrisons and that of El Obeid suffered for many months the extreme pangs of hunger and misery. Forty soldiers died daily at Kassala, but Kassala did not surrender. It may be urged that they could not but remain, that the Arabs gave no quarter. But it was not so. At El Obeid, at Omdurman, and many other places, the garrisons were not slaughtered. Most of those who escaped starvation and death in action are now alive.

Mohammed Pasha Said of El Obeid, like Gordon, was starved into surrender. But Abd en Nur of Sennar did not surrender without severe fighting, nor did Ahmed Bey Iffat, two of whose brothers commanded steamers under Nushi, nor did Tewfik of Sinkat surrender.

The extent of women's influence in this long struggle in the Sudan will never be accurately gauged; but on the one side the Mahdi's devotion to women was a large element in his popularity, and on the other there is little doubt that a main cause of the long resistance offered by these soldiers was that they fought for their wives and daughters.

Admiral Hewett recalls that the soldiers escaping out of Sinkat carried their wives on their backs, and the reason why such things are not oftener recorded of Moslems is that their women are less often in difficulties than the women of other nations. It has been said that the position of woman in the East is very humble, but it is probable that in the East the influence of women is greater than elsewhere. The Egyptian wife is certainly both helpful and hard-working, and often courageous.

Gordon said many hasty things of his fellahin soldiers, and the following words from his diary should be given here :—

It would be a great mistake to think the troops are down in the mouth. We have certainly lost a lot, but the men are as determined as ever, and only think it their due if they are aided. Stewart talks of their cowardice, but it is a cowardice of calculation, and it would be a great mistake if the expeditionary force for the extrication of the garrisons comes up here and thinks the men are going to say they are *in extremis*. I leave out Cairo troops and the Bashi-Bazuks.

There were, however, 30,000 Cairo troops and Bashi-Bazuks amongst these garrisons. All fared alike. The garrisons of Gera, Galabat, and Amadib were, it is true, extricated, but it is impossible to shake the evidence that the other garrisons nearly starved to death.

Initiative the Egyptian has not. Decision he has not. Placed in a position where he must quickly commit himself on a question of life or death, he, without confidence in himself or his officers, will surely fail, but placed in a situation where the alternative is remote, he will doggedly endure with fortitude.

What can be more melancholy than the history of Hicks's army, collected together in chains from the defeated and disbanded army of Arabi, led into a country they ever regarded as a living grave, by officers they had never seen before, attacked on all sides and massacred?

The same words apply to the men killed in Baker's expedition; and, on the other hand, what can be more stubborn than the resistance of these same troops in the walled places of El Obeid, of Tokar, of Kassala, of Sennar, Galabat, and Gera?

SENNAR, 1885

Let us turn now to events which had happened in the neighbourhood of Sennar. Early in the year the town was heavily besieged by the "Merhdi," who constantly demanded its surrender; and on the news reaching the town that Khartum had fallen a council was called to consider the situation.

The mudir, still a prisoner to his house, was called upon for his views. He volunteered that, should he again be placed in command of the garrison and the town, he would soon drive

away the rebels, and to further guarantee the truth of his words, at once offered to hand over to the garrison his large supply of corn. The offer was accepted and Hassan Sadik was once more reinstated.

Early in February he made a sortie and drove El Merhdi from Kebosh; but on returning to the town and resting under a wide-spreading gemaizeh¹ with some thirty of his men, he was suddenly attacked by a small party of the rebels. A number of the officers, including Hassan Sadik, were killed; Nur Bey, however, escaped, and collecting a force attacked the rebels and recovered the bodies, which he brought to Sennar.

Meanwhile, when matters had settled down at Khartum, the Mahdi despatched a force under his cousin, Abd el Kerim, and the emir Medawi, for the reduction of Sennar. This force arrived in front of the town on April 18th, and on the garrison refusing to surrender, a determined attack was made on the 16th June, and the town would in all probability have been captured had it not been for the steamer, which brought a cross fire to bear on the enemy and cut off some 1500 of them, who were massacred by the garrison.

After this defeat Abd el Kerim decided to capture the town by starvation, and once more it was heavily besieged.

On the 18th July, Nur Bey made a successful sortie, and falling on the besiegers inflicted considerable loss on them, capturing 500 rifles and two mountain guns, but Nur Bey himself was severely wounded.

Another successful sortie was made a few days later, and Nur Bey despatched letters to the British, now at Dongola, begging for reinforcements, but the letters were intercepted and never reached their destination.

And now Abd el Kerim, having gathered all the neighbouring tribes, completely cut off communication, and soon the garrison, weakened by continuous fighting, was in the last stages of famine. As a final effort, Nur Bey on August 18th ordered a sortie to be made by Hassan Bey Osman with 1500 of the troops, but the rebels falling on them at Kessab utterly defeated them, and the remnant, with their leader killed, made their way back to the town. And on the following day Nur

¹ The *Ficus sycamora* or sycamore-fig-tree.

Bey, having exhausted all the food in the town, was obliged to capitulate. Of the original garrison of 3000 men 700 only remained—strong evidence indeed of the severity of the fighting and of the siege.

For two days the town was given over to pillage and massacre, which was only checked on the arrival of Nejumi, who with Wad Gubara had been despatched with a force of 13,000 men to reinforce Abd el Kerim, but who did not reach Sennar till after its fall.

It may not perhaps be out of place here to briefly describe this celebrated fanatic, Abderrahman Wad en Nejumi.

His career closed only at Toski, where his devoted body-guard sold their lives dearly in defence of his revered corpse. He was a Jaali, one of the not very numerous tribe of Jaalin, but one in whom the Baggara recognised warlike qualities similar to their own, and with whom it was important to keep on good terms. In early life a fiki, like the Mahdi, and his devoted friend, stern, hard, ascetic, the thin dark man was the incarnation of a blind sincerity of conviction. He never transgressed the self-appointed strictness with which he ruled his conduct. Withal, a spice of madness entered into his composition. There was no man but trusted his word, and his the distant enterprise, his the forefront of danger always. Mahdiism was the natural outlet for his wild temper. He was the "khaled" of the Prophet's wars. He it was who prepared the stratagem which annihilated Hicks. He it was who crept silently round through the shallow mud beyond the crumbled ramparts of Khartum. In him was realised the phrase, unique in consular despatch, "They are so fond of the Mahdi one may say that they are the body and he the soul."

Nejumi was more a cunning and ascetic warrior than one versed in theological history. His Mahdi once dead, he recked little that the death had been in all respects that of the Prophet, that the same Shia' schism had arisen, that everything had been done according to the traditions of the situation. It was thought well, therefore, to send after him the following proclamation :—

In the name of God the compassionate, the merciful. Praise be unto God the generous Governor, and His favour be on our lord Mohammed and his family with salutation.

From the servant of the Lord El Khalifa Abdullah Ibn Mohammed, the khalifa of the righteous.

To Abderrahman en Nejumi, and all leaders, chiefs, and followers, the peace of God and His mercy and blessing be upon you all.

Ye late companions of the khalifa of the apostle of God and leaders of the faithful, follow the example of the companions of the Prophet and be ye all as one, working for the same cause, consulting each other in all your proceedings as brothers in God. God, the Almighty, says: "Those who associate for My sake, who love one another and assist one another, are most worthy of My love."

The Prophet says: "Those who are most liked by God are those who associate and induce others to do so, and those who are most disliked by God are slanderers who stir up dissensions among brethren."

Again the Prophet says: "Those who love one another in God have for their residence 70,000 rooms set up on the top of a pillar of red ruby in Paradise, where they shine on the inhabitants of Paradise as the sun shines on the inhabitants of the earth, wearing clothing of green brocade with this passage written on their foreheads, 'Lovers of one another in God.'"

Love ye one another. Let the followers obey the chiefs and the chiefs obey the emirs, and let the chiefs and emirs be humble and treat their followers kindly as their equals. The Prophet used to sit down side by side with his men, especially the poor and the lowly, and say, "I am but a servant of God, and thus as a servant should I sit." "Having been given liberty by God to choose," he says, "between two things, either to be a man and an apostle or an angel and a prophet, I lifted my eyes to His angel Gabriel and asked what to choose. Gabriel answered me saying, Humble yourself before God, and so I chose to be a man and an apostle."

The Prophet says again, There are four virtues which God does not bestow save upon those whom He loves best.

These are—1st, silence before God; 2d, trust in God; 3d, humility; and 4th, abstinence from this world and devotedness to God.

Isa (Jesus), peace be on him, says: "Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of Heaven. Blessed are the meek on earth, for they shall sit in the pulpits in the day of resurrection. Blessed are the poor in heart, for they shall see God. Blessed are the peace-makers, for they shall inherit Paradise."

God also spoke to Moses, peace be on him, saying: "I accept only the prayers of the meek, of those who do not deem themselves greater than other men, those who fear Me in their hearts and forsake their lusts for My sake."

Again, on the subject the Prophet says: "God raises them that humble themselves before Him to the seventh heaven."

Consider, my men, all this, and as leader of the faithful never allow a dispute to take place among you, but rather be all one in one sentiment, treating kindly your followers and forgiving one another. May ye all do the will of God as exhibited in His book and His law.

KASSALA, 1885

It is necessary to return now to events in the Eastern Sudan and watch how the progress of events at Khartum and elsewhere had affected the situation there and on the Red Sea littoral.

At the end of 1884 Colonel Chermside at Suakin was still endeavouring to obtain the relief of the beleaguered garrisons through the intermediary of the Abyssinian king, while Osman Digna by this time had succeeded in reviving to a large extent the fanatical ardour of the disaffected tribes in the Suakin district.

The Hadendowa were entirely with him and also a portion of the Amara, though the latter had never entered into the revolt with the same spirit as the Hadendowa.

The wave of rebellion had also spread towards the Bisharin tribe on the coast bordering on the Amara; but, probably owing to their remote position, the movement soon collapsed and they devoted themselves to carrying on a contraband trade, while a few of their chiefs professed loyalty to the Mahdi.

Up to this time Kassala, though still closely besieged, managed occasionally to communicate with Massawa, which in February was occupied by the Italians. The Egyptian garrison returned to Egypt.

The garrisons of Gera and Galabat were still holding out.

The following letter from the commandant, dated 23/11/84, will best explain the situation:—

Some time ago the rebel Hassan Abd el Wahid with 8000 men came and surrounded this town and invited the garrison to surrender. But we kept them off, and in a few days they dispersed. This has already been reported, and I presumed that in a month the reinforcements asked for would have arrived and that he should be ready if the enemy returned. The reinforcements have not been sent. The rebel chiefs wrote and told the Mahdi of their former investment of Gera, and now the Mahdi has summoned me to surrender the Government property to one of his khalifas (agents) close by, either to Abdullah Ahmed Abu Sin or to Mahmud Zeid. Other similar letters have been sent to Gera by the rebel chiefs—in all thirty-five letters.

Not being well prepared for defence, we gained time by stratagem until the arrival of the reinforcements.

On the 7th November four confidential men of the Mahdi, namely, Hassan Abd el Wahid, Taher Tataig, Abdullah Sherifi, and Tamani Ahmed, arrived near, and Mahmud Zeid was with them, and repeated their summons to surrender and join them in their intended attack on Galabat.

I asked for a month to reply, and sent to their camp to dissuade them and to spy on them. The mission was not successful, and the officer sent returned to me with a letter saying that if Gera did not surrender the garrison would be destroyed.

I asked for a month's delay, hoping for reinforcements with God's help. We are now all under arms, prepared to hold out. The rebels daily try and surprise us, but find us ever alert and they withdraw. I wrote to the rebel chief threatening him, but the rebels are in two bodies, one for fighting and one for surrounding the town.

The situation is critical, and the garrison continually under arms. The fortifications are fairly good, but you know how few men we have, and therefore I beg for a prompt despatch of reinforcements, if only of two companies, which might come *via* Hamran and raise the siege.

(Sealed) COMMANDANT OF GERA.

GALABAT

In the early stages of rebellion the neighbourhood of Galabat had been disturbed by local revolts, but these were soon put down.

At the close of 1884 a severe encounter had taken place in which Saleh Bey Shanga had taken a prominent part.

This official, it will be remembered, was of Takruri¹ origin, but throughout the stirring events which had occurred his loyalty was undoubted. He had already secured the Abyssinian chiefs on his frontier as allies.

On November 26th, 1884, the combined Egyptian and Abyssinian forces met a large body of Jaalin and Debaine Arabs at Jadba and completely defeated them, but gathering in larger force a few days later, the enemy now enclosed the town, and during the early months of 1885 Galabat was closely besieged.

The following letter, addressed in October 1884 by Saleh Bey to General Gordon in Khartum, shows the general situation in the neighbourhood, at that time:—

¹ Takruri or Takayrne are pilgrims from the Mohammedan negro states of Darfur and Waddai who often, after long years of pilgrimage to the holy cities in Arabia, settle down in the Eastern Sudan. They are said to be very fanatical, intelligent, and active people, with pronounced negro features. The meaning of their name in Arabic signifies purification, that is chastening of the religious feeling through the pilgrimage to Mecca.

FROM SALEH BEY, GOVERNOR OF GALABAT, TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE
HONOURABLE THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE SUDAN.

SIR—Your servant, who stands in the attitude of service to you, prays God with a sincere heart to grant his request and to extend His goodness towards me, in strengthening and preserving your excellency under His shadow for the sake of the servants and subjects of government, and to change the conditions of affairs from what they are, and to grant me the honour of seeing your excellency, to kiss your bountiful hands, by which we have been covered with good and with blessings; (even you who are) the destroyer of the enemies of the government, the wicked rebels who have lost their souls and their religion, and are deprived of the benefits of the government, from which they had obtained glory and honour; and turned, in spite of (all) that, from truth to error. May God preserve the glory of the government, so that by presence of your excellency you may destroy and utterly ruin the wretched Mohammed Ahmed and his followers.

We have also to-day heard from the neighbourhood of Doka, of Abu Sitti, and of Abu Haraz, about what the energy of your excellency has accomplished in beating the rebels and dispersing their people and troops, assembled for purposes of sedition.

And I beseech God most high, to whom be praise, to stretch out the sword of your government more (and more), (in order) to annihilate the false pretences of Mohammed Ahmed, and to disperse his wicked hordes.

If your thoughts be directed towards your servant and the humble subject of the government, (I have to say that) at present date I am well, under your protection, and am still continuing in the attitude of service to the government. And oh! what a government! (it is). How much compassion and benefit and kindness have bestowed on us in goodness and bounty, which no man can deny! I pray in the name of God and of His Prophet that your servant may never depart from this path of duty (fidelity-being), obedient to the government openly, without hindrance, under your protection.

With regard to the subjects of the government under the care of your servant, they do not cease to remain as they were in respect of submission and obedience (loyalty), and will never follow the ways of rebellion, by the mercy of God most high, and as a result of the advantage of being under your government.

But, excellency, we are surrounded by the enemy on all sides; from the side of Doka, by the Shukrieh, by the Dhaniyeh, and by the Jaalibiyeh: as on the side of the river by the Rahbar; also by the Bukadi, and those rebels who follow them.

But by the influence of your excellency no harm will come to us from them. Nor do we take account of him (the Mahdi): our Lord will make us victorious over him through the strength of the government and the reputation of its power and majesty from which we derive glory and honour through your excellency and the favour of the khedive.

As to what we have enclosed about, we trust and pray for the answer.

Including this time we have now written to you, the messenger takes them the (letters) from here, and when he gets to Gedaref, or Doka, he finds liers-in-wait, and the rebels torment him on meeting him in the road.

This prevented us from writing lately, but we are in constant communication with the mudirieh; and in that road we have lost two persons by (hands of) the rebels of Dhaniyeh and of Bukad on the road of Tumruk.

(Signed)

SALEH IBRAHM,

*Mamur and Nazir of Galabat,
District Inspector, and Officer.*

1 Zu'l Hejjeh 1301
(22d September 1884).

It will be remembered that King John had been urged to send relief to Galabat. Colonel Chermshire had also in August 1884 despatched Major Saad Rifaat, as Egyptian commissioner in Abyssinia, to assist in the coming operations for which preparations were now being actively made.

Saad Eff. Rifaat left Adua with a considerable force of Abyssinians on January 27th, 1885, and arriving near Galabat succeeded in warning Saleh Bey.

By a well-arranged movement the combined force attacked and defeated the besieging Arabs, and succeeded in extricating the garrison and population, some 3000 men, women, and children; these latter, under Abyssinian escort, and retiring *via* Gondar, Wagdeh, and Elmoda, succeeded in reaching Massawa towards the end of May. Here most of the irregulars with their families remained, while 670 in all embarked for Egypt.

The troops of Amadib also safely reached Massawa on April 10th, and the garrison of Senhit on the 19th.

Early in 1885 the food supply at Kassala showed signs of exhaustion, and the hostile tribes intercepted the introduction of all grain from the neighbourhood, and again the mudir Ahmed Bey Iffat appealed for reinforcements; both he and the commandant of the troops on the Abyssinian frontier—Khusrau Pasha—reporting that they had only sufficient food supply for two months longer.

Towards the end of February it was decided to despatch another British expedition to Suakin, the intention being that when Berber was captured by the Nile expeditionary force the two British forces would be in a position to join hands and compass the final downfall of the Mahdi; but when it

was found impossible to take Berber before the autumn, the plan of campaign for the Suakin expeditionary force was somewhat modified. It was then decided that the object of the expedition should be to crush Osman Digna, occupy the Hadendowa country, and construct a railway as far as Ariab, which was to be eventually continued to Berber.

In accordance with this plan, General Sir Gerald Graham was again appointed to command, and arrived at Suakin on March 12th.

The British force was further augmented by a brigade of Indian troops under Brigadier-General J. Hudson, C.B., Bengal Staff Corps, and an Australian contingent; in all, the force amounted to over 13,000.

Major-General Sir G. Greaves, K.C.M.G., C.B., was appointed chief of the staff.

It is not proposed to enter in these pages into the details of operations carried out by this force which are now well-known matters of history; suffice it to say that a successful action was fought at Hashin on March 20th, and again at Tofrik on March 22d, where the enemy, attacking "M'Neill's zariba" suddenly, inflicted considerable loss on the British, but were eventually repulsed with great slaughter. The force subsequently occupied Tamai on April 3d, Osman Digna's stronghold, and burnt his village.

Subsequent to Lord Wolseley's arrival on May 2d, an advance was made to Otao and T'Hakul, where the enemy were dispersed on May 6th, and a large number of cattle captured.

On the 17th May the withdrawal from Suakin of the expeditionary force began, and General Hudson was left in command with a mixed British, Indian, and Egyptian force, which a few months later were replaced by the normal Egyptian garrison.

Colonel Chermiside had in the meantime informed the Mudir of Kassala that Khartum had fallen, and that the impending British expedition to Suakin would probably distract the attention of the hostile tribesmen from the siege; he should therefore take counsel with the leading personages and decide what course to pursue as regards holding or evacuating the town. At the same time the mudir was authorised to ask

King John for assistance should he decide to evacuate, and that he might promise 10,000 rifles to the Abyssinians, and might also offer 50,000 to the neighbouring tribes in compensation for assistance they might render in safely carrying out the retirement from Kassala of the garrison and those who wished to come away.

It is doubtful whether the late expedition had succeeded in distracting the attention of the tribes of the "Gash"¹ district from the siege of Kassala; as Osman Digna had mainly drawn his fighting force to oppose the British from the tribes of the "Gunub."²

Up to this time the rising of these tribes and those in the Gash district had been local and distinct; neither was largely affected by the reverses of the others, and neither asked the other for assistance, and so great was the distance of both districts from the Nile, that the idea of obtaining reinforcements or assistance from that direction does not appear to have even entered into their calculations. They both considered that not only were they able to carry on the "Holy War" in their respective districts, but it was their right to do so without the influence of others. For this reason also the fall of Khartum had little effect in the Eastern Sudan beyond the rejoicing at what was considered a fulfilment of the Mahdi's prophecies.

While the brief English expedition lasted, the Arabs began once more to ask themselves if this could be the true religion after all.

Having regained their confidence the preceding year, on Osman Digna's triumphant assertion, to them unanswerable, that he had in spite of temporary defeats driven the English out of the country, they still found that on the return of these English the result was the same as before, though at first the English tactics were looked upon as indications of a want of courage. The Arabs soon learned that on the field of battle their fierce onslaught, their confidence of victory, and their contempt of death availed as little as formerly, and when seemingly on the point of annihilating the infidel forces, the same relentless fire forced them back, broken and defeated;

¹ The district in the vicinity of Suakin.

² The district in the vicinity of Kassala.

and when the British expedition took its departure, Osman found himself at Tamai with scarcely 1000 followers. But again he was able to appeal to the tribes with the same positive assurance that it was the power of Mahdism which forced their conquerors to retreat a second time. But this constant warfare was tiring even the most fanatical amongst them; food was scarce and all had suffered severely. The defection of the hostile Amarar tribe may be said to date from this point, and many of them returned to their homes. The rest would gladly have done the same, but they feared the vengeance of Sheikh Mohammed Saadun of the Abderrahmanab, the most powerful Amarar sheikh of that district, and one of Osman's most devoted adherents.

Osman now began to destroy the railway, commencing at Handub, and appointed Hamed Mahmud, head sheikh of the Amarar, to again gather together his tribe. Hamed, taking up his quarters between Otao and Tambuk, succeeded in rallying around him a considerable number, but the majority of these had feelings the reverse of friendly to Osman; and the latter, feeling mistrustful, refused to add to his force the 500 men which Hamed had sent to Tamai.

In April Osman despatched Abd el Kader Hussein—ex-kadi of Suakin—to replace the emir Omar,¹ whose conduct was unsatisfactory, and to induce the Habab² to make common cause with him. He succeeded in reaching the Lebka river, but met with a half-hearted reception.

Meanwhile the situation at Kassala was becoming very critical. In a letter dated April 13th the mudir states that all the donkeys have been eaten, that they still hope for relief; but he will not leave his post. On May 23d the Arabs made a determined attack on Khatmieh, the suburb of Kassala, and succeeded in taking it, massacring the inhabitants and severely wounding Sayid Bakri el Morghani. Colonel Cherm-side had already on April 11th written an urgent letter to

¹ Omar had been talked over to the governor by Sayid Osman Morghani, and this had reached Osman's ears.

² An important tribe, whose country lies between the post of Rarat, 170 miles south of Suakin, and the river Lebka, extending inland some sixty miles to the Beni Amer country.

King John, that Kassala must fall unless speedily relieved, and promising him 10,000 rifles if the attempt should be successful.

On June 15th a determined attempt was made on the fortress of Kassala. It was surrounded during the night and a fierce assault made at dawn, but the garrison, forewarned, opened fire on the assailants, who were repulsed with enormous loss. The garrison then sallied out and completed the rout, killing some 3000 of the rebels and capturing 1000 oxen and 1000 sheep.

Up to this time the garrison had been subsisting on gum and hides, and the timely capture of these supplies enabled them to hold out a few weeks longer.

Towards the end of June the Arabs also suffered another defeat near Galabat, where King John, after rescuing the garrison of that place, had left a strong force. On receipt of the news of these reverses Osman at once despatched all the men he could collect in the country to Kassala under the emir el Khadr, Sheikh of the Hassanab, leaving only a small force at Tamai.

And now the first signs of the decadence of Mahdiism in the Suakin neighbourhood began to appear. Food had long been scarce. The cultivation of Tokar had been necessarily neglected, as most of the men were away in the Kassala neighbourhood.

Gradually a feeling of dissatisfaction sprang up as tribes began to realise that after all their losses they had gained nothing, and had by no means bettered their condition; and on the news of the Mahdi's death reaching them early in July, the personal feeling against Osman grew so strong that it was only by the most ardent appeals, reminding them of his early successes, he succeeded in keeping together the tribal confederation; many, however, openly declared they had been deceived, and it was only by the great personal influence of Osman Digna that the cause of Mahdiism in this district was maintained.

The news of the Mahdi's death reached Kassala too, early in July; the effect on the besiegers was immediate. A quarrel had long been growing amongst them over the distribution of the plundered provisions.

Mustafa Hadal, emir of the Hadendowa of the Atbara,¹ came into conflict with Wad Hushi, emir of the Gash Hadendowa and of the Halanga and Jaalin. The Shukrieh also joined the latter. This tribe had only adopted Mahdism in absolute default of any other predominating power on which they might lean.

A fierce conflict took place between the rival factions at Ebelil, in which Wad Hushi was victorious, driving the Hadendowa to Filik, forty miles from Kassala. He then returned to Khatmieh and resolved to enter into an agreement with the mudir of Kassala.

In the meantime the situation within Kassala was desperate, even the gum and hides were becoming exhausted, and it was evident to the mudir that he could hold out no longer. Accordingly he accepted Wad Hushi's deputation, which by this time had been joined by two special emissaries from Khartum, viz. Idris a Jaali, and Wad Gahra, a Dongolawi, and himself with a number of notables came out of the town on 30th July, and under the clump of sycamore figs, so indelibly imprinted on the minds of all people there, a truce was proposed which should last three months. This practically meant surrender, and it was agreed that the lives of the inhabitants and garrison should be spared, but as soon as the arms had been delivered up ill-treatment commenced. It was believed that the inhabitants had secreted treasure, and this was made the plea for every description of torture, cruelty, and robbery.

Meanwhile Osman Digna, hearing of the inter-tribal disturbances and state of affairs at Kassala, collected a few of his staunchest adherents and set off for that town, arriving there about the middle of August. Taking survey of the situation, he at once appointed the emir Abdullah Abu Bakr to command at Kassala, and himself meeting and reinspiring the shattered Hadendowa and neighbouring tribesmen, prepared to take the

¹ The Bahr el Aswad or Black River of the Arabs is an intermittent stream, although its course is some 550 miles in length. During the months of February, March, April, and May it is quite dry, especially in its lower course, the water remaining only in isolated depressions; but when the rains begin to fall its bed is flooded to a depth of 25 to 30 feet, with a breadth of 550 yards in some places. The Atbara reaches the hill at Ed Damer above Berber, and mainly supplies Egypt with fertilising mud.

field against Ras Alula, who was now said to be advancing for the relief of Kassala.

Colonel Chermiside had during the uncertainty of the fate of Kassala strained every nerve to get the Abyssinians to advance.

On the 5th August he despatched Marcopoli Bey, the sub-governor of Massawa, to Asmara with a gift of 1000 rifles and 50,000 dollars for Ras Alula, and an urgent request that he would lose no time in setting forth.

On August 26th Alula wrote letters to Colonel Chermiside to the effect that he would start after the feast of Saint John (13th September), and that he was collecting cattle for the Kassala garrison.

Ras Alula was further joined by a strong contingent of the Beni Amer under Sheikh Mussa Mohammed, who had succeeded Bakhit Bey,¹ and who was acting in conjunction with Sayid Bakri Morghani of Kassala. This raised his force to some 10,000 men in all.

Towards the end of August, Osman, accompanied by the emir Mustafa Hadal, in command of an army of 8000 to 10,000 men, set out from Kassala to Kufit, a small station in the Barea country which had been formerly occupied by Egyptian troops as a frontier garrison, until the Barea and Bazeh submitted to Egypt, when the line of the frontier was pushed forward to the boundary of Hamazin.

Here the Arab army, gathering reinforcements, awaited Ras Alula's attack, and confident of success Mustafa Hadal despatched the following challenge to his enemy.

FROM THE SLAVE OF GOD AND FAITHFUL MUSTAFA HADAL, TO THE KING OF INFIDELS, TO RAS ALULA HIS DEVIL, AND TO MUSSA MOHAMMED, CHIEF OF THE BENI AMER TRIBE, TO ALL NOTABLES, AND TO EACH AND EVERY MAN OF YOU.

In the name of God, etc.—This is to tell you that I know you said you would bring English troops to fight against the servants of the Prophet. But all your sayings are a delusion. They have not come, and now you say you will fight me with an Abyssinian army; but in this you cannot succeed.

The emir of emirs, Osman Abu Bakr Digna, has now decided to conquer every province; he came to Kassala, where all the inhabitants

¹ This loyal sheikh died in December 1884.

joined him, and now we have come down to the hills in your neighbourhood. Therefore come out and meet us. Do not delay, but if you cannot come and are afraid, then let me know by the bearer of this and I will come to you with my "ansar" (victorious troops), and will fall upon you and utterly exterminate and destroy you and all those who do not believe in God and His Prophet, and all your souls shall go down straightway to hell.

18th Zu'l Kada
(29th August 1885).

Ras Alula left Asmara on the 15th September, and reached Kufit in the evening of September 22d. He found Osman Digna in possession of the fort, with a force of about 8000 Arabs.

On the following morning the Abyssinian cavalry was sent to reconnoitre, but on a heavy fire being opened on them, Alula sent forward his second in command, Bellata Gabro,¹ with the infantry, and a general action ensued. On the Abyssinians approaching, the Arab spearmen, quitting their entrenchments, charged down on them, and a fierce hand-to-hand encounter took place, in which Bellata Gabro and seven other chiefs and a number of Abyssinians were killed.

Ras Alula, seeing this reverse, putting himself at the head of his reserve, and shouting "We must conquer or die," charged into the *mêlée*: his horse was killed under him and for some time he fought on foot. Ali Nurein too, chief of Sabderat, fought most gallantly, and gradually the Arab force was driven back; but by this time the wings of the Abyssinian army had rushed between the entrenchments and the Arabs, and so prevented the latter from beating a retreat; while the Beni Amer and Algeden cavalry, charging down, completed the rout and continued the pursuit for some distance.

The slaughter was terrible. Over 3000 Arabs lay on the field, including almost all the important emirs except Osman,² besides those killed in the pursuit, while the Abyssinians lost some forty officers and 1500 killed and a very large number of wounded.

Ras Alula remained two days at Kufit and then returned

¹ Alula's uncle and the governor of Senhit.

² For a long time it was believed that Osman Digna had been killed, and the evidence to that effect appeared most circumstantial; but it was not long before this determined chief was again in the field.

to Asmara. Various reasons are given for his not proceeding to Kassala: one, that the rains prevented him; but it is more than probable he believed that such a signal victory as he had gained must enable the garrison to retire without further help on his part. He had not, however, realised that before he fought his battle Kassala had to all intents and purposes surrendered, and that all arms were in the hands of the Arabs.

On October 22d Ras Alula made a triumphal entry into Asmara at the head of his army, and preceded by priests in full canonicals, while the victorious troops carrying the captured arms and banners shouted out songs of victory. Alula himself was directly preceded by a raised dais, on which lay the banner of Osman Digna.

This ubiquitous and defeated chieftain, however, proceeded forthwith to Kassala, where he wreaked his vengeance on his unfortunate captives; and at 10 A.M. on the day after his arrival the gallant mudir, who had maintained a close siege of eighteen months, was beheaded, together with Hassan Agha sirsiwari of Bashi-Bazuks, Ibrahim Effendi Shauki, the bash moawin, and two merchants, Stilio Apostolidi and Tadros Manisse; and now the garrison melted away. Some were absorbed under the banners of the emirs, others were sent to Khartum, where also some 6000 camels' loads of property were despatched, and the oft-resuscitated Osman Digna was once more supreme in the eastern Sudan.

GERA

The garrison of Gera, which had been closely besieged for some months, had been safely extricated by the Abyssinians, and on the 22d July 1885 reached Ghabta in the province of Wolkait, where they were clothed and fed by order of King John. The latter informed the government that he would send them to Asmara when the rainy season was over.

It was estimated that they were in all 5000 men, women, and children, but it was not till early in February 1886 that the first portion of them succeeded in reaching Massawa, whence they were despatched to Cairo.

Meanwhile matters in the Suakin district, after Osman's departure for Kassala, had taken a favourable turn.

Three days after he had left Tamai, Sheikh Hamed Mahmud despatched a deputation of Amarar sheikhs to the governor, the Morghani, and Mahmud Bey Ali, with a view to re-establishing friendly relations between the government and the Amarar. The result was very satisfactory, and from this time the Amarar ceased to be of any assistance to Osman.

The first open signs of the decadence of Mahdism now also appeared amongst the Hadendowa. Osman had left his nephew Fai Digna to command during his absence. Two months earlier the communism of property, practised by most of the tribes in this first devotion to the cause, had ceased.

Fai was therefore obliged to levy taxes from the surrounding tribes in order to maintain his small force. This was fixed at three dollars on every twenty-five sheep, and the same sum on every camel.

The first to object to this payment was Sheikh Mussa Gidif of Hamdab, who had hitherto been amongst the staunchest of Osman's adherents, and Fai, though furious at this change of front, was powerless to force the payment.

The supply of grain, which had been somewhat uncertain, was now coming in considerable quantities through the intermediary of the Bisharin, who had established themselves at Khor Shenab, some 160 miles north of Suakin, and plied a brisk trade with Jedda and other parts in slaves and contraband.

Towards the end of August H.M.S. *Grappler* and H.H.S. *Mukhbar* were despatched to disperse this settlement. The ships bombarded the camp and afterwards landed, dispersed the Arabs, and took some prisoners and a quantity of merchandise — one sailor and two Arabs from the *Mukhbar* were killed — the ships then returned, but the rebels still remained in the neighbourhood.

Up to this time no interruption of friendly relations had taken place between the Italians and the Abyssinians. The latter had always claimed suzerainty over the Habab, and had been in the habit of demanding yearly tribute from them. This tribe was, it is true, of Abyssinian extraction, but had

long since become mixed with Arab tribes from the Arabian side, and had moreover paid tribute to Egypt since the latter's occupation of Massawa, some eighty years previously.

The demand, therefore, of the Abyssinians was invariably repudiated by the Habab, while the former as invariably endeavoured to press its claim by the despatch of an armed force into their country.

On 10th October Kantibai, the sheikh of the Habab, arrived at Massawa and begged arms and ammunition of the Italian authorities, ostensibly for use against the rebels. He was accorded a favourable reception, which much incensed Ras Alula, already smarting under the Italian advance to Sahati, and caused him to dismiss the two Italian doctors whose services had been placed at his disposal to tend the wounded after the battle of Kufit. He moreover demanded of the Italians that Kantibai should be at once sent to him. General Saletta replied that in receiving Kantibai he had been under the impression that he was paying a compliment to the Abyssinians; but Ras Alula refused to be pacified, and moreover abandoned all projects for the further extrication of the Egyptian garrisons.

In September the ex-kadi, Abd el Kader Hussein, returned from his fruitless mission to the Habab, having quite failed to secure their allegiance to Mabdism.

Meanwhile Osman Digna was still at Kassala; he had been making attempts to collect a large force to attack the Abyssinians in revenge for his recent defeat, but the khalifa ordered him to cease his pretensions in that direction, and to again turn his attention to Suakin.

Tokar at this time was very lightly held by the enemy. Deputations of sheikhs had come to Suakin to beg that the government should advance before the harvest was gathered in, and so prevent it falling into Osman's hands. But there was no intention of changing the defensive for an offensive attitude, and, on this becoming realised, the hostile party at Tokar insisted that the government feared to advance. Osman sent word that he would soon return from Kassala to lay siege to Suakin. Confidence was restored amongst the tribes, grain was sent in quantities to Tamai, and all preparations made, in anticipation of his arrival.

In December the force of the enemy at Tamai was increased, and frequent raids were made in the vicinity of Suakin. A number of camels were captured, and on one occasion a private of the British mounted infantry was killed.

Towards the end of the month Osman sent orders to the Amarat to collect at Khor Shenab, and despatched Sheikh Mohammed Adam Saadun to Hashin to make preparations for the impending siege. About this time the Arab force was further strengthened by a portion of the Beni Amer, under Ahmed el Gir, who, after assisting the Abyssinians against Osman, quarrelled with Ras Alula and proceeded to join the rebels.

At Khartum Abdullah et Taashi was ruling the turbulent people round him with an iron hand. The town of Omdurman now stretched some five miles along the river, built chiefly of tokuls¹ or straw huts. A fine burnt-brick building with much architectural ornament had been placed over the Mahdi's grave, and his three little sons there received innumerable pilgrims, and gave their late father's "sibheh" or rosary to be kissed by the faithful. A cave also was provided in the neighbourhood of the grave, for the difficulty of all prophets is their liability to die. This is obviated by frequent disappearances or retirements during life. Prophets have always their caves; thus when they are in hiding no one knows but what they may be dead, and when dead no one knows but that they may be in hiding. Though the official announcement was made of the death, the belief was always encouraged that Mohammed Ahmed might reappear.

The steamer *Ismailieh* plied as ferry to Khartum, where Lupton, now with a sword and a salary, superintended a bakery, a pharmacy, and lastly the factory where Greeks were making gunpowder; and the dockyard was fitting out and repairing steamers, four of which were anchored off Mukran for the use of the emirs. Gum and ostrich feathers were sold from the Beit el Mal, and a species of government was inaugurated.

¹ A round straw hut with a conical roof.

KORDOFAN, 1885

The hillmen in Kordofan were still a source of continual trouble. Mohammed Ahmed, on first quitting El Obeid for the siege of Khartum, had left his cousin, Sherif Mahmud Abd el Kader, as emir. This latter had at his disposal a force of some 4000 men, but of these 1000 were the old regular troops of the Egyptian army. Little of importance occurred until after the death of Mohammed Ahmed, when Sherif Mahmud, together with various other emirs, was called up to Omdurman to pay his allegiance to the Khalifa Abdullah. A few weeks, however, after his departure—about the middle of October—a serious disturbance occurred at El Obeid. The old regulars rose in mutiny against the Arabs, killed the emir who was temporarily commanding in Sherif's absence, and after looting the town, took refuge in Jebel en Nima, one of the Nuba group, having previously possessed themselves of a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition. On this news reaching Omdurman, Mahmud returned posthaste to El Obeid, rapidly gathered together a force, and proceeded to En Nima; but the regulars were prepared for him, and in the attack which ensued, on the 20th December 1885, Mahmud's forces were repulsed with great loss, while he himself, seeing his men turning to take flight, dismounted from his horse and, seizing a standard, called on those who fought for the true religion of the Mahdi to follow him, and then dashed into the thickest of the fight. A few men only followed their leader, and all were soon killed.

The remnant of Mahmud's army returned to El Obeid, and Osman Wad Adam,¹ another of the khalifa's cousins, was at once sent there from Omdurman with a considerable force, while the defeated remnant of the late Mahmud's army was sent to join Nejumi at Dongola.

Meanwhile another revolt had broken out amongst the Howalib Arabs, and against these, Abu Angar² was despatched

¹ This emir, who took a very important part in the subsequent events in Darfur, is perhaps better known as "OsmanG anoo," the sobriquet Ganoo signifying a man of ruddy complexion.

² This redoubtable emir, whose name frequently appears in the following pages, was originally a slave of the Khalifa Abdullah. During Zubeir Pasha's

from Omdurman, but on his approach the revolted tribe dispersed and fled to Jebel Dinka.

Abu Angar now directed his efforts to subduing King Adam of Tagalla,¹ and, as a first step, proceeded to Jebel Tamam of the Tagalla group, pillaged and sacked the locality, carrying off large quantities of slaves and cattle, and compelling many of the rebels to join his force. He then advanced to Jebel Dair, and besieged Mek Kumbo; but learning of the disaster to Mahmud's force, he proceeded to Jebel Nima, attacked and dispersed the regulars, and once more returned to besiege Jebel Dair.

DARFUR AND BAHR EL GHAZAL, 1885

After putting down the revolt in Jebel Marra, Zogal appears to have been left undisturbed for some time at El Fasher, but in the southern and south-eastern portions of Darfur disturbances soon broke out.

On the death of the Mahdi many of the principal leaders

campaign against the Taashi tribe, Abu Angar was captured, and remained for some time with Zubeir Pasha, but on the recall of the latter to Cairo he was permitted to return to his master. In the early stages of the revolt he distinguished himself by his bravery, and soon rose to the position of emir. He is described as very tall and strong, of the negro type, and a man of exceptional ability and astuteness.

¹ It will be remembered that for long King Adam of Tagalla had been a source of anxiety to the Egyptian government. Installed in his mountain fastness, it had never been possible to subjugate him. The Mahdi, therefore, in his early flight to Jebel Gedir, bethought him that King Adam would be a powerful ally. He visited him and secretly informed him that he was the expected Mahdi, and that he looked for his assistance, when the time should come for him to declare himself.

When the early revolt began the Mahdi wrote to King Adam for support, but the latter on receipt of his letter consulted his kadi, who did not hesitate to denounce the new prophet as an impostor, and in consequence Adam refused to join in the movement. After the capture of El Obeid, the Mahdi again wrote to him. This time the invitation was accepted, and together with his kadi he set out to pay his allegiance, but on his arrival was cast into prison. He, however, appealed that his kadi had misinformed him. The latter was asked why he had been guilty of such an offence, but the courageous kadi is said to have replied that he still did not believe in him, and preferred death to acknowledging such an impostor. He was at once executed. Shortly afterwards King Adam died while on his way to Khartum as a prisoner. His family was guarded at Omdurman until 1885, when Ali, his son, made his escape, and after Abu Angar's raid on Tagalla re-established himself there, collected a number of his followers, and once more became a bitter enemy to Mahdism.

in the revolt demurred somewhat to obeying the Khalifa Abdullah Taashi's summons to proceed with their families and property to Omdurman.

Amongst these was the emir Madibbo, who had taken such a conspicuous part in the first outbreak. He, with his tribe the Rizighat, now openly defied the khalifa's authority. The latter therefore despatched Karamallah, then emir of the Bahr el Ghazal, to bring this recalcitrant emir to subjection, and in conjunction with Karkasawi, who was then emir of Shakka, to oblige him to come to Omdurman.

Karamallah at first tried pacific means, but these soon failed; he therefore sent the emir Ketenbur to Shakka with 600 riflemen, and collecting some Arabs on the way, he surprised Madibbo at Ed Di'ian, forty miles north-west of Shakka, inflicted considerable loss on him, and captured some 2000 prisoners and a considerable quantity of cattle. Madibbo attempted to recover these the following day, but was again defeated. Ketenbur then despatched a portion of his force to attack one of Madibbo's camps on the Bahr el Arab, while he himself set off with the remainder to endeavour to effect Madibbo's capture; the latter had, however, escaped through Darra to the Beni Helba Arabs, and Ketenbur, fearing to attack so powerful a tribe, demanded reinforcements from the Bahr el Ghazal, which Karamallah, after taking the khalifa's authority, agreed to send him.

In December 1885 Ketenbur was still at Darra, unable to take any further active measures against Madibbo.

Meanwhile Zogal had received repeated orders to return to Omdurman, but, probably suspicious of his new master's intentions, he delayed his departure by every imaginable excuse, and the close of 1885 still found him established at El Fasher.

EQUATORIA, 1885

In Equatoria, Emin Bey was still at Lado, while his advanced post of Amadi was in a state of siege. On the 6th January he received a letter from his clerk, Osman Arbab, who, it will be remembered, had been one of the members of the surrender mission to Karamallah, informing him that he

had arrived before Amadi with a force of 400 men; that he was expecting a further reinforcement under Bringi Zubeir; that resistance was useless; that the whole Sudan had now joined the Mahdi even as far as Suakin, and moreover that Karamallah had informed him that Khartum had fallen. He also enclosed letters from Karamallah with Mahdi proclamations and a summons to join him. To these letters Emin replied that he would await the arrival of Osman Arbab at the capital before coming to terms; but in the meantime he made all preparations for a withdrawal of the various garrisons to the south, while, on the 23d January, Dr. Junker left for Anfin¹, with the intention of doing his utmost to communicate with the Uganda missionaries, through whom he hoped to get letters through, *via* Zanzibar, to the Egyptian Government, and inform them of the state of affairs in Emin's province. Captain Casati now returned to Lado from Makaraka.

On the 30th the barges which had been sent to Bohr returned without having effected anything. The officers, who had large households, refused to march with them overland, and the barges at their disposal were too few and too small to be of much assistance to them.

Emin again sent a fresh supply of corn, and reiterated his order to the commandant to retire. During this interval varying news arrived from Amadi, where the garrison was reduced to great straits for food. On February 14th a successful sortie was made, the besiegers driven out of their trenches, their huts burnt, some ammunition captured, and the emir in command, Abdullah Abd es Samat, and his brother killed. Instead, however, of taking advantage of this success, the commanding officer ordered a retreat, and though the officers and soldiers urged that the work should be completed, nothing was done. The officers returned to Amadi to carouse while the men suffered hunger. Emin had already given repeated orders to the commander, Morghan Agha, to retire on Lado or Makaraka, if he found his position untenable, but the orders were not obeyed, and in despair he instructed the chief of Makaraka to take reinforcements of men and supplies to Amadi; but this order was also disobeyed, and the task of extricating the garrison became daily more hopeless.

¹ The chief of Magungo, Shifalu, and part of the Lango country.

On the 21st February information arrived at Lado that Karamallah, with large reinforcements, had arrived in front of Amadi and had summoned Morghan to surrender; but this the latter refused to do, and now the town was more closely besieged than ever, and all communication cut. An attempt was eventually made by the chief of Makaraka to relieve the beleaguered garrison. He got within a short distance of the town, but was unable to effect anything, and retired again to Makaraka. The end now rapidly approached; the soldiers had repeatedly urged their officers to make a sortie, but the latter refused and appeared desirous to yield. At last, however, the soldiers became desperate, and, headed by six brave officers, made a sortie from Amadi, cut their way through the besiegers, and took the road to Makaraka; the commandant, now finding himself almost deserted, followed them with his lieutenant, Rabih Agha, but both were intercepted and slain and their heads sent to Karamallah. The few deserters, dragomans, and bazingers who were left in Amadi now surrendered, and the rebels took possession towards the end of March. Of those who made the successful sortie some 260 arrived safely at Wandī in Makaraka, almost at the same time as the Monbuttu garrison, who had previously been ordered to concentrate there, but had taken some months to carry out the order. It subsequently transpired that, just previous to the fall of Amadi, the commandant and two of his officers had planned the surrender of the town, and had written to Karamallah to that effect; but the remainder of the officers retained their honour, and the soldiers in particular had behaved in a manner beyond all praise. For nineteen days they had lived on cowhide, and at last were reduced to eating their sandals; while their superiors had given themselves up to the grossest debauchery. Emin thus characterised the situation: "Disobedience is the order of the day, and every one seeks to protect his own interest only."

To add to this trouble, the civil and military officers in Lado on April 1st presented a petition to Emin, begging that the southern district should be given up and troops concentrated on the Lado-Kiri line. Emin, though entirely opposed to such an idea, had perforce to yield to the unanimous opinion of the petitioners, and issued the necessary orders. On 3d

April letters again arrived from Karamallah and Osman Arbab, informing Emin of the capture of Amadi, and ordering him to appear at that place on April 5th, as otherwise he (Karamallah) would advance against Lado. Needless to say, this summons was left unheeded, and soon the rebel outposts were pushed forward to within three days' distance of the capital, while other parties appeared in the vicinity of Makaraka. Instructions were therefore issued to the commandant of that station to hold on as long as possible, but if he found the position untenable to retire towards Lado.

Soon afterwards a detachment of the enemy dispersed the small garrison of Kamari, near Wandi, and obliged the troops at the latter place to retire towards Rimo, whence they intended to take the road to Regaf, but before they could reach it the rebels attacked them fiercely. They were driven off with loss, and the troops eventually reached Bedden in safety, and by the 19th the whole garrison of Makaraka had safely reached either Bedden or Regaf. The day previous to this letters again arrived from Karamallah giving the terrible news that Khartum had fallen and Gordon had been killed; and on the 24th Emin assembled the council of all his officers to consider the general situation and to discuss the measures now necessary to be taken to save the troops from famine. Emin purposely withdrew from the council in order that the decision might be impartial, and in the presence of Captain Casati the following resolution was passed:—

Considering that there is not corn enough in Lado, Regaf, Bedden, etc., to support the men that have come from Makaraka, as well as our own people, that the next harvest is still far off, that by sending out foraging parties we should exhaust our meagre supply of ammunition and be left at the mercy of the negroes; while, on the other hand, it is impossible to procure corn by any other means: having regard to all these circumstances, it is resolved that the women and children shall be sent to the south, that the stations shall be occupied by soldiers only, to the exclusion of all civilians, and that they shall be given up if needful, so that all our strength may be concentrated in the south. The line of retreat to be chosen towards the south, because the route northwards beyond Bohr is impassable; and, further, we do not know whether Khartum has not actually fallen, while we possess strong points of support in the south at Duffileh and Wadelai, where there is plenty of corn and rich lands in the rear. Finally, we should have a chance of sending letters and men to Zanzibar and Egypt, or, if everything went against us, of throwing ourselves into the arms of Kabarega or Mtesa's son.

The requisite orders were at once issued. Three companies remained at Lado under Major Rihan Agha. Most of the civil functionaries had already left for the south, and on the following day Emin left for Gondokoro to supervise the transport to the south.

A redistribution of the regular forces was now made, and the whole divided into two battalions of eight companies each—the first battalion, under Major Rihan Agha, at Lado, Regaf, Bedden, and Kiri, while the second battalion, under Major Hawash Muntassir, garrisoned the line from Duffileh to Wadelai. Soon after his departure south Emin began to realise that this project of withdrawal to the southern stations was only being acted on in a half-hearted manner, and rumours reached him that a plan had been already devised to march north. He therefore despatched an urgent message to the commandant insisting that his orders should be carried out, and in reply he received apparently sincere protestations of loyalty on the part of all the officers; but Emin's suspicions that a mutinous spirit existed in the first battalion were fully borne out by subsequent events.

After remaining a few weeks at Gondokoro, where corn was scarce, he started for the south, after giving emphatic orders that the Bari should be well treated lest they should be roused to rebellion, and at the same time issued instructions that as large a detachment as possible should be sent to Bohr to bring in the garrison from there.

During Karamallah's absence from Bahr el Ghazal local disturbances had broken out there with the negroes, and he now hurried back with the greater part of his force, leaving the province for a time free from the dreaded Danagla. Emin was apprised of this news in April, and shortly afterwards set out for Muggi, whence he despatched a large quantity of corn to Lado. But it was not till he arrived at Laboreh that Karamallah's departure was fully confirmed. Here he was joined by Captain Casati, and together they proceeded to Duffileh, whence Casati went on to Wadelai, and was followed there by Emin, who arrived on July 10th. The intention of the latter in proceeding thus far away from his capital was to open up friendly relations with Kabarega, as Dr. Junker had failed to come to any satisfactory agreement with Anfina and

Kamisoa.¹ Kabarega he knew had always been friendly disposed to him, and through his assistance he hoped to get letters through to Uganda. With this object therefore in view, he despatched a messenger with letters to both Kabarega and Masudi on the 22d August.

The following quotation from Emin's journal gives his view on the situation as it now existed:—

Thus it is now certain that the country is clear of Danagla, but are we any the better for that? No one can guarantee that they are not, perhaps, concentrating themselves in Dem Suliman, to return in January 1886 at the expiration of the rainy season, strengthened by all sorts of ruffians from the Bakara, etc. But suppose they do not return, we are a handful of men, with a very small amount of ammunition, without supplies and communication of any kind, in the midst of thousands of negroes excited by the wars; and that if these negroes should rise against us, it is quite clear that we have nothing to expect from Khartum, at any rate until letters from us reach Egypt—so let us send letters at any price.

On September 20th a verbal reply was received from Kabarega, who sent greetings to Emin and a pressing invitation that he should come to see him. Emin replied with other letters and presents, and a month later a second deputation, who had instructions to find out whether Emin was in very truth he who had visited him years ago.

The deputation appeared to have satisfied themselves on this point, for they promptly produced letters and presents from Kabarega.

The former contained bitter complaints against the Turks, requested him to kill Kamisoa and Anfinia, who were blocking the road between him and Emin, and reproached the latter for his want of friendship in not having informed him long before of his danger.

The presents were very acceptable, and consisted of American shirting, handkerchiefs, tobacco, and coffee. All were luxuries the supply of which had long since been exhausted in Equatoria, and these Emin promptly divided amongst his superior officers, with the remark that "in these days we must all be equal."

But it is now necessary to return to events which had

¹ Kamisoa, the son and successor of Rionga, chief of Shifalú.

occurred in the northern districts. The orders to send a detachment of troops to Bohr had not been carried out, and at length, just as the garrison were starting for Lado, the negroes fell upon them and slaughtered them. Rihan Agha, hearing of this disaster, despatched 200 men, who reached Bohr, recovered the lost ammunition, and then proceeded to march north, but were dispersed on the Bahr ez Zaraf by the negroes without firing a shot, and only forty-three men succeeded in retiring to Lado.

The immediate consequence of this was the revolt of the Bari tribe,¹ and on 4th October a mixed force of Bari, Dinka, Shir, and Niam-Niam attacked Lado on all sides, but were repulsed. The town, however, was besieged, and it became necessary to send reinforcements.

The communications between Gondokoro and Lado were cut, and most of the inhabitants now fled from Regaf. The revolt of the Bari may be ascribed to the cattle raids which had been so continuously made upon them by the commanders of the stations at Lado, Regaf, and Gondokoro. The recent complete defeat of the troops at Bohr, and the example set them by the Dinka, who had now considerably enriched themselves with the rifles and ammunition they had captured, also added fuel to the flame, and now, though free from the Arab hordes, the northern garrisons had to cope with the local disturbances, which in their way were every whit as serious as the Danagla movement had been.

Emin, therefore, having at length established himself on a friendly footing with Kabarega, proceeded to describe in letters addressed to the consuls-general at Zanzibar the difficulties of the situation, and the hope that they (the consuls) would communicate with the Egyptian Government. These letters were handed over to Kabarega's messengers on the 1st November, with a request that they should be sent through the Uganda missionaries. Emin also begged the latter to send him some information concerning the events in Egypt and the northern Sudan, from which they had been cut off since 1883.

Towards the end of the year Regaf was heavily attacked

¹ Emin Pasha divides the Bari into eight large sections. 1. Baris (east and west of the Bahr el Jebel); 2. Fejilus; 3. Kakuaks; 4. Marshias; 5. Niam-baras; 6. Liggis; 7. Maudaris; 8. Shir.

by the Bari and Dinka, but they were repulsed with a loss of 500 killed.

Lado was still besieged. Emin therefore again sent the most peremptory orders for the garrison to withdraw south, but, with the conviction the order would not be obeyed, he also despatched reinforcements to Regaf, the garrison of which place had again successfully driven off the Bari, and preparations were now made to relieve Lado.

On the 23d December convoys arrived from Kabarega, bringing with them seven boys who were to manage the speedy despatch of letters, but whose real duty was to inform Kabarega of all events and send him news as quickly as possible. Kabarega sent also a message to the effect that the bearers of Emin's letter had already started for Zanzibar direct. This was good news, and now Doctor Junker decided to make the attempt to return through Kabarega's country to Zanzibar, while Emin resolved to send his apothecary, Vita Hassan, as his representative to the great king of Unyoro, and on the 2d January 1886 Junker and Hassan left Wadelai in the steamer for Kibiro on the lake, whence they would strike inland for their destination.

At the end of 1885 the extent of Emin's province was about 180 miles, a narrow strip from the lake to Lado, and an area of about one-seventh of the original extent of his province previous to the revolt.

THE INVASION

To return again to the khalifa's projects of an invasion of Egypt. The stirring events which had been happening in the various parts of the Sudan, though serious enough, could postpone no further the long-meditated march north.

A grand programme was always kept before the Arabs' minds. As the generals of Mohammed had done to some extent, so those of the Mahdi should do—they were to overrun the world. The women sang songs, the burden of which was "To Cairo." Others described the treachery of the English commanders: Gordon, it was always insisted, had abandoned his soldiers and fled to Sennar. The Mahdi had left in his

own handwriting a great plan of campaign, and its execution only awaited the return of Nejumi from Sennar.

Nejumi did not stay long at Sennar, for the garrison which remained after the disastrous advance to Wad Medina, had already succumbed to Abd el Kerim.

Great were the rejoicings on the return on the 12th September of the victorious army of Nejumi, Abu Girgeh, and Gubara, and now nothing hindered the grand march of conquest north which, if successful, was to justify everything and sanctify the Mahdi's pretensions, and place the position of Abdullah as khalifa beyond all criticism.

His master had now gone to Paradise, and was empowered to appear to his faithful successor in visions, telling him the pleasures which awaited the faithful followers after death. His letter to Mohammed el Kheir is an interesting specimen, and shows how far more lavish were his promises to those who perished in the holy war than were those of his predecessor.

FROM THE KHALIFA OF THE MAHDI AND THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF
HIS ARMY TO ALL FOLLOWERS AND EMIRS UNDER THE COMMAND
OF MOHAMMED EL KHEIR ABDULLAH KHOJALI

In the name of God, etc.—Brethren, You are well aware that the Mahdi came to us to revive the true religion of God, to exterminate God's enemies and the unbelievers, to guide the believers in God, and enlighten their hearts by the light of truth. You are very fortunate to have lived in these days, and to be enlisted in his army.

You have faithfully heard him in quitting the world and looking only to the pleasures of the world to come. You were wise in that you paid your allegiance to him, and in fighting for his faith and religion against the enemies of God. God has great pleasure in this, and those who sacrifice their lives in this cause are sure of inheriting the glories which God has prepared in Paradise for those who love Him. There degrees are granted according to the trouble and affliction borne in the defence of God's cause on earth. God Himself says in His precious book, Give up your souls and all that you have to God and it will be well with you. If I save him who struggles for My cause, I grant him victory, and he will return with much of the spoils of war. But if I will that he should be killed it is because I desire to transfer him to Paradise. I forgive him all his transgressions and permit him to enjoy the fullest pleasures.

Paradise, therefore, is the reward of the martyr.

When a martyr enters Paradise he is met at the entrance by a little girl, a little boy, and an angel. Each of them offers him a gift, and above him 3000 winged angels gather around him, to be ready at his desire to fly with him throughout all the realms of Paradise. They fly

faster than birds. There are in Paradise also beautiful birds, whose heads are like mountains, and whose shape, feathers, and wings are of the most lovely description. Each bird has seventy wings, and with them they can cover the whole earth. These birds stand in rows and sing praises to God in the most sweet and excellent tones, which delight and enchant the martyrs and the friends of God. Then God in an infinitely benevolent tone draws near and speaks to them saying, "Welcome, my worshippers, welcome, dwell in my Paradise, enjoy its pleasures and eternal happiness. Ye are my friends—the chosen, the champions of my love—ye are true Moslems, my worshippers, peace be upon you. Approach near unto me and behold my glory, and I will give you all that your heart can desire. I will talk and laugh with you, and feed you with mine own hands. I am your Lord, whom you worshipped, feared, and obeyed. I take a delight in you and am ready to reward you. You have but to ask for what you want and it will be granted to you. Fear not, neither be ashamed. Behold my bountiful hand is ever extended towards you, ready to do all to complete your happiness and afford you eternal joy. I make myself as one of you, so as to encourage you to ask for what you want. You need never think of poverty, want, displeasure, weakness, troubles, sorrows, afflictions, or old age. You shall enjoy all pleasures for ever and ever."

The martyrs then say, "O Lord God, all that we desire is the pleasure to behold your holy face." Then the Lord of lords and God of all answers them, saying, "Behold my face, behold it and be happy for evermore. Behold, here are your wives, enjoy their society; here are your children, let them delight you; here are gardens, enjoy their pleasures. Behold, here are horses on which you may ride; here are couches on which you may take your rest. . . . These are the gifts of your Lord, enjoy them. Behold, here are your garments, wear them; here are your meeting places, converse with one another; here is the Khuter river, bathe therein; here are meadows, delight yourself therein; here are rivers flowing, drink therefrom; here are trees laden with ripe fruits, eat of them. Behold, all these are yours for ever and ever."

All this being understood, brethren, I now wish you to rise up and join together in fighting the enemies of God; fight for the cause of His religion on earth.

For this purpose our friend Mohammed el Kheir is proceeding to Dongola. You are therefore ordered to proceed there under his command without delay. If you are faithful and obedient to the orders of God, His apostle, His mahdi, and His khalifa, proceed at once without making excuses of any description.

I am well aware that you are all fervent in upholding the religion of God. Be active therefore, and advance in God's name. The Mahdi ordered you to follow El Kheir, and to proceed with him at once to the place which he has directed, therefore do not hesitate, and beware of disobedience. I desire all the chiefs who are proceeding with Mohammed el Kheir to be obedient to their emir, and to be at unity with each other and in sympathy with their men. I desire you also to fight valiantly and steadily against the enemies of God, the unbelievers. May God be with you all. Amen.

Here follows another inciting proclamation :—

Beloved, worship God, and continue to think ever of holy war. Give up all thoughts of this fading world, but think rather of the everlasting world, continue reading the "Ratibs" (Mahdi's prayer-book) both morning and evening, for I have seen the Prophet and he bent towards me and kissed me between the eyebrows. He also kissed me on my cheeks and on my mouth and said, "I am greatly pleased with you and with your followers." He also said to me, "Warn your friends that they continue to say their prayers daily and read the Ratibs." He told me that there are liars amongst us who are jealous of us, and when they see us busily engaged at our prayers it is to them as if they were being sawn by saws. But he told me not to mind them and said, "Send messengers to En Nejumi and inform him of this, and tell him that his people must continue to say their prayers and read the Ratibs, for in so doing they will reap a good reward and will be a good example to those who are with them."

In the meantime Lord Wolseley's appeal to be allowed to destroy the Mahdi's power at Khartum was of no avail. The Government had finally decided to evacuate the Sudan, and orders were given for the withdrawal of the Nile field force, which, after the return of the desert and river columns, had been quartered at Merawi, Tani, Debbah, Kurot, and Dongola for some three months.

The orders were given, not, however, before Lord Wolseley had in his despatch, dated 16th April 1885, made the justified forecast, that if the Dongola province were evacuated "we should have to carry on a succession of frontier affairs, harassing and vexatious to the troops, and costly both in men and money . . . and at the end we should have to meet a large army on the frontier."

While the evacuation of Dongola was being rapidly carried out, the new Government for a moment hesitated as to the wisdom of giving up this fertile province, which, since its acquisition, had always been a source of revenue to Egypt; but Sir Redvers Buller, then commanding the Nile column, reported that the stores and munitions of war had been sent north, and that it would be necessary to organise a new expedition to defend the province against the already advancing enemy. It was therefore decided to continue the retirement, and to halt as far south of Halfa as might be necessary to protect the railway which ran from Halfa to Akasheh on the east bank.

The last of the British troops left Dongola for the north .

under the command of General Brackenbury, and British protection was finally withdrawn from that place on the 15th June 1885.

The Nile expedition was broken up, and a mixed force of English and Egyptian troops, called the Frontier Field Force, with headquarters at Assuan, was placed under the command of Major-General Grenfell, while Brigadier-General Butler commanded the advanced brigade at Wady Halfa, with outposts as far south as Kosheh, some forty-two miles south of the railway terminus at Akasheh. During the subsequent operations the brunt of responsibility rested on this officer, and it was in a great measure owing to the careful dispositions made by him that the rapid advance of the enemy was checked, and time given to concentrate the troops which subsequently inflicted a crushing blow on the Arab masses.

It may not perhaps be understood why a position so far south as Kosheh should have been selected as the outpost, but a consideration of the peculiar nature of the country rendered this necessary.

It had been decided that the railway must be protected. Akasheh, the railway terminus, was an impossible military position; surrounded on all sides by hills, it would have been quite untenable. From Akasheh, for nearly forty miles, the country is a confused mass of rugged hills and boulders, known as the Batan el Hajar, or "belly of stones." Kosheh was therefore chosen as the first open spot, because it commanded the Nile both to the north and south, and here a very strong mud fort was erected and garrisoned by the Cameron Highlanders and a portion of the 9th Sudanese battalion.

But to return to the Arabs. Mohammed Ahmed's plan for the invasion of Egypt was well conceived. The orders for the advance were promulgated by the Mahdi on the 26th of May 1885. It provided for two river columns and one desert column, and paid Lord Wolseley the delicate compliment of imitation.

Abd el Mejid and Mohammed el Kheir were to hem in and render powerless the garrison of Halfa; after which, Wad en Nejumi was to advance and take Egypt. A desert column, of which the commander never got finally nominated, was to cross from Abu Hamed to Korosko and co-operate with Nejumi in his invasion of Egypt.

Such was the plan conceived by the Mahdi before his death, and which was attempted and again attempted with an enduring persistency by his successor. It was not till four years later that the redoubtable Nejumi succeeded in penetrating some sixty miles into Egyptian territory in the blind endeavour to carry out his late master's instructions.

Fanaticism was now certainly decreasing—in some slight degree, perhaps, owing to Mohammed Ahmed's death, but in a greater to the plentiful provisions and to the attempts at conciliation which the Khalifa Abdullah now thought politic to make in his newly-acquired territory. In proportion as the one dominating feeling lost power, smaller jealousies obtained more influence. Mohammed el Kheir and Nejumi would never work together, and it is possible the existence of large sums of money belonging to no powerful individual influenced their plans.

A sum of some £55,000 had been left at Berber by Gordon.

On the fall of that town this money was seized by Mohammed el Kheir, who was averse to sending it to Khartum to the Mahdi. He argued that, in accordance with precedent, the capturers should receive four-fifths of the loot, one-fifth being paid into the Beit el Mal. The Mahdi was, however, insistent, and El Kheir was obliged to send £20,000 to Omdurman. What became of the remainder has never been clearly ascertained, though it is generally believed that El Kheir retained a large sum. Certain it is that little or nothing found its way into the hands of the troops. When Abd el Mejid passed through Berber on his way to Dongola, he had great discussions with Mohammed el Kheir regarding the disposal of a sum of 68,000 dollars which were lying in the Beit el Mal there. Abd el Mejid arrived at Dongola on the 26th of August, but El Kheir remained at Berber for a time, and did not arrive at Debbeh till the 6th of October.

Wad en Nejumi left Omdurman on the 26th of November, and, collecting reinforcements, arrived at Berber on the 20th December. A contingent from Kordofan, under Morghani Siwari ed Dahab, joined Abd el Mejid's force.

From Dongola the irregular stream made its way north along the river; another body collected at Abu Hamed, while Mohammed el Kheir with a considerable force followed in the rear.

A constant obstacle, however, to the desert column moving towards Korosko from Abu Hamed was the loyalty of the Ababdeh sheikhs. Some time previously they had been made responsible for the safety of the eastern flank; and though their relations with the Arabs were often questionable, yet with the light of subsequent events there is no doubt that the general result of their action has been to prevent hostile movements on a large scale being attempted in the desert by the Arabs from Abu Hamed.

Previous to this many suggestions had been made for establishing some form of native government after the departure of the British troops from Dongola, but one after the other they all fell through.

One of the most important hereditary chiefs, Melik Tumbal of Argo Island, was appointed mudir with Said Agha at Debbah, and sheikh Mahjub Idris in the Sukkot and Mahass districts to support him; but it was acknowledged that these men could make no stand against the advancing Arabs.

Their part was to govern until the Mahdi's troops came, and that was all that could be hoped for. Said Agha did not hesitate to join the Mahdists, and the condition of the remaining *soi-disant* rulers was pitiable, as the Arabs gradually closed on them.

Recruiting as they came, the emirs took a man or two men per water-wheel, but did not ill-treat the people, from whom they obtained information and supplies.

Melik Tumbal, with Khashm el Mus Pasha, who had occupied the extreme southern portion of the Dongola province, escaped and came to Akasheh, leaving Mahjub to hold the country as far south as Hannek. The loyalty of this sheikh is a bright spot in the midst of the wavering masses of Danagla: a descendant of the Abassides, the son of a much-revered sheikh, he was also an important member of the Morghani sect. Mahjub succeeded in maintaining loyalty throughout his district, and not until his house was actually surrounded by Arabs did he submit. He was taken as a prisoner to Omdurman, where the cruel treatment he received shortly afterwards resulted in his death.

The position of the river sheikhs between the Government outpost and the advancing Arabs was full of difficulty.

Accusations were flying everywhere. The atmosphere was full of spying and cross spying, and the wildest reports were prevalent. Arab emissaries came north, and the people of Assuan were alarmed by a rumour that the frontier was to be pushed back there from Halfa, and that the English were about to leave Egypt on account of a rebellion having broken out in India.¹

The frontier force was busily preparing for the impending attack. On the 27th of November the fighting strength was disposed as follows:—

	British. ²	Egyptian.
Kosheh	600	300
Mograkeh		266
Sarkamatto ³ and Dal .		200
Akashch	600	350
Halfa	500	350

Besides small detachments at Tanjur Road, Ambigol Wells, Murat Wells, and Sarra.

On the 29th November the first sight of the advancing enemy was obtained by Captain Hunter, intelligence officer to the force, who telegraphed that the Arab infantry were visible in large numbers on hill-tops east of Amara.⁴ On the following day the armed stern-wheeler *Lotus* exchanged shots with them. The first attempt on the line of communications took place at Ambigol Wells, a station in the desert on the railway line some twenty miles north of Akashch. A party of Arabs under the emir Ez Zein, mounted on camels and horses, with a few men on foot and one gun, had left Amara on the 29th November, having previously destroyed the line for about a mile. They attacked on the 2d December the Ambigol post of thirty men under Captain Ferrier, R.E., consisting of detachments of the Berkshire and West Kent Regiments under Lieutenants Fitton and Annesley. They were driven off with some loss. The next day they again attacked the fort, and destroyed a portion of the line to the north. The attack was

¹ 1886 Blue Book—Intelligence Report.

² Full details of British regiments are given in attached diagram showing order of march on Ginnis.

³ Opposite Dal.

⁴ East of Sakyet el Abd.

renewed once more on the 4th. During the intervals of these attacks a redan was constructed to cover the entrance of the redoubt, and several sorties were made under fire to bring in telegraph instruments, ammunition, blankets, etc., while a patrol of the Egyptian camel corps under Lieutenant Said Radwan and mounted infantry under Lieutenant Delisle succeeded in reaching the fort. This reinforcement, the timely arrival of a train from Halfa with troops and the advance of a strong force under General Butler caused the besiegers to withdraw—a great relief to this small garrison, which had held its own for three days with gallantry against overwhelming numbers.

In the meantime the *Lotus* was doing good work, and in co-operation with the mounted troops harassed the enemy, who had by this time occupied in force the villages of Ginnis and Kosheh.

In the early morning of the 12th a party of Arabs under the Kordofan emir, Siwari ed Dahab, turned Kosheh Fort and attacked Mograkeh Fort from the north. Here Captain Besant, in command of a force of some 200 men of the 3d battalion of the Egyptian army, held his own, making repeated attacks on the Arabs, getting within forty yards of their position, and inflicting some loss on them.

During this attack the emir Ez Zein raided the village of Ferkeh, and secured a number of cattle and some money. The enemy drew off during the night.

Whilst the line of communication was being thus harassed, the main position of the enemy in front of Kosheh was being steadily reinforced, and the fort of Kosheh was now completely invested on the south side.

To understand the situation a slight description of the surrounding country is necessary. From the village of Ginnis to within a short distance of the fort of Kosheh a narrow stretch of cultivation extends along the east bank of the Nile, planted with numerous palm trees. Along this narrow strip and close to the river is a continuous row of strongly-built mud houses, for the most part detached. Sometimes they are clustered thickly together, and then perhaps there is a considerable gap, but the whole presents the appearance of a long straggling village.

The village of Kosheh was now strongly held by the enemy,

and though the ground to the immediate south of the fort had been cleared to a distance of some 500 yards, this did not prevent the enemy occupying a large black rock which jutted out on the foreshore, from which a very harassing fire was continually kept up on the fort; and had it not been for the excellent construction of this earthwork and the innumerable traverses which it had been found necessary to erect, the loss during the month of investment would have been very much heavier. Close to the rock a palm grove also gave good cover to the enemy's sharpshooters; casualties daily occurred within the fort, and on the 15th December the fire from the black rock and the palm grove became so unusually harassing that a sortie was made by a party of Cameron Highlanders under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Everett, who succeeded in surprising and bayoneting fourteen of the enemy, but with the severe loss of Lieutenant Cameron mortally wounded, Captain Hunter severely, and Major Chalmers slightly wounded, one man killed, and three men wounded.

In the meantime all the posts were being rapidly reinforced. General Grenfell had arrived at Wady Halfa on the 4th December, being followed on the 19th December by General Sir F. Stephenson, commanding in Egypt, who assumed supreme command, while General Grenfell became chief of the staff.

The fire from the enemy's guns was now getting very accurate, and on December 20th a shell passed through an embrasure of Kosheh Fort, dismounting a Gardner gun and severely wounding Major Hassan Radwan, as well as an armourer-sergeant and a private of the Cameron Highlanders.

On the 22d December General Butler, with the mounted infantry, Egyptian Camel Corps, and a troop of the 20th Hussars, reconnoitred from Mograkeh towards Ginnis to ascertain the enemy's strength and position. Before, however, they could reach the high ground, the enemy advanced from Ginnis in force, and the reconnaissance fell back fighting. General Butler's casualties were very slight, but the enemy lost five killed, amongst whom was an important Kordofan emir named Bedawi el Azrak, who, it was subsequently ascertained, was held in great respect by the Arabs on account of his personal bravery. He alone, considerably in advance of the mounted party he was leading, charged and succeeded in

getting close to the mounted infantry before he was shot dead, his horse being captured.

All arrangements were now made to inflict a blow on the Arabs, who, elated by the ease with which they had advanced hitherto, boldly pushed their advanced parties north from the village of Ginnis, which was the headquarters of their main body. At the same time some 1000 men with one gun threatened the zariba on the west bank, held by portions of the 9th Sudanese and 3d Egyptian battalions. The Arabs appeared entirely ignorant of the impending attack, and indeed their emirs assured them that the quantities of transport which daily arrived in the Government lines were but preparations for a retreat.

On the 29th December Lieut.-General Sir F. Stephenson, Major-General Grenfell, and their staffs marched from Ferkeh to Kosheh, and bivouacked on the east bank below the fort of Kosheh, where the whole of the fighting force was concentrated this day, viz.—

MOUNTED TROOPS.

Lieut.-Colonel Blake, 20th Hussars, commanding.

Captain E. R. Courteney, 20th Hussars, staff officer.

British Mounted Infantry—Lieut.-Colonel C. Barrow, commanding.

British Camel Corps—Captain Maunsell, West Kent, commanding.

Egyptian Cavalry—Major Bakir Kamil, commanding.

Egyptian Camel Corps—Lieutenant Marriott, commanding.

ARTILLERY.

Lieut.-Colonel Herbert, R.A., commanding.

Lieutenant Warre, R.A., adjutant.

No. 2 Battery, 1st Brigade, South Irish Division, Royal Artillery—
Major Whateley, Royal Artillery.

Egyptian Camel Battery—Major Wodehouse.

Gardner Guns—Lieutenant Mercer, Yorkshire Regiment.

ENGINEERS.

Major A. J. Hepper, commanding Royal Engineers, Frontier Field Force Section, 11th Company, R.E.; Captain Blackburn, R.E.

1ST INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Brigadier-General W. F. Butler, C.B., A.D.C., commanding.

Lieut.-Colonel Crofton, South Staffordshire Regiment, brigade major.

Lieutenant Daubeney, South Staffordshire Regiment, aide-de-camp.

Berkshire Battalion—Major Temple.
West Kent Battalion—Lieut.-Colonel Tweedie.
Durham Battalion—Colonel Coker.

2D INFANTRY BRIGADE.

Colonel Huyshe, C.B., Berkshire Regiment, commanding.
Major Dixon, Berkshire Regiment, brigade major.
Lieutenant Feetham, Berkshire Regiment, aide-de-camp.
Cameron Highlanders—Lieut.-Colonel Everett, in Kosheh Fort.
Yorkshire Battalion—Lieut.-Colonel Bennett.
Detachment, 1st Battalion, Egyptian Army.
Detachment, 9th Battalion, Egyptian Army.
English Bearer Company—Surgeon-Major Barrow.

EGYPTIAN TROOPS.

Major Wodehouse, commanding.
Captain Smith Dorrien, staff officer.

Egyptian Bearer Company—Surgeon Keating.
Kosheh Fort—Colonel St. Leger, Cameron Highlanders.
Mograkeh Fort—Captain Tapp, E.A.
Ferkeh Fort—Lieutenant Or, Yorkshire Regiment.
Borrow's Zariba—Lieutenant Gibb, E.A.
Lotus Stern-wheeler—Major Lloyd, E.A.

On the 28th and 29th artillery fire was kept up on the enemy's position, and at 5 A.M. on the morning of the 30th the whole force began to move off, the line of march being shown on the accompanying diagram.

The general plan of attack was briefly as follows :—

The 2d Brigade to crown the heights above Ginnis, and by artillery and rifle fire to prepare for the attack on the north end of the village of Ginnis by the Cameron Highlanders and 9th Sudanese.

The 1st Brigade to sweep round to the south end of the village and attack the enemy's camp.

The cavalry and mounted troops to protect the left flank of the two brigades and pursue south when the village and camp were taken.

The detailed movements of the troops were to be as follows :—

The mounted troops, consisting of the 20th Hussars, Mounted Infantry, and the Egyptian Cavalry and Egyptian Camel Corps, to march in rear of the 1st Infantry Brigade,

eventually diverging to the east and scouting on the left flank during the advance.

The English Camel Corps to support and keep in touch with the 2d Brigade.

The attack on Ginnis to be carried out by the 1st Brigade with the Egyptian battery and the Egyptian Camel Corps.

The 2d Infantry Brigade with the English battery to attack, in the first instance, the enemy's position between Kosheh Fort and Ginnis.

The Yorkshire Battalion and 1st Battalion Egyptian Army to conform to the movements of the screw-gun battery, while six companies of the Cameron Highlanders and two companies of the 9th Battalion Sudanese were to advance along the river bank and capture the village of Kosheh, which would be previously shelled by the screw-gun battery.

The armed stern-wheeler *Lotus* was to steam slowly in advance of the Camerons and fire on the beach and foreshore.

The 2d Brigade had, by daylight, taken up a strong position 1200 yards from and directly opposite to, the village of Kosheh; and at 6.10 A.M. the English battery began to shell the village. A quarter of an hour later the Cameron Highlanders and two companies of the 9th Sudanese rushed the houses in the most gallant manner. This village was captured at 6.50 A.M., and one brass gun taken.

The *Lotus* co-operated in this movement, and inflicted considerable loss on the retreating Arabs.

In the meantime the 1st Brigade under General Butler, who knew the ground thoroughly, marched over the broken and hilly desert, selecting first a prominent mountain top on the horizon as a line for the advance. When the day broke the brigade had gained a position in the hills about a mile south of the river and a mile and a half south-east of the western end of the village of Ginnis, which was the headquarters of the enemy.

Up to this time the advance along the enemy's flank had not been observed, but as the eastern horizon became brighter behind the advance, the Arabs, seeing that they had been surprised, came streaming in long lines and groups from the villages and low ground along the river towards the front. Soon the brigades were lined with their riflemen, who opened and maintained an irregular fire for about forty minutes.

In the meantime the Egyptian battery had been brought into action on the right, while the Berkshire deployed to the left, about 200 yards in advance of the guns; the Durham Light Infantry prolonging the line farther to the left, while the West Kent were on the right of the guns, and the Egyptian Camel Corps on the left of the Durham Light Infantry. On the Arab attack developing, the West Kent were eventually moved to the left flank of the Durham Light Infantry, while the cavalry conformed to the general movement some distance from the left flank of the infantry.


Unchecked by the strength of the fire, a large body of the enemy's spearmen, creeping up unobserved through a deep khor (or valley) in front of the infantry line, suddenly debouched into a nullah where the dismounted camels of the Egyptian Camel Corps had been placed; so rapidly did the spearmen advance, that the Camel Corps were unable to mount, and were forced to retire slowly before the Arabs, who pressed them heavily, and several hand-to-hand encounters took place.

Numbers of the enemy were, however, quickly shot down by the right troops of the Camel Corps and the left company of the West Kent, and the remainder of their column fell back and dispersed amongst the hills. The brigade, then swinging round to the left, was directed towards the village of Ginnis; crest after crest was abandoned before the steady advance, and though several attempts at a stand were made, all were eventually dispersed. In the meanwhile the Arabs were streaming out of the village in a southerly direction towards Atab, and at 9.15 A.M. Ginnis was occupied, while the mounted troops followed the enemy's line of retreat along the river. The 2d Brigade, continuing its advance towards Ginnis, arrived there a quarter of an hour after the 1st Brigade had entered. The pursuit was continued till 10 A.M., and by that time the Arab army was a disorganised mass of fugitives. Their camp was occupied, their treasury, four guns, and twenty standards falling into the hands of the British and Egyptian troops.

The Arab force on the west bank made a show of attacking the fort, but when they perceived the retreat along the east bank, they too retreated, followed by the garrison of the fort, who destroyed their batteries and trenches.

General Grenfell, in his despatch to Sir F. Stephenson,

EYE SKETCH SHOWING POSITION OF TROOPS IN ATTACK ON GINNIS 30th December, 1885.



characterises "the behaviour of all ranks during the action as steady, and the conduct of the whole force of Egyptian troops very creditable."

It may not be here out of place to remark that a *camaraderie* sprang up between the Cameron Highlanders and the 9th Sudanese battalion, which has been perpetuated by the former presenting to the latter a banner inscribed "Ginnis," which is always carried on parade alongside the Khedivial colour.

On the same day the 1st Brigade advanced to Atab,¹ while the cavalry continued the pursuit to Abri,² and on the following day Abri was occupied by General Butler's brigade. From here the *Lotus*, with the British and Egyptian cavalry under Captain Smith Dorrien, continued the pursuit south as far as Absaret,³ capturing nine large boats, two standards, and a miscellaneous assortment of Arab stores. The total British and Egyptian losses were seven killed, amongst whom was a promising young officer, Lieutenant Soltan, and thirty-four wounded.

Shortly after the fight it was found that a small party of the enemy still occupied a house in the village of Kosheh, in the capture of which an Egyptian officer was killed. Though frequently summoned, the inmates refused to surrender until guns were brought up, the house shelled, and every man killed.

It is estimated that the Arab force engaged on the 30th amounted to some 6000 men, of whom 500 were killed and 300 wounded.

Abd el Mejid, the emir in command, was wounded, while his second, Abd el Mejid el Khalik, was killed, as well as eighteen minor chiefs.

The remnant of the scattered forces were collected at Kermeh, where Mohammed el Kheir awaited reinforcements from Berber, which Nejumi could not or would not send him. Abdullah Taashi was said to be furious with Mejid for bringing on an action instead of leisurely besieging the Government troops as he had ordered.

The action at Ginnis was a severe blow to the Khalifa.

¹ Five miles west of Ginnis.

² Opposite Sakyet el Abd.

³ Opposite Koyeh.

BOOK IX

Mohammed el Kheir's description of the action of Ginnis—The Arab plan of campaign remains unaltered—Decision to consider Wady Halfa as the Egyptian Frontier—Egyptian troops garrisoned at Halfa—British at Assuan—Effect of the retirement on the Khalifa's plans—Nejumi leaves Omdurman—The Khalifa's proclamation to the people of Egypt—The council of emirs at Omdurman—The appointment of the four principal emirs—Nejumi's letters to Osman Digna—The emir Ez Zein advances north—The mission of Shuhdi Pasha—The situation in the Sudan—Osman Azrak commands the advanced posts—Distribution of the enemy's forces—Nur el Kanzi occupies Gemai—General de Montmorency advances against him, the Arabs retire to Suarda—The Kababish tribe—Sheikh Saleh—He harasses Nejumi's flank—He collects his tribe at Jebel Ain—Kordofan—The Arab tribes revolt and attack Abu Angar—The emir Zagal arrives at El Obeid from El Fasher—Darfur—Capture of Madibbo—Karamallah at Shakka—Equatoria, Emin at Wadelai receives letters from Egypt—His reasons for not abandoning the Province—The war between Unyoro and Uganda—The cause of the ill-feeling between the first and the second battalions—Emin's reflections on affairs in his Province—Dr. Junker reaches Uganda—Suakin—Osman Digna at Tamai—The secession of the Amara—Changes in the command at Suakin—Osman seeks to coerce the tribes into submission—The Anti-Mahdist tribes begin to besiege Tamai—Osman receives instructions from the Khalifa—The situation at Suakin as expressed by the notables and merchants—The Amara press the siege of Tamai—The letter of the Khalifa's emissaries in Tamai—The attack and capture of Tamai—The friendly Arabs operate towards Tokar—But retreat, and are disbanded—Tribal differences and jealousies—Osman proceeds to Omdurman—His attempts to raise the Shukrieh—The Italians and Abyssinians—The port of Rarat.

NILE FRONTIER, 1886

MOHAMMED EL KHEIR had thus described the battle of Ginnis in his letter to the Khalifa Abdullah, dated from Kermeh on the 4th of January 1886.

When your beloved troops were besieging the unbelievers at Mog-rakeh, who were greatly harassed by our troops, they suddenly received a very large number of reinforcements. Our beloved Ansar did not know

of this sudden reinforcement, and early on the morning of the 23d Rabia el Awal (30th December 1886) the enemy opened fire on our beloved troops from all sides. The firing lasted for a long time, some of our men were killed and also some of the enemy were killed. ✓

To-day some of our men came from Mograkeh, and state that there were a large number of the unbelievers, that they had repaired the railway in a wonderfully short time. Some of them say their strength is 50,000, others say more. Just before this news reached me, I had sent spies to Korosko. They had arrived at Murat, but on hearing what had happened to our beloved troops they came back and informed me that the unbelievers intended advancing into this part of the country in large numbers. To-day I wrote to En Nejumi to come here at once. Please send me reinforcements at once before the unbelievers arrive. I think that the Faithful may now win a victory, but if we delay the chance will be lost. I have told our beloved who came from Mograkeh to tell you verbally all they saw. The Danagla are useless and cannot be depended upon, the people of Mahass and Sukkot neither care for the Mahdi nor his religion, they gave us no help whatever. -

The Arabs, though temporarily checked by the defeat at Ginnis, never for a moment abandoned their original plan of campaign; they pushed small parties northwards, and in February the village of Koyeh was raided, a new emir Wad er Reis was appointed at Dongola, a portion of Nejumi's force under the emir Haj Ahmed was transferred to the west bank at Berber, with orders to march on Merawi, and El Khalik, the defeated chief of Ginnis, was superseded by the warlike Kordofan emir Morghani Siwari ed Dahab. At the end of March, Mohammed el Kheir was still at Kermeh with a considerable force, distributed between Kermeh and Dongola, the remnant of the Ginnis army was at Old Dongola, under Osman Azrak, while the bulk of the invading force was still at Berber, under Nejumi.

In the meantime it had been decided to fix the Egyptian frontier definitely at Halfa. All posts south were now withdrawn. The troops arrived at Halfa on the 13th April, and by the 7th of May the reduced British force had gone into cantonments at Assuan, leaving Wady Halfa to the care of the Egyptian troops.

The retirement was known at Omdurman on the 25th of April, when El Kheir wrote to the council of emirs assembled there "that the Government had evacuated all stations south of Halfa, and that the English had gone back to Assuan."

This was a signal for general rejoicings, and now fresh

impetus was given to the northward movement. Wad Gubara had already left Berber with a force for the north. A new emir, Abu Hejil, was appointed at Abu Hamed, and Nejumi, on the breaking up of the council of emirs on the 15th of May, returned with all speed to Berber.

The departure of Nejumi from Omdurman is thus graphically described by one who was present :—

Nejumi burnt his house at Omdurman, and vowed that he would not return until he had conquered Egypt. On his departure the Khalifa Abdullah assembled the four khalifas and all the emirs. They all stretched out their hands in the direction of Cairo, and called out "Allahu Akbar" three times. Then the Khalifa Abdullah called out in a loud voice, "O Ansar, fear not for the fight for the island of Egypt; you will suffer much at the battle of Assuan, after which the whole land of Egypt will fall into your hands; O Ansar, you will also suffer much at the battle of Mecca, after which the whole country will be yours."

Mohammed el Kheir was ordered to remain where he was until relieved by Nejumi, who now appointed Wad Gubara and Makin en Nur as his assistants.

Consequent on Nejumi's departure the Khalifa Abdullah sent proclamations by the hands of emissaries to Egypt. These proclamations were to "all people in the south and north of Egypt," calling on them to rise in one spirit against the Turks and all who followed their example in not believing in God, urging them to destroy them to a man. If they will follow his orders in doing so they will then show themselves to be the true followers of the Mahdi, who came to call all nations to the worship of God.

He continues to explain that it was not necessary for the Mahdi to live until he had taken Constantinople and Mecca, he only died because he was so anxious to see God, just as the Prophet had died before him.

The Prophet was supposed to take Syria and all other parts of the world, but he died before he had time to fulfil his mission, therefore his khalifas after him had to do his work; and so it was with regard to the Mahdi, his khalifas would complete his mission and would take Constantinople, Mecca, and all other parts of the world, and thus the whole world would become obedient to the Mahdi.

He quotes several verses of the Kuran, and ends by urging all to destroy the Turks and infidels without delay.

Previous, however, to the breaking up of the council of emirs the Khalifa had solemnly appointed four emirs; El Kheir had long been the first—the emir of emirs—and had been preferred to the man of the people, the victorious Nejumi. This, however, was all over now. The impossibility of ever getting El Kheir to move from Berber and Dongola, which he had so long considered his own, told heavily against him. His wish had always been to hold those two provinces, and to let Nejumi go and conquer those farther north. El Kheir clung to the terms of the original firman of Mohammed Ahmed, but now Nejumi was made the emir of emirs. The second in rank was Osman Digna, the third was Hamid Abu Angar, and El Kheir the fourth. At this council the last differences were arranged concerning Mohammed Ahmed's children, and the succession was solemnly confirmed to Abdullah, who, with the other two khalifas, Wad Helu and Mohammed esh Sherif, the youthful son-in-law of the Prophet, was to live in Omdurman.

Again a check occurred in the new plan of invasion. The revolt in Darfur had become more serious, Mohammed esh Sherif had been heavily defeated.

Nejumi at Berber, writing at the end of January to Osman Digna, says

that he has arrived at Rubat Berber, where he is ordered to remain by the Khalifa Abdullah to watch the movements of the infidels at Korosko, and to support the Ansar at Dongola under Mohammed El Kheir; also that he has sent spies to discover the exact position of the infidels, and that these have returned and reported that they have left Korosko and gone back to Assuan. There they learned that the English and others had had a fight with our Ansar and that many had been killed on both sides, that the infidels had retreated to Korosko, and that their main body had gone back to Assuan; that they have also some troops at Halfa, Derau, Keneh, and Sohag.¹ Amongst those killed at the battle were Hassan Osman el Azrak, one of our generals, and some other chiefs. The spies also reported that the Sultan had sent two commissioners to inquire into the affairs of the Sudan, that the Morghani had been ordered to go to Khartum to meet the Khalifa, that he had already reached Assuan, and that he is now waiting for orders from the council, composed of Mukhtar and an English commissioner.

He says that Haj Ali, emir of Berber and Dongola, is quite prepared to fight the infidels, that by the Khalifa's orders reinforcements were daily arriving at Berber, and that he expects the Khartum troops also to

¹ Opposite Ekhmim.

join him at Berber. He begs Osman Digna to give him news of the movements of the infidels near Suakin.

In another letter Nejumi informs Osman Digna that the Khalifa Abdullah has ordered him to Khartum to receive further instructions, that he left his camp on the 12th of Rajab, and reaching Khartum he was well received by all. He met there Khalifa Ferik and Khalifa Karrar, he is soon returning to Berber, as by the Khalifa's orders he is to prepare an army for Dongola, to fight the infidels. His reports about the infidels are, that they have formed an army of 18,000 under Mukhtar Pasha, which is to march *via* Dongola, while 5000 men under Abd el Kader Pasha will advance *via* Abu Hamed. The Ansar are preparing for battle, and may God destroy the infidels. He sends his compliments to Taher, and forwards letters from Mohammed el Kheir to the Khalifa Abdullah, in which he reports that the Ansar who were at Mograkeh were surprised by the infidels, who came in large numbers from the north. Many were killed, and they were obliged to fall back on Mohammed el Kheir, for the infidels were as numerous as the stars, they were also repairing the railway, and it was said that they had at least 50,000 men. Before the battle took place El Kheir had sent spies northwards, and when they were near Korosko they heard about the battle; they returned and reported that the infidels were more numerous than at first reported; El Kheir had asked him (Nejumi) to abandon the transport of his families and come to his assistance with all the fighting men he could collect; El Kheir was now at Dongola, and had again asked that reinforcements might be sent him before the infidels arrived. El Kheir curses the infidels, and says the reason of the defeat of the Ansar at Mograkeh was because the Mahass and Sukkot contingents deserted them and gave the infidels assistance in repairing the railway.

Towards the end of May, Mohammed el Kheir was permitted to send troops as far north as Khor Mussa, and he was not long in giving effect to this order. The advance began early in June, and by the 15th the emir Ez Zein had occupied Akasheh and destroyed the railway between Akasheh and Ambigol Wells, returning subsequently to Kermeh, while Wad Gubara had by this time advanced to Handak¹ with a strong force.

The eastern desert between Abu Hamed and Murat was now patrolled weekly by a force of Arabs.

In the meantime, at the suggestion of Mukhtar Pasha, the Ottoman high commissioner at Cairo, an Egyptian functionary, Shuhdi Pasha, was despatched to Halfa with a view to receiving any advances which might be made for peace by the

¹ Near Abu Gussi.

Sudanese. The general tenor of his reports was to the effect that the people in the Sudan were very discontented with the Arab rule and the exaction of arbitrary taxes combined with compulsory service, and that the Sudanese would rejoice at the return of Egyptian rule—this, in a degree, was doubtless the case.

In the early stages of the rebellion, it is true that the inhabitants had heartily joined the movement, but it soon became patent to the population that the lavish promises of the Baggara leaders were seldom if ever carried into effect; they saw one by one their chiefs and the men they had been accustomed to obey ruthlessly cast into prison, or in some cases put to death, while a cruel Baggara took his place—their property became the property of the Beit el Mal, their wives and servants became the wives and servants of their *soi-disant* deliverers. Their state was that of the Israelites of old, to whom it was said that their former rulers had chastised with whips, but that they were now to be chastised with scorpions. To rise against their oppressors was impossible, tribal systems had been ruthlessly destroyed, the slave had changed places with the master, and confederation became an impossibility. The cries of distress had already reached Egypt, but help was out of the question. "They must combine against their common enemy" was the invariable reply, but the Baggara still remained master of the situation and forcibly drove the unwilling inhabitants to fight, plunder, and cultivate for them.

This misrule could not continue long without its ill effects on the country. With all semblance of government removed and with numbers continually reduced by the system of compulsory service, cultivated lands gradually fell into disuse, and the sting of want began to be felt—not, it is true, by the Baggara, but by the rural population, who, tired of this constant warfare, sighed for the return of a rule which, with all its faults, had at least given them enough to eat. By the end of June the original price of corn at Omdurman had been trebled, and there was a complete dearth of luxuries, such as sugar, rice, etc.

In the meantime, Nejumi had been ordered to return to Omdurman to confer with the Khalifa on the plan of campaign.

Towards the end of the month he again came back to Berber, and was reinforced by the emir Abd el Halim and his men, fresh from their successes on the Atbara. Him he appointed as his wakil. The next few months were spent in collecting the forces and pushing them on to the various posts; but delays in an ill-organised army are inevitable—troubles on the Abyssinian frontier, in Kordofan and Darfur, prevented the Khalifa from sending Nejumi the reinforcements he required. The left flank of his advance, too, was continually threatened by the restless Saleh, sheikh of the Kababish. All these circumstances delayed and hampered the impatient Nejumi, and it was not until the 14th of October that he at last advanced across the desert from Berber to Merawi, to again delay at the latter place to recruit from the inhabitants of that district. His advanced posts, however, were active, probably owing to the recall of Mohammed el Kheir to Omdurman; and the command from Kermeh north devolving on Osman Azrak, he in October pushed on small parties to Suarda and Ferkeh under Nur el Kanzi.¹

The Egyptian advance post at Gemai, twenty-two miles from Halfa, was now withdrawn to Khor Mussa, some five miles distant from Halfa. The command of all the troops on the frontier was held by Brigadier-General the Honourable de Montmorency, while Lieut.-Colonel Chermside, arriving at Halfa on the 20th October, assumed command of all troops at that station.

Nejumi had now assumed the pompous title of "Kaïd es Seriyeh el Masriyeh," or commander-in-chief of the forces destined for Egypt. El Kheir had returned to Berber, and the distribution of the Arab forces was then approximately as follows:—

At Omdurman	Under the Khalifa	13,000	
„ Berber	„ El Kheir	12,000	
„ Abu Haraz	„ Nejumi	2,000	3 Guns
„ Sannam (Dar Shaggieh)	„	500	„
„ Dongola	„ Gubara	2,000	„
„ Kermeh	„ Morghani ed Dahab	500	4 „
„ Dulgo (Dar Mahass)	„ Mohamed Hashmi	500	
„ Suarda	„ Osman Azrak	700	
„ Ferkeh	„ Nur el Kanzi	400	

¹ The uncle of Ahmed Abu Kashawa, Hicks Pasha's guide.

Of the above numbers there were, between 2000 and 3000 Bazingers, which, as has been previously stated, is the name given to all rifle-bearing black troops on the side of the rebels. ✓

The sympathies of these latter were never thoroughly with the Arabs, and every effort was made to induce them to desert to the government. On many occasions the Arabs were obliged to disarm the Bazingers, or send them south again; while Saleh (Kababish) was promised a gratuity of ten dollars for every Bazinger he could send down. Many of these escaped and found their way to Halfa, where, as a rule, they were enrolled in the Sudanese battalions, and have subsequently proved their sterling fighting qualities under English leaders, as they had already done under Gordon, Baker, and others.

Proclamations were now issued by the Arab leader to all the head men and sheikhs of the districts as far north as Halfa, calling on them to collect men and be prepared to assist in the invasion of Egypt. Towards the end of October, Nur el Kanzi with Mohammed Hashmi arrived at Akasheh with a force of some 1500 men and four guns.

It does not appear that they intended with this force to attack Halfa, but rather to make a descent on Deberra or Argin, a few miles north of Halfa; thus cutting the communications, while the Arabs' main body would besiege the garrison of that place. Nur el Kanzi continued his advance, and on the 9th of November a reconnoitring party of Egyptian troops found that he had occupied Sarras with the whole of his force and destroyed a mile of railway. On the same day Nejumi arrived at Dongola with large reinforcements.

Nur el Kanzi lost no time in occupying the advance post at Gemai, lately vacated by the Egyptian troops, and on the 13th he had established a large portion of his troops there, while a small detached party came as far as Khor Mussa and attempted to destroy the railway bridge. Colonel Chermiside at once pushed out the cavalry and camel corps, supported by the armoured train, and the Arab force fell back after having destroyed about 120 yards of rail. No further advance took place for some days. In the meantime General de Montmorency had arrived, and at once made all preparations to secure the safety of the inhabitants of Halfa and Dabrosa,

who numbered some 17,000 souls. The whole of these, together with their animals and grain, were collected on three islands, and were protected by armed steamers and detachments of troops. On the 24th an attempt was made to tamper with the line some 500 yards north of Khor Mussa, but the Arabs retreated on being discovered; there was also some activity on the west bank, where a party approached one of the blockhouses, but after firing a few shots was driven off.

On the 27th Kanzi moved his advanced guard to Abka, some eight miles south of Halfa, and anxiously awaited the reinforcements under Morghani ed Dahab which had reached Dal some four days previously. On the 29th a cavalry reconnaissance proceeded towards Abka, but the enemy on sighting the troops moved off to hills on the flank. On the following day the armoured train with working parties was sent out to repair the line, and Colonel Chermside, with the mounted corps, advanced to the enemy's camp, which he found deserted, and thence pushed on to Sarras.

At daybreak on the 1st of December General de Montmorency with the main body, consisting of two and a half battalions and two guns, advanced to Gemai and thence to Sarras, where he joined Colonel Chermside the same evening. The enemy had refused to make a stand anywhere, retreating across the desert towards Murat. They then came down to Okmeh on the river, a few miles north of Akasheh, and eventually returned to Suarda. The railway was repaired to within one and a half miles of the Arab camp at Abka, and a season of comparative tranquillity again reigned on the frontier.

THE KABABISH TRIBE

It is now necessary to revert briefly to the movements of Saleh Bey Fadlallah Wad es Salam, chief of the Kababish tribe, who, as we have seen, had shown considerable activity in the Dongola province, and had impeded somewhat the movements of Nejumi's force towards the north.

The Kababish, who lived in the desert west of Dongola, had always hankered after possession of the province with which they were accustomed to trade, and which was, so to speak, their seaport. And they had more than once offered to hold

Dongola on conditions, such as the receipt of thousands of rifles, which the government could not accept.

From the battle of Ginnis 1885, to the storming of the entrenchment round Suakin in December 1888, the Arabs never came seriously into conflict with the Egyptian army, which, from the beginning of this period of three years, took sole charge of the defence of Egypt, though it was not till July 1888 that the British flag, with its support of one company of the Welsh Regiment, was finally withdrawn from Assuan. Skirmishes there were, and raids, forming an excellent training for the still young army, and these will be mentioned as they occurred. But in the main these three years were given up to a fair trial whether or not the tribes could themselves make some head against the Mahdi power, which was continually reported as tottering to its fall.

The first act of this period was the despatch of Saleh of the Kababish on a wild adventurous career of alternate victory and defeat, rallying and defection, over hundreds of miles of almost unexplored desert, ending eventually in the death of this gallant chieftain on the confines of Kordofan, 900 miles from his starting-point, and the dispersal of the remnant of this once powerful and numerous tribe.

It will be remembered that Saleh of the Kababish had been connected with the Nile Expedition of 1884, when he supplied Lord Wolseley with camels, which were of great use for the convoys in the Bayuda Desert and elsewhere; but he was followed by but an insignificant section of his enormous tribe, most of whom had joined the Mahdi.

The Kababish stretch right down the west bank of the Nile and curve west along the north of Kordofan and Darfur; thus even one hostile sheikh could create an uncertainty sufficient to seriously harass the flank of Nejumi or El Kheir in any advance along the Nile.

After the action of Ginnis, Saleh's loyalty was revived, and he wrote to the Sirdar saying that Kordofan and Darfur were in revolt against the Khalifa, and that if assisted he could hold Dongola.

The Sirdar replied that the course to be pursued in the Sudan was now being earnestly discussed by his Highness's ministers; that, now that the tribes round Galabat, Sennar,

and Kordofan were in revolt against the Mahdists, he should join his force with some of the anti-Mahdists and destroy these enemies of God and man.

It was on the 21st of March that Sir Francis Grenfell wrote to him, and on the 1st of May he pounced on a small detachment of Arabs at Abu Gussi and beat them.

On the 3d of June he defeated a force at Dongola, and was said to have killed Abd el Mejid who had commanded at Ginnis.

After these two successes many of his relations joined him, and there was a general gathering of clans at his headquarter at Jebel Ain—some six days' journey to the west of Dongola.

But on the 27th of July he suffered a reverse, and for a long time he remained inactive in the mountains of Oudun, where he stayed till towards the end of the year.

It may be said of the three main causes which crippled the Khalifa's offensive power, the revolt in Kordofan, the attacks of the Abyssinians, and the attacks of the Kababish along the long west flank of the Nile, were a principal factor in impeding the fulfilment of the original plan of campaign against Egypt. The large tribe to the east of the Nile was the Ababdeh; they were more acquainted with the ways of civilised peoples than the Kababish, and with them an understanding was more easily arrived at. Three of the leading men were employed by the Government, and there is no doubt they brought information sometimes, also that they gave information. The information, however, that they brought outweighed any injury that could arise from the information they gave the enemy. There was little in the defences of the frontier which owed its efficiency to its concealment.

No offensive movements were carried out. On the other hand, the frontier was generally well informed of all important movements in advance, and even of the intended raids, which early in 1887 became a feature in the Arab attacks on the southern frontier of Egypt.

KORDOFAN, 1886

In September 1885 Abu Angar was still besieging Mek Kumbo at Jebel Daïr, but finding he could make little impres-

sion on this mountain stronghold, he encamped his troops at Khor Telodi,¹ whence he made extensive raids on the surrounding neighbourhood and captured large numbers of slaves, which he sent in convoys to Omdurman. These proceedings drove into revolt the Homr, Misarieh, and Hawazma Arabs living in these districts, and a number of them attacked and annihilated a raiding party of Abu Angar's between Jebel Gedir and Telodi; and gathering in still greater numbers, they proceeded to attack Abu Angar's position. They were, however, driven off with fearful slaughter, and as many as 10,000 are said to have fallen on this occasion.

This last victory destroyed all opposition to Abu Angar, who now continued his plundering raids with unabated vigour, and it was not till March 1886 that he was at length instructed by the Khalifa to evacuate the mountainous districts and return to El Obeid. But in order to understand the reasons for this step it is necessary to revert to events in Darfur.

At the close of 1885 the emir Zogal was still at El Fasher. He had already received numerous summonses from the Khalifa to return to Omdurman, and his persistent excuses to remain where he was, now made Abdullah et Taashi somewhat anxious as to his proceedings in that distant province: rumours were current that Zogal intended to set up in Darfur an independent kingdom, that he had gathered a large army, rumours which, if true, might menace the safety of Kordofan and indeed of Omdurman itself. But for these rumours there was in reality little foundation. Zogal was chiefly occupied in making money; and when at length a peremptory and final summons reached him from the Khalifa to at once appear at Omdurman, he set out early in March 1886 for El Obeid with the greater part of his force, leaving Sultan Yusef, nephew of Sultan Dubbenga, as his representative in Darfur.

When, therefore, the Khalifa learned that Zogal had at length started with a force, he at once despatched orders to Abu Angar to meet him with his force at El Obeid, in case Zogal should have any ill intentions. Zogal had despatched the greater portion of his force some distance in front of him, and on the arrival of these latter at El Obeid they were incor-

¹ Not shown on the map.

porated with Abu Angar's army, and Zogal on his arrival at Bara found himself a prisoner, his money confiscated, and himself in danger of losing his head. He was kept for some months a prisoner at El Obeid, and was subsequently sent to Omdurman under a guard, but on explaining matters to the Khalifa was released, though not again permitted to leave Omdurman.¹ Abu Angar remained at El Obeid during the remainder of 1886, and returned to Omdurman early the following year. Osman Adam still continued as emir in chief of Kordofan, which now, with the exception of the Jebel Dair district, remained comparatively tranquil for a long period.

DARFUR, 1886

Towards the end of 1885 Karamallah himself arrived from the Equatorial Provinces at Darra, with large reinforcements for Ketenbur, and at once began a campaign against Madibbo and the Beni Helba Arabs. The latter, alarmed at the news of Karamallah's arrival, deserted Madibbo, who was left stranded with only 500 men. A few days later he was attacked by Karamallah, who annihilated his force, but Madibbo with a few men escaped the slaughter and fled to Jebel Marra. Here, however, he was caught and handed over to Zogal's successor, Sultan Yusef, at El Fasher, and sent by him as a prisoner to Karamallah, then at Et Towaish. The latter transferred him to El Obeid, where he was subsequently beheaded.

Karamallah now returned to Shakka, where he received the submission of the Maalieh Arabs, whose chief, Mohammed Bey Abu Salama, he induced to visit him. But on arrival at Shakka, he and his three sons were beheaded. Meanwhile the force despatched to subdue the Rizighat Arabs of the Bahr el Arab had succeeded in its undertaking; and now Karamallah had re-established the Mahdi's authority in all the revolted districts, and, like his companions in arms in Kordofan, he now freely raided the districts, for slaves and cattle, and towards the end of the year despatched a force to Darra to

¹ In 1889 he was despatched to Tokar to settle some differences between Osman Digna and Abu Girgeh, and quite recently has been again brought back to favour and appointed emir of Dongola.

raid towards the north of that place, a step which led to very serious results, which will be dealt with in a subsequent chapter.

EQUATORIA, 1886

Emin at Wadelai received news in February 1886 that Junker and Vita Hassan had safely reached Kabarega's, and learning that letters had arrived from Uganda, which had been brought by a messenger disguised as a trader, he lost no time in despatching a trusted messenger, who on February 26th returned, bearing letters from Cairo and Zanzibar containing news of all that had happened during these long years in which Equatoria had been cut off from the outside world. The despatch from Cairo was signed by Nubar Pasha, president of the council of ministers, and dated 2d November 1885, and was to the effect that the Egyptian Government was unable to assist Emin Bey, for the Sudan had been abandoned, but authorised him to take any steps he thought desirable, should he decide to leave the country. Emin now, for the first time, learned the details of the fall of Khartum and the death of Gordon, and his remarks on the new aspect of affairs are interesting, as showing his reasons for not abandoning the province he had held for so long. He says:—

The greater part of my men, especially the officers, have no desire to leave this country. I have repeatedly drawn the attention of the government in Khartum to the fact that it is absolutely necessary to change the officers here every second year, and also the men in part at any rate, lest in troublous times our movements should be impeded by innumerable obstacles. I have not even received an answer. The greater part of our soldiers, coming, as they do, from our own districts (Makaraka, Dinka, etc.), and having never seen Egypt, naturally prefer to remain here and live as their fathers did, while the negro soldier sent hither from Egypt, whether he be an officer or a private soldier, has forgotten in the lapse of years what strict discipline means, and, further, has adapted himself to the country to such a degree that it has quite taken the place of his native land. Each has his family, often a very large one if all its dependants be counted, and each has its couple of goats or cows. Every one knows that the journey is long and the toils great, that many days of hunger and hardship lie before him, and that when he arrives in Egypt the loose bonds of discipline will be tightened again, that he must then say farewell to the *merisa* jug, and that the "Ta'ala ya walad" (come, O boy) and "Ruh ya walad" (go, O boy) must come to an end.

And adds :

Even now it is believed here that the news of General Hicks's defeat in Kordofan is a fiction. All my efforts during the last twelve months to concentrate the men in the south have had no other result, hitherto, than to draw from the first battalion, stationed in Lado and the neighbourhood, or at any rate from the officers, a categorical declaration that they would not give up Lado.

Shortly afterwards war broke out between Unyoro and Uganda, which decided Doctor Junker to attempt to reach the latter place, while Emin's representative at Kabarega's, Vita Hassan, was obliged to retire to the lake until the trouble had passed over.

Meanwhile affairs at Lado were becoming more and more unsatisfactory, but to trace the origin of what can only be termed the mutiny, which subsequently broke out, it is necessary to go back some way. It appears that the commandant of the second battalion, Major Hawash Effendi, had confiscated the property of one of the officers of the 1st battalion, a certain Bakhit Agha, during the absence of the latter from Duffileh. This officer, on his return to Regaf from Amadi, learnt for the first time of Hawash Effendi's conduct and determined to revenge himself. He began by seizing certain articles of food which he was aware belonged to Hawash Effendi, and on the matter reaching Emin's ears, he sent instructions to Major Rihan Agha to inquire into it. The latter did not hesitate to complain bitterly of Major Hawash's conduct, and it was now evident that the personal differences between the officers were taken up by the men of the battalions. A plot was set on foot to seize Hawash Effendi and bring him to Lado, but Rihan died before the execution of it and his place was taken by Major Hamad Agha. The news too contained in Nubar's letter, which Emin had sent to the various garrisons, did not tend to improve matters, and the men of the 1st battalion now agreed among themselves that they would not go south, on the plea that Khartum must still be the seat of government, and they would prefer rather to disband and go to their homes than turn their steps towards Wadelai. A plot also had been hatched by some of the Bornu¹ and Adamawa¹ men to kill all their

¹ Not shown on the map.

officers, Sudanese and others, and establish a free state; the plot, however, was discovered, and the ringleaders were put in irons but subsequently released. In Duffileh, too, a sergeant-major had shot at his officer. All these mutinous events bore a significance which could not be mistaken. Emin, writing at the end of May, says:—

We are just as we were. The men will not move, and the few who are inclined to make the journey dare not speak their minds. Moreover, the disagreement between the Sudanese and Egyptians becomes more marked every day, and hatred of the latter is openly expressed, only a few of them, who enjoy a fairly good reputation, being spared. This is certainly not undeserved, for the Egyptian gentlemen have always treated the Sudanese *en canaille*, in spite of all my warnings, but now the tables are turned. I endeavour to mediate as much as possible; but can this go on long? I have made a fresh attempt to bring the men to reason; if this too fails, I must resign myself to circumstances, and preserve the show of authority which I still possess as long as I can. If the worst comes to the worst, the only thing I can do will be to put the reins into the hands of the oldest Sudanese officer, withdraw, if possible, to Kabarega's, and wait there until the men have recovered their senses and will follow me—for follow me they will, sooner or later. In any case, I will let the Government know by this post all that is going on here.

And further confirms his decision not to quit his province in the following words:—

I shall remain here and hold together, as long as possible, the remnant of the last ten years. If help comes to me from any side, so much the better; if not, at least I will fall on the field where my work has been accomplished. I am sorry to be obliged to contradict the opinion which Stanley and Schweinfurth have expressed, "that now the slave-dealers are overrunning this country, and that the negroes have more to suffer than they used to have." Since the retreat of Karamallah and the destruction of himself and of all his men on the borders of Kordofan everything has remained in perfect peace; and indeed the war in some respects has done good, for the whole of Bahr-el-ghazal district has been totally freed from the slave-dealers, who, according to the above account, were said to be following unchecked their nefarious traffic. In the whole of the Bahr-el-ghazal, I repeat, there is to-day no single Khartumer remaining. It is true that a few of Lupton's old negro soldiers are still there. But they are living peaceably with the natives. In my province I have only sixty-two Danagla left, and I am quite able to prevent them committing any excesses. The reoccupation of these districts, which have been temporarily given up, could be carried out with the greatest ease; and if we could only get a few caravans sent *via* Mombasa, Masai, Masala, Wakori, and from thence either here or to Kabarega, it would be all that we want.

Meanwhile Doctor Junker had, through the valuable mediation of Mr. Mackay, the missionary of Uganda, succeeded in reaching that place in safety, whence, before leaving for Zanzibar, he despatched a caravan to Emin, which was received by the latter in October. The war between Uganda and Unyoro had terminated, and Emin had despatched Casati to Kabarega, there to remain and keep open the communications which had been so satisfactorily begun with Uganda.

SUAKIN, 1886

The year 1885 closed at Suakin with a prospect of a speedy return of Osman Digna and a season of renewed activity. At the end of January 1886 the redoubtable emir arrived at Tamai, but without the large reinforcements it was expected he would bring with him, and, after all, his total number of fighting men did not exceed a thousand; with these, however, and with the assistance of the emir Saadun at Hashin, the country in the vicinity of Suakin was vigorously patrolled, raids were frequent, and many cattle were lifted.

To the south the country was comparatively quiet—the Beni Amer still continued to be divided, part being with the rebels, though rather in name than in deed.

The Habab had been partially undermined, during Kantibai's absence at Massawa, and his brother Hedad, possibly with a view of usurping the chieftainship, had been communicating with Osman, with the result that a few of his tribe, as well as the Beni Amer, had come to Tokar. The Ashraf—a tribe extending along almost the whole length of the Khor Baraka to the west of the Beni Amer—professed to have deserted Mahdism, but the attitude of these worthies, as well as that of the majority of tribes between Tokar and Kassala, seems to have been one of indolent uncertainty.

The secession of the Amarar had been steadily continuing, and in May, Osman despatched Saadun with a force of 900 men to collect taxes from them and bring them back to reason. At this time Onur, of the Abderrahmanab section of the Amarar, one of the few remaining hostile sheikhs of this tribe, had been captured at Raweiya and brought to Suakin, an event which enabled the loyal sheikh Ali Hamad, of the

Korbab section, to press the other leading Amarar to adhere to their decision to quit the rebel cause; his appeal was immediately effectual, and Saadun found on advancing that a considerable force of hostile Amarar barred the way at Arbaat.¹ He appealed to Osman for reinforcements, which the latter could not send; shortly afterwards, however, he was joined by Mustafa Hadal, of Kassala fame, and with a small force he proceeded to Arbaat; but ere he reached that place many of his men had deserted owing to scarcity of food, the Amarar fell upon him and utterly defeated him, Saadun himself being amongst the killed.

In the meantime changes had taken place at Suakin. Colonel Chermaside had left some time previously: General Hudson and the last of the Indian troops had sailed on the 26th of January: Sir Charles Warren had arrived on the 8th of February and left again on the 15th of March, and on the 3d of May, Major Watson arrived at Suakin as Governor-General.

Meanwhile other sections of the Amarar who had lately been with Osman expressed a wish to return to their allegiance, but dared not come openly to Suakin; consequently H.M.S. *Condor* proceeded to Dara, where a meeting of the sheikhs had been convened; they were told that the main desire of the Government was to assure peace to the neighbourhood. This meeting appears to have had a good effect, and shortly afterwards the friendly tribes near Sheikh Barud,² some 600 in number, defeated a second force of the rebels under Fiki Madani, whom they killed, together with two other emirs and a number of men, besides capturing a quantity of ammunition and camels. All this defection from Osman did not, however, pass unnoticed by him; he sought to coerce the recalcitrant tribes by imprisoning their sheikhs, the most notable being those of the Hambab, Gariab, Meshab, and Omar Hassayab³ sections. In the south, too, the Habab, on whom Osman had been relying, definitely decided against him, and Kantibai, on his return from Massawa, entirely repudiated his brother's overtures. Osman at this time also despatched an expedition to the Ashraf to bring them to obedience, but the chieftain of

¹ Sixty miles north of Suakin.

² Thirty miles north of Suakin.

³ The districts of the three last sections are not shown in the map.

this important tribe—Mohammed Abu Fatma—now openly declared hostility to Osman, and the expedition returned barren of results.

In the month of June, Osman attempted to raise the Hadendowa to fight against the Amamar, who had been collecting at Sheikh Barud, but this attempt also failed, and shortly afterwards a mamurieh was established at Sheikh Barud, which considerably added to the Amamar's confidence.

During all this period Suakin was in a state of partial siege. The rebels patrolled the neighbourhood by day and fired on the town at night, but now an important change took place. The Amamar began to assume the offensive, and on the 17th of June they attacked and drove away a party of Arabs at Hashin under the emir Ali Sherai, and two days later a party of 1500 Amamar collected at Handub, where, on the 21st, Brewster Bey and Mahmud Bey Ali were sent out to meet them. They were cordially received, and a meeting was held in which the Amamar declared open hostility to Osman. The latter, hearing of their intentions, and knowing that he was powerless to subdue them, attempted pacification by making promises. He sent one Gilani, the wakil of sheikh Hamed Mahmud, an Amamar prisoner at Tamai, to tell them that if they would disperse to their homes he would trouble them no more; but Gilani had been instructed by his master to urge the Amamar to fight, and this they unanimously decided to do. On the 22d they moved towards Hashin and reconnoitred Tamai, on the 24th they were attacked by the rebels, whom they repulsed with considerable loss; and thus the position between the Mahdiists and loyal Arabs was reversed, the former being practically shut up in Tamai. The Gemilab tribe now deserted Osman.

In the following month the Khalifa despatched an emissary—Fiki Ali—from Omdurman, with instructions for Osman that he must use every endeavour to conciliate the tribes and gain their allegiance; Osman, however, does not appear to have paid much attention to these orders, and shortly afterwards caused sheikhs Hamed Mahmud and Wad Hassab (Nurab section) to be beheaded, thereby intensifying the resentment already borne him by the Amamar. A few days later Ali, the son of Mohammed Saadun, the only remaining

Amarar sheikh who had adhered to Mahdiism, came into Suakin and offered his submission.

On the 10th July a *mamurieh* was established at Mohammed Ghul, and shortly afterwards the Bisharin sheikhs of that district came in to express their loyalty to the Government.

Early in the following month fifteen Beni Amer chieftains arrived from Akik and expressed loyalty to the Egyptian Government, which they hoped shortly to see re-established in the country.

Meanwhile the partial blockade of Tamai continued, and provisions began to fail. Many deserted, while others left for Tokar to attend to their crops, and this unsatisfactory condition of affairs reaching the Khalifa's ears, he summoned Osman Digna to Omdurman, promising at the same time that reinforcements would shortly be sent to Tamai. Osman left Tamai on the 13th August, and on the 23d the notables of Suakin, religious, mercantile, and Arab, assembled to express to the Governor-General their views on the situation, which were briefly as follows: they represented that the Arabs had lost large numbers of their men, that they had at last realised the Mahdi was an impostor, that the rebellion had only resulted in the aggrandisement of a few unscrupulous agitators, and that it was vain to hope for peace and re-establishment of trade without some authority which would establish law and order in the country; they therefore prayed that some active steps might be taken to further their object, and that the present seemed a favourable time for such action. The Hadendowa, they admitted, were responsible for this state of affairs, but had suffered so much from their folly that it would require a very slight effort to crush them, destroy Tamai, and occupy Tokar.¹

The foregoing is interesting, as it was not only the expression of opinion of a responsible assembly of natives and merchants of Suakin, but in substance it is to this day the invariable reply given by the Arabs, since their abandonment of Mahdiism, whenever the expulsion of the Mahdieh has been discussed. They never appeared to have realised that the

¹ Their recommendation has been justified by events, since this was written. The succeeding paragraph states so aptly the previous state of affairs, that it has not been omitted.

Sudan had been officially abandoned, and that the attitude of the Government was purely defensive, but they always hoped for the re-occupation of the country and the re-establishment of law and order. At the same time, though they could alone, if they tried, crush the Mahdi's power in the eastern Sudan, they have so far always said they could not do so without the assistance of Government troops. They argue that organisation and combination of the tribal units, at all times difficult, had been rendered much more so by the levelling tendencies of Mahdism, by which the power and authority of the sheikhs had been largely decreased. Again, there was always the fear of retaliation on the part of the Mahdists, should they fail in their attempts to shake off their allegiance; they knew little of what was going on in the more distant parts of the country, and they dreaded that, even if they succeeded in expelling the Mahdists, an overwhelming force would probably be sent by the Khalifa to again coerce them to obedience. It will therefore be readily understood how difficult it was to form intertribal confederation without granting any but a moral support to those making the attempt, on the result of which their existence must so largely depend.

But to revert to events round Tamai. The Amarar now pressed on the siege vigorously, and soon all exit was completely blocked; they were also joined by a few Hadendawas in September, and on the 7th of October they attacked and took the place, killing 200 of the enemy, capturing seventeen guns, 50 prisoners, and a vast store of rifles and ammunition. Those who escaped fled to Tokar.

Lieut.-Colonel Kitchener, who had succeeded Major Watson as Governor of Suakin, on the 7th of September visited Tamai, the day following the action, and described the position as a very strong one, consisting of low undulating ground, completely hiding the camps in the valley. The fort itself was strongly built of masonry in the form of a square, with two round towers on which guns were mounted. These protected the entry to the fort, and contained several chambers full of ammunition and other stores. A hundred yards south of the fort, and towards the main valley from which the water was obtained, a battery of straw bags filled with sand had been erected on a commanding site. The camp itself was large enough to hold 3000 men.

The attack of the Amarar, which had been carried out by Ahmed, son of Mahmud Bey Ali, of the Fadlab Amarar, with 1000 men, had evidently been a complete surprise, the garrison of Tamai at the time consisting of some 500 men only.

A quantity of correspondence was also captured, and the following letter will best describe the events just preceding the assault. The writer and his companion, who were Mahdi emissaries proceeding to the Hejaz for the propagation of the new faith, were both killed.

From El Haj Ali Ismail el Kheir and Ahmed Mussa, envoys to Mecca and Medina, to the Khalifa Abdullah.

After compliments we beg to report that we arrived at Berber and the Governor Haj Ahmed Khojali received us with great honour, and in due time gave us two camels with a guide to proceed on the road to Suakin. We reached Kokreb, and then only we learnt that Osman Digna was going to Khartum, and that the disloyal Arabs were besieging the fort at Tamai and stopping the roads, but we did not believe the report. The guide named Mussa Wad Isa, who speaks their dialect, told us he thought the report was true and that the place was besieged.

In spite of all this bad news we trusted in God and continued our journey. Shortly afterwards the camel-men told us that the infidels were only half an hour distant from us and numbered 300 men, but God blinded these men, and unseen we reached the fortress of Osman Digna. Here we found Mohammed Ahmed Digna and his followers, all devoted to the cause and fighting day and night against the enemies of God. We saluted them and handed over the letter we had. He took it and, bringing it to his forehead, ordered us to be given the best house, and said, "You can now see with your own eyes what these infidels are doing, how they besiege us from all sides and attack the place, but so far God, by favour of the Mahdi and the Khalifa, has preserved us." We then told them what had happened to us on the road, and we all thank God for the kindness he had shown to us all. We had never seen people like them, they fight heroically, may God reward them; how their daily bread comes no one knows; their country is barren, no cultivation, no trees, nothing but stones.

All the Arabs have abandoned the cause, and now none but the brave men remain in the place, and they are not more than 300 men, and besides, the infidels, seeing the weakness of the faithful, said to their brethren, "Let us go and attack the fortress and seize all that is in it. So they came very near the fortress, and then many left to join the besiegers."

As soon as any of the disloyal Arabs join the infidels, they make them soldiers and call them police, and make them wear a piece of red cloth so as to be recognised. Our people killed some of these, and found the red cloth on their necks. Two men, Said Jaafer and Shanga, who were in the fort, told the infidels of all that took place.

From the day we came here we joined in six attacks made by the infidels upon the fort, but by the help of God the faithful were always victorious, and now the infidels are attacking us from the rear, and have intercepted all communications. We said to our brother Mohammed Ahmed Digna that we could remain here no longer, but must accomplish our mission, that death is to be met on land as well as on the sea, that we must go to Tokar, where we should perhaps find a dhow to cross. Then our brethren got a guide for us, but we did not know that the men in the fort went straight to the infidels and told them that two men had come from Khartoum and intend to go to Tokar, and advised them to catch us.

We left the fort and had marched four hours when we were told that the infidels were in front of us in great numbers. We therefore decided to return to the fort and wait for nightfall. In returning the caravan we were with was attacked and captured by the infidels, but we escaped back to the fort. Our friends seeing us again said, "God has indeed been merciful to you, for the attack was made to catch you as you are carrying the despatch entrusted to you by the Khalifa of the Mahdi." The brethren suffer greatly, but bear all with patience; the best of their men are Taher Magzub and his son Abderrahman. We are now waiting here, and pray God to send us a dhow in which we can sail away.

The camp was now completely destroyed and the fort blown up. The successful leaders received ranks and decorations from His Highness the Khedive, and the Governor-General took this favourable opportunity to despatch letters demanding the surrender of Tokar, where it was known a strong feeling in favour of the Government existed; but it was subsequently ascertained that those who were loyal feared to assert themselves, and the news of the approaching return of Osman Digna with a large force effectually checked any intended overtures on their part. The victors of Tamai, however, were not so easily baulked, and prepared for an advance on Tokar. They were now joined by Mohammed Abu Fatma, sheikh of the Ashraf, who wrote to those of his tribe in Tokar, urging them to join the loyal Arabs. A number of the Beni Amer sheikhs also took this opportunity for asserting their allegiance to the Government, and a deputation comprising most of their leading men, with the exception of one Okkud Mussa, met the Governor-General at Akik.

Early in November the loyal Arabs established themselves at El Teb, and all seemed to promise well, when, on the 9th of November, the emir Mussa Fiki advanced from Tokar with a considerable force. The loyal Arabs made no attempt to stand, but retired to Trinkitat, where they evinced no anxiety to con-

tinue operations against superior numbers. Shortly afterwards they were brought back to Suakin and the attempt abandoned.

A season of greater tranquillity than there had been for years now set in. With the exception of Tokar all tribes in the Gunub appeared to have deserted Mahdiism; the crops, however, in the Tokar delta were exceptionally good, and attracted many Arabs to the neighbourhood, with the result that the Tokar leader, Mussa Fiki, had by the end of the year considerably increased his following. The emir, El Khadr, too, was unceasing in his efforts to stir up hostility against the Government.

To the north the country was completely quiet, while many of the sheikhs from the western neighbourhood began to come into Suakin. In the south the year 1886 was chiefly spent in continual dissensions between the local Arabs and the emirs appointed by Osman Digna, varied by occasional raids on the neighbouring tribes, such as the Barea and Beni Amer, who had not submitted to the Mahdi rule. It will be remembered that Ahmed el Geer, a sheikh of the latter tribe, had previously joined the cause, and it is probable that on account of his influence no serious attempts were made to force the Beni Amer to submission. The Mahdiists, however, inflicted some loss on the Barea and Bazeh in men and cattle, but these turbulent frontier tribes seem to have taken as much from their enemies as the latter did from them. The dissensions at Kassala do not appear to have been caused by any hostility or revulsion of feeling against Mahdiism, but rather by the desire of the rebel tribes, especially the Hadendowa, to see one of their own tribe appointed emir in these parts. Fai and Ahmed Digna, Abdullah Abu Bakr, and others of the Digna family or related to them, succeeded one another during the course of the year, but none of these were successful in keeping in hand the discontented tribes. In the early part of the year several influential sheikhs had separated from the Dignas. In July sheikh Mohammed Mussa refused to acknowledge them, and in November Mohammed Fai Digna, then emir, had completely lost all control and influence. It is probable he would have been forcibly deposed had not the more moderate party proposed referring the matter to the Khalifa. The latter had received many complaints

previous to this, both against Osman Digna and the Kassala emirs. Seeing the danger of an open revolt against the latter, he now summoned all the Hadendowa sheikhs of importance to Omdurman, promising them that he would meet their wishes; accordingly sheikhs Mohammed Mussa, Wad el Haddab, Belal el Amin, and many other influential men obeyed the summons. On their arrival the Khalifa promised to send them Abu Girgeh as emir instead of the Dignas whom they disliked; to this, however, they strongly objected, upon which the Khalifa condemned them to death for disobedience and insubordination. They were kept in suspense for some days, but were eventually set at liberty and permitted to return to their country on promise of absolute submission, but sheikh Mohammed Mussa was detained as a hostage; and in this manner the Khalifa effectually destroyed what might have developed into a serious revolt against his authority.

Osman, on his arrival at Omdurman, demanded reinforcements to continue hostilities against Suakin, but the Khalifa at this juncture does not appear to have been fully satisfied with his conduct in the eastern Sudan, where so many of the tribes had fallen away from the cause. Moreover, the Mussayab now charged him with the murder of their chief, Hamed Mahmud, and in consequence Osman was imprisoned for a short time. He was, however, soon liberated, and in November received a few men from the Khalifa, who told him he must gather the Shukrieh to his standard. He accordingly proceeded to their country, but after a month of ineffectual attempts, he was obliged to retire without having secured a man.

His tribe, though not of a specially warlike disposition, had never entirely submitted to Mahdism. For some time they had joined issue with the Hamran—a warlike tribe on the Abyssinian frontier and south of Kassala—of whom the chief was the well-known sheikh Eguel; and these two tribes had steadily resisted the encroachments of Mahdism, but on the imprisonment of their chief, the celebrated and loyal Awad el Kerim Pasha Abu Sin, at Omdurman, many of the tribes submitted, and on his death, which occurred in chains on the 25th of December, all resistance ceased.

Up to this time Ras Alula and King John do not appear

to have apprehended any immediate difficulties from the Italian occupation of Massawa, and turned their attention to their northern and western frontiers, where they inflicted some loss on the Mahdiists. In October, Ras Alula prepared to make a descent, it was said, on Kassala, and in November he advanced through the Barea and Bazeh countries, causing great consternation at Kassala ; but when within two or three marches of that town, he was suddenly alarmed by the news of an Italian advance, and quickly abandoning his present operations, he returned forthwith to watch their movements.

In this month the Italians succeeded in opening the port of Rarat to trade under their protection—a proceeding which appears to have somewhat perplexed the local sheikhs, who came to Akik and begged for an explanation, as the only form of government they knew was the Egyptian.

BOOK X

Nile Frontier—Nejuuni's progress northwards—Arrival at Assuan of four envoys from the Khalifa—His letter to H.M. the Queen, H.M. the Sultan, and H.H. the Khedive—The Morghani sect and family—Gordon's letters concerning the Morghani ladies Fatima and Nefisa—The Khalifa's letter to the chief Morghani—A caravan from Darfur arrives at Assiut—The emir Nur el Kanzi arrives at Sarras with a force—The action of Sarras, 28th April—The flank movement from Abu Hamed—The emir Bahr Karrar—The raid on Allaki—The descent on Erminna—The Ababdeh sheikhs and their action—Sarras reoccupied by the enemy—The skirmish at Abka—Sarras made a permanent outpost of the Arab force—The smallpox epidemic—Darfur—Sultan Yusef expostulates with the emir Karamallah for raiding—Magdum Jarut exterminates one of Karamallah's raiding-parties—Magdum Dembo surprises Et Towaish and drives Karamallah out of Darra—Sultan Zayid heavily defeats the emir Ketenbur—The Khalifa despatches Osman Adam (Ganoo) to restore order in Darfur—Joining Karamallah he defeats the Darfurians—Equatoria—1st Battalion throws off allegiance—Revolt in Regaf—Emin retires to Mahagi—Mutiny—Dr. Junker arrives in Europe, public sympathy for Emin—The Emin Pasha relief expedition—Mr. H. M. Stanley volunteers to take command—H.H. the Khedive's "high order"—The expedition proceeds *via* the Congo and Aruwimi—Emin hears that Stanley is coming—The eastern Sudan—Defection of the tribes from Mahdism—Osman Digna at Kassala—The Hamran tribe—Sheikh Eguel—Saleh Bey Shanga—The Arabs and Abyssinians—The battle of Madana—Defeat of Arabs and death of Wad Arbab—The Khalifa writes to King John—Yunis ed Dekeim sent to Galabat—Hamdan Abu Angar assumes command of the Arab army on the Abyssinian frontier—The battle of Debra Sin, Abu Angar's victory—He reaches and pillages Gondar—His return to Galabat—The prophet "Isa" at Galabat draws away many Mahdiiist emirs—He is captured and beheaded—The Khalifa's vision of "Nebi Isa's" torment in hell—Abu Angar returns to Omdurman—Dissensions in the eastern Sudan—Wad Eguel writes to H.H. the Khedive—The revolt of the Rufa's Arabs on the Blue Nile—The revolt of Abu Kalam—The Khalifa's vengeance—The movement of Saleh Bey (Kababish)—H.H. the Khedive writes to him—General Grenfell sends him rifles—Capture of Charles Neufeld—Saleh fights the emir Grieger at Om Badr and Mahbass—He is defeated and slain—Saleh's mother describes the battle—Dissensions between the Hadendowa and Amarar—The death of Lieutenant Stewart, R.N.—Dispersion of the Heteima colony—Osman Digna arrives at Handub—The anti-Mahdi tribal confederation—The action of Dara and the raid upon Taroi.

FRONTIER, 1887

DURING the early part of 1887 the frontier was left undisturbed. Nejumi at Dongola was mainly occupied in collecting reinforcements and stirring up the inhabitants to join the long-talked-of movement northwards, but the action of Saleh of the Kababish made it impossible for him to push on as he had hoped—he was in continual fear of a flank attack, and all he could do was to continue sending on small parties slowly northwards. At the end of March, Ferkeh was again occupied by the Arabs in considerable force under sheikh Taher and Nur el Kanzi. On the 15th of April these latter left Ferkeh for the north.

About this time a somewhat interesting episode occurred. On the 12th of April four Arab envoys sent by the Khalifa from Omdurman arrived at Halfa, and being bearers of letters for her Majesty the Queen, his Majesty the Sultan of Turkey, and his Highness the Khedive, they were permitted to come to Cairo, where they presented their missives to the latter. That to his Highness was a long letter, detailing the various successes gained by the Mahdists over the Government troops, exhorting him to adopt the true Mahdi faith, and advising him to lose no time in setting forth for Omdurman to make his submission in person. The letter ended up with the usual threats of immediate invasion in case of non-compliance with these orders! The letter to the Sultan was couched in similar terms, and both letters were accompanied by a number of Mahdi prayer-books, which the sovereigns were enjoined to study carefully. The translation of the letter to her Majesty the Queen is here given in full. It was accompanied by copies of the Mahdi's letters to General Gordon, dated the 9th of March 1884,¹ and of his proclamation to Hicks Pasha,² which the Khalifa requests her Majesty "to read and take into consideration."

FROM THE KHALIFA ABDULLAH TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN.

In the name of God the Merciful, the compassionate, praise be to God the Benefactor, and grace be on our Lord Mohammed, and on his posterity, with greeting!

¹ See p. 111.² See p. 86.

From the servant (of God) whose strength is in the might of his omnipotent Lord, the successor of the Mahdi, peace be upon him, the Khalifa Abdullah Ben Mohammed, the successor of the Faithful, to the beloved of her people, Victoria, Queen of England.

Grace be upon him who knoweth the Mahdi !

Know thou that God is mighty and great. He is the King of kings, the Powerful, the Omnipotent. There is none like unto Him, and all things which have being are within His grasp. Nothing in earth or heaven can lessen His might, and did He wish to destroy His foes in less than the time of a thought, He were able to fulfil his desire. But He tends His flock and does not leave them, the power of His arm does not turn aside from following the guilty. He indeed sent the great prophets to point out the way to His creatures, and He sent our prophet Mohammed ; the grace of God be upon him, the seal¹ of them all, and universal messenger to all creation, a bringer of good tidings, an apostle, inviting all to God by his grace, a shining lamp. He was the annihilator of peoples, the destroyer of nations ; any one who believed in him, and had faith in his mission, stood in the favour of God, and obtained the greatest happiness he could desire. But the unbeliever, and he who denied his mission, was put to confusion by God ; he went to the fire, and to eternal torments.

And when the awaited Mahdi came—grace be on him—he was the successor of our Prophet Mohammed. God be gracious towards him, whom God revealed to all people to revive the faith of Islam, and to wage holy war against his enemies, the accursed unbelievers. I am his successor, who follow in his footsteps to that end, and now I summon thee to Islam. If thou wilt believe and testify that there is no god but God, and that Mohammed is the apostle of God, and if thou follow the Mahdi—grace be on him—and art subject to my rule, I will receive thee and give thee tidings of prosperity and safety from the torments of the fire. Thou wilt be secure and content ; what is for me will be for thee ; what is against me will be against thee ; a love in God will arise between us, and He will pardon thee all the sins thou hast committed in the time of thy unbelief, even as He has promised, saying, may His name be glorified, “Say unto the unbelievers that they make an end (of their error), and the past shall be forgiven them.” But if thou refuse all save unbelief, trusting to thy supplies of war and thy armies, then know that thou art in great error, and with all thy preparations and plans we have wherewithal to meet them—the true faith to which God, the Almighty King, assures victory and support, and the upraising of His light, and which He will strengthen. None have strength to resist Him, and none have means to overthrow Him, for the might of God is victorious, not to be withstood, and His force is terrible, not to be clashed against.

Truly, if thou hast thought, in thy error, that the hosts of the Mahdi, which stand in the strength of the law of Mohammed, were as the soldiers of Ahmed Pasha Arabi, among whom worldly deceit had entered, so that they were turned aside thereby from their faith, and the banner was turned from its victory, so thou wast enabled to gain possession of the

¹ The last and greatest of the prophets.

land of Egypt, and they became the lowest of captives, unable to defend themselves—this is a vain thought and a futile delusion. For the men of the Mahdi are men of iron ; God gave them a nature to love death, He made it sweeter to them than cool water to the thirsty. Hence are they terrible to the unbelievers, as were the noble companions of the Prophet of God ; in the sight of God the reproacher will not reproach them, neither will he who strikes against them praise them for what is returned them. They regard in everything nought save God by reason of their trust in their mighty Lord. They care not for the life of this world, the transient, the enchanted with magic, but they look instead for eternal bliss and dainty living to be allotted them in the world to come. For if they be faithful to their Lord, and are in the way of salvation, and spurn the love of the world from them, and keep well that which God has enjoined upon them, then He will strengthen them with His aid, and when thy soldiers come to put them to flight and to overcome their cities, if thou lookest with the eye of seeing and of understanding, thou wilt know the difference, and from what will befall thee thou wilt understand thy baneful error.

Verily, when thou hast heard of the rising of the Mahdi, the awaited one, grace be upon him, and of the war waged against him by the Empire of the Turks, and of his defeating them in many battles, thou didst imagine that thou couldst fight with him and overthrow him. So first thou didst send one of thy famous men named Hicks Pasha, and with him an army composed of many and divers kinds and sorts of men. That was owing to thy hasty thought, to thy giving no glance to what would follow, and not entering into consultation with other nations in the matter. It was thy own desire alone, without the rest of the nations, imagining that thou couldst be victorious over the hosts of God the Conqueror. And when that army came with its thousands upon thousands, and numbers upon numbers, it could not stand before the people of God, no, not one half-hour ; but God condemned it to ruin and destruction, even to the last man. And the death of that man, the wise and brave, with his army, was owing to thy evil measures and the greatness of thy blindness. The greatness of numbers, the strength of equipment, availed him nothing ; he went to the flames and the Almighty was wroth. Afterwards thou didst take no heed of that, nor reflected on thy plight, but rashly didst continue preparing thy soldiers time after time, in every defile, to fight against God and His Prophet and His Mahdi, now at Suakin, now at Dongola, now at Wady Gamr, until by thy folly thou hadst slain more than thousands of thy people. Thence fell many of the chiefs of thy men, who were honoured and of high repute before thee, for courage and skill, and firmness, and strength of purpose. Such was General Gordon Pasha who fell at Khartum, and General Stewart who fell at Abu Tlieh,¹ and the second Stewart and the consuls with him at Wady Gamr, and yet others to swell their number of thy most famous men, as thou knowest well. So despite thy frequent demands for advance to the field of battle, and thy exhorting them with the power of courage and

¹ It is a popular error to call this the battle of Abu Klea ; the Khalifa's rendering is correct.

wisdom, thy soldiers thought only of the retreat from the Sudan with discomfiture and defeat, whereof they have had more than enough. It cannot be questioned that this defeat arose only from the terror of the valour of the conquering hosts of God, for that is a thing plain to all. So they were now in an evil plight, and grievous strait, overwhelmed by trouble and amazement, finding no path to an asylum of safety. And all this arose from thy error and from following thy own courses apart from the rest of the nations; for hadst thou taken counsel of them, as it behoved thee to do, they would have shown thee the means to set all thy fears at rest; they would have advised to withhold from clashing against the hosts of God, which thou hadst no power to resist, and thou wouldst have confined thyself to the guarding of thine own land and of it alone. But as it is they aid thee with men and arms, and join thee in warring against the troops of God, so in the day of defeat shall the shame not be on thee alone, but shall be shared by others.

Thus hast thou erred in many ways, and art suffering great loss, wherefrom there is no refuge for thee save by turning to God the King, and entering among the people of Islam and the followers of the Mahdi, grace be upon him. If thou wilt do thus, and yield all the matter to us, then shalt thou achieve thy desire of perfect felicity and true repose, which is salvation before God in the blissful and enduring Dwelling, the like of which eye has not seen nor ear heard nor the heart of man conceived. But if thou wilt not turn from thy blindness and selfwill, continue to war against the hosts of God thyself, with all thy armies and warlike equipment. So shalt thou behold the end of thy work. Thou shalt be crushed by the power of God and his might, or be afflicted by the death of many of thy people, who have entered on war with the people of God, by reason of thy Satanic presumption.

Know thou that I am strong by the help of -God, not in myself, but in Him are my strength and my victory. I am a weak servant, and there is no strength in me alone. But God is my refuge, in Him is my trust, and He has promised His aid to those who trust in Him and seek asylum with Him. Again, every one who comes out as a foe against us will die at our hands by the aid and might of God, though they be both men and jinns.

Consider this well, and be not deluded by that which glitters in thy sight, (such as) equipments and armies, for the forelock of all things is in the hand of God; no one shall overcome Him, for He is powerful above His creatures.

And thou, if thou wilt not yield to the command of God, and enter among the people of Islam and the followers of the Mahdi, grace be upon him, come thyself and thy armies and fight with the host of God, and if thou wilt not come, then be ready in thy place, for at his pleasure and in the time that he shall will it, the hosts of God will raze thy dwelling and let thee taste of sorrow, because thou hast turned away from the path of the Lord, for therein is sufficiency, and salvation is to him who followeth the Mahdi.

(It has not been found possible to reproduce a facsimile of the seal, but the following is a translation.)

(Sealed)

Translation of Seal.—There is no god but God, Mohammed is the prophet of God, Mohammed el Mahdi Abdullah.

Once the object of the mission was known, the letters were returned to the bearers, and they were despatched, with perhaps less ceremony than they had been treated with on arrival, back to Omdurman, with a verbal message to their master that their Majesties would not deign to accept such overtures.

Shortly afterwards the Morghani, chief of a religious brotherhood, received a letter asking him to join the cause—and it is perhaps as well to explain here the reasons for the Khalifa's desire to obtain the co-operation of this important religious functionary.

Some eighty-seven years ago the head of the Morghani family, of Afghan descent and long resident in Mecca, conceived the idea of converting the Sudan to Islam. He crossed over with a considerable following from Jedda, and established his creed in several parts of the Sudan; from that time the sect has been continually growing, and like all religious Moslem sects its religious and temporal influences are so interwoven that it had long been a recognised power, and should the head of such a sect adopt Mahdism it would imply the adoption of Mahdism by his followers, and consequently an enormous acquisition of power. This sect may in some ways be compared to the Senussi sect, and in point of numbers it is perhaps as numerous; but the majority being in the Sudan, numbers of them had been unwillingly forced to accept Mahdism, while the Senussi sect, being outside the sphere of actual warfare, has been enabled to preserve its integrity. Neither the Senussi nor the Morghani sects are considered heretics by orthodox religious Moslems. As in Christianity there are the Roman, Greek, and English Churches, so in the Mohammedan religion there are a variety of forms, such as Morghani, Senussi, Shadlieh, Bedawieh, Ahmedieh, and many others. It may therefore be understood how readily the Mahdi would have welcomed in his ranks the head of so important a sect as the Morghani.

It is even stated that previous to his offer of the Khalifa

Osman's chair to the Senussi, the Mahdi had offered it to sheikh Osman Morghani at Taka, but it had been indignantly refused by the latter, whose conduct during the long siege of Kassala is beyond all praise.

Gordon's appreciation of the services there performed by Sidi Mohammed Osman el Morghani is shown in the following letters, which he sent to him from Khartum :—

To the great Refuge, the illustrious Counsellor, the honourable Professor, my Lord Mohammed Osman, may God benefit us and him. Amen.

After greetings and compliments, I received your letter of the 7th Shawal 1301 (30th July 1884) sent me by El Haj en Nadif, and I thank God for your safety and the wellbeing of Kassala, which is owing to your presence there. May God not deprive us of you nor of your blessing in this world and the world to come. Khartum, thank God, is in a satisfactory state, so do not trouble to think of us. I do all in my power to care for the officials, inhabitants, and garrison.

I beg of you always to keep up friendly relations with the Beni Amer, and to maintain your communication with Massawa, so as to obtain news without delay of the advance of reinforcements for Kassala, and I beg of you to give me all the news you receive on this subject. El Haj en Nadif will inform you verbally of all our news.

I have received information that the troops coming for the relief of Khartum have arrived at Dongola, and, please God, they will soon be here.

I have also heard that the "honourable ladies," complying with your request, left Shendi for Kassala, but I think it would be better if they remained at Shendi, as I believe their presence there has assured peace to the surrounding districts.

Present my regards to all friendly tribes and to your men.

(Signed) GORDON,
Governor-General, Sudan.

To the honourable Sidi Osman el Morghani, may God preserve him.

After greetings and compliments, I beg to inform you that I have received a letter from the mudir of Taka, to the effect that the Hadendowa and Halanga tribes are making preparations to attack Kassala and that he requires reinforcements.

In answer to his letter I have informed him that English soldiers will be sent from Suakin to Kassala. I have also informed him that, should he think it necessary, he may order up the garrison of Amadib to reinforce Kassala.

The bearer informs me that you have collected the Shukrieh and Beni Amer, so as to resist the impending attack ; thank you. This is by no means the first good service you have rendered. If you consider

it necessary to call up the Amadib garrison, please let the mudir know ; if not, let the garrison stay where it is.

(Signed) GORDON,
Governor-General, Sudan.

1st March 1884.

General Gordon's letters and Mr. Power's journals, published in November 1884, came through Osman el Morghani's hands, and, as it will be seen in the first letter quoted, he, at Gordon's request, left his wife and daughter at Shendi for the sake of the influence of their name, and even now arrivals from the Sudan bear testimony to the respect in which the ladies Nefisa and Fatima are held by the populace, in spite of the cruel treatment they received at the hands of the Khalifa. These unfortunate women are still close prisoners in Omdurman, and have suffered much indignity from their captors. Sidi Mohammed Osman, after suffering great hardships, at length escaped from Kassala, and arrived at Suakin only to die, the result of the great exertions he had undergone. From what precedes the Khalifa's anxiety to win over to his cause the present chief Sidi Mohammed el Morghani, *Sir El Khattam*,¹ will be readily understood. He therefore launched forth the following appeal, which it is needless to say, was left quite unheeded by the Morghani, who has, at all times, rendered good service to the Government of Egypt by despatching letters to his followers in the Sudan, urging them to keep true to their creed and to desist from Mahdiism; for this purpose he has been sent on missions both to Suakin and Wady Halfa, which have always been attended by good results.

In the name of God, etc. From the servant of his God and the true believer, the successor of the Mahdi, grace be upon him, El Khalifa Abdullah Ben Mohammed, to the descendant of the chosen prophet, our reverend friend Es Sayid Mohammed Sir El Khattam, may God lead him into the right path and keep him from evil.

Peace be to you, my friend. Be it known to you (may God lead you to hear His good words) that you are known to us to be a man of good

¹ The title *Sir El Khattam* implies that the Morghani's creed is the Khattam or finality of all creeds, that any further development of the Mohammedan creed can only be a work of supererogation, in fact that the Morghani creed includes everything that is necessary for the highest development of the Moslem religion.

heart and mind. Those who are righteous do follow the instructions of our Lord and Prophet Mohammed, all other teaching is false, and woe be to those who follow it. You, my friend, are well aware of the late events which have happened, and of the harm which has been done to our sacred religion, and also of the degradation into which the Moalems have fallen ; to all true believers and right-minded people such a state of affairs is very unsatisfactory. To a man like you it is perhaps permitted to delay and to hesitate to listen to the calls of the Mahdi who has come to revive the laws of our Lord the Prophet, and to destroy those who spread evil in the land. You are one of the most religious families, and an offspring of a holy people ; it is not right, therefore, for you to think of the pleasures of this world. You were one of the first to desire the reformation of the Mohammedan religion, and the laws of the Prophet, which are the basis of all truth. Do you consent to help those who are following the paths of darkness ? God has said, "Do not rely on the oppressor lest you be burnt by fire."

The Turks, with whom you are at present, have altered the true religion of God, have cancelled His laws, and do not follow in the footsteps of your predecessors. They follow the infidels, the enemies of God ; do not, therefore, accept them as your rulers ; do not obey them, but leave them (especially as the expected Mahdi has now come) ; save yourself and repent to God. Be it known to you that I now call upon you to come to God, to work according to His book and to the law of the Mahdi and his successor. If you wish to be saved and respected listen to my call and join me at once ; either come straight to me or join our friend and brother Abderrahman Wad en Nejumi, who is quite close to you. If you accept to do this you will be quite safe, also your property and every person who comes with you, and you will be received with honour. Start then, my friend, on your way to victory, success, and happiness. Know, my friend, that our only intention is to revive the laws of your grandfather, the chosen one, and to guide our people to follow those laws. Thanks be to God, all people in this part of the Sudan have been brought into the light of the true religion, and willingly sacrifice their lives, knowing that they will have a good reward.

As it is proposed to occupy the northern countries by the troops of the Mahdi, I have therefore written this letter to you, because I pity you, my friend, and wish for your good. If you receive it gladly and hasten to comply with its contents, you will be very dear to us, and will have your reward, but if you refuse it you will have none but yourself to blame. It is our duty to warn you, only be sure of this, that by the help of God you will fall one day into our hands, for God has promised that we shall win the victory. Think, therefore, of yourself, my friend, and obey God's wish. We do not doubt that you will accept the truth. Come to God and obey His chosen Khalifa. Send me an answer, and may God guide you in the right path. Peace be upon you.—Sealed as usual.

Dated 16TH SHABAN 1304 (1st May 1887).

In the midst of this extensive movement by desert and river an unusual spectacle of the arrival of a large caravan of

1400 camels at Assiut from Darfur filled every one with surprise. Starting from a place some twenty days west of El Fasher with 1520 camels on the 24th of January, the caravan arrived at Assiut on the 1st of April, having lost 120 camels *en route*. It had travelled *via* Nugra, El Agia, Selima, Beris, and Khargeh. This road had been closed since 1883. In 1884 it had been partially surveyed by Colonel Colville and Lieutenant Stuart Wortley with an escort of Jowazi Bedawin, and now in 1887, probably owing to the success of Saleh of the Kababish, the caravan performed a perfectly peaceable journey.

And now, while Nur el Kanzi was creeping slowly northwards with the advanced guard of Nejumi's force, the emir Ez Zein had reconnoitred the wells of Murat in the eastern desert, and a force was collecting at Abu Hamed, evidently with the object of demonstrating towards the flank at Korosko, while the front attack was being directed towards Halfa. The Abu Hamed force was under the emirs Ali Wad Saad, Wad el Fil, Wad Mustafa, Wad Hamza, and Hassan Mohammed Khalifa.¹ But whilst they were awaiting orders to advance, the movement down the Nile received a sudden check, which delayed the flank attack for some time.

News reached Colonel Chermiside, commanding at Halfa, at noon on the 27th April, that Nur el Kanzi with his force had occupied Sarras and pushed on an outpost to Gemai. With the recollection of the last Arab advance fresh in his mind, Colonel Chermiside at once decided to oust the intruders from their position. Mindful of the fact that his every movement would be reported to the enemy, and well knowing that he must strike at once before the rebels were further reinforced, he decided on a secret and sudden *coup de main*.

Four hours after he received the news of the enemy's arrival he had already despatched as advanced guard, under Major Rundle, R.A., the second cavalry squadron, 100 men, under Major Hilmi Effendi; the 2d Camel Corps, 40 men, under Lieutenant Dunning; the Irregulars, 60 men, under Lieutenant Rycroft; two guns of the 1st Camel Battery, under Major Bakir Effendi.

These troops were ordered to march by night as rapidly

¹ Son of Hussein Pasha Khalifa, late mudir of Berber.

and as secretly as possible to Sarras, and to prevent *en route* any natives from giving warning to the enemy that troops were approaching. A small patrol also marched parallel with this force on the west bank with similar orders.

The 9th Sudanese Battalion, under Captain Borrow, which formed the main body of the advance guard, was concentrated at Abka—twelve miles from Sarras—by 7 P.M., and thence continued their way to Sarras—twenty miles distant by route march. A second column, under the command of Major Lloyd, and consisting of the 1st Egyptian Battalion and Supply and Transport Columns, moved out by rail and route march, and were all concentrated at Abka in the early morning, where they were to await orders for a further advance.

Major Rundle had orders to halt within three miles of Sarras and await the dawn; he was then to push on, get touch of the enemy, and engage him until the arrival of the infantry and guns. Accordingly at dawn a dismounted picket occupied a block-house on the hills overlooking Sarras, while Lieutenant Rycroft's irregulars, supported by the Camel Corps, pushed rapidly into Sarras and seized the old railway station and the block of buildings close to it.

This movement was executed under fire from a block-house¹ in the hills to the east, some 340 yards distant, held by the enemy's riflemen. The Irregulars² then seized a spur some eighty yards distant from the block-house, and held this position, which was partially defiladed from the enemy's fire, whilst the Camel Corps opened fire on the block-house from some hilly ground in front of the station.

At 5.15 A.M. a strong cavalry patrol was pushed along the destroyed railway line, but before it had covered 400 yards the Arab main body, to the number of some 300, showed behind some rising ground 600 yards in front, while groups of spearmen were seen in the hills in the rear.

The cavalry patrol, having accomplished its object, fell back behind the station, from which a heavy fire was now opened on the enemy's position. Messages were also sent back to

¹ These block-houses had been left standing when the British and Egyptian troops had evacuated Sarras the year previously.

² These Irregulars were formed in 1885, for the most part old soldiers of Gordon's—Shaggihs who had been on board Nushi Pasha's steamers. They number upwards of seventy men mounted on camels, and are a most useful force.

Colonel Chermside, who (with Captain Kempster, chief staff officer, and Lieutenant Palmer, junior staff officer) was advancing rapidly with the remainder of the column.

At 6.30 the two guns of the Camel Battery arrived, having marched the whole distance from Halfa—thirty-four and a half miles—in little over twelve hours, and taking up a position close to the station, opened fire with common shell on the block-house, which, unless silenced, must have inflicted considerable loss on the infantry attacking the enemy's main position.

Fortunately, after firing twenty-one rounds, the gun succeeded in breaching the block-house, which was then stormed and carried by the irregulars. The guns were then turned on the enemy's main position, which was shelled with some effect. In the meantime the infantry had arrived, and by 7 A.M., when the block-house had fallen, they were advancing to the attack. The ground now traversed by the infantry requires some description. At this time of the year the river was low. The banks here are high and unusually steep, while a sandy foreshore dotted with rugged boulders intervenes between bank and river. The left of the Arabs' position rested on the scarped bank, but the enemy when exposed to artillery fire had evacuated the open ground on which their camp stood, and had retired into a narrow valley or khor about 200 yards distant from the river. Two companies of the battalion were therefore detached, under cover of the steep bank along the foreshore, to turn the left of the enemy's position. The remainder of the battalion was left as support south of the railway station on the level ground above, while the irregulars and Camel Corps conformed to the advance on the extreme left.

Previous to this the cavalry had been sent to turn the enemy's position. This they succeeded in doing simultaneously with the delivery of the front attack, driving in with considerable loss a detached party of some fifty Arabs. The second line of the enemy, consisting chiefly of ill-armed Danagla, seeing the cavalry in their rear, made no attempt to join the first line, but making straight for the river, swam across and succeeded in escaping.

In the meantime, as the right flank company had neared

the left of the position, the Arab spearmen, with wild yells, rose up from the khor, and, headed by their three mounted leaders, dashed down the bank. The full shock of their charge fell on the slender Egyptian fighting line, which had slowly to fall back on their supports, fighting hand to hand with their assailants. Captain Borrow, seeing this, at once reinforced the two companies, and the heavily-pressed left company, as they felt the impetus of reinforcement, immediately began slowly to advance; the enemy, contesting every foot, fought with desperate bravery, and fell almost to a man. Many were actually killed in the water, while others, attempting to turn the left flank of the infantry, had scaled the high bank, and fell from the fire of the Irregulars, the Camel Corps, and reserve of the fighting line;—it was here Nur el Kanzi was killed.

By 7.45 the position, with ten standards and a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, was captured.

Almost the entire Arab fighting force of 200 men had been annihilated, while the Egyptian loss was 21 killed and 30 wounded, including two officers who had been severely wounded in the hand-to-hand fighting.

The patrol on the left bank re-captured a large boat belonging to some Greek traders who had been previously seized by the enemy—one of these describes as follows what had happened in the Arab camp:—

At about midnight on the 27th April Nur el Kanzi woke us up saying, "The infidels are coming in the morning and there will be a fight. I do not wish any harm to you—you can go away to the rear, and when the fight is over come back again." I do not know who brought the news. Nur el Kanzi called his men together, and also sheikh Taha of Sarra, whom he posted on the hills in rear, with orders to come down when he had defeated the Turks. He also sent a body round to the rear to prevent any one escaping. He then prayed for a long while, and thanked God who had delivered the infidels into his hands. He sent his money away on a camel with his cousin on a horse. Just before daybreak he collected his men for prayer—in the middle of their prayers shots were heard from their advance picket in the block-house, when immediately they formed up behind a hill.

After this short but decisive action the troops returned to Halfa and a short period of tranquillity ensued.¹

¹ It may be considered hardly necessary to have dwelt so fully on this small action, but on the other hand it should be remembered that this was the first action fought by Egyptian troops, entirely independent of British or other

The fugitives from Sarra returned to Ferkeh bringing news of the defeat; and here the Arab leaders were beyond measure irritated by the conduct of their Dongolese allies, and realised that they could no longer count on them for any material support.

The annihilation, however, of their small advanced guard did not interfere with the steady stream of reinforcements from Omdurman, Berber, and Dongola; and towards the end of May the emirs Morghani ed Dahab, Wad Gubara, and Abd el Halim, with a force, arrived at Ferkeh.

In the meantime the flank movement from Abu Hamed had begun. The emirs Hassan Khalifa, Ali Bishir, and Khojali had left Abu Hamed on the 12th May with 150 men, and occupying the wells of Murat, detached a small party under Bahr Karrar towards the river. On the night of the 17th a few of these descended on Allaki—a village some 50 miles north of Korosko—but beyond firing a few shots and cutting the telegraph wire, no further damage was done. On the 10th June another descent was made on Erminna—45 miles south of Korosko—in which a villager was killed and two wounded. The wire was again cut. These raids spread great alarm amongst the riverain population, and already an armed steamer was diligently patrolling the river, while the irregular Camel Corps moved from post to post. These events also considerably shook the confidence of the Government in the loyalty of the Ababdeh sheikhs, who, it will be remembered, were presumably responsible for the protection of this long eastern flank, for which service they received considerable subsidies. The spheres of their protection were divided between Bishir Bey Gibran, a head sheikh of the Ashiabab Arabs; Saleh Bey, sheikh of the Ababdeh Arabs; and Minshetta Bey, sheikh of the Abu Din. Bishir's responsibility extended for some distance north and south of Assuan and into the eastern desert. Nominally as far as the Red Sea, but practically

support; and when it is considered that the Camel Corps and mounted artillery marched 35 miles, carrying 100 rounds of ammunition per man, and two days' rations and forage, while the infantry marched 22 miles, and all arrived within 14 hours in the presence of the enemy, whom they at once attacked and utterly defeated, the importance of this engagement cannot be overestimated. It inspired a confidence in both officers and men which subsequent events have fully justified.

beyond the wells of Haimur—125 miles from the Nile at Assuan—his authority ceased to exist; the country farther east of these wells being inhabited by various sections of the Bisharin tribe, who, though nominally owing allegiance to the Egyptian government, had long since ceased to pay any taxes. The attitude of this latter tribe had since the first outbreak in the Sudan been a source of anxiety to the Government; but up till now they had occupied a neutral position, and subsequent events have proved them to have been loyal, and to have served as a buffer to all attempts to introduce Mahdism into Egypt.

Saleh Bey's authority extended from Korosko into the Eastern Desert, including the wells of Murat; while Minshetta Bey was responsible for the districts of Allaki, Syaleh, etc., and the adjoining desert.

All these tribes had for centuries held the various roads leading from the Sudan to Egypt through the Eastern Desert, and are as numerous in the vicinity of Abu Hamed and Berber as they are within the districts of the Egyptian frontier. Those, however, on the other side of the desert towards Abu Hamed had long since, willingly or unwillingly, joined the Mahdist banners, and many of these men who were now raiding on the river from the Murat wells had relatives and friends in the very districts they attempted to plunder.

Bishir was first cousin to Bahr Karrar, while Saleh was first cousin to Hussein Pasha Khalifa. It was therefore natural under such circumstances that the Government should question the loyalty of these sheikhs, who were highly paid, and who undoubtedly played a double game. Yet, putting into the scales their utility to the Government and the harm they were in a position to do, the balance was largely in favour of the former. It was of course necessary to make a few severe examples to show how futile it was to attempt to trifle with the Government; and after-events have shown that the policy pursued by it in its relations with these Bedawin was in general a good one, seeing that now their loyalty is seldom questioned. In addition to forming an admirable barrier, they form a channel of communication concerning events in the Sudan which is generally trustworthy.

It is hardly necessary to add that the state of the Eastern

Desert effectually stopped all commerce with the Sudan in this direction. Fortified posts were now established at many of the threatened points between Assuan and Halfa. The rebel force at Murat lingered on for a time, but eventually returned to Abu Hamed, whence their patrols occasionally revisited the wells.

The check given to the Arabs advancing down the Nile was but temporary. On the 18th of June a party of 100 men again made a descent on Sarras, which, since the action of the 28th April, had been reoccupied by the villagers. They plundered the houses, carried off women and all they could lay their hands on, and retired again south, while the scared inhabitants made the best of their way to Halfa.

A reoccupation of Sarras by the enemy now seemed imminent, but again their plans were frustrated. Saleh of the Kababish was unusually active. The tribes were in revolt against the Arabs in Darfur. Affairs on the Abyssinian frontier were becoming serious, while the various emirs at Berber and to the north clamoured for the removal of Mohammed el Kheir. So disturbed was the Khalifa by these matters, that he ordered his principal emirs to assemble at Omdurman for a general council, and at the same time the garrisons of the northern posts were much reduced, to enable him to send reinforcements to Darfur and Abyssinia.

On the 12th August a conflict occurred between a post of Arabs at the Selima Oasis and some Moghrabi¹ merchants, who had come from Kordofan to collect natron, resulting in the defeat of the Arabs.

The council of emirs at Omdurman broke up early in August, and the orders which immediately followed showed that it had been decided to continue the advance on Egypt with renewed vigour.

Towards the end of August a considerable force of Baggara and Jaalin Arabs arrived at Ferkeh, and shortly afterwards a mixed force of some 2000 men under the emir Mohammed Ahmed Hashim² left that place for Semneh, arriving there on the 15th of September; and continuing their march thence,

¹ Moghrabi, meaning western, is a term applied to all North African Arabs west of the Egyptian frontier.

² Ex-Prefect of Police at El Obeid.

they reoccupied Sarras on the 27th of September, while on the same day Osman Azrak and Makin en Nur with considerable reinforcements left Dongola for the north. Bahr Karrar again set out from Abu Hamed in a north-easterly direction, with the avowed intention of raising the Arabs in those districts.

The Dongola reinforcements arrived at Sarras on the 19th October, bringing up the force there to 2500 men, 200 horses, 100 camels, under thirteen emirs. On the 22d a mounted Egyptian patrol found 200 yards of railway line torn up some three miles north of Abka. This discovery was made at 10.30 P.M., consequently the patrol bivouacked till the following morning, and advancing at daybreak discovered upwards of 150 of the enemy encamped on the Abka plain. The Arabs opened fire, which was replied to by volleys; at the same time they slowly retired, until they at length took up a position in the block-house and station at Gemai, and the patrol, in consequence, returned to Halfa.

At 6 A.M. on the 25th October a telephone message was received from the outpost fort at Khor Mussa—4½ miles from Halfa—to the effect that a force of 1000 Arabs was in sight and apparently advancing on Halfa. Colonel Wodehouse, then commanding the troops at Halfa, accompanied by Lieutenant Ternan, at once pushed out with the mounted corps and sighted the enemy watering near the Abka Pass. In the meantime the 9th Sudanese battalion, arriving in the armoured train, took up a position in the hills some three miles south of Khor Mussa. Lieutenant Dunning had been sent ahead to discover the enemy's whereabouts. He found them in large numbers on the Abka plain, and on being sighted was followed back to the main body by some of the enemy's mounted men. The patrol having now accomplished its object, began to fall back on the infantry support, but the camels, unable to move rapidly over the rugged ground, delayed the retirement, and soon the enemy's cavalry approached, followed by their infantry, who opened an ill-directed fire. Just as the order was given to abandon some of the lagging camels, the Arab mounted men dashed into the midst of them, and several hand-to-hand encounters ensued, but the retirement on the infantry supports was gradually effected, and the 9th Sudanese, covering

the retreat, checked the enemy and drove them off with loss. The Egyptian casualties were one man killed, two men wounded, and four camels killed. The troops then retired to Halfa.

Colonel Wodehouse, in reporting this skirmish, commends the conduct of the Egyptian Camel Corps, who, so heavily pressed, were reluctant to abandon their camels, while he noticed several instances of personal gallantry on the part of officers and men during the hand-to-hand encounters.

After this skirmish the Arabs retired to Gemai, which became a permanent outpost with supports on the west bank opposite, while the main body remained at Sarras. It seemed that for the present the idea of a direct attack on Halfa had been abandoned. Abd el Halim with a considerable force still remained at Ferkeh, and the retention of the Beit el Mal at that place indicated that further reinforcements were expected before any movement on a large scale against the Egyptian frontier would be undertaken.

The force at Sarras was too large now for any attempt to repeat Colonel Chermiside's former tactics, and the permanent occupation of that place by the Arabs was further confirmed by the arrival towards the end of November of a large detachment of women and children under the Baggara emir Wad Basir. The enemy's patrols now came daily as far as Abka, sometimes showing in front of Khor Mussa, and on both sides there was an attitude of anxious expectancy. Before long, however, the difficulty of keeping a large force at Sarras supplied with food became apparent to the Arab leaders. Already the inhabitants of Sukkot and Mahass had been reduced almost to starvation-point, their meagre crops had been seized and everything they had had been plundered by the ruthless Baggara. Smallpox too made its appearance in the crowded Arab camp at Sarras, and numbers of deaths took place daily. Such was the state of affairs at the close of 1887. The emirs clamoured against this forced inaction, but matters in other parts of the Sudan were seriously occupying the Khalifa's attention, and though he had with considerable difficulty concentrated a fairly formidable force within 35 miles of the Egyptian frontier, he was again obliged to postpone the execution of his plans.

DARFUR, 1887.

The serious events alluded to in a previous chapter as being about to take place in Darfur arose in the following manner:—

Sultan Yusef, who, it will be remembered, had been left by Zogal as emir at El Fasher, learning of Karamallah's raids from Darra and his levying of taxes on the tribes whom he considered his subjects, forthwith wrote and complained of the depredations committed by Karamallah's men; but Karamallah in reply sent Sultan Yusef a copy of the Khalifa's instructions to him, which left the question of the frontier somewhat indefinite. Yusef therefore sent a mission to define the limits of the respective territories, but on their arrival at Karamallah's he imprisoned them and continued to raid with more frequency than before. Yusef was now goaded into taking active measures, and forthwith instructed the magdum¹ Imam Jarut, of the Birgid tribe, that if Karamallah's men should even put foot in his territory he should slay them to a man.

Shortly afterwards, in May 1887, a raiding party of some 500 men under the emir Wad Aalim crossed the frontier, and Jarut, faithful to instructions, fell upon them and annihilated them; a few men only escaped to tell the tale.

Karamallah now set to work to gather all the men he could at Darra, but Yusef, following up his recent victory, now despatched under the magdum Abu Dembo a force of 4000 men to Et Towaish, where the emir Hassan Agha, former governor of the Liffi district, with a force of 500 men, was stationed. Abu Dembo surprised Et Towaish on 2d June, massacred the entire force, and proceeded thence towards Darra. By this time, however, Karamallah had collected a force of 2000 men, whom he despatched from Darra under the emir Ketenbur.

The contending forces met a few days later in the Wadi el Masrieh, but Ketenbur's rifles played havoc amongst the ranks of sword and spear men, and Abu Dembo was obliged to retreat to Jur Tobak,² where he entrenched himself and despatched an urgent messenger to Sultan Yusef for reinforcements. The

¹ A title in Darfur equivalent to emir or chief. A form of the word *mukaddum*.

² About 20 miles east of Darra.

latter, on receipt of this demand, requested Sultan Zayid¹ of Jebel Marra to come to his assistance.

Zayid readily accepted the proposed alliance and himself proceeded with a large force to Jur Tobak.

Meanwhile Ketenbur, hearing of Zayid's arrival, proceeded to Et Towaish, which he captured, and halting there for three days, advanced against the reinforcements which he knew were marching to Zayid's support. The latter, however, succeeded in combining his forces before Ketenbur's arrival, and on the 29th June a battle was fought between the contending armies, which resulted in Ketenbur's total rout and the destruction of almost the entire force. Ketenbur himself escaped to Darra, where he found Karamallah, and together they evacuated Darra and proceeded to Injileila, where they entrenched themselves and wrote to the Khalifa begging for immediate assistance. Zayid after his victory followed up Karamallah; but finding Darra evacuated, he formed an entrenched camp near the town, in which he left 500 men, and then returned to El Fasher with the remainder of his force.

On the news of Ketenbur's defeat reaching Omdurman, the Khalifa at once summoned the emir of Kordofan, Osman Wad Adam (Ganoo), and despatched him with a large force to Shakka, with orders to join Karamallah, assume command of all the troops, and re-establish his authority in Darfur.

Osman Adam set out, and on arrival at El Obeid nominated Ali Wad Hashmi as emir of Kordofan, and leaving him with only a small force he advanced on Shakka. Arrived here he wrote to Sultan Yusef, asking him to come to him at Shakka and discuss the boundary question, which had been the first cause of the revolt; Yusef, however, suspecting treachery, took no notice of the letter, but despatched a force of 10,000 men to Darra under magdums Adam Bosheh and Rahma Gomo.

During this interval Osman Adam joined Karamallah at Injileila, and the combined forces now marched towards Darra; but when reaching Khumma, a short distance from the town,

¹ Zayid was said to be a very brave negro. He had greatly distinguished himself in Sultan Durbenga's early wars, and had, at one time, commanded all his forces.

Sultan Durbenga, it will be remembered, had been recalled to Omdurman, where he was pardoned by the Mahdi, and was eventually killed in the battle of Galabat.

they were attacked by the Darfur army. A fiercely-contested battle was fought on December 26th, but the Darfurians were obliged to give way, and their forces were eventually dispersed.

The year 1887 closed on this province with Yusef making great preparations to revenge his last defeat; while the disturbed state of the country was a source of no small disquietude to the Khalifa Abdullah, whose projects for the invasion of Egypt on a large scale were once more indefinitely postponed.

EQUATORIA, 1887.

Little change had taken place in the aspect of affairs in this province. The 1st Battalion had practically cast off allegiance, though Emin's order to retire from Lado on Regaf and reoccupy Makaraka, on account of the difficulty of supplying these northern garrisons with corn, had been obeyed; and now, in addition to Makaraka, the following stations were held, viz. Regaf, Beden, Kiri, Muggi, Laboré, Khor Ayu, Duffileh, Fatiko, Wadelai, Imga,¹ and Mahagi. In April Wadelai had been accidentally burnt down and a large quantity of stores lost; but it was speedily rebuilt. In the same month another plot was prepared by the 1st Battalion, and this time it was decided to capture Emin, who was then at Kiri, and thus effectually prevent all possibility of further retirement towards the south. The conspirators argued that their safety lay in the presence of their civil governor amongst them, for they said, "We know only one road, and that leads down the Nile to Khartum."

The news that a party of 190 men of the 1st Battalion, accompanied by 900 armed negroes, was advancing on Kiri from Regaf, does not seem to have alarmed Emin, who is reported to have said, "Well, if they kill me, I am not afraid of death. Let them come, I will await them." He was, however, prevailed upon by the officers of the 2d Battalion to quit the station, which he did and proceeded to Mahagi. Soon afterwards the mutineers appeared, and learning that Emin had escaped, they entered the station, soundly flogged the commandant, and took a number of prisoners and retired again

¹ Not shown on the map.

to Regaf. It subsequently transpired that it had been the intention of the mutineers to take Emin to Gondokoro, concentrate the troops of Wadelai, Tunguru, and Mahagi at that place, and then march down the river to Khartum, and, should they find that city had fallen, severally disperse to their homes. Such had been their plan, and it does not appear that the ringleaders were instigated by any desire to join the Mahdiah forces, but rather a fixed idea had taken possession of them that the only way to return to Egypt was by the same road as they had come; nor did they appear particularly desirous to leave under any circumstances, for they had large households and had been long resident in the country; their intention, therefore, seems to have been to make themselves masters of the situation, and, as it will subsequently be shown, there were in this mutiny many of the elements which had been the cause of the Arabi revolt in Egypt; indeed, in this as well as in the subsequent events, the ringleaders were Arabists who had been banished to the Sudan for their participation in the revolt of 1882.

Meanwhile Dr. Junker had safely arrived in Egypt in January 1887.

Emin's letters sent through Uganda had some time previously reached the civilised world, and soon the public sympathy was aroused into making an effort to relieve Emin and his beleaguered garrison. It is unnecessary here to enter into the various details connected with the organisation of this relief movement, which are now well-known matters of history; suffice it to say that an expedition, known as "the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition," was organised, and a leader was found in Mr. H. M. Stanley, who volunteered his services for this task of magnitude and danger; and in him the promoters of the expedition had obtained a chief whose previous career enabled them to feel assured that if it were possible to send help to Emin, he of all others would be the most likely to bring this vast enterprise to a successful issue.

The expedition, it was decided, should penetrate Africa by the Congo route, and following the water way as far as Yambuya, some 1300 miles from the Atlantic, should strike across the hitherto unexplored district which lay between the river Aruwimi and the Albert Lake.

Preliminary arrangements completed, Mr. Stanley left London on the 21st January 1887 and proceeded to Egypt, where he obtained the necessary official instructions from the Egyptian Government, and was armed with the following order, signed by H.H. the Khedive.

Translation of the "High Order" to Emin Pasha, dated 8th Jamad Awal 1304 (1st February 1887), No. 3.

We have already thanked you and your officers for the plucky and successful defence of the Egyptian equatorial provinces entrusted to your charge, and for the firmness you have shown with your fellow-officers under your command.

And we therefore have rewarded you in raising your rank to that of Lewa Pasha (Brigadier-General). We have also approved the ranks you thought necessary to give to the officers under your charge, as I have already written to you on the 29th November 1886, No. 31, and it must have reached you with other documents sent by H.E. Nubar Pasha, President of the Council of Ministers.

And, since it is our sincerest desire to relieve you with your officers and soldiers from the difficult position you are in, our Government have made up their mind in the manner by which you may be relieved with officers and soldiers from your troubles.

And as a mission for the relief has been formed under the command of Mr. Stanley, the famous and experienced African explorer, whose reputation is well known throughout the world; and as he intends to set out on his expedition with all the necessary provisions for you, so that he may bring you here with officers and men to Cairo, by the route which Mr. Stanley may think proper to take, consequently we have issued this high order to you, and it is sent to you by the hand of Mr. Stanley to let you know what has been done; and as soon as it will reach you I charge you to convey my best wishes to the officers and men—and you are at full liberty with regard to your leaving for Cairo or staying where you are with officers and men.

Our Government has given a decision for paying your salaries with that of officers and men.

Those who wish to stay there from the officers and men may do it on their own responsibility, and they may not expect any assistance from the Government.

Try to understand the contents well, and make it well known to all the officers and men, that they may be aware of what they are going to do.

(Signed) MOHAMMED TEWFIK.

He left Cairo on February 3d, and travelling via Zanzibar, where he concluded an agreement with the well-known Tippu-Tib, he continued his journey round the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Congo on March 18th. On June 16th he had arrived at Yambuya with his staff of Major Barttelot,

Captain Nelson, Lieutenant Stairs, Mr. Mounteney Jephson, Surgeon Parke, Mr. Jameson, Mr. Bonny, and Mr. Ward; and leaving Major Barttelot, and Messrs. Jameson, Bonny, and Ward, in charge of his rearguard at Yambuya, he started off with the remainder, 389 men and 357 rifles, for the lake. On the 28th June the wild adventurous career of this little force through the great forest, the privations endured, the strange discoveries made, the successful issue from gloom into the light of day after months of wandering in this almost impracticable jungle, the fights with the Mazamboni people, the arrival at the lake, and no news of Emin, the return journey to bring the boat *Advance* from Kilonga Longa's to the lake, are now so well known, and have been so admirably described by Mr. Stanley, that it would be out of place here to dilate further on them.

It was not until the 29th April 1888 that the relief column, arriving for the second time at the lake, met Emin Pasha and Captain Casati at Nsabé on the shores of the Albert, and Stanley delivered to him His Highness the Khedive's "High Order." They remained together for twenty-five days at the lake, and then Stanley started back through the same interminable forest to meet the rearguard, while he left Mr. Mounteney Jephson with a guard of thirteen Sudanese soldiers to accompany Emin Pasha on his tour throughout his province, where he would consult with his officers, inform them of the arrival of the relief expedition, and decide what action was to be taken.

But it is now necessary to give a slight sketch of events in the province immediately preceding Stanley's arrival.

After the unsuccessful attempt of the 1st Battalion mutineers to make themselves the possessors of Emin, little of importance occurred, and a season of comparative tranquillity set in. Emin, writing in a report (1887), mentions that he had despatched messengers to the south-west in search of Stanley, whose plans he had been made aware of by the letters despatched from Zanzibar in January, and which had reached him in May. In November he writes again, "All well, on best of terms with chiefs and people, will be leaving shortly for Kibiro on east of Lake Albert—have sent a reconnoitring party to look out for Stanley, which had to return with no news as yet.

Stanley expected about 15th December." News, too, had reached Casati at Kabarega's, who calculated that Stanley would arrive in March,—yet, strange to say, Stanley did actually arrive on the shores of the lake on the very day predicted by Emin, but on learning no news of him then, had started back for his boat, with which to sail to Wadelai and learn the fate of the Governor he had come to rescue. Four months, however, were still to elapse before the rescuer and the rescued should meet.

THE EASTERN SUDAN

In the eastern Sudan the year 1887 began with a very appreciable increase of friendly relations on the part of the sheikhs of the "Gunub" towards the Government at Suakin.

The Hadendowa sheikhs, who had come in at the end of the preceding year, were now followed by others, notably El Amin Fagiri, of the Sherab, a man of great influence among the tribes of Sinkat and Erkowit. All professed a dislike to Mahdism and a desire to support the Government. The same feeling existed among the sheikhs of the Beni Amer, and in January the Governor-General received a deputation of twenty-two leading men, who all took oaths of allegiance.

The sheikhs at Tokar, though still secretly professing loyalty, did not dare to openly espouse the Government cause, fearing the consequences which must inevitably follow such a declaration. And now news reached them that the Khalifa was despatching Abu Girgeh with a large force to replace Osman Digna. Towards the end of January a curious dispute arose at Tokar concerning a horse, the property of Sayid Bakri el Morghani, which had been appropriated by the emir Khadr. The Ashraf claimed this horse, and were supported against the Hassanab. A rupture was imminent, and Abu Fatma, chief of the Ashraf, left Suakin to press the claim, but fiki Ali, then emir-in-chief, decided in favour of Khadr, much to the disgust of the Ashraf, who thus became further alienated from the Mahdist cause. The condition of the tribes being such, it was now decided that an attempt should be made to induce them to crush Mahdism in these districts, and in March the Governor-General met a large number of loyal sheikhs of the

Beni Amer, Artega, Gemilab, Shayyab, and other tribes, at Akik. These chiefs were accompanied by some 3500 of their men, and openly expressed their desire to see the Government re-established in their country, and their willingness to assist in bringing this about. Towards the end of the month, El Amin Fagiri left Suakin to collect the Sinkat and Erkowit tribes, while Mahmud Bey Ali prepared to do the same with the Amara. It was also thought that the loyal inhabitants of Tokar would join this movement.

In January, Osman Digna arrived at Kassala from Gedaref, where he had left Awad Muladi, lately clerk in the Government employ at Kassala, as emir. This man, noted for rapacity and cruelty, soon became the terror of the surrounding tribes, and once more the Shukrieh sought refuge with the Homran,¹ who during the expeditions for the relief of the Egyptian garrisons had always assisted the Abyssinians. Saleh Bey Shanga,² too, the former governor of Galabat, had also thrown in his lot with the Abyssinians, and both he and sheikh Eguel were conspicuous on all occasions in which the Abyssinians and Arabs encountered each other.

There is little authentic information regarding the events on the Abyssinian frontier immediately following the extrication of the Egyptian garrison of Galabat, but it appears that King John appointed one Ras Adal³ of the Amhara to guard the frontier with a considerable force. In the meantime the Khalifa had sent the emir Mohammed Wad Arbab to occupy Galabat. This he succeeded in doing, driving out Saleh Shanga, who had continued in occupation after the Egyptian troops had been withdrawn. In June a fierce engagement took place between the contending forces in the plain of Madana, in which Wad Arbab was killed and his force completely broken up, all his camp followers and women falling into the hands of the Abyssinians. The Khalifa, on receipt of this news, despatched his cousin Yunis ed Dekeim to take Wad Arbab's

¹ The tribe of sheikh Eguel, well known in times of peace as a race of hunters and trained to the use of arms, and who had from the commencement of the revolt successfully resisted Mahdism.

² See page 289. Saleh [Bey, originally a Tadruri from Darfur, had been promoted to the position of Moawin by Gordon, and subsequent events have proved that he did not belie the confidence placed in him.

³ Described as a hot-tempered and bold Arab.

place, and at the same time sent large reinforcements with which it was intended to capture Galabat. He also in July wrote the following letter¹ to King John, in which he demanded the immediate return of the prisoners captured, and also demanded that Saleh Shanga, Eguel, and Fiki Medawi should be given up to him. The letter runs as follows:—

In the name of God, etc. From the servant of God, etc., the Khalifa Abdullah, to the great of Abyssinia, John.

Know you that God is the King of kings. He gives kingdoms to those whom He likes, or takes them away. He gives victory to whom He wills. In His hands are good and evil. He has created man to worship Him, and has sent His apostles to instruct him. He has made heaven to be the inheritance of those who are obedient to Him, and hell for those who are disobedient to Him. Prophecy has ended in His chosen prophet Mohammed. He sent him into the world to preach His name and call men to God. He was sent as a kindling light that through him all men might believe in the religion of Islam. God afterwards sent His Khalifa, the expected Mahdi, to regenerate Islam and enjoin men to keep the commandments of God.

I am the Khalifa of the Mahdi who has come to enforce the Islam religion and summon you to the truth, as God has said in His precious book, "Ye believers of the Holy Word, believe in our word, which is the same as yours." That is to say, we should worship only one God, who has no partner in His kingdom, and we should not make gods from gods. If you confess this and say there is no god but God, and Mohammed is the prophet of God, and if you answer my summons from your heart and obey my orders, you shall be protected, welcomed, and honoured. You shall become as a brother to us, and we shall share alike. True affection will spring up between us, and you shall be in safety; but if you refuse this summons and reject the true religion, then the result will be on your own head.

Up to the present time I have ever followed the commandments of our lord the Prophet, who said, Avoid the Abyssinians as long as they avoid you, and that is the reason why I refrained from fighting you; but as it now appears to me that you are the cause of the breaking of peace by your oppression and ill-treatment of the weak Moslems who live near the frontiers of your country, inasmuch as you have killed and captured many of them, and have given a refuge to those who have deserted the religion, such as Saleh Shanga, Eguel, Idris Abu Sin, and Medawi, and many others, I have therefore sent a portion of my army to your frontier to watch your proceedings. If you wish for peace, then you must return all the captives you have taken, both males and females, slaves, old and

¹ This letter was sent by the Khalifa to Her Majesty the Queen in 1889, after the final defeat and death of King John, and was intended to show that in thus writing he had duly warned King John of the futility of attempting to withstand the followers of the Mahdi.

young, not a soul must be left in your country. Also you must return all the men who deserted with Saleh Shanga and permit them to go back to their country ; but if they are still unwilling to return and prefer to live with the ungodly, then you must take their statements down on paper, sealed with their own seals, and send them to me, so that we may know that they are no longer our people. You must also cease your raids on our frontier, and must keep your men within your boundary.

If you do what I tell you, then I will cease to wage war against you, and will instruct my army not to enter your country. Again I repeat that if you will accept the religion of Islam and follow the teaching of the Mahdiah, then you will be most welcome and gain honour in the world to come, but if you refuse, then you must expect nothing but war. You will fall into my hands, by God's will, for He watches over us and defends us from our enemies, even should they be as numerous as the sand of the sea, and those to whom God wills the victory will never be defeated.

Deceive not yourself by the numbers of your men. God is with us, and will destroy our enemies. Return an answer by bearer.

Dated *July* 1887.

Of this letter King John appears to have taken no notice, in consequence of which Yunis ed Dekeim made two successful raids into Abyssinian territory. Ras Adal now collected an enormous force and made preparation for the invasion of the Sudan. On receipt of this news the Khalifa sent the emir Hamdan Abu Angar, reported to be the most skilful of all the Mahdi leaders, to Galabat. The latter, leaving Omdurman with considerable reinforcements under the emirs Ez-Zaki Tumul, Abdullah Wad Ibrahim, Nur Angara, Farag el Omdurmani,¹ and Ismail Dandaluk, and making forced marches, collecting the tribes on the way, arrived with a force of some 87,000 souls at Galabat. Finding that the Abyssinians did not intend to advance, he wrote to the Khalifa for permission to attack instead, and soon received orders to that effect. It was reported to Abu Angar that Ras Adal was encamped in the plain of Debra Sin, some six days' march from Galabat and within 30 miles of Gondar ; he therefore entered Abyssinia, destroying many villages and churches on the way and taking numerous prisoners, and at length arrived in front of Ras Adal's position. It is said that the Abyssinian army numbered some 200,000, but many were unarmed. A fierce and prolonged battle took place, and the Abyssinians, in spite of their great bravery, were completely defeated, and large

¹ Gordon's commandant of Omdurman. See Gordon's Journals.

numbers of them slain. Almost all the important chiefs were killed; Ras Adal himself escaped, but his son was captured and sent to Galabat. The Abyssinian camp and all in it fell into the hands of the victorious Abu Angar, who continued his march and a few days later reached Gondar, sacked the town, destroying most of the principal buildings and churches, and capturing thousands of women and children, including the wife and daughter of Ras Adal. After a stay of fourteen days at Gondar, Abu Angar returned to Galabat with numbers of prisoners and a quantity of loot, to find during his absence a serious reaction against the Mahdieh had arisen. It appears that a Takruri from Darfur, calling himself Nebi Isa, well versed in all description of sorcery and magic, had arrived at Galabat, and after performing extraordinary miracles,¹ proclaimed himself to be the prophet Jesus (Nebi Isa). This individual established himself at a small village outside Galabat and soon secured a large following, amongst them no less than seventeen emirs, including Yunis ed Dekeim. On his arrival Abu Angar despatched the emir Wad Ibrahim to arrest him and the recalcitrant emirs. The capture was effected without much difficulty, and a few weeks later the Khalifa's instructions arrived that all were to be hanged, with the exception of Yunis (the Khalifa's cousin) who was ordered to Omdurman in disgrace. The sentence was carried out, and the pretender's head sent to the Khalifa, who for long exposed it over the door of his mosque; and in order to strike terror into the hearts of his followers, launched forth, on the 7th December, the following most curious proclamation, which is certainly calculated to deter any of his superstitious adherents from following in the unfortunate Nebi Isa's footsteps:—

In the name of God, etc. From the servant of his God El Khalifa el Mahdi to all the brethren. On receiving the news of the destruction of the false prophet (who pretended to be Jesus) and of all those who believed in his doctrines, my heart was filled with pity for them, for they were formerly our friends and only suffered from mistaken views. I prayed to God to forgive and pardon them, and this I did seventy times.

¹ Amongst the many extraordinary and impossible miracles with which Nebi Isa is credited, the following are the most universally known. Seeing a man standing in the sun, he would summon a tree to give him shade—drawing with his finger on the ground, he would cause water to spring up which when drunk had the taste of sherbet—he could produce visions of Paradise, Hell, battles, etc.

And while my mind was full of these thoughts, behold I heard a voice calling me to prepare for a revelation. This took place in my house to-day, after morning prayers, and when the Spirit came upon me I knelt down twice and prayed again to God to forgive these men, and while I prayed I suddenly saw them suffering torments in the flames of Hell, and the description of their torture, as I saw it, is as follows :—

The false pretender was at an unseen depth, and great noise was heard from the direction in which he was, accompanied by shouts and yells. Wad Baghdawi was at a still greater depth, nearly at the bottom of Hell. Abdullah el Berkauli was higher up than the false prophet, and so also were the Korashi, his vizir, and Et Taief, and the torment of these men was each according to his degree ; but Hanun, Abu Afdali, Abdullah el Gamus, and others of the believers, were suffered to appear and disappear at intervals out of the depths of Hell. All were under the charge of black persons, who tortured them in various degrees. Each of these condemned souls was undergoing severe torture except Abdullah el Gamus, whose torture was lighter. And at this moment I saw the Prophet pass by them, and they all lifted up their voices begging his assistance ; he, however, did not turn aside but made a sign to the Mahdi ; they all then prayed to the Mahdi, who told them that they had disobeyed the Khalifa Abdullah, and therefore their fate was in his hand. And I, owing to their dreadful state, earnestly prayed to God to forgive them. They all lifted up their hands and joined my prayers ; we continued for a long time in prayer, then I heard a voice saying, "The door through which they entered is not the door of repentance, but the door of infidelity, for they did not die in the religion of Islam," and he who enters from this door can never be forgiven nor can his punishment ever be lightened.

I then asked why Wad Baghdawi suffered more torture than Abdullah Gamus. I was answered that the former was aware of the false prophet's infidelity, and that he was an apostate, but the latter really believed in him. They had however all denied Mahdism, and were therefore being tortured, and had been so suffering ever since their death. They are still falling down into the depths of Hell, nor have they yet reached the bottom. Iron chains are hanging from their necks, and whenever any one of them rises to the surface he is beaten down again by the angels of torture, who say to them, "Had you given yourselves up to the Khalifa you would have been saved" ; and I saw that when the angels turned their faces and looked at me they appeared to be all white and dazzling, but when they turn to torture these unbelievers they appeared as black as night. And when I learned that by immutable decree these sinners were not to be forgiven, I ceased praying, for my soul was alarmed within me by reason of their dreadful state. I prayed to God for help, and thus the revelation ended. God is the Lord of all knowledge.

Dated 21 Rabia-el-awal 1305

(7th December 1887).

Abu Angar was soon afterwards recalled to Omdurman, leaving the bulk of his force under emir Ahmed Wad Ali at Galabat, and the year 1887 closed with King John breathing

vows of vengeance against the Khalifa and his followers, and threatening to come down with all his army to destroy Khartum.

It is now necessary to follow the progress of events to the north and east of the Abyssinian frontier. Up to early in 1887 the Arab forces had been drawn solely from the local tribes, none of the *Aghrab* (i.e. Baggara, Jaalin, Danagla, etc.) had as yet invaded the eastern Sudan. Abu Girgeh was at the beginning of the year in the Shukrieh country, having been sent, it was asserted, to assist Osman Digna in raising that tribe. Early in February he arrived at Kassala with about 3000 Baggara and a number of Shukrieh; many of these, however, deserted shortly afterwards, owing to this agreement with the Hadendowa. Nor did the Baggara agree any better with the local Mahdieh, being in themselves a great cause of strife. They considered themselves the original promoters of the holy cause, and claimed superiority over all others in consequence. And being very powerful, they were, as a rule, able to enforce their pretensions. The Hadendowa, however, were by no means prepared to accept the position quietly. Continual friction ensued between the two, until in April Wad el Haddab refused to have anything more to do with Abu Girgeh, stating that he would take orders from the Khalifa alone. Upon this the Baggara had recourse to arms, but in the fight which followed they were worsted, and once more quiet was restored for a time.

In this month letters were received by His Highness the Khedive from Wad Eguel and Amara Abu Sin, in which the former gave an account of his victories, begged for recognition, assistance, and arms, and asserted his undying loyalty to the Government. He states in his letter that when the Mahdi's revolt first began he fought against it with all his tribe, was several times wounded and lost many men, at length he was obliged to retire south to Ghabta. In this retirement he lost most of his money. At Ghabta he spent the remainder of his money in fortifying the place, and several times attacked and repulsed the enemy, distributing the loot he captured amongst his own and the neighbouring tribes, so as to gain their adherence. He wrote several letters to the tribes urging them not to join the Mahdi, and in many cases his

appeals had been successful. Mohammed Bey Hamdi had been with him and could testify to the truth of his statement. He states that his arms are practically useless, and begs to be provided with arms and ammunition, and that King John be requested to allow them free transit through his country. He also asks for permission to raise 1000 or 2000 irregulars, and that Amara Wad Sin of the Shukrieh be appointed to command them, and gradually he hopes to subdue the country and retake Khartum. He is prepared, if His Highness's Government wish it, to send his brother as security in return of the arms and ammunition.

Early in the year a rising against Mahdiah also occurred on the Blue Nile, and was a typical instance of the manner in which the tribal system was destroyed and the tribe rendered powerless by the terrorism which was now a distinguishing feature of Mahdi government.

The powerful tribe named the Ruf'a, inhabiting the west bank of the Blue Nile in the vicinity of Karkoj, and who, it will be remembered, had taken an active part in the siege of Sennar, were suspected of anti-Mahdi tendencies, whereupon the Khalifa ordered the head sheikh, El Merhdi, and all the chief men of the tribe to come to Omdurman. El Merhdi hesitated to obey the order, and an attempt was made to capture him in his house. He was, however, rescued, and now the whole tribe rose against this treatment, and at Karkoj defeated a party of some 500 Arabs sent to enforce the order. Instructions were then sent by the Khalifa to Yunis Dekeim, by this time restored to favour and commanding the army of the Blue Nile, to bring the tribe to obedience. Yunis repaired with his forces to Karkoj, met the tribe, which had assembled in large numbers, and utterly defeated them, killing El Merhdi and all the leaders, and confiscating all their property and camels. This is but one of the many instances in which the tribes were reduced to complete subjection: and in the majority of cases a Baggara emir took the place of the head sheikh, and with a small band of his own tribe to support his authority, would harry and ill-treat the tribesmen to such an extent as to crush them down and render them powerless; and with the destruction of the tribal system all prospect of confederation with other tribes adverse to Mahdiah would vanish. But

there were other tribes besides the Rufa'a who, on the death of the Mahdi, began to realise that after all they had been imposed upon. An important tribe in the neighbourhood of Tagalla, under the leadership of Wad Abu Kalam, refused to obey the summons to come and pay allegiance to the Khalifa at Omdurman. Yunis ed Dekeim was sent with a force to bring them into subjection, which, after considerable bloodshed, he succeeded in doing, and their women and children were driven into Omdurman.

A further instance of this wholesale slaughter was the quelling of the Gihana Arabs, which was in all respects similar to those already cited. Nor was Saleh of the Kababish more fortunate in his attempts to rise against the powerful rule of the Khalifa. When last mentioned he was in July 1886 inactive in the mountains of Oudun, but in February 1887 the vigorous chieftain was once more in arms, and cleverly captured a convoy of 500 camels on its way to join Nejumi, and in March he defeated that warrior in person. His Highness the Khedive wrote him encouraging letters, and in April letters were received from Saleh that thirty of his relations had rallied to him, and each had fifty men. On receipt of this news General Grenfell sent him a convoy of arms and ammunition. But it was Nejumi's turn this time, and he captured, in the oasis of Selima, a large part if not the whole of the rifles. This was mainly owing to the imprudence of an enterprising German merchant named Charles Neufeld,¹ who had accompanied the convoy, and, desirous of obtaining a supply of water, had descended to the oasis, where he was captured by a party of the enemy and sent to Omdurman. The remainder of the convoy were captured and taken to Dongola, where they were executed.

Meanwhile the Khalifa at Omdurman had learnt of Saleh's intention, and in May despatched from Omdurman a force of 500 Sudanese under the Baggara emir Hamad with a few of his Arabs, accompanied by some Beni Jerrar tribesmen under Wad Nubawi and a few Maalieh and Maganin Arabs under the emir Grieger,² with orders to annihilate Saleh and his mutinous followers, who were allied with the infidels.

¹ Charles Neufeld is still a prisoner at Omdurman.

² The Khalifa in this, as in many other instances, showed his astuteness in

The first conflict took place at the wells of Om Badr, where Saleh endeavoured to prevent the rebel force from watering. For the first day Saleh was successful; the fight was resumed the next day, in which Saleh's brother, Gamih, was killed, but still he managed to prevent the enemy from getting possession of the wells. That night, however, a number of the Kababish, alarmed at Gamih's death, deserted, and Saleh fled to the wells of Mahbass; but he had with him a large number of his women and children, and ere he reached the water his enemies were already in possession; and now in desperation he and his remaining followers flung themselves on the Arabs and a fierce fight ensued. But it is best related in the words of Saleh Bey's mother,¹ a gallant woman who with her daughter joined in the combat, was captured, and subsequently sent to Omdurman.

Saleh fought bravely and changed horses many times, for all of us, both men and women and animals, were very thirsty. Seeing my son in this danger, my daughter and I joined in the fight; but it went against us and many of our followers fell. Saleh, seeing his third brother killed before his eyes, dismounted from his horse, and, as is the custom of brave Arab chiefs, he took his sheepskin from off his saddle, spread it on the ground, and there sat awaiting his death. The emirs of the enemy then surrounded him, calling on him to surrender, and to come to the Khalifa at Omdurman, but he answered, "I never wish to see the Khalifa; kill me where I am." The emir Grieger then beckoned to his cousin, who advanced and, drawing his sword, cut off Saleh's head, in revenge for the death of his father and uncle. One brother now only remained, and he was taken with all of us to El Obeid, where he was beheaded. The enemy captured all our camp, and our women and children and servants fell into their hands, and we came all together to Omdurman.

After this last crushing defeat, few of the Kababish were left, and at the present time, of this once powerful and numerous tribe, practically the name alone remains.

Saleh's head was sent to Omdurman, where it remained exposed for a month on the scaffold; while his family were made close prisoners, and are to this day still guarded at the headquarters of the Khalifa.

sending Grieger on this expedition; for there had been a blood feud of long standing between Grieger and Saleh, the latter's father having killed both Grieger's father and uncle.

¹ The following account was related by the mother of Saleh Bey to a well-known Sudanese merchant, sheikh Ahmed el Farisi, who has recently arrived from Omdurman.

SUAKIN

Affairs in the Suakin district had meantime been progressing satisfactorily. The Amarar still continued their professions of loyalty, while Mohammed Abu Fatma also reported that he considered his tribe would soon be prepared to enter into active hostility against Osman. Letters were also received from sheikh Wag (Wahaj) Hassan at Tokar to the effect that Mahdieh was also on the decline at that place.

In May an unfortunate incident occurred which considerably disturbed the inter-tribal Hadendowa and Amarar confederation and checked all progress for some months. The road to Berber had been, to all intents and purposes, open for some months; but it had not been considered advisable by the Governor-General to declare it open for many reasons, the principal one being that the rights of the road had been a long-standing question of dispute between the Amarar and the Hadendowa. The former tribe, however, taking the matter into their own hands, declared the road open, and at once the old feud broke out. The Hadendowa loudly declaimed the action of the Amarar, and some of their sheikhs proceeded to Tokar to obtain the assistance of the Arabs against the Amarar. The emir Fiki Ali of course fostered the feud, and for a time hostilities seemed inevitable; fortunately two important sheikhs, El Amin Fagiri and Abd el Kader Hamad, now declared their opposition to any such action, and wrote to the Governor-General that they would do their utmost to maintain peace and carry out his wishes. In consequence an open rupture was averted.

While affairs were in this condition, Mohammed Mussa Digna arrived at Tokar with 1000 men, mostly Baggara and well armed. The force at Kassala at this time numbered upwards of 21,000. To the north of Suakin slave-dealers had for some time been driving a brisk trade; after being ousted from Khor Shenab by H.M.S. *Grappler* in 1885, they had settled at the Port of Halaib, some 250 miles north of Suakin, where, emboldened by long immunity, some of the Heteima colony fired on a boat of H.M.S. *Gannet*, killing Lieutenant Stewart and wounding some of the blue-jackets.

In May H.M.S. *Dolphin* burnt the Heteima village, and in June, Colonel Kitchener proceeded to Halaib with a party of Bashi-Bazuks and a company of the 10th Sudanese battalion, accompanied by H.M.S. *Gannet* and *Falcon*. The Heteima were dispersed, their sheikhs captured, and shortly afterwards they left the country and settled on the opposite coast. Halaib was now opened as a Government port,¹ a post of police established, and soon trade found a ready market.

The arrival of the Baggara at Tokar had somewhat revived the fanatical spirit at that place, but had not much effect on the surrounding tribes, who, on being summoned there, refused to go. In July the chief sheikhs of Tokar were summoned to Omdurman, and Mohammed el Amin, sheikh of the Wel Aliab, a man of considerable importance in the Sinkat district, was chosen as the representative to accompany them.

In the same month the Hadendowa made a formal friendship with the Amara. But shortly afterwards the peace of Adobana was disturbed by the establishment of a Baggara post there to collect taxes from the tribes, which, for a time, they refused to give. The irreconcilable Okkud Mussa alone threw in his lot with the Baggara.

Affairs continued thus with little change for some months. The Baggara had not ingratiated themselves with the local tribes, and their overbearance combined with extortion had alienated many who on first arrival were prepared to treat them as friends. At the same time the Baggara kept the local tribes in considerable awe of them.

In July Osman Digna again left for Omdurman to attend the council of emirs convened by the Khalifa, and in which the whole of the Sudan affairs were to be discussed.

The intention of the Khalifa in assembling all the sheikhs with their families was to guard the latter as hostages in Omdurman, while the sheikhs were to return and enter into active operations in every direction. But the majority refused to bring their families, and even refused to enter upon this extended plan of campaign, though they agreed that if the Khalifa were attacked they would lend their assistance. In consequence of their refusal several of the sheikhs were imprisoned. On the break-up of the council Osman returned

¹ A port in the Beni Amer country opposite to the island of Bahdur.

to Kassala, where constant conflicts were taking place between the Hadendowa and Baggara; and Osman on his arrival there was obliged to ask for Baggara reinforcements.


The feeling against these latter was perhaps stronger in this part of the country than elsewhere. The main centre of disturbance was at Odeib, where the Shebodinab and Gemilab sections showed the most open hostility to the Baggara and frequent skirmishes took place, which usually resulted in favour of the Hadendowa.

In October forty of the most influential Hadendowa and Amarar sheikhs assembled at Suakin, and with the approval of the Governor-General, decided to assemble at Taroi,¹ preparatory to an advance on Tokar. In November they advanced to Setirab, but here, as is inevitably the case where powerful tribes combine without a common head, dissensions sprang up; the Amarar accused the Hadendowa of not coming to their support, while the latter reproached the Amarar with cowardice, and the force again retired to Taroi. Here on December 9th a party of Baggara foot and horsemen fell on the Amarar and completely dispersed them.

In the meantime news had reached Osman at Kassala that the garrison of Suakin had been largely reduced. The 5th Egyptian battalion left in the autumn, followed in November by the 10th Sudanese, and on the withdrawal of the latter it was reported to Osman that the town was undefended except by a few Bashi-Bazuks. Collecting all the men he could, he at once set out for Tokar with a force of 5000 men, arriving there in ten days; and proceeding thence to Handub, he established himself there, and on the 16th December was once more master of the whole country.

The Arabs now made no secret of their intention to attack the town, but Osman resolved to summon all the tribes to his standard ere he struck the decisive blow. His patrols were most active by day, while the gardens under the walls of Suakin were pillaged by night, and once more Suakin was in a state of siege. Fortunately, however, the anti-Mahdi confederation stood firm, and the local tribesmen did not offer a ready response to Osman's summons. In order, therefore, to hasten matters he despatched expeditions north, south, and

¹ Five miles south of Tamai.



west. That to the north was almost annihilated by the Amarar, who collected in force at Dara under Ahmed Mahmud and killed some 350 of them, including their guide, in consequence of which the majority of those who escaped lost their way and died of hunger and thirst. The south and western expeditions returned without having effected any result of importance.

Two days after the action of Dara a party of Amarar and Muwalledin¹ sallied forth from Suakin and fell on the Arab post at Taroi, which they dispersed, capturing some 1200 head of cattle and 160 camels.

Thus the year 1887 closed on Osman, encamped at Handub with a more or less shattered force, and once more disappointed of the prey for which he had struggled so long, and which he thought he could at last secure without much difficulty.

¹ The name given to natives of a mixed parentage—*i.e.* generally an Egyptian or Turkish father and a Sudanese mother.

BOOK XI

The protection of the frontier entrusted to the Egyptian army—Bahr Karrar establishes himself at Ongat—The raid on Kalabsheh—The raid on Girsheh—Fortified posts established between Korosko and Halfa—The wells of Murat occupied by the enemy—Raid on Farrek—Nejumi attends a council of emirs at Omdurman—The establishment of the frontier military Mudirieh—Colonel Wodehouse appointed Governor—Minshetta Bey tried by a general court-martial as a traitor—Proclamation to the Bisharin—Reinforcements arrive at Sarra—The attack on Dabrosa—The attack on Fort Khor Mussa—Nejumi taunted by the Khalifa for inaction—Suakin—Osman's expedition from Handub—Colonel Kitchener attempts the capture of Osman—The action at Handub—Colonel Kitchener wounded—The Arabs entrench themselves close to Suakin—The action of 4th March—Death of Captain Tapp—Osman and the tribes—Two months' cessation of hostilities with Suakin—The arrival of Osman Naib with reinforcements from Omdurman—The enemy open trenches within 1900 yards of Suakin—The siege of Suakin—Colonel Holled-Smith Governor-General—Reinforcements sent from Cairo—General Grenfell reports necessity of increasing the Egyptian army—The reconnaissance of 8th October—General Grenfell proceeds to Suakin—He considers it necessary to drive the enemy from their trenches—British ordered to Suakin—The attitude of the tribes—The action of Gemaizeh—Complete defeat of the Arabs—Events on the Abyssinian frontier—The Khalifa's letter to King John—The Khalifa's vision—Abu Angar's campaign—He again reaches Gondar—Death of Abu Angar—Events in Darfur—Osman Adam attacks and defeats the Sultan Zayid at Wadi el Masrieh; and again at Baira—The death of Sultans Zayid and Yusef—The revolt in Dar Tama—Sheikh Abu Gemaizeh leads the revolt—He calls on the Sultan of Borgo for assistance—The latter appeals to the Senussi—Senussi's reply—Explanation of the so-called Senussi movement—The Khalifa's letter to Abu Gemaizeh—The alarm at Omdurman—Abu Gemaizeh advances towards El Fasher—He defeats the Mahdiist forces at Kebkebieh—He returns again to Dar Tama to collect reinforcements—Equatoria—Who was the White Pasha?—An explanation—The Khalifa despatches an expedition from Omdurman to capture the White Pasha—Emin and Jephson make a tour through the province—The mutiny at Kiri—The revolt at Duffleh—Emin and Jephson made prisoners—The Mahdiist army under Omar Saleh arrives at Lado—Emin and Jephson released—They proceed to Wadelai—Evacuation of Wadelai—Duffleh recaptured from the Mahdiists—Omar Saleh's despatch to the Khalifa—The latter sends it to Osman Digna, who passes it to General Grenfell at Suakin—The situation in Equatoria at the end of 1888.

FRONTIER, 1888

THE state of affairs at Sarras remained unchanged. On the 4th January the last detachment of British troops¹ was withdrawn from Assuan, and the protection of the frontier devolved on the Egyptian army. On January 6th the emir Wad Basir was despatched to Dongola to press Nejumi for orders either to attack or withdraw, for the retention of so large a force at Sarras was daily becoming more and more difficult; food was getting more scarce and sickness more prevalent. The emir Mussaid, who had proceeded as far as Ferkeh with reinforcements, returned suddenly to Dongola early in February as governor of the province, while the command of the Dongola army devolved absolutely on Nejumi. Mussaid's reinforcements, consisting of some 500 men, arrived at Sarras on 20th.

In the meantime Bahr Karrar, although he had failed in his mission to raise the Bisharin, took possession of the wells of Haimur and Ongat in the Eastern Desert, both of which he occupied in force with the object of raiding thence on the river between Assuan and Korosko. The conduct of Bishir Bey, who was responsible for the safety of this portion of the desert, was naturally questioned, but he pleaded inability to protect the wells against such superior numbers. Bahr, however, lost no time in making known his proximity, and on 25th February he sent the emir Hussein Abu Hamed to attack the village of Kalabsheh, 50 miles south of Assuan, and some 100 miles from Ongat. The Arabs descended on the village at 4 A.M. and made for the police station, where the small detachment, after a slight resistance, was soon scattered with the loss of four men wounded, while the officer in command was captured; his wife made a gallant resistance to his capture, and died a few hours afterwards from the wounds she received. A detachment of troops under Captain Besant arrived from Assuan on the following morning and pursued the enemy for some distance, but being mounted on dromedaries they succeeded in escaping.

It is a noteworthy fact that on this occasion none of the villagers were touched, and moreover seemed quite indifferent

¹ One company of the Welsh Regiment.

to the presence of the troops who had been sent there for their protection. It was now evident that the inhabitants could not, and in many cases would not, do anything to help themselves, and it became necessary to establish fortified posts of 100 men each at the various points threatened; while gunboats and Camel Corps detachments vigorously patrolled river and banks. But even these steps were not sufficient to prevent parties of roving Arabs from coming down during the night, cutting the telegraph wire, and retiring into the desert during the daytime. It was ascertained that these Arabs occupied the wells of Glib, a few hours distant from the river on the Haimur road. A party came down on Allaki on the 28th, attacked some sailing vessels at anchor, and robbed the dhurra with which they were laden. On March 12th another party, some 150 strong, mounted on camels, came down to the village of Girsheh, six miles north of Jebel-Haiata, destroyed a mile of the telegraph and ill-used the inhabitants, but retreated rapidly when the mounted patrols came in sight. The persistency of these raids and the alarm they created were a cause of some anxiety. There were now fortified posts of 100 infantry at Sabua, Syaleh, Allaki, Jebel-Haiata, Merieh, Abu-Hor, and Kalabsheh, while orders were given to Bishir Bey to at once organise a force of his irregulars to retake the desert wells. The Sirdar, reporting on the general situation, stated that the present strength of the Egyptian army was not sufficient to hold Halfa, Korosko, and Assuan, and the 220 miles of country between Assuan and Halfa, so as to prevent raids and protect the telegraph.

Hitherto these raids had been confined to the country north of Korosko, but now, in addition to the occupation of Haimur, Ongat, and Glib, the wells of Murat were again occupied by a hostile body of Arabs, and on March 23d a descent was made on the village of Farrek—35 miles north of Halfa—which was plundered, twelve of the inhabitants being killed and thirty wounded.

This serious raid appears to have occurred in the following manner. Just before sunrise a party of about 100 Arabs, mounted on camels and armed with swords, spears, and long Sudan guns, came down to the river, about a mile below Farrek, and having taken water, instantly disappeared into the

hills, and without pausing swept down on Farrek, firing one volley and then charging the village in all directions, killing and wounding all they could catch, including the two head sheikhs. They then proceeded to loot cattle and steal ornaments from women and destroy the telegraph. They remained in the village about five hours and then made off to the hills with some forty head of cattle. Fortified posts were now established at Farrek, Toski, and Ibrim. In the meantime Bishir Bey's brother Ali Mustafa, with a force of 400 Ababdehs, had left Derau on the 22d, to occupy the wells of Abrak, whence he could operate against the Arabs at Haimur and Ongat, while an Egyptian battalion was posted at Derau.

On 28th March Nejumi left Dongola for Omdurman, doubtless to discuss further the plans for the invasion of Egypt.

Raids, however, still continued, and on 5th April the village of Erminna, 50 miles north of Halfa, was plundered and three of the inhabitants captured. The unsettled state of the country between Assuan and Halfa now seriously occupied the attention of the Government; and in order to give increased powers of supervision to the military authorities charged with the protection of this long line of frontier, it was decided to separate the district south of Assuan from the Esneh mudirieh, of which it had always formed a part, and to create a new province, to be designated the frontier mudirieh, vesting the entire civil and military control of this district in the person of the officer commanding the troops. Consequently Colonel Wodehouse, then commanding on the frontier, was officially inducted as governor of the new province on 16th April. The civil police were withdrawn from the various posts and replaced by military police; the inhabitants were warned that they were now subject to martial law, and the discovery of any attempt to communicate with the enemy would be punished by the extreme penalty.

A case soon occurred. Minshetta Bey, one of the subsidised Ababdeh sheikhs, was arraigned before a general court-martial at Assuan on the charge of communicating with the enemy. He was sentenced to be shot, but his Highness the Khedive commuted the sentence to penal servitude. The effect of this action was soon apparent; gradually a complete change came

over the inhabitants and expressions of loyalty became general. Arms were issued to them for the protection of their villages, and a feeling of greater security prevailed everywhere. Bishir Bey's expedition had succeeded in clearing the desert wells in the vicinity of the Nile valley of marauders, and on June 1st he occupied Haimur with 250 men.¹

At Sarraṣ the numbers of the enemy had decreased considerably, partially owing to desertions on account of scarcity of food, and perhaps in a greater measure to Nejumi's departure for Omdurman and the consequent absence of any orders for an advance.

Proclamations were now sent to the Bisharin tribes, granting the Government pardon for any former misdeeds, and urging them to greater loyalty and to take active measures against Mahdist intrusion in their country.

A short season of tranquillity on the frontier now ensued ; but on the 15th July news was received from Nejumi that operations were to be renewed against the frontier, and on the 18th a large force of camel-men arrived at Sarraṣ from the south, with orders to attack the villages north of Assuan. The force at Sarraṣ received this news with acclamation ; they had long clamoured to be allowed to plunder, and the scarcity of food made them doubly anxious to advance.

On the 19th a party of 500 horsemen and camel-men left Sarraṣ secretly under the emirs Makin en Nur and Billal, and taking up a position in the hills above Dabrosa,² detached a small party to plunder. In spite of a warning of possible attack, the inhabitants were completely surprised by the Arabs, who set fire to the houses, killed some fifty men, women, and children, and wounded thirty-five others. The terrified villagers fled to the boats, of which there were some twenty, but in the confusion three of them were upset and 137 people drowned, while the remainder succeeded in taking refuge on an island opposite. In the meantime the alarm had been given at Halfa, and the mounted troops at once pushed out ; but the enemy succeeded in reaching the hills and making good their retreat

¹ Shortly afterwards these wells were visited by Captain Beauchamp with a patrol of the Egyptian Camel Corps.

² Dabrosa is the bazar or cantonment of Halfa, and is situated about a mile north of the lines ; it is inhabited principally by Greek and Egyptian merchants, and is the supply mart to the Halfa garrison.

under a brisk fire, in which an important emir named Bilal was wounded and died shortly afterwards. This serious raid happened almost under the walls of Halfa, and in spite of vigorous scouting the Arabs had effected a complete surprise, arriving within a mile of Dabrosa before there was the smallest idea of their presence in the neighbourhood.

It appears that they made a very long detour into the desert, thus avoiding the line of scouts, and penetrating a deep valley which debouched close to the village, they succeeded in arriving at their position unseen. It subsequently transpired that they were guided to the spot by Hassan el Gazzar, a former deserter from Dabrosa, who had taken service with the Arabs and had been made an emir. In many of the subsequent raids from Sarras this man and another deserter named Abu Yezid, an ex-official of the Halfa railway, invariably guided the enemy, and it was not till after the action of Toski in 1889 that Abu Yezid was captured and shot in the presence of the Dabrosa villagers whom he had betrayed.

It seemed now that a period of activity was about to begin; there were constant rumours of contemplated attempts to cut communications north of Halfa on a large scale, but the plan which gained most credence was that Abd el Halim intended to divide his force into three sections. The first section was to occupy Deberra,¹ the second to establish itself between Dabrosa and Halfa, while the third was to attack Argin, some nine miles north of Halfa on the west bank. But the emirs could arrive at no decided plan of action, and again Osman Azrak left for Dongola to urge Mussaid to give definite orders.

Meanwhile the Arab force at Sarras was not idle, and on the night of 29th August a most daring attack was made on the outpost fort of Khor Mussa, held by two companies of the 7th Egyptian Battalion and a detachment of the Camel Corps.

To understand the detail of events, a slight description of the fort is necessary. It consisted originally of a native house on the river bank, and only a few yards distant from the high-level water-mark. This was converted into the fort, while the north wall separated it from a large inclosure surrounded by a mud wall; the whole length south and east was

¹ Some ten miles north of Halfa on the east bank.

protected by a thorn zariba and wire entanglement. The barrack-rooms were built along the east face of the fort and along the inclosure, stairs being placed at frequent intervals to enable the men to mount on to the parapet, from which they could fire.

To the north was a further inclosure for mounted troops. The faces of the fort perpendicular to the banks are continued to the water's edge. The positions of the various gates are shown in the accompanying diagram.

At about midday on the 29th four camel-men were captured near Halfa, while at about sunset a horseman was seen by the patrols east of Dabrosa on the hills; these two facts aroused the suspicion of Colonel Wodehouse, commanding the troops, who gave instructions that the *Metemmeh*¹ should keep up steam all night, while the armoured train with a detachment of troops should be held in readiness to leave the lines at short notice.

Meanwhile a party of some 500 Arabs under the emir Abd el Hafiz, and guided by the nephew of sheikh Koki,² aided by the darkness of the night, had arrived close to the fort. A small party detached from the main body now crept up silently under the river bank, unheard and unperceived, till close under the walls. Two sentries were posted on the two southern corners of the fort: the sentry on the south-west corner, hearing a noise close to his post, challenged, and was immediately shot, and at the same time hit by a thrown spear. The corporal of the guard, hearing the noise, and a loud shout outside, at once opened the western gate on the river bank and was shot down, while the Arabs, streaming through the gate, killed all the men of the guard.³ The garrison of the southern fort, suddenly roused, turned out, and finding the south end of the fort full of the enemy, had to fight their way to the northern section, and from here for two hours they


¹ An armed stern-wheeler.

² This man lived close to fort Khor Mussa and used to supply the garrison with milk, but had deserted some three weeks previously in company with the railway official Abu Yezid.

³ The action of this unfortunate corporal is quite inexplicable. Suddenly awakened up, he was perhaps dazed by the noise, and suspecting no danger, opened the gate to see for himself the cause of the disturbance. Had the gate been kept closed, it would not have been possible for the Arabs to have effected an entry.

مطبخ طابئة خور موسى باشا بمفرق السكينة والكور

PLAN OF KHOR MUSSA FORT





offered a stubborn resistance, firing from every available spot of advantage and making loopholes in the roofs of the barrack-rooms of the southern fort; but their fire was necessarily very confined and inflicted little loss, the enemy being protected by the walls. Up to this time the defence had been conducted in a gallant manner by Major Abd el Ghani Fuad, who on the first alarm had telephoned in to Halfa. The news reached Colonel Wodehouse at 11.30 P.M., and immediately afterwards the wire was cut, while heavy firing was heard from the direction of Khor Mussa. The armoured train started at once with a detachment of fifty men, but owing to possible tampering with the line it went slowly, guarded by a detachment of cavalry. The gunboat *Metemmeh*, under the command of Lieutenant M'Murdo, received orders to steam towards the fort, which it reached at 1.30 A.M., and its commander, learning the situation, opened fire on the portion of the fort in the possession of the enemy. At 2.45 A.M. four mounted messengers arrived from the fort at Halfa, and Colonel Wodehouse, on being apprised of the details, despatched a party of 100 men of the 13th Sudanese battalion under Lieutenant Machell, by a second train. These latter arrived within 300 yards of the fort almost simultaneously with the first train, which, delayed by a break in the line, had stopped to repair it.

Lieutenant Machell, leaving a small detachment to guard the train and sending the cavalry towards the river, advanced himself with two companies towards the north end of the fort. Halting within fifty yards of it, he made the men lie down, and proceeded alone to the fort to ascertain the situation. Ten minutes later, sending for his men, he posted fifty near the gate on the east side, and fifty near the gate on the west side of the inclosure, which he saw had been left open, and, anticipating the possible escape of the enemy before daylight, he determined to effect a surprise. Calling to the gunboat to cease fire, he directed the fifty men on the east side to range themselves silently under the south and east walls, with orders to prevent any of the enemy escaping, while he with the other fifty crept stealthily round the outside wall until they arrived at the gate. Here the front section, rapidly forming up, fired a volley straight into the mass of the enemy

collected within the fort. The Arabs, in their turn completely surprised, attempted to escape by clambering over the wall, but were met at the point of the bayonet by the other detachment, who were waiting below to receive them.

Lieutenant Machell with his men then dashed through the gate, and, forming a rough line, steadily received the Arabs, who, baffled in their attempts to escape, and with their retreat by the gate cut off, fought with the energy of despair, literally throwing themselves on the bayonets. Soon all within the inclosure were either killed or wounded, and the fort was once more in possession of the Egyptians, but with the severe loss of nineteen men killed and thirty-four wounded, three officers being included among the latter. The enemy's loss was heavy, eighty-five bodies, mostly Baggara and Jaalin, being counted in and around the fort, while many others fell along the line of retreat. Their emir, Abd el Hafiz, was severely wounded, while his second in command, Hassan et Taleb, was killed; 153 spears, 31 rifles, and a number of other arms were captured.

This severe reverse considerably discouraged the Arabs, while it restored confidence amongst the riverain population.

Nejumi had not yet returned from Omdurman, and it is stated that before the council of emirs was broken up, the Khalifa solemnly rebuked him, saying, "Osman Ganoo has captured Shakka, Abu Girgeh is doing great deeds at Suakin, Hamdan Abu Angar has beaten the Abyssinians, you are two years at Dongola and do nothing,—go and take Halfa, and do not return here until you have done so." Nejumi is said to have protested that Halfa was impregnable, but said he would turn it. Leaving Omdurman shortly afterwards, he arrived at Dongola on the 15th September, and immediately began collecting a force. The Khalifa had promised him large reinforcements, and they were actually on their way to Dongola when they were recalled and sent to Galabat with the expedition against the Abyssinians. The frontier was now once more tranquil, the force at Sarras was reduced by the withdrawal of most of the Baggara to fight in various parts of the Sudan, and refugees from the northern districts began to pour into the frontier.

SUAKIN AND THE EASTERN SUDAN, 1888

Early in January 1888, Osman Digna, collecting the scattered remnants of his force at Handub, busily prepared a second expedition to enforce the obedience of the Amara. Ahmed Mahmud was still in the neighbourhood of Dara with a force. Many of his followers, elated with their recent success, had returned to their homes, and the remainder, fearing that Osman was preparing a second expedition, began to lose courage. On the 13th of January a strong expedition left Handub, and after a few slight skirmishes came on the main body of the Amara at Dara on the 17th. The latter offered a half-hearted resistance and retreated, losing some 700 men, including Mohammed Sheikh, brother of Ahmed Mahmud, one of their most active leaders. Meanwhile Colonel Kitchener, apprised of the departure of the expedition from Handub, conceived the idea of making a *coup de main* on Handub, which, if successful, might lead to the capture of Osman Digna, and the probable break-up of Mahdism in this part of the country. Telegraphing to Cairo, he received permission to carry out this project with the friendly tribes, irregulars, and police, whose action he was allowed to support with the few mounted troops at his disposal.¹ Leaving Suakin at 1 A.M. on the 17th with a force of some 500 men, he proceeded along the old railway line towards Handub, and at 4 A.M. the force was halted to await dawn. Owing to a mistake of the guides it was believed that the force was now only a mile distant from the rebel camp; but in the darkness a miscalculation had been made, and it was subsequently discovered that the camp was still three miles in advance. At 4.45 A.M. the foot party, consisting of Amara, Bashi-Bazuks, police, and Muwalledin, and some Sudanese troops, advanced rapidly towards Handub. The Sudanese were for the most part recent deserters from the enemy who had belonged to the garrison at Kassala, and were taken on this expedition owing to their local knowledge of the rebel camp, and it had been pre-arranged that this party was to make straight for Osman Digna and endeavour to capture him.


¹ Colonel Kitchener was accompanied by Lieutenant Prinsep, A.D.C.; Captain T. E. Hickman, commanding the cavalry and second in command; Lieutenant M'Murdo, commanding the Camel Corps; and Surgeon-Major Galbraith.

The mounted troops remained at the first halting-place in order to support the action of the advance party when necessary.

The rebel camp was situated between a range of hills on the left and a small detached hill on the right of the road, and consisted of a strongly-built zariba, to the rear of which lay the village. The country in the vicinity was alternate thick and open bush.


At the first streak of dawn the force under the command of Mohammed Ahmed, chief of police, emerging from the bush, fell on the Arabs assembled outside the zariba at prayer. The latter, completely surprised, fled precipitately, leaving their arms and ammunition, while the irregulars swept through the camp in pursuit, the Sudanese making straight for the place in the village where they knew it was probable Osman Digna would be found. Before many minutes he was espied in the distance, and his horse, tethered a few yards away from him, was captured; but the wily Osman was equal to the occasion, and mounting a passing camel he escaped into the hills when almost in reach of his would-be captors. The rout seemed complete, and the whole force, believing the village to be now clear of the enemy, split up into small parties and followed after the retreating enemy. But many of the huts were still occupied, and the remainder, who had been dispersed, now rallied, and, led by their mounted men, swept round the detached hill, re-entered the camp in rear of their pursuers, regained their arms and ammunition, and in turn became the assailants. And now the irregulars, in their turn completely surprised, found themselves cut off and isolated.

In the meantime the first flashes of fire from Handub were observed by the mounted troops as they were slowly advancing in support, and Colonel Kitchener at once advanced them at a trot to within half a mile of Handub, where the critical position of the advanced party was reported to him by their commander, and already a detachment of his cavalry had engaged the enemy's horsemen. He thereupon advanced the remainder to within 500 yards of the rebels, and dismounting his men, opened a heavy fire, which forced them to take cover in the village. By this time the Sudanese, after their fruitless attempt to secure the person of Osman, had collected on a small knoll,



SKETCH OF ACTION AGAINST HANDUB

17.1.88



S²

J. E. Hylman, Bird
Suakin, 17th Jan 88

the irregulars were scattered on the hills behind, while the friendly Arabs had retired into the bush. Seeing the position of affairs, Colonel Kitchener at once sounded the "assembly," intending to renew the attack on the position, now strongly reoccupied by the enemy. The Sudanese, at once obeying the summons, rejoined him, and now the whole force was advanced 150 yards nearer the position, and a very heavy fusillade maintained on both sides. The right flank of the attacking force was now observed to be seriously threatened by a number of the enemy in the bush, and as many men as possible were sent off to the right to prevent a turning movement, but it was soon noticed that what at first appeared to be a strong force of the enemy were really a number of escaped prisoners and deserters, who were apparently endeavouring to make their way towards Suakin. Colonel Kitchener now made every effort to cover the retreat of these latter, and by maintaining a heavy fire on the enemy enabled some 160 of them to make good their escape. 'Just at this time Colonel Kitchener received a severe bullet wound in the face which placed him *hors de combat*. He had realised that the action of the irregulars and friendlies in the first attack had destroyed all chances of recapturing the camp. And the escape of the prisoners having been effected, he deemed further action useless. A retirement was therefore ordered, and was well carried out by Captain Hickman, who had now assumed command of the force. In order to cover the retreat of the wounded and prisoners, a general retirement did not take place till these had proceeded some three miles on the road back to Suakin, and then by alternately withdrawing the troops by detachments a slow and orderly retreat was effected, during which they were closely followed by a considerable number of the enemy. 'Lieutenant M'Murdo received a wound in the knee, but continued with his men until the rearguard reached Suakin at 11 A.M.

The casualties on the occasion were 10 men killed, 3 officers and 19 men wounded, and 6 men missing. It is estimated, from reports of prisoners and others, that the enemy's loss could not have been less than 300.

Two days later Colonel Kitchener left for Cairo invalided.

The expedition sent by Osman towards the north returned a few days later to Handub, upon which he despatched a


second force to the west against the Hadendowa tribes. This, however, returned in February without having encountered any one.

Meanwhile the Arabs, emboldened with their recent success, began to display increased activity round Suakin, and on the night of the 3d March a large party established themselves in a position on the site of the old Fort Hudson—1900 yards from the gates of Suakin. And from here they kept up a continuous fire during the night on the advanced fort of "H" redoubt—1300 yards distant—and on the town. Their position was shelled by guns from the works, Fort Shaata, and "H" redoubt, but owing to the nature of their entrenchment—a sort of deep traversed rifle-pit—the fire was ineffective. On the following morning Major Shakespear, on whom the duties of commandant devolved on Colonel Kitchener's departure, made an attempt to dislodge the enemy, and for this purpose took out a company of the 2d Egyptian and a company of the 3d Egyptian battalions, and the mounted troops—in all some 450 men. These latter soon became engaged with a party of the enemy's horse and footmen, whom they succeeded in keeping in check during the development of the infantry attack. On approaching to within 150 yards of the rebels the infantry poured a heavy fire into the position, which was equally heavily replied to by the enemy; so heavy indeed was it that an attempt to charge failed, and after a fusilade lasting some two hours the reserves, consisting of a small detachment of the 10th Sudanese and some friendly Amarar, were brought up. Of these the Amarar crept up to the right front, while the 10th Sudanese succeeded in breasting the mound, just in front of the enemy's position, from which they brought a heavy fire to bear on them. Now, however, a strong party of the enemy was seen approaching the right flank from the direction of Handub to reinforce the entrenched party. Just at this moment an unfortunate incident occurred. A shell from one of the ships in harbour directed against the enemy's reinforcements burst prematurely and fell amongst the friendlies, who, suddenly scared, fell back on the troops.

Meanwhile Captain Tapp, commanding the right flank, had thrown back a company to meet the flank movement from Handub; but the troops, already unsettled by the backward

**SKETCH OF COUNTRY ROUND
FORT HUDSON**

Suakin 4.3.88.





rush of the friendlies, took the movement of the flank as an indication that a retirement had been ordered, and in consequence the whole line fell back, followed by the enemy, who attempted to charge, but were checked by the fire from "H" redoubt. On seeing the troops retiring, the enemy's horsemen charged, and succeeded in reaching Captain Tapp (commanding 3d Egyptian battalion), who, the last to retire, fell pierced by the spear of an Arab horseman, against whom he had emptied his revolver, and who fell almost immediately afterwards. The whole force had now regained "H" redoubt, with a further loss of seven men killed and seventeen wounded, while the rebels maintained their position during the remainder of the day under a heavy cross cannonade. At nightfall they drew off, and made no further attempt to reoccupy this position.

After this occurrence little was seen of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Suakin during the remainder of the month.

Colonel Kitchener, though still suffering from his wound, returned to Suakin on hearing of the affair of the 4th March.

Meanwhile Osman was still unsuccessful in obtaining the co-operation of the tribes, in spite of his recent defeat of the Amarar, and now his attention was mainly occupied in conciliating the Baggara and Jaalin, who complained of having been brought into a barren country to no purpose, while they had been led to believe that the natives would receive them with open arms. The natives of Tokar, too, were dissatisfied with Osman, whose wants for the supply of a large force had drained their resources, and it was probable that all would be exhausted before the summer was far advanced.

Osman now tried persuasion instead of force, and sent the well-known Hadendowa sheikh Wad el Haddab on a mission to the local sheikhs. These latter would not, however, listen to him, and moreover induced Haddab not to return to Handub; but in spite of their loyalty a new factor now came into play. Hitherto they had not felt, in any large degree, the sting of famine, but this, the natural consequence of continual warfare, was now apparent more or less throughout the whole country. While, therefore, still professing loyalty, they in March informed the Governor-General that Osman was

virtually in possession of the country, and therefore of its supplies, and that absolute want might drive them into submission at last, but they begged that it might be understood that they were loyal at heart, even though they might at any time be forced to give assistance to the rebels.

At the end of March small reinforcements arrived at Handub from Kassala under Mustafa Hadal, who was followed in April by Abu Girgeh, with a considerable force. The Arabs were now more numerous and in a stronger position in the Suakin neighbourhood than they had been for a long time. The new fortifications, however, begun by Colonel Kitchener on his first arrival were completed in the month of May, and the enemy seemed to realise that a sudden attack on the town would be a very serious undertaking; they therefore contented themselves with constant patrolling in the vicinity. The arrival of Abu Girgeh also proved a source of dissension. He had been one of Mohammed Ahmed's earliest supporters, and had always occupied a very high position; he therefore refused to acknowledge Osman Digna as his chief, while, on the other hand, the latter claimed the Khalifa's authority as the supreme head in the Eastern Sudan. Abu Girgeh, with the Baggara and Jaalin, held that it would be useless to attempt the capture of Suakin by assault, while the more warlike faction of Osman advocated it. The consequence was a series of quarrels, which on several occasions very nearly led to actual fighting. Correspondence of a conciliatory character was at this time carried on between Abu Girgeh and the Governor-General.

The presence of an unusually large force of rebels in their country did not prevent the loyal tribes from continuing their hostility. Towards the end of May the Amarar began to cut the Arab communications between Tokar and Handub, while the Gemilab and Hamdab again sent in assurances of loyalty. On hearing this Osman established a post at Serarab to guard against possible reprisals on their part. Such was the state of affairs when Colonel Kitchener again left, this time invalided to England, and Major Rundle was despatched to Suakin to act as Governor-General during his absence.

Meanwhile complaints of Osman Digna's unpopularity with the tribes had reached the Khalifa's ears, and the latter decided that every attempt should be made to conciliate them. More-

over, it was necessary to replenish the grain, now wellnigh exhausted, owing to the constantly disturbed state of the country. It was well known that the insecure state of the roads alone prevented large supplies entering the country from the Red Sea ports; consequently towards the end of June instructions were received by Osman from Omdurman to suspend all warlike operations for the space of two months.

Regarding events in other parts of the country, little of importance had occurred. Attention was mainly concentrated on Suakin. Many of the Jaalin had deserted back to the Nile, and on the 7th July Abu Girgeh started for Omdurman, followed a few days later by sheikh Mohammed Wad Mussa Bey, and once more Osman found himself in undisputed supremacy at Handub.

Matters thus continued tranquil until the expiration of the two months' cessation of hostilities. By September, Osman's stores had been replenished, and he had received further reinforcements from Omdurman under the emir Osman Naïb.¹ The Khalifa had long recognised that his operations towards Egypt could not be fully developed so long as his flank was threatened by Suakin. A flank attack on Egypt through the Bisharin country to Kosseir, and thence to Keneh, had often been contemplated, but to carry out this successfully he considered that Suakin must first be taken.

Colonel Kitchener having now been appointed Adjutant-General of the Egyptian army, was succeeded as Governor-General by Lieut.-Colonel Holled-Smith, who, arriving on the 13th September, relieved Major Rundle.

On the 15th September a council was held at Handub, at which it was decided to besiege Suakin, and on the night of the 17th, without giving any notice that hostilities were to be reopened, a force of some 500 Jaalin and Baggara under Osman Naïb, with a small body of horsemen, entrenched themselves within 900 yards of the water-forts, with the intention of cutting off the wells. With these reinforcements Osman Digna's strength was now estimated at between 4000 to 5000 men, distributed between Handub, Hashin, and the new entrenchments. Firing was now kept up almost continuously

¹ An Arab taken prisoner during the Nile Expedition of 1884-85, but subsequently liberated.

on forts and town by day and night, and casualties were of frequent occurrence. On the morning of the 21st the mounted infantry reconnoitred the enemy's position and succeeded in drawing him out. On appearing they were heavily fired on from ship and forts, but owing to large bodies of spearmen and horsemen appearing in the bush, the mounted infantry was obliged to retire with the loss of three men wounded.

On the night of the 22d the Arabs placed a small gun on the ridge between the water-forts and fired some shell into the town, but the fire from the guns on the lines of Suakin obliged them to withdraw it.

It was now evident that a determined attempt might at any time be made to attack Suakin. Colonel Holled-Smith urgently telegraphed for reinforcements, while H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh, Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Squadron, recognising the necessity of increasing the naval force in the Red Sea, despatched H.M.S. *Racer* (Commander May) to Suakin to assist H.M.S. *Gannet* (Commander Bradford).

Meantime the enemy were becoming bolder. On the night of the 25th a party crept up and set fire to the zariba round Fort Shaata. Two nights later they pushed forward a trench to within 500 yards of the fort, and opened a heavy fire on it and the approaches.

The garrison of Suakin was now reinforced from Cairo by the 4th Egyptian Battalion, and General Grenfell, reporting on the situation, submitted that until the present revival of Mahdiism was at an end, it would be necessary to provide for a larger garrison at Suakin; and in order to provide for this, and for carrying out the responsible duties of guarding the frontier and Suakin with a fair system of relief, he pressed for the addition to the Egyptian army of three battalions of infantry, a troop of cavalry, and a troop of mounted infantry; and in view of the urgency of the matter an increase of fifty men per battalion was at once authorised, while the further increase was under consideration.

The Arabs still continued active in the trenches, believing that if they could capture the water-forts they would then be in a position to bombard the town. Considerable reinforcements were reported to have reached the trenches, and in order

to discover as far as possible the numbers, Colonel Holled-Smith made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position. The troops, under the command of Captain Lewis, consisting of battalion wings of the 3d Battalion, 11th Sudanese, and mounted infantry, succeeded in getting within 600 yards of the trenches of Fort Gemaizeh, and having ascertained that the strength of the enemy was little changed, a retirement was ordered, the Egyptian losses being two men killed and twenty-six wounded. The enemy, on sighting the troops, had massed in the trenches on the right, expecting an attack, and had been subjected to a heavy fire from the town and ships, from which they suffered considerably. On the night of the 13th they attempted a reprisal, and succeeded in filling up one of the wells near the fort, but retired on being fired at.

This state of affairs now continued without intermission for some time. On the 16th October H.M.S. *Gannet* was relieved by H.M.S. *Starling* (Commander Paget).

The fire from the trenches was getting exceedingly accurate. Out of nine Armstrong shells fired at Fort Shaata on the night of the 26th, six struck and burst, slightly wounding Lieutenant Gordon. Had the shells been filled with good powder the results would have been far more disastrous. As it was, the powder was barely sufficient to burst the shells.

On the 2d November General Grenfell left Cairo for Suakin, with small reinforcements of two divisions of horse artillery and six mortars, with which it was thought the enemy's trenches would be soon made untenable. Arriving at Suakin he took a general survey of the situation, and on the 8th reconnoitred the enemy's position with the horse artillery and mounted infantry. The former opened fire at 1600 yards range on the enemy's right, but on their horsemen advancing rapidly, the reconnaissance retired with a loss of four men killed. On the following night a party of 200 Sudanese of the 11th Battalion attempted to spike or capture the enemy's guns, but the extraordinary vigilance of the Arabs frustrated the manœuvre, and the Sudanese were in their turn heavily attacked, and after a severe encounter withdrew, but with the loss of five men killed and four wounded. The enemy's loss was considerable.

General Grenfell returned to Cairo on the 15th, and

reported that he considered it imperative to drive the Arabs from the trenches, and for this purpose he would require a reinforcement of two Sudanese battalions, the 9th and 10th. It was therefore decided that his advice should be acted upon, but on no account should further offensive operations than those now proposed be entered upon, and that during the absence of the Sudanese regiments from the frontier, half a battalion of the Welsh Regiment should be despatched to Assuan. The Sudanese battalions, marching *via* Kenneh and Kosseir, reached Suakin early in December.

During this interval, some apprehension being felt in England that the force for attacking the trenches was not sufficient for the purpose, the 2d battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, under Colonel Talbot Coke, and 100 men of the mounted infantry, were ordered to Suakin. This brought the numbers there, early in December, up to 750 British troops, 2000 Sudanese, and 2000 Egyptian troops. With this force General Grenfell reported he was confident of success.

The orders he received from the Government on leaving Cairo were that the Arab trenches were to be taken, and the enemy driven from his position round Suakin. But this was to be the extent of the operations, and this done, the Anglo-Egyptian force was to remain at Suakin, and on no account to advance against Osman Digna at Handub.

On the 2d December he and his staff left Cairo, arriving at Suakin on the 7th, and on the 9th a reconnaissance of Egyptian cavalry, under Colonel Kitchener, meeting a strong force of the enemy's horsemen, before whom they were forced to retire, proved the necessity of augmenting the cavalry, in consequence of which a squadron of the 20th Hussars, under Major Irwin, was despatched from Cairo. And in order to further allay the disquietude which was again apparent in England respecting the strength of General Grenfell's force, they were accompanied by half the 1st battalion Welsh Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth. By the 18th December the troops had arrived, and now all arrangements to ensure the success of the impending attack were pushed forward with the utmost rapidity.

In the meantime the enemy had considerably increased in activity. On the 22d November they had brought up a gun

to within 500 yards of Fort Gemaizeh, and opened on the town with shell, many of which fell inside the walls, causing a few casualties. The musketry fire from the trenches was also well kept up by the enemy, and Mr. Wake, a promising young artist, who represented the *Graphic*, was killed close to the gates of Suakin. These tactics were continued nightly. The estimation of the numbers in the trenches was always uncertain. They varied from day to day. At times they dwindled down to under 500, while the next day over 2000 would be in occupation. The enemy's horsemen were kept some 1000 yards in rear towards Handub, while a mile nearer that place they stationed their reserves. The main body always remained at Handub. Hence it will be readily understood why the numbers of men in the trenches varied so much. With the insufficient control over their men, the emirs were unable to keep them continuously in the trenches, where they were subjected to a continuous fire from the forts, and where there was often scarcity of food and water; and it was only when their leaders discovered that the numbers had become unusually small they would report the matter to Osman Digna, who would then order up reinforcements. This state of affairs was of continual occurrence, and no doubt accounted for the great variance in the statements of prisoners and others.

The attitude of the tribes in the vicinity of Suakin requires some slight explanation. After the opening of the siege Osman again turned his attention to the north. The day following the opening of the trenches Ahmed Mahmud, the second son of Mahmud Bey Ali, had deserted from Suakin with his brother Taher to Handub, and at the end of the month he was despatched by Osman Digna to besiege the Mamurieh of Raweiya. He established himself at the wells of Bela, from whence the inhabitants usually drew their water, and cutting off the supply, he forbade the neighbouring tribes to hold communication with the Mamurieh, but beyond this he made no further hostile demonstrations. Early in November Lieutenant Prinsep (intelligence officer at Suakin), accompanied by Mahmud Bey Ali, was sent to report on the situation there. After some hesitation, Ahmed at length consented to hold a meeting in the desert, at which he eventually agreed to allow communication with the Mamurieh, and bound himself by a


promise not to molest the tribes, but at the same time stated that he must continue to appear hostile in order to prevent Osman sending an emir in his place. Shortly after this he returned to Handub—nominally to ask Osman for guns, but the latter mistrusting him sent him to Omdurman.

During the siege of Suakin the majority of the Hadendowa sheikhs still held aloof from Handub. Some were obliged to go there for food, but in almost every case those who did so first sent in to Suakin to say that they could not help themselves. They were obliged to go and to apparently profess hostility to the Government. They all declared, however, that as soon as the Government advanced against Handub they would join to a man. Some sheikhs still continued to cause annoyance to Osman by cutting off convoys and raiding cattle. But these episodes, as a rule, took place in the more remote parts of the country. The most active of the tribes hostile to the Arabs were the Gemilab, and it was only a few days previous to the action of Gemaizeh that Osman persuaded their head sheikh, Ali Omar, to come and discuss matters with him, but upon arrival at Handub he was immediately sent to Omdurman.

At this time sheikh Isa Barir had returned from Omdurman and threatened to besiege and destroy the Mamurieh of Halaib, but he failed to raise any enthusiasm amongst the neighbouring tribes.

The attitude of the tribes may therefore be best expressed as one of anxious expectancy, and, while avoiding and disliking Osman Digna, circumstances forced them to fear him as the representative of the only great power in the Sudan, viz. the Khalifa. Once Osman's power was broken, they pledged themselves to complete the extermination of him and his followers from the country. Handub and perhaps Tokar must, however, be possessed ere such operations could be entered upon. Hence the widespread desire on the part of the tribes for a further advance; but there were other considerations than this which determined the Government to adhere to its original defensive policy, though the necessity of freeing Suakin from a long and tiresome siege was fully recognised.

And now the preparations for the long-expected attack were complete.



On the evening of the 19th December General Grenfell explained to his commanding officers the plan of attack, which was to take place early the following morning.

A glance at the accompanying sketch-map will best explain the positions of the enemy's trenches, which were situated between 800 and 1000 yards south-west of the water-forts Gemaizeh and Shaata. They traversed two khors, the north flank being carried about fifty yards beyond the crest of a spur, the south flank on a knoll south-west of Gemaizeh. There were three gun epaulments, one in the north khor and the others on the south flank. The ground to the west of the trenches is a succession of open spurs running roughly east and west, divided by bushy khors, but on the south-west the thick bush approaches more closely the south flank.

The ground to the west of the enemy's north flank was clear and practicable for cavalry, while to the north of their north flank was a depression which would enable the troops to form up for attack before coming under fire.

These considerations decided General Grenfell to attack the enemy on the north flank, while a feint attack was, at the same time, to be made on their south flank. This plan had also the advantage of making no alteration in the usual appearance of the troops manœuvring as seen from the trenches. For some days previous to the attack, the troops had been drilled in the direction from which it had been decided the advance should take place.

Precautions were taken to make the attack a complete surprise, and to further this object a naval demonstration was to be made at Mersa Kuwai, some six miles north of Suakin, and visible from the enemy's camp at Handub. Previous to the development of the attack, the trenches were to be heavily fired on from every available gun. For this purpose the artillery of the north and south water-forts were divided into right and left defences, while the Naval Brigade were to work a Nordenfelt battery of six guns and a sixty-four-pounder R.M.L. in position on the embankment connecting the water-forts. The artillery of the enceinte and of Forts Handub, Fulah, and Quarry were formed into a third defence, and H.M.S. *Racer*, in position between Suakin and Quarantine Island, was also to direct her fire on the enemy's trenches.

In accordance with this plan, a vigorous artillery-fire was opened along the whole line at 6 A.M. on the 20th December, while the troops, marching out, took up a position between the town and "H" Redoubt at 6:30 A.M.

The mounted troops, under the command of Colonel Barrow, were on the right. The 1st Brigade, under the command of Colonel Kitchener, was composed of the 9th, 10th, and 12th Sudanese battalions; the 2d Brigade, under Colonel Holled-Smith, consisted of the 4th Egyptian battalion and the 11th Sudanese; while the 2d battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers and the 3d Egyptian battalion, marching out independently, formed up in rear of the water-forts, and were also in position by 6:30 A.M. Picked marksmen of the Borderers and Welsh regiments were told off to the water-forts, and General Grenfell, taking up his position in Fort Gemaizeh at 7:30 A.M., directed the operations.

The medical department had established collecting stations at the water-forts, while H.H.S. *Shibin* was fitted up as a hospital.

The transport, water-supply, and general reserve columns, the latter with an ample supply of material for the construction of temporary redoubts, were held in readiness.

A complete system of signalling was also organised between headquarters, corps, forts, and ships.

The troops now advanced up the khor, headed by the mounted corps, and on arriving at a position parallel to the extreme north flank of the enemy's trenches, they fronted and marched steadily towards them in the following formations.

First line—the 11th Sudanese on the right, forming three sides of a square, with one company in the square in reserve; one company of the 9th Sudanese, and two companies of the 10th Sudanese.

The second line—one company of the 9th Sudanese and two companies of the 10th Sudanese; supports, two companies in column of the 9th Sudanese, and two companies in column of the 12th Sudanese.

The reserve was echeloned on the outer flank, while the 4th Egyptian battalion followed in square.

When within 600 yards of the trenches, the troops came under fire of the enemy, who had by this time massed towards

the north flank. The advance was, however, continued steadily without firing till within 200 yards, when the brigades, advancing by successive quick rushes, and opening a heavy fire on the Arabs, who appeared as if about to charge, soon reached the trenches, which were captured in the most gallant manner at the point of the bayonet. Here numbers of the enemy were killed, and the remainder, attempting to rally on the right flank, were dispersed by the 11th Sudanese, who, in their eagerness to fight, had broken their square and deployed.

During this attack the mounted troops had been on the extreme right guarding the flank.

The horse artillery battery at this time galloped up and shelled the enemy's redoubt on the south flank, which had been heavily fired on by two companies of the Welsh Regiment and two companies of the 3d Egyptian battalion, who now advanced from their entrenched position. The brigades now steadily advanced from the north, clearing the whole line of trenches and inflicting considerable loss on the enemy, now in full retreat towards Handub, while on the north flank the mounted infantry by steady volleys materially added to their losses.

In the meantime an attempt had been made by the enemy's horsemen to work round the right flank, which was checked by the 20th Hussars, who, charging, dispersed and drove them in disorder towards Hashin.

The enemy's position had now been completely won, and cease fire sounded at 8 A.M. The cavalry and mounted infantry, however, continued to pursue the retreating enemy for some distance.

The troops now entrenched themselves on the enemy's position in four zaribas.

No. 1. The Borderers and Welsh ;

No. 2. The 11th Sudanese ;

No. 3. The 9th and 12th Sudanese ;

No. 4. The 10th Sudanese ;

while block-houses were erected in Nos. 1 and 2 zaribas, and in a very short time the troops were fully under cover.

Some 500 of the enemy were found to have been killed in and around the trenches and during the pursuit, while it is estimated that the strength of the enemy previous to the attack

was some 1100 in the trenches, 500 spearmen in the bush, and a number of horsemen; the thickness of the bush aided many of the enemy to escape.

The naval demonstration at Mersa Kuwai had evidently prevented the enemy from reinforcing the trenches. The combined British and Egyptian loss was comparatively very slight—in all six men killed and two officers and forty-four men wounded.

A glance at the plan (page 365) and at the opposite profile of the enemy's trenches is interesting, as showing how completely they took advantage of the conformation of the ground, and how their curious construction protected them from an artillery and rifle fire, which, well directed as it was, produced a comparatively small effect. Dug in stiff gravel soil, the trench was continued down from the parapet without interior slope, and served to completely cover the occupants; while the deep ditch with narrow opening in rear of the line of entrenchments, on the extreme left, was evidently intended for living in. In and around the trenches a large number of rifles and quantities of ammunition were captured. Four important emirs were killed, while Derir Mussa Digna, cousin of Osman Digna, was taken prisoner severely wounded.¹

The rout of the enemy had been quite complete. The troops remained bivouacked on the field on the night of the 20th, and the new redoubts were strengthened and sites chosen for new forts in such positions as to prevent the enemy again being able to entrench themselves within range of the town. Fort Hashin was begun near the site of Fort Hudson, Fort Mansur on the enemy's position in front of the water-forts, while Fort Tamai was to be erected near the site of Fort Greaves, on the left front of the water-forts. The British troops were withdrawn from Suakin as soon as possible, but before their departure General Grenfell made a demonstration on the 28th in the direction of Handub, and on the following day reconnoitred the coast for some miles north of Suakin.

The effect of the victory on the local tribes was considerable, and they now believed that an advance of the Government troops would at once be made. Proclamations were issued


¹ This emir, after undergoing treatment in the hospital at Suakin for upwards of a month, was subsequently liberated, and permitted to return to his tribe.

قطاع السوكان الدرويش في سوكان


PROFILE OF DERVISH TRENCHES AT SUAKIN

December 1888.


On extreme Right




Immediately South of Water Khor



Immediately South of Gun Khor




Immediately North of Gun Khor



On extreme Left

تفصيل



Soil Stiff Gravel

Depth of trench
as far as it goes
5.5 to 6.5
5.5 to 6.5



urging them to take advantage of the rout of the Arabs and drive them out of their country.

Replies were received assuring the Government of their loyalty and delight at the defeat of Osman Digna, but that they were still powerless to do anything of themselves.

At Handub, for some days after the action, an attack was anticipated, and most of the emirs urged an immediate retirement on Tokar. Osman, however, seemed confident that no advance would be made, and when the news of the departure of the British reached Handub, confidence was once more restored.

On the 4th January 1889, Sir F. Grenfell left Suakin for Cairo, leaving Colonel Kitchener in command of the troops, while Colonel Holled-Smith again resumed his functions as Governor-General, with instructions to use all means in his power to detach the local tribes from Osman Digna.

ABYSSINIAN FRONTIER

It is now necessary to revert to events which had taken place on the Abyssinian frontier during the year 1888. At the close of 1887 we left King John smarting under the recent successful raid of Abu Angar on Gondar. Early in the year, however, to the astonishment of the Arabs, a deputation arrived at Galabat from Ras Adal, offering their submission and agreeing to pay a small tribute. The head of the mission, an important notable of Abyssinia, was taken by Abu Angar to Omdurman. Arrived there, he made all profession of having adopted the Mahdi religion. He was well treated, received every consideration, and at his suggestion the Khalifa wrote the following reply to King John.

In the name of God, etc. From the Khalifa Abdullah to the unfortunate John, great of Abyssinia.

You must know that God is a capable God, and has prepared everlasting fire for those who do not believe in the Moslem religion. You are a miserably weak servant. You are incapable of doing yourself the very slightest good or harm. You have lived at the time when the expected Mahdi, the Khalifa of our Prophet Mohammed, was sent to preach and bring men to God, and whose words were as a kindling fire. The Mahdi wrote to you and tried to induce you to embrace Islam, but you refused. I have previously written to you on the same subject, and warned you of

the future if you do not listen to our words. I have told you that the army of the faithful would occupy your country if you hesitate to obey our orders ; but in spite of all this you have not repented, and therefore our armies invaded your country, killed your men, ruined your churches, burnt your cities, captured your women, made your children orphans, and came back victorious. Now you must know that the blood of all your helpless people is on your head, because you are their shepherd. Now let bygones be bygones ; we have still a liking for you, be therefore converted to the true religion and follow the precepts of the Mahdi.

I have written to you again before I renew my attack on you, that you may take pity on yourself. Believe on our religion, and follow us in confessing that there is no god but God, and that Mohammed is His prophet. I have written to you to carry out the laws, prayers, fasting, and other matters connected with our religion. Now become one of us, and let us cease warfare, and instead let us become friends.

God will then pardon you, forgive your sins which you committed whilst you were an unbeliever, and give you happiness in the world to come. But if you still refuse to answer our call, I tell you now once for all, that, by God's will, you will be defeated, our armies will invade your country and devastate it to the last degree, for by this time you must know that the Mahdiah is God's religion, and that you cannot oppose the will of the Almighty.

Do not boast to yourself and trust in the number of your men ; I tell you that, by God's will, they will be destroyed. I have written all this to you in pity's sake, so that you shall have nothing to say when you stand before God in the day of judgment. If you obey and believe, you will be saved ; if you do not, you and your people will be destroyed.

Dated JAMAD EL AKHER 1305 (*March 1888*).

On receipt of this letter, King John replied that in a few months he would come to Galabat with an army, and when the river was low he would attack and annihilate the Arabs and then advance on Khartum ; with this letter he sent four hides full of sand, telling the Khalifa that his army was more numerous than the grains of sand they contained. In face of the Abyssinian deputation this change of front was a surprise, but still the Khalifa was blind to the fact that they were merely spies sent to report on the state of the country. King John's threats did not apparently disturb him, and he now thought it politic to prophesy the result of the impending conflict. In April he proclaimed the following vision, which is but one more instance of the extraordinary method of playing on the credulity of his followers.

In the name of God, etc. From the servant of his lord the Khalifa of the Mahdi to all the brethren.

I beheld a vision in which the Lord of all creation, the Mahdi, and

the Khudr were present. The Prophet sat on my right and greeted me with a pleasant smile; the Mahdi sat on my left, but had the appearance of great reverence, as he was in the presence of the Prophet of God. The Khudr sat behind me. The Prophet then turned to me and said, If the Abyssinians come to attack you, their hands will be tied up to their necks and you will be victorious. In speaking about the Turks he said to me, They are in terror of the Mahdi. He then gave me leave to send our armies to the "Rif" (Egypt). Then speaking again about the Abyssinians, he said, "Allahu Akbar" (God is most great), and we all repeated this after him. Then he again said this when speaking of the Turks, and Tewfik, and the English, and we all repeated "Allahu Akbar" three times.

After this he expressed his satisfaction at all my proceedings, especially regarding the death of Saleh of the Kababish, Wad Abu Ardef, and about the events in Darfur. Also he said he was pleased at what I had done to the Shukrieh and Battahin Arabs, and also of my proceedings at El Buka'a¹ (Omdurman) and at other places.

He then said to me, "I have put the whole world into your hands; tell me now what you desire to do to all the inhabitants." I replied, "I desire that they shall all become like me—true believers." He thanked me for this and offered me his good wishes, and said to me that when my life in this world is at an end then the prophet Jesus would come into the world; he told me how long he would remain, and what would take place after his departure; he also told me of the duration of Islam, and that there should be no Mohammedan on the face of the earth. He then ordered me to present his good wishes to certain of the brethren whom he mentioned by name.

In another vision he told me that I am included amongst those referred to in the following passage in the Kuran: "Those whom we supported on earth, who have offered their prayers to God, who give alms, teach benevolence and kindness, and forbid all evil and wicked actions."

He then said to me, "You are the best of all the people on the face of the earth; every inhabitant of this earth will be happy if you are pleased with him, and will be unhappy if you are displeased with him."

He also told me much more good news, but it would take too long for me to tell it all to you.

Dated SHABAN 1305 (*April* 1888).

Large reinforcements were now despatched to Galabat, and Abu Angar, taking with him the proselytised Abyssinian chief, once more took to the field. Concerning this second campaign against the Abyssinians there is no very reliable information, but it appears that each side won a victory. Abu Angar was at first successful, but was in July or August completely defeated by the Abyssinians, who captured a large number of prisoners. It does not appear that the King himself took part

¹ El Buka'a signifies the patch or spot, and is the name by which Omdurman is now known in the Sudan amongst the Mahdists.

in this fight, for in September he wrote to the Khalifa that he was at Gondar and would shortly follow up his victory by the capture of Galabat. Abu Angar, who had now returned to Omdurman and had been sent to quell an insurrection in the Bara country, was once more despatched to the Abyssinian frontier, and again succeeded in reaching Gondar, this time without fighting, for the King had taken the bulk of his troops to quell a disturbance elsewhere. In November, shortly after his return to Galabat, Abu Angar was seized by an illness, which he sought to cure by drinking a concoction prepared by some Takruri pilgrims, which resulted in his death¹ early in January. There was now some discussion as to his successor, but previous to his death he had nominated the emir Ez Zaki Tumul, and on the matter being referred to the Khalifa he confirmed Abu Angar's nominee. Such was the state of affairs on the Abyssinian frontier early in 1889.

DARFUR, 1888

At the close of 1887 we left Sultan Yusef collecting his forces to repel the victorious Osman Adam.

He now despatched the Sultan Zayid a second time to Darra with a considerable force, but on his way there, at Wadi el Masrieh, twelve miles from the town, he was on December 16th, 1887, heavily attacked and defeated by Osman Adam, whose numbers were reported to have been three times greater than his opponent's. Zayid with a remnant of his army escaped to El Fasher, and here Sultan Yusef, with but a few followers left, now saw that the cause was well-nigh hopeless. He, however, resolved on one last effort, and collecting some 1000 Arabs, he entrenched himself at Wad Baira, a few miles south of El Fasher, and awaited the advance of Osman Adam. The latter arrived on 8th January, and succeeded without much difficulty in dispersing Zayid's followers, who now fled to Jebel Marra; and Osman advanced victoriously to El Fasher, which he entered without opposition, capturing many prisoners and a quantity of loot.

It was believed that both Sultan Yusef and Zayid had

¹ Up till recently it was believed that Abu Angar had been poisoned, but latest arrivals from that part of the country maintain that the cause of his death was as now stated.

been killed at Wad Baïra, but they had managed to escape and now took refuge with Wad Jabrallah in the Jebel Marra.

Osman Adam, learning that the Sultans were still at large, sent a force under the command of his uncle, Ahmed el Khetaim, with instructions not to return until he had either killed or captured them both.

Meanwhile Zayid and Yusef had separated. The former remained with Jabrallah, who betrayed his trust, and in a drunken debauch slew Zayid and sent his head to El Fasher; while the latter, Yusef, fled farther into the hills, but was followed by Wad el Khetaim, who succeeded in killing him and the few followers who had remained faithful.

Khetaim returned to El Fasher on the 14th February with Sultan Yusef's head, which, together with Zayid's, was sent to Omdurman.

Meanwhile Jabrallah, thinking by his treacherous conduct to have ingratiated himself in Osman Adam's favour, now ventured to come to El Fasher; but Osman, suspicious of his future good behaviour, sent him to Omdurman with his five sons, who on arrival there were thrown into prison, where they soon afterwards died.¹

Osman Adam was now master of the situation, and for a time complete tranquillity reigned. This was, however, but the prelude to a coming storm, which was to again drench the plains of Darfur with blood, and to make the Khalifa Abdullah fear greatly for his own safety and that of his newly-acquired dominions.

The second revolt about to be described partook of the nature of a religious movement, and it was this aspect of the insurrection which appeared to so greatly disturb the Khalifa; he had already begun to realise that in spite of all his success there was a growing tendency on the part of his followers to affect Mahdism rather for the plunder and loot which followed in its train than for the religious truths so zealously inculcated by the late Mohammed Ahmed. Once the religious hold he exercised was relaxed, he must have been aware that the beginning of the end of Mahdism was approaching, hence his alarm at the news that an anti-Mahdist revolt had broken out,

¹ Jabrallah is said to be still at Omdurman, but in a state of the most abject poverty.

headed by a leader who took as his motto the "overthrow of the Mahdi imposture and the re-establishment of the true religion of the Prophet"; but we must trace this movement from its origin.

After the death of Sultan Yusef, his brothers Abu el Kheirat and Abbas, with the few remaining chiefs of Darfur, such as the magdums Abu Dembo, Hamed of the Dar er Rih country, Said Baros, and Abu Bakr Nageh of the Baigo, all assembled in Dar Tama and took anxious counsel as to the best means of revenging the death of their late leaders. At this meeting it was decided to appeal to the Sultan of Borgo for assistance, and at the same time warn him that unless some steps were immediately taken against Osman Adam the latter would in all probability make a descent on Borgo. And now enters the curious connection with the Senussi Mahdi, to whom reference was made in the early pages of this work.

In Borgo as well as in Waddai the tenets of the Senusiyeh had taken a firm hold of the people, and the same reverence for the great Senussi Mahdi of Jerhbab prevailed in that district, and all the important undertakings were referred to him by the Sultan of that small kingdom, who regarded his judgment as quite infallible.

The Sultan of Borgo, on receipt of the letter from the chiefs of Dar Tama, at once referred the matter to the Senussi; and the characteristic reply of the latter "to abstain from Sudan affairs and only to fight against the Mahdiists should they attack his kingdom" is significant of his desire to hold to his original resolution to have nothing to do with the heresy of Mohammed Ahmed, and to preserve unfettered his liberty of action, until the time for his own public declaration should have arrived.

The Sultan of Borgo therefore replied that he could not join in the movement, much as he should have liked to assist his neighbours in their combination against a common enemy.

The chiefs of Dar Tama, disappointed at the failure of their first appeal, now turned to the Tama and Masalit tribes, and in the chief of the latter tribe they found a ready supporter in sheikh Ahmed—surnamed Abu Gemaizeh¹—who

¹ This sheikh was a noted fiki, and was in the habit of preaching to his assembled tribe under a large gemaizeh-tree—hence the *sobriquet* with which his followers dubbed him.

thirsted for revenge ; for Osman Adam on his first arrival at El Fasher had summoned the chiefs of all the tribes to pay him their allegiance. Abu Gemaizeh's father, then chief of the Masalit, had presented himself at El Fasher, but being suspected as a dangerous man to be at large, had been sent off to Omdurman and there imprisoned.

His son, now the head sheikh, took up his father's cause and found ready listeners amongst his tribe, and together they made a solemn compact to exterminate the Mahdi intruders or die in the attempt.

They therefore joined Abu el Kheirat's force *en masse*, and by common consent it was agreed that Abu Gemaizeh should assume the chief command, as being the sheikh of the most numerous tribe which had joined the movement.

A slight reference to the religious character of the fiki Abu Gemaizeh is now necessary.

He was a man of considerable influence, and swayed with ease the superstitious Arabs of Western Darfur, who attributed to him a power over the jinns and the *thakalain* or fairies. He was not a member of the Senussi Order, but he could not have failed to have heard much concerning this celebrated religious reformer from the neighbouring country of Bornu, Borgo, and Waddai, in which Senussiyeh had been long established.

Moreover, some twenty-five Tripoli merchants, who were in Darfur at the time Osman Adam had entered it, and who with the other people of the town had suffered severely at his hands, losing all their property and goods, had fled to Abu Gemaizeh, who at once gave them the protection they sought. From them Abu Gemaizeh learnt the history of the Mahdi's attempts to gain their lord and master Wad Senussi to his side, and how he had been offered the chair of the Khalifa Osman, which he had indignantly refused. And now a bright idea suggested itself to Abu Gemaizeh ; he would proclaim himself the Khalifa Osman, and thereby secure a following amongst the Senussi adherents which would add greatly to his power.

Not the Khalifa of Osman which the Mahdi had originally offered to the Senussi, but an independent Khalifa, which would place him on an equality with Khalifa Abdullah Taashi—the Mahdi's successor. The arguments which he used when

proclaiming himself as such are unfortunately only generally known, but Abdullah Taashi's reply to his pretensions shows with what animus he regarded this new pretender, who was now usurping the authority which he had acquired with so much trouble and bloodshed.

His letter to Abu Gemaizeh runs as follows :—

In the name of God, etc. We inform thee that we have received and understand thy letter of 13th Rabia-el-awal 1306, in which thou hast pointed out that thou followest the Kuran and the doctrine of the Prophet and also the path of the Mahdi ; that thou art the Khalifa of Osman, and that thou hast recognised me as khalifa without even seeing me, and thou art obedient to the orders.

We tell thee, then, that thou hast written is false, and of no value, because thou hast done (things) quite contrary, in fighting against the defenders of the Islam faith, and the men of the Mahdi, and we have learnt that thou makest false pretensions, that thou wouldst make trouble (amongst us), and thus extinguish the light of the master of the world.

As to thy pretensions that thou hast recognised me as khalifa, if it were true thou wouldst be under my order, and wouldst act according to my commandment. We then order thee decidedly and irrevocably to give up thy ideas and return to God, and to fight no man, above all the men of the Mahdi, who are charged by us to welcome the people to stop trouble, and to invite the world to bow to the Mahdi under the orders of our governor, Osman Adam, in the countries of the west ; and if thou obey my orders, thou shalt be forgiven. Finally, we tell thee to disband all thy troops and to come alone to us, to present thy obedience, that we may lead thee in the right path, otherwise, by the help of God, thou shalt be caught where thou art found.

And now the fame of Abu Gemaizeh spread far and wide, numbers flocked to his standard, and a wonderful system he adopted for feeding his now large army gave rise to the superstition that a magic tent always accompanied him wherever he went, and he had only to command the food and it would be brought in quantities by the jinns and fairies.¹

To the various provinces of the Sudan, exhausted by this constant warfare and bloodshed, the news that an anti-Mahdist revival had commenced in the far west was as the trumpet blast announcing that relief was at length at hand, when the inhabitants would be freed from the terrible thrall

¹ The account of the magic powers of Abu Gemaizeh was given in all sincerity by an eye-witness who, in telling the story, did not hesitate to say that he believed implicitly in his supernatural gifts.

and tyranny of Mahdiism. The whole country, as far east as Suakin, as far south as Bahr el Ghazal, and as far north as Dongola, teemed with the joyous news that the great Senussi had at length asserted his authority and intended to drive the Mahdi imposture from the face of the country.

The news, the farther it spread from the actual theatre of operations, was exaggerated in proportion, the recent successes were magnified into most glorious victories—first El Fasher was said to have fallen; then an interval, then the fall of El Obeid; then the victorious advance to the Nile and the approach to Khartum; the abject terror of the Khalifa, at one moment said to be fortifying himself in Khartum, at another to have fled to Berber, at another to have escaped to the southern mountains. The whole Sudan echoed with the wildest reports; even at Cairo it was believed that the end of Mahdiism was near, and that a new ruler had arisen who would at least open the roads to Mecca and would no longer be at war with all the world. Relief seemed near. Every arrival from the Sudan reported the growing success of the anti-Mahdiist revolt.

The wish was, indeed, in this instance the father to the thought, and the bazars were full of gossip as to what relations the Government would have with the new ruler; but in the midst of all these strange rumours came news from Jerhbab that the great Senussi sheikh disclaimed all knowledge of the movement conducted under his name; it had not even his sanction. It is true the Sultan of Borgo had asked him for advice, but he had "recommended non-interference." He was a "peaceful pioneer of a religious revival which revolted against the bloodshed and rapine of the *soi-disant* Mahdi of the Sudan; he had no intention or desire to interfere. Mohammed Ahmed and his successor must work their own salvation or destruction; he was in no way responsible." Such was the tenor of the great sheikh's policy. He would have rejoiced, it is true, at seeing the road again opened from the western kingdoms to the Red Sea, so that the true followers might make their pilgrimage to holy Mecca without fear of molestation, and so far he may have approved Abu Gemaizeh's proclamation, in which he declaimed the power of the Mahdi or his successor to forbid pilgrimages which the

holy Kuran enjoined; nor would he admit his right to authorise pilgrimages to the shrine of the Mahdi at Omdurman instead of to the tomb of the great Prophet Mohammed. So far he was a thorough supporter of the movement in its religious aspect, and so far he gave it his moral support. But further than this he had not gone; nor had he the smallest desire that the movement should be made in his name.

On this information becoming known, it was for the first time realised that all these wild reports of the approaching downfall of Mahdiah must be modified; and, by slow degrees, the ferment, which had reached almost the boiling-point of anxious expectancy, gradually cooled down. Soon the movement was regarded as merely a successful local revolt. Darfur might perhaps be lost to the Khalifa, and El Obeid might be threatened. But the news which leaked gradually through the tribes in the vicinity of the frontier and Suakin, who were at heart the most ardent well-wishers to Abu Gemaizeh's success, showed that not even Darfur had gone, and that the powerful Osman Adam still ruled at El Fasher.

In reverting to the operations which caused such a ferment of excitement, and which when viewed in the light of sober history leave one in bewilderment as to how such wild rumours could ever have attained such realistic magnitude, one is constrained to remark on the truth of the saying that a prophet is not honoured in his own country. In the Sudan, exhausted by constant warfare and drenched with blood, the advent of a prophet who would free the unhappy inhabitants from this miserable state and annihilate the all-powerful Baggara would have been welcome as the lifeboat to the sinking ship; and it was but the ardent longing of the unfortunate sufferers, far from the actual scene of operation, which so coloured Abu Gemaizeh's successes and gave them a semblance of reality which only ended in the most bitter disappointment. Abu Gemaizeh early in October joined Abu el Kheirat at Dar Tama, and the combined forces, now amounting to many thousands, began their advance towards El Fasher. Osman Adam now despatched a force representing one-fourth of his army to Kebkebieh, thirty miles from El Fasher, under the emir Abd el Kader Dalil, and here on October 16th Abu Gemaizeh made a fierce onslaught on him and almost

annihilated him. A week later Osman Adam despatched a second force under the emir El Khetaim to Kebkebieh, which met with the same fate as the first, and now the situation became somewhat alarming. Osman prepared for a siege, gathered all the Arabs he could lay hands upon, and resolved that at El Fasher he would at least make a determined stand against this widespread religious revolt.

Abu Gemaizeh too, instead of following up his victory, retired again to Dar Tama, and with the prestige of his recent victories added largely to his following. The Sultan of Bornu sent him reinforcements, and Borgo too added its quota, in spite of the Senussi's advice to withhold from interference; the Beni Helba, together with the Fur, Bedayat, and Zaghawa Arabs, and many others, joined the movement, which towards the end of 1888 had swelled to an alarming extent. But the subsequent operations which occurred early in the following year will be reserved for the 1889 chapter.

EQUATORIA, 1888

While Stanley was for the second time toiling with his boat the *Advance* to reach the lake, the hitherto friendly Kabarega suddenly changed his demeanour. It will be remembered that the relief expedition on its first approach to the lake in December 1887 had fought for five days in succession with the Mazamboni warriors; these all happened to be Kabarega's subjects, and on the news of their defeat reaching the king, he conceived the idea that his country was being invaded by an enormous army under the leadership of a white chief, who had in all probability been summoned by his quondam friend Emin. His attitude therefore towards this latter completely changed, and he vented his displeasure on the unfortunate Casati, who on February 13th suddenly found himself a prisoner, his house robbed, and himself expelled almost naked and with every mark of ignominy, while Mohammed Biri, Emin's trusted messenger, fell a victim to his wrath and was killed.

Casati fortunately escaped, and managed to send a messenger to Emin apprising him of what had occurred, and after days of wandering on the shores of the lake in a state of destitution

and starvation he was at last rescued by Emin, who had started to search for him in his steamer; and thus Emin and Casati, after a long separation, re-united only a few weeks before Stanley's arrival for the second time at the Albert Lake.

Meanwhile the news which had so alarmed Kabarega had sped down the banks of the Nile, gathering in magnitude as it went. It reached Khartum about the month of May, and thence filtered through to Suakin and the outside world, to which hitherto no trustworthy news of Stanley's doings had yet come to hand. The gist of these rumours was to the effect that a white Pasha had appeared in the Bahr el Ghazal, that he was advancing victoriously, and that the Khalifa Abdullah was much alarmed. There were the wildest surmises as to who this white Pasha could be; some said it must be Stanley, others Emin; some identified him with the mysterious Abu Gemaizeh of Darfur, who was said to be of a fair skin and came from the north of Africa; while others said he must be Captain van Gelé, known at that time to be exploring the Welle. And it was not till almost two years later that the mystery was dispelled. Stanley's own version is undoubtedly the correct one, for every contingent circumstance confirms it. Writing to General Grenfell on March 29th, 1890, he says:

CAIRO, 29th March 1890.

MY DEAR GENERAL GRENFELL—Regarding the "White Pasha," you know that I never heard anything connected with the White Pasha until I reached the south end of Victoria. Some "cuttings" there explained the rumour of the mysterious personage, and from the description it was suggested to me that it could be no other than a combination of Emin and myself. On December 14th, or rather 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th December 1887 we were fighting with Kabarega's allies. The news entered Unyoro, and Kabarega expelled Captain Casati. Soon after, the news of our coming had also reached Uganda and Unyoro, magnified by rumour, and Mackay was released from Uganda. Casati was expelled from Unyoro, Kabarega having recently conquered all the territory on the east of the White Nile, was in close relations with the Mahdiist sympathisers from Lado up to Duffilé and at Regaf the headquarters of the extreme Emin-haters; the news was received coloured by Kabarega's fears, other ignorant men at Lado magnified it again, and so these grew as it descended the Nile into a White Pasha. Reaching Khartum, on attempting to define the personage, he became a distinct person bearing the semblance of Emin, with the attributes Kabarega's fears had given us. Thus two distinct persons became one at Khartum. We reasoned it out at Msalala with Mackay and Emin, and we all came to the same con-

clusion. I heard of no other person, from any one, being in the neighbourhood of Equatoria. Yours faithfully,

(Signed) HENRY M. STANLEY.

General Sir Francis Grenfell,
etc. etc. etc.

Major Rundle, then commanding at Suakin, also endeavoured to trace the connection between this mysterious white Pasha and Stanley, and wrote to Osman Digna asking whether he had any news of the arrival of the travellers or of Emin. The reply received some months later, and which will be subsequently quoted, is a masterpiece of Eastern fabrication based on a shred of fact, and further demonstrating the readiness with which the Khalifa made use of his wits, to the discomfiture of his enemy, when occasion offered. Certain it is that the facts mentioned by Osman Digna in his reply sent to General Grenfell at Suakin just previous to the action of Gemaizeh in December 1888 obtained most widespread credence, and for a time all hope of a successful issue for the Emin Pasha relief expedition was abandoned.

On receipt of the news that a white Pasha was devastating the southern districts of his domains the Khalifa in July 1888 despatched an expedition of three steamers and six barges with some 4000 troops, to proceed south, take possession of Equatoria, and annihilate this intruder. And now the stage is prepared for the final act of the drama in Equatoria.

We left Emin and Stanley early in April at Nsabé; the latter on the 24th May proceeded once more towards the gloomy forest in search of his rearguard, while Emin and Jephson set off in the steamer *Khedive* to communicate to the various garrisons his Highness the Khedive's high order and to collect those who wished to return with Stanley to Zanzibar and thence to Egypt. The stirring events which occurred in Equatoria during the ensuing nine months have been so fully described by Mr. Stanley and Mr. Jephson in their respective literary works, that it is intended here only to touch on the main points of this eventful period, with the object of following out the historical narrative of the various occurrences, and thus adhere to the original lines on which this work has been written, viz. to describe with as much accuracy as the information at hand will admit the varied events which have

happened in the Sudan since the first outbreak of Mahdism ; and, while avoiding all criticism, to place before those who are interested in the history of this vast country a bare and unvarnished statement from which the readers must draw their own deductions.

Emin and Jephson proceeded to visit first the stations to the extreme south, and, after reading H.H. the Khedive's and H.E. Nubar Pasha's letters to the assembled officers, soldiers, and officials at each post, the latter were invited to give their decision as to what they intended to do ; whether they would accept the offer of a safe conduct to Egypt, or elect to remain where they were.

The unanimous reply at each station was, " We will follow our Governor wherever he goes."

On reaching Kiri, the last station of the 2d Battalion, Emin received a letter from Hamad Agha, the commandant of the 1st Battalion at Regaf, warning him to come no farther, as the officers and men had again planned his capture, and intended, when they had effected it, to start off towards Khartum. Emin and Jephson therefore decided to return south again, and when reading the proclamation at Laboreh, a soldier stepped out of the ranks exclaiming : " All that you are saying is a lie, and these letters are forgeries ; Khartum has not fallen. That is the right road to Egypt ; we will go by that road only, or will stay and die in this country." Here was a clear case of mutiny, and moreover a complete surprise to Mr. Jephson, who does not appear to have been apprised of the mutinous condition of the province. Emin Pasha asserted his authority, and ordered the insubordinate soldier to be imprisoned. On this the men, breaking their ranks, surrounded their Governor and Jephson, and loading their rifles, levelled them at their prisoners. For a moment the utmost uproar prevailed, and a massacre seemed imminent ; but this ebullition passed off almost as rapidly as it had begun ; the men calmed down and the officers apologised. It subsequently transpired that this had been a prearranged plot, concocted by Surur Agha, the commandant of the station.

Meanwhile, however, some of the garrison to the south, to whom the proclamations had already been issued by Emin and Jephson on their way north, had broken into active revolt.

Some of the Egyptian officers and employés at Fabbo, who had been sent to the Sudan for participation in the Arabi insurrection of 1882, had instigated the soldiers of the garrison to believe that the letters and proclamations were forgeries, that Stanley and his party were mere adventurers, that the whole affair was a plot to take all the people out of their country with their wives and families, and hand them over as slaves to the English, and that as they themselves had already rebelled against the Khedive, they saw no reason why they should not rebel against their Governor Emin, who was a tool in the hands of these adventurers! These seditious words took rapid hold of the garrison, and the Governor of Fabbo, one Fadl el Maula Agha, heading the revolt, marched with his men to Duffileh, and ere Emin and Jephson reached that town it was in open mutiny, and on their arrival, on August 18th, they were at once made prisoners. Emin was deposed, letters were sent to all stations to inform them of the capture, and it was decided that Emin should be transferred as a prisoner to Regaf, while plots were formed to entice Stanley and his party into the province, rob them of their guns and ammunition, and then turn them adrift. A meeting was then convened, at which it was decided to dismiss from their posts all officers who were known to be friendly to the deposed Pasha.

Hamad Agha was nominated Governor in place of Emin, Selim Bey replaced Hawash Effendi, while the sub-mudir, to escape being made chief of the council to condemn their prisoners, threw himself into the river, but was saved, and Saleh Bey took his place as president.

Matters remained in this state for some time, until on 15th of October came the alarming news that the Mahdiist forces¹ had arrived at Lado in three steamers and nine large sandals or barges. On the 17th three of the enemy arrived at Duffileh bearing a letter and flag of truce. The letter was from Omar Saleh,² the commander of the Mahdiist force, to Emin, calling on him to surrender and promising a full pardon to all.

The letter was opened by the mutineers, who promptly

¹ Which had been despatched from Omdurman in February.

² A Jaali, but who had been brought up at Shakka, and had married into the Rizighat tribe. He had some time previously gone to Omdurman to pay his allegiance, and was selected for the distant enterprise of subduing Equatoria and capturing the "White Pasha."

decided to fight, and began by putting the three messengers to death. On the 21st came the still more alarming news that the Mahdiists, joined by numbers of the Bari tribe, had attacked and taken Regaf, killing three officers, two clerks, and a number of men, while the remainder and all the women and children had been captured. A panic ensued on receipt of this news, and the garrisons of Bedden, Kiri, and Muggi fled in disorder to Laboreh. The mutineers endeavoured to concentrate troops at Muggi to check the Mahdiist advance, but this led to dissensions amongst the officers, and the soldiers now declared they would not fight unless Emin Pasha were set at liberty and reinstated as Governor. On 15th November information was received that some of the troops had marched down from Muggi to Regaf, but on approaching the latter place Omar Saleh sallied out and dispersed them. The men fled, leaving their officers, six of whom were killed, including the newly-made governor, Hamad Agha; two officers were captured, and many of the soldiers, exhausted in the fight, were pursued and killed. The effect of this news at Duffileh was instantaneous: those amongst the officers who were still friendly to Emin prevailed on the remainder to release their prisoners, and after three months' close imprisonment he and Jephson were freed and sent to Wadelai, where they were enthusiastically received by the people, who now for the first time acknowledged that the fall of Khartum must be true, and that Stanley's mission was what it professed to be, namely a relief expedition designed to save them from the hands of the Mahdiists. On the 4th December the officer in command of Bara, a small station between Duffileh and Wadelai, arrived in great haste, reporting that the Mahdiists had advanced, had captured Duffileh and Fabbo, that all the northern stations had fallen and the steamers had been captured, and that the natives of all the surrounding countries had joined Omar Saleh's victorious banners. A council was now held at Wadelai, in which it was decided to at once abandon Wadelai and retire overland on Tunguru, whence it was thought a junction might be effected with Stanley's column at Fort Bodo. Consequently Jephson was obliged to destroy his boat, the *Advance*, to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, and on the following day the evacuation of Wadelai was begun,

but at the last moment the soldiers, who were for the most part natives of the Makaraka district, decided to retire to their own country; and on Emin and Jephson with most of the inhabitants quitting the station, the soldiers entered and looted the houses. On December 6th, as the retreating mass was slowly making its way towards Tunguru, a steamer appeared following up. It was thought that this must be a Mahdiist steamer, and preparations were made to fire on her, when it was found that it was the Duffileh steamer carrying letters for Emin Pasha to the effect that after all Duffileh had not been captured. The enemy, it was true, had captured Fabbo, which had been evacuated in time, the garrison going to Duffileh, and had then attacked Duffileh, which they had held for a time, and had also taken the steamers; but the remainder of the garrison, some 500, who had been driven out, finding themselves between two fires, with the energy of despair and headed by their leader Selim Bey, returned, attacked the station and recaptured it, at the same time inflicting such a severe defeat on the enemy that they had been obliged to retreat to Regaf and send for reinforcements.

In these four days there had been continuous fighting at Duffileh. Fourteen officers and a large number of soldiers had been killed. The small garrison at Wadelai, who on the point of returning to Makaraka had received this news, now entreated Emin Pasha to return, but their faithless conduct hitherto, decided him to continue his journey to Tunguru, and on this decision being made known at Wadelai, the garrison at once concluded that the previous news of the fall of Duffileh had been concocted by Emin in order that he might hand the garrison over to Omar Saleh, while he and those who were with him might make good their retreat. They therefore sentenced Emin, Casati, and Jephson to be put to death for treachery; but fortunately these officers had now reached Tunguru, and so the sentence could not at once be carried out.

It is now necessary to revert for an instant to Omar Saleh's action on his first arrival at Regaf. Having attacked and captured the station, and learning that Emin and Jephson were prisoners in the hands of the rebels, and little doubting that in due time they and the whole province would soon fall into his hands, he despatched one of his steamers forthwith to Khartum,

together with some of the captured officers and loot taken at Regaf, and with the following despatch for his lord and master the Khalifa, and dated 15th October 1888 :—

We proceeded with the steamer and army, and reached the town of Lado, where Emin, the mudir of the equator, is staying, on the 5th Safar 1306 (10th October 1888). We must thank the officers and men who made this conquest easy, for they have seized Emin and a traveller who was staying with him and put them both in chains, refusing to go to Egypt with the Turks.

Tewfik had sent to Emin one of the travellers. His name is Mr. Stanley. This Mr. Stanley brought with him a letter from Tewfik to Emin, dated 8 Jamad Awal (the date of the Khedive's letter), telling him to come with Mr. Stanley, and give the rest of the force the option of coming with him or remaining here, as they please.

The force refused the Turkish orders, and received us gladly. We have found a great deal of ivory and feathers. I am sending with this the officers and chief clerk on board the *Bordein*, commanded by Mohammed Kheir. I am also sending the letter which came from Tewfik to Emin, together with the banners we took from the Turks.

I have heard that there is another traveller who came to Emin. I am looking out for him, and if he returns I am sure to catch him.

All the chiefs of the province, with the inhabitants, are delighted to see us. I have taken all the arms and ammunition. When you have seen the officers and chief clerk, and given them the necessary instructions, please send them back, as they will be of great use to me.

This letter was accompanied by a copy of His Highness the Khedive's "high order," which he had obtained at Regaf,¹ as well as some Snider ammunition.

On receipt of this news the Khalifa, bethinking himself of the anxiety of the Suakin authorities to learn the fate of the Governor of Equatoria, sent the despatches to Osman Digna with orders that he should forward them to Suakin. Osman accordingly enclosed them with the following letter addressed to General Grenfell, at that time preparing to attack the enemy besieging Suakin.²

¹ Omar Saleh having arrived, as far as is known, at Regaf without fighting, leaves little doubt that the northern garrisons at once made terms with him. As regards the garrisons of the southern posts, there is also little doubt that numbers of the officers had decided to adopt Mahdism. Omar Saleh, therefore, at the time he wrote his memorable despatch, was in all probability fully convinced that the officers were inclined to submit to him; and such would in all likelihood have been the case, had not the soldiers taken matters into their own hands and obliged the officers of the Regaf garrison to lead them against the intruders.

² Which resulted in the action of Gemaizeh—fought on December 20th, 1888.

HISTORY OF THE SUDAN

In the name of the great God, etc. This is from Osman Digna to the Christian who is Governor of Suakin.

Let me inform you that some time ago Rundle sent me a letter asking me of the man who was Governor in the Equatorial Provinces. On the arrival of the said letter in our hands I sent it at once to the Khalifa, on whom be peace, etc. The Khalifa has sent me the answer, and has informed me that the said Governor of the Equator has fallen into our hands, and is now one of the followers of the Mahdi. The Khalifa sent steamers to the Equator, commanded by one of our chiefs named Omar Saleh. They reached Lado, and on their arrival they found that the troops of the said Governor, who were composed of military men and officers, had seized the Governor, with a traveller who was with him. They put them in chains and delivered them into the hands of our chief. Now all the province is in our hands, and the inhabitants have submitted to the Mahdi. We have taken the arms and ammunition which were there; we also brought the officers and chief clerk to the Khalifa, who received them kindly, and now they are staying with him. They have handed to him all their banners.

Therefore, as Rundle wishes to know what has become of this Governor, you tell him of this message.

I enclose a copy of the letter which our chief in the Equator sent to the Khalifa, and also a copy of that which Tewfik had sent to the said Governor.

I also send you a dozen rounds of the ammunition which were brought from the Equator. I praise God for the defeat of the unbeliever and defeat of the infidels.

The close of the year 1888 had indeed been a period of active disturbance in Equatoria, and now all Emin's projects of remaining on in his province instead of accepting the proffered safe-conduct of Stanley to the coast seemed blighted. Here at the end of December was the deposed Governor, with a few Egyptian troops and their families, in a sorry plight at Tunguru, awaiting anxiously the arrival of Stanley, who was now for the third time approaching the lake. The northern portion of his province from Regaf was in the hands of the Mahdists; while from Regaf to Wadelai the garrisons were in a ferment of mutinous disorder and confusion.

BOOK XII

Rumours current of Nejumi's advance north—The improbability of an invasion by the west bank—Preparations made on the frontier to resist raids—Letters from the Khalifa to Nejumi relative to his expedition—The Eastern Desert—The Khalifa's present to Bishir Bey—Bahr Karrar and Bishir Bey—Nejumi receives reinforcements at Dongola—State of affairs in Darfur and Abyssinia delays Nejumi's advance—Disloyalty of Bimban—Nejumi and Mussaid quarrel—Large numbers of refugees arrive at Halfa—Abd el Halim arrives at Sarra with a force—The raids on Debera and Serra west—The Egyptian cavalry annihilate the Debera raiders—Rumours that Nejumi is advancing—The second raid on Serra—The enemy at Sarra move to the west bank—Disturbances in the Eastern Desert—Mustafa Gibran defeats the Arabs at J. Messa—His official despatch—The attempted raid on Argin—The attack on Matuka—The wells of Murat occupied by Hassan Khalifa—Captain Sillem checks a raid on Gustol—Nejumi writes to Abd el Halim at Sarra—Dispositions of the invading force—The intended seizure of Sarra by Egyptian troops—Nejumi's instructions and intentions—He arrives at Sarra—His army reaches Matuka—He reconnoitres Halfa—The invading force crosses the Egyptian frontier—Colonel Wodehouse's dispositions—The composition of Nejumi's army—The action of Argin—Nejumi's orders disobeyed—The enemy driven out of Argin—Differences between Nejumi and Abd el Halim—The Arab dem above Argin—Nejumi addresses the Ansar—Colonel Wodehouse's plan of campaign—Reinforcements sent from Cairo—General Grenfell starts for the frontier—Nejumi moves north—The camp at North Argin—The halt at Serra—The dem at Adendan—Nejumi reaches Belanga headed by the flying column—Nejumi's letter to Wad Saad—Saleh Bey volunteers to turn Hassan Khalifa out of Murat—Sheikh Koki captures two guns at Matuka—General Grenfell arrives at Belanga—His reconnaissance of Nejumi's position—His letter to Nejumi—Nejumi's reply—Scarcity of food in the Arab camp—General Grenfell returns to Assuan—British troops arriving—General Grenfell's plans and the disposition of the troops—Captain Lewis reconnoitres Sarra—Reinforcements under Makin en Nur reach Nejumi—He marches north from Belanga—Concentration of troops at Toski—Bishir Bey's expedition to Abrak—Lieutenant D'Aguiar attacks a party of the enemy at Anebi—General Grenfell arrives at Toski—He reconnoitres the enemy's position—Nejumi advancing drives back the reconnoitring troops—The infantry and artillery called out from Toski—The action near Toski—Complete defeat of the enemy—Death of Nejumi and his principal emirs—Four thousand prisoners taken—Disposal of the

prisoners—Capture of Abu Yezid—Reoccupation of Sarra by Egyptian troops—Successful result of Saleh Bey's expedition to Murat—Bahr Karrar retires from Ongat—The distress of the Bisharin—Effect of the defeat at Toski on the Mahdiists—Effect of victory in Egypt—Letters from emirs desiring pardon—large numbers of Bisharin and other refugees arrive on the frontier—The Baggara rule of terror.

FRONTIER, 1889

THE year 1889 broke with persistent rumours of Nejumi's advance from Dongola. Mohammed el Kheir, who had for some time been in disfavour, was reappointed emir of Berber, and the original plans for the invasion of Egypt were once more to be put into execution; but this time the main advance was to take place down the west bank of the Nile, thus avoiding Halfa and the various intermediate fortified posts.

To the minds of the military authorities in Egypt the possibility of an advance through the arid sandy deserts of the west was improbable and unlikely; steps, however, were taken to provide for the defence of the various villages on the west bank in the vicinity of Halfa, and block-houses were constructed at the various points liable to attack. From the experience of previous years, it was believed that no advance in force was likely to take place, and that the usual rumours of invasion on a large scale would end in strong reinforcements being sent to Sarra, whence a repetition of the previous raids would probably follow. The dispositions, therefore, on the frontier were made rather with this idea in view than with the intention of repelling an invasion. The following letters¹ from the Khalifa to Wad en Nejumi throw some light on the general situation at this period:—

In the name of God, etc. From the servant of his God, the Khalifa el Mahdi, etc., to the reverend Abderrahman en Nejumi. May the Lord be his guide and helper. May the mercies and blessings of God be upon you. Your letter in which you inform me of the distressed state of the forces at Dongola and Sarra, also the letter of Abd el Halim in which he describes his general affliction, have both been received. I have noted your statement regarding your being unable to send provisions to Abd el Halim, also that twenty of your men share one robaa of dhurra.

Such being the state of the Ansar, and as you ask my permission to

¹ These letters were found on the field of action at Toski on the 3d of August 1889.

proceed to the enemy's country, I therefore write this to you. On its receipt you will assemble your emirs and chiefs, and all those whom you can trust, consult with them regarding the expedition you propose, and send me your opinion together with theirs.

Hold yourself in readiness, so that you can proceed at once on receiving my permission.

Please take this matter into serious consideration, consult the chiefs and guides, and keep me informed of all your movements.

Hoping that God, in spite of the infidels, may bless your work and spread His religion, I await your reply.

(Sealed) HASBONA ALLAH WANIMA EL WAKIL.

Translation.—God and the grace of His representative is sufficient for us.

In the name of God, etc. From the Khalifa el Mahdi, etc., to the reverend Abderrahman en Nejumi. May God bless and help him and may the mercies and blessings of God be upon you.

I have received your letter, in which you acknowledge the receipt of my order appointing Mohammed el Kheir, Ali Saad, and the emirs of the Jaalin, Barábara,¹ Gemilab, and Aliab. You also say in your letter that you have consulted with our brother Mussaid Kaydum, the emirs, and others who are well acquainted with the roads, etc., and that you have selected the Dongola road, and prefer it to that of Abu Hamed, which is difficult for several reasons, and that Dongola is too small to hold the whole force, and requesting my permission to move from Dongola at once, so as to make room for reinforcements.

I quite agree with your plans, and will write to Mohammed el Kheir and Ali Saad to follow you at once with their forces.

As regards your moving, you will consult with the emirs on whom you can rely, also with Mussaid Kaydum, and inform me of your decision.

You will hold yourself in readiness to proceed immediately on receiving my permission.

(Sealed as above.)

17 Rabia el Awal 1306
(22d November 1888).

Rumours of probable disturbances in the Eastern Desert were again rife, and the Khalifa Abdullah did all in his power to gain over to his side the subsidised Ababdeh sheikhs. Bishir Bey received from the hands of Bahr Karrar a pressing invitation to join the cause, accompanied by a standard and emir's robe, but Bishir at once sent the letter and presents to the Sirdar and adhered to his loyalty to the Egyptian Government. A word of explanation is here necessary to show the curious relations which then existed between Bahr Karrar and his cousin Bishir. It will be remembered that the previous movement in the Eastern Desert had melted away

¹ The Barábara are the riverain populations extending from the northern confines of Dongola to Assuan, known by Europeans in Lower Egypt under the name of Berberinea.

with Bishir's occupation of Haimur; but Bahr Karrar with a few men still remained at Ongat, some wells within a few miles of Haimur, and a species of mutual agreement was arrived at between the two chiefs. This rumour reaching the Khalifa's ears, he summoned Bahr Karrar to Omdurman and threatened him with death; but the latter in his defence stated that he knew Bishir was inclined to Mahdism, and recommended writing the letter which Bishir eventually received. Bahr was therefore again sent north as bearer of the missive, and with orders to do all in his power to harass the communications; while Bishir, apparently gratified with the Khalifa's letter, wrote in reply that he would assist Bahr in his attempts, and thus a *modus vivendi* between the two chiefs was once more established. This little episode forms a fair example of the intrigues with which the military authorities were surrounded, and through which it was often most difficult to steer a true course. On the one hand, the good results arising from Bishir's action were admitted, while on the other, it was impossible to say how far he kept the enemy informed of the movements and intentions of the Government as he interpreted them. Had troops been available, it would no doubt have been better to have purged the desert of all these Mahdi emissaries, but every available man of the Egyptian army was required for the defence of the frontier and Suakin, and so the situation had perforce to be accepted. About this time Nejumi received large reinforcements of Battahin¹ Arabs at Dongola, but their anti-Mahdist attitude proved them to be no valuable acquisition as trustworthy fighting men. Meanwhile Nejumi, commanding the troops, and Mussaid, the Governor of Dongola, were in constant disagreement, the former wishing to impress every available man in the province for service under his banners, while the latter advised their remaining to cultivate the land and obtain supplies for the troops. Nejumi, who was now on the point of leaving Dongola for the north, was again delayed by the disquieting news from Darfur that the Senussi movement was rapidly growing, and was undermining the Khalifa's authority.

¹ This tribe, situated on the banks of the White Nile, south of Khartum, had been suspected by the Khalifa of anti-Mahdist tendencies; they had been treated like the Rufa'a and other tribes disloyal to Mahdiah, and were therefore withdrawn from their country to fight in distant parts.

And now rumours of disloyalty amongst the riverain population north of Assuan were current. Suspicion rested on the district of Bimban, where, after the evacuation of Dongola, a large number of the merchants and refugees from that province had settled. The interests of these individuals were naturally involved with the present occupiers of their lands, and there is little doubt that a brisk correspondence was kept up between Bimban and Dongola: the merchants in all probability kept the Arabs informed of the strength and movement of the troops, and in return were granted safe-conduct for their goods. It was subsequently ascertained that they assisted the enemy in many ways, but the exact nature of their communications never transpired, though there was a widespread belief that Nejumi had been advised by them to advance, and they had volunteered to assist him.

The differences between Nejumi and Mussaid were now known at Omdurman. The Khalifa had long been jealous of Nejumi's popularity with the Arabs; he therefore thought it politic to replace Mussaid by his own nephew—Yunis Dekeim—who had just returned from Galabat, and the latter arrived in Dongola on the 12th February.

Still the northward movement hung fire. Arab reverses in Darfur, Bahr el Ghazal, and on the Abyssinian frontier, greatly disquieted the Khalifa, and he again began to withdraw some of his northern forces to send them to fight elsewhere. On the 25th February Makin en Nur left Sarras for the south with a force of Baggara. The whole Sudan was now teeming with the wildest reports of the Senussi success. Suakin rumour placed the leader at the head of a large force within a few days' march of Khartum, but it subsequently transpired that the movement had not penetrated beyond Darfur. In the midst of all this alarm came the news of the defeat of the Abyssinians and the death of King John: and the Khalifa, relieved of further anxiety in this quarter, and having already despatched a fresh expedition to Darfur, was able once more to turn his attention to the conquest of Egypt. During this interval of inaction at Sarras streams of refugees poured into Halfa from the south, often more than 300 a week, and trade with the Sudan, such as it was, revived somewhat. But on the 8th of April, Abd el Halim arrived at Sarras with a force

of 1000 men, and the old feeling of anxious expectancy of sudden raids and attacks prevailed once more on the frontier. On the 9th April a gruesome head arrived and was paraded about the Sarras bazar; it was said to be the head of an important Abyssinian chief killed in the recent battle, and was supposed to incite the warriors to similar successes. The Arab outposts were now pushed on to Abka on the east bank and Matuka on the west bank, both some $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Khor Mussa fort. On the night of the 15th April small parties of raiders from these outposts came down on the villages of Sahaba (east bank), six miles north of Halfa, and Argin (west bank), almost opposite to Sahaba, and succeeded in lifting a few cattle and wounding some villagers. They were pursued by Camel Corps patrols, but managed to escape with their loot.

The force at Sarras now consisted of upwards of 1000 men, under the command of Abd el Halim, the other emirs being Makin en Nur, Wad Gubara, Morghani ed Dahab, and Wad Rahma.

On the 29th a party under the last-named emir left the outpost of Abka, and making as usual a long detour in the desert, arrived at Deberra at nightfall; almost at the same time another party, which had left Matuka, were seen in the hills near Argin going north. News of the proximity of this latter party was conveyed by the sheikh of Argin to Lieutenant Dunning, patrolling near in the gunboat *El Teb*. It was thought that this party intended raiding the village of Serra West, some nine miles north; Lieutenant Dunning, therefore, at once went down stream to protect this village, but on arrival there at 8.45 P.M. heard shots fired from Deberra (opposite to Serra) on the east bank. He landed with a detachment of thirty men of the 13th Sudanese Battalion, and found the villagers in a state of alarm, firing wildly in all directions. The darkness of the night and the general confusion prevented him for a time from discovering the enemy's whereabouts, but at last he found them in a portion of the village a mile distant from the river, who on the approach of the detachment fled to the hills, taking with them some cattle and loot. It was useless to follow them in the dark; Lieutenant Dunning therefore, having restored tranquillity in the village, re-embarked, and finding all quiet at Serra West, he proceeded again up

stream, and from the fortified post of Ishkait he warned Colonel Wodehouse at Halfa of what had taken place, and at the same time sent a party of the Camel Corps to patrol towards Khor Mussa. Meanwhile Colonel Wodehouse sent instructions to the Camel Corps on the west bank to patrol southwards from Argin towards Khor Mussa, and at 4 A.M. despatched 100 cavalry under Himmet Effendi, with Captain Hickman, towards the hills east of the fort, which the Deberra raiders would probably pass on their return to Abka.¹ Colonel Wodehouse himself proceeded to Khor Mussa, and arrived there just in time to see the Camel Corps patrol coming up with the west bank raiders; a skirmish ensued, in which three Arabs fell, while the remainder managed to escape. Meanwhile Captain Hickman, having divided his force, placed them about a mile apart, concealed behind the hills through which the enemy must pass. At 7.30 A.M. the Arabs, consisting of about forty men, mostly mounted on camels and horses, and the remainder on foot, with a quantity of cattle, were seen making their way towards Abka. Hickman at once moved off with his troops at a gallop, and coming up to within 300 yards of the enemy, dismounted and fired a few volleys into them; then mounting, he charged into the middle of them, and a sharp hand-to-hand encounter ensued; while the second troop, moving across the front, placed themselves between the enemy and the Abka khor, and cut off the fugitives. Two horsemen only escaped; of the remainder eight were taken prisoners and the rest killed, including their leader Wad Rahma. This latter fought with the most desperate determination, but was eventually despatched by one of the troopers, who, jumping off his horse, literally threw himself on him, and after a severe struggle killed him.² It was now ascertained that Nejumi with a large force had arrived at Hafir, thirty miles north of Dongola, but it was almost impossible to find out what the strength of the enemy really was; the ordinary Arab or Egyptian has little or no idea of numbers, and all arrivals from the south gave different estimates. The force was said to consist of Baggara,


¹ At the head of the second cataract on the east bank.


² It was on this occasion that the Egyptian troopers, seizing the lances of their assailants as they fell, used them with considerable effect against the remainder. The aptitude here shown for the lance gave rise to the subsequent formation of the Lancer troops in the cavalry regiment.

*Rough sketch of movements
of Troops in A.S.W. ELTEB on
the night of the 30th April, '89*

A.S.W. = Armed Sternwheeler
5d

H. J. Dunning Bomb.
D.A.A.G. Intelligence





Jaalin, Battahin, Fellata,¹ and Beni Hussein² Arabs, in all about seventy standards, or approximately 5000; but this number included women and children, who invariably accompany an Arab army in the march, and a considerable number of horses and camels and five guns. As the force swept forward, it carried with it the unwilling inhabitants of the districts through which it passed. These the fighting-men employed as carriers and slaves.

Meanwhile Sarras had been reinforced, and the numbers there were estimated at 2500 men, 250 horses, and 300 camels and 4 guns, besides a large number of women and children.

There was now little doubt that a movement on a larger scale than that of previous years was about to be attempted, and all preparations were made on the frontier to guard against raids and surprises.

On May 7th news was brought to Halfa that a force of Arabs had crossed over to the west bank of Sarras on May 5th, and had at once set out for Matuka; it was believed at Sarras that a raid in force was to be made either on Argin or Serra. One hundred men of the 13th Sudanese under Lieutenant Cunningham were therefore sent to Argin, while fifty of the same corps under Lieutenant Judge proceeded in the gunboat *Tamai* to Serra. Seventy men of the Camel Corps under Lieutenant Dunning went to Argin fort. On the following day the scouts near Khor Mussa reported a large force of the enemy had left Matuka for the north; Argin was therefore further reinforced by Captain Kempster, with 150 men of the 13th Sudanese.

In the early morning of the 9th the Camel Corps patrols reported having seen tracks of a considerable force, evidently marching north, and some five miles distant from the river.

Meanwhile Lieutenant Judge had arrived at Serra, and in the early morning, while patrolling with 25 men in the vicinity of the village, caught sight of a force of some 600 spearmen and several camelmen and horsemen within $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, marching on the south end of the village. He therefore retired on the Omdeh's house, a large square building in the north end

¹ A tribe found in different districts of Kordofan and Darfur.

² The district of this tribe is to the north-east of Khartum.

of the village, and collecting some 300 of the villagers, cattle, etc., he put it into a state of defence, while he despatched the gunboat back to Argin for reinforcements.

The Arabs had now entered the village, and were pillaging the houses. A few of the spearmen and horsemen came within view of the Omdeh's house, and were received with volleys; and after a desultory investment for about half an hour they drew off, followed by Lieutenant Judge and his 50 men, who tracked them into the sandhills to the south-west of the village, killing eight stragglers, and rescuing some 30 villagers and a number of cattle which would otherwise have been captured. The Arab main body, however, seeing they were followed, turned back, and Lieutenant Judge was again obliged to retire on his fortified post, where he found Lieutenant Cunningham, who had just arrived with 100 men from Argin in the gunboat. The latter now decided to attack the enemy, who had by this time returned in force to the south end of the village, and marching out with 150 men, came up with the enemy in the middle of the village and at once opened fire on them, throwing out a few skirmishers to his right flank to guard against an attack by the horsemen. A party of the latter, suddenly appearing from behind a sandhill, charged the skirmishers, who retreated on to the main body; while Lieutenant Judge, who was the last to return, narrowly escaped the spear of the emir Abd el Hafiz, who with a few of the most daring horsemen dashed into the right flank, and some hand-to-hand fighting ensued, in which Lieutenant Judge, throwing himself on Abd el Hafiz, unhorsed and severely wounded him.¹ The horsemen were eventually driven off, but in face of overwhelming numbers Lieutenant Cunningham was forced to retire on the fortified post. Thence he despatched the gunboat to patrol in front of the village, and after a time he again advanced through the village, which he found deserted by the enemy. Leaving therefore a few men at Serra, he returned with the remainder to Argin.


Meanwhile Colonel Wodehouse had despatched a party of cavalry and Camel Corps from Argin towards Serra under

¹ This emir, who had also led the night attack on Khor Mussa, was subsequently rescued by his men, and died of his wounds at Sarra a week later.


ROUGH SKETCH of the attempted Derrish raid on SERRA WEST

ON 9th MAY 1889.

Enemy
Intended disposition of Egyptian force
Actual




About 1 mile off when enemy first seen from Gaddool



R. NILE

Sd. G. G. Cunningham
XIII^a Sudanese



Lieutenant Dunning, who, finding the enemy retreating in force, kept touch with their rearguard for some distance, until recalled to proceed to Khor Mussa West, where a force of some 500 troops under Major Hunter had been concentrated, with a view to intercepting the Arabs on their return to Matuka. This force demonstrated towards the west in the early morning of the 10th May; but it was found that the enemy had passed during the night some five miles from the river, and had succeeded in reaching Matuka. Major. Hunter therefore returned to Halfa.

It was estimated that the enemy had covered upwards of seventy-two miles of waterless desert in sixty hours, which told well for their mobility. They lost some 30 men, but succeeded in taking with them a number of cattle and a few villagers whom they had captured; while the Egyptian loss was 6 men wounded, 4 villagers killed and 3 wounded. The unusually large scale on which this last raid had been carried out, and the rumours of Nejumi's force constantly increasing in magnitude, all tended to show that serious disturbances must soon be expected on the frontier. Small reinforcements were pushed up from Cairo, and a flying column was organised at Halfa, with sufficient steam and boat transport to enable it to move at the shortest possible notice. On May 12th a merchant arrived from the south who reported that he had been present at a large parade of the troops at Dongola, who numbered some 8000 fighting-men and 2000 Bazingers, the total number of standards that had moved to Hafir was 83, Yunis Dekeim remained at Dongola with 4000 troops, while Nejumi had gone to Hafir. All the Arabs were eager for a "Jehad." Some 700 cavalry and from 5000 to 6000 camels were to accompany the force marching north. A large grain depot had been established at Kerma.¹

On May 24th the force at Sarras transferred their camp to the west bank, as if to be in readiness to at once join Nejumi, who, it was said, did not intend to remain long at Sarras, but would move on at once. On May 26th Nejumi's force was said to be at Sakyet el Abd,² while he himself still remained

¹ This news was at first rather discounted as an exaggeration of facts, but subsequent events proved the numbers to have been well estimated.

² Distant about 110 miles south of Halfa.

at Kerma to push on reinforcements. He wrote thence to Abd el Halim at Sarras that he was advancing with his army and quantities of ammunition and grain.

Affairs in the Eastern Desert again assumed a serious aspect. The Halaib raiders had not left the neighbourhood, but had settled themselves at the wells of Agwamteri, 30 miles from Jebel Elba, and forced the Bisharin in the immediate neighbourhood to join them.

News reached Bishir Bey that an attack on his post of Abrak was intended. He therefore despatched his brother Mustafa, who shortly afterwards wrote that the enemy's force had increased to 1000 strong, was within five days' march of Abrak, and that there was plenty of water on the road. Bishir Bey in forwarding this information remarks that a descent on Abrak is possible, and that if it take place his Ababdehs will be forced to join the enemy, and will be made by them to act as guides for raiding-parties who wish to descend on points on the river between Derau and Keueh, and that he will not be able to prevent them taking Abrak if they want to.

Mustafa, however, subsequently effected an alliance with the Aliab and Amrab sections of the Bisharin, and instigated them to raid on the Mahdiists, then at the wells of Glib. This called forth the following letter from the Arab chief Hassan Wad Saad el Baghdadi to Bishir Bey, characteristic of the curious intertribal relations which then existed:—

I write to inform you that on Tuesday, 23d Ramadan, a party of Bisharin, reported to be Aliab and Amrab, came and pillaged the bazar here, in which the followers of the Mahdi were living. They said it was your order to attack the followers of the Mahdi and take all they possessed. I know quite well that these men wish to stir up dissensions between the Ababdeh and Mahdiists; but I cannot allow this, and in consequence I beg to tell you that as I am of the same tribe as yourself I do not wish for any fighting between us. My desire is to come and take over the whole of our tribe, but if you do not like this and still wish to fight, know that I am ready to fight you with my 500 men. Still I am sure that this need not happen, owing to our relationship, so I hope to hear from you again on this matter, as I hope to be lucky in this world.

(Sd.) HASSAN SAAD MOHAMMED.

It appears, however, that the writer received no answer; he therefore sent his men west, and on June 3d Mustafa with his newly-acquired allies met them at Messa; a fight ensued,

but Mustafa's official account to the commandant of Assuan will best explain the curious mode of conducting desert warfare.

Copy of a report written by sheikh Mohammed Mustafa Gibran to the officer commanding the Assuan district.

SIR—I have the honour to submit to you the details of an action fought between my men and the rebels at Messa.

Whilst at Abrak with my men, six Aliab and Amrab Arabs arrived with messages from their sheikhs proposing that they should meet me at Messa, and that we should combine and attack the rebels at Elba.

I consented to meet them, and on the 1st of Shawal (31st of May) I left Abrak with 200 men and arrived at Messa on the 4th. I did not find here any Bisharin, but there were four Aliab in charge of six prisoners. They informed me that they had been captured at El Adaliab. I took them over, and on the same evening I received a letter from the emir Hassan el Baghdadi addressed to Bishir Bey; I also received a letter from Donne Bey.

At dawn on the 5th of Shawal a Bishari came in and informed me that the rebels intended to come down and attack my men. I then dismounted my men and tied up the camels. Half an hour afterwards the enemy attacked me. I fired on them, and I hoped the bullets hit them, for the enemy retired and disappeared. I then sent a party to occupy the hills which they had left, with orders to follow them and harass them.

When all the enemy had disappeared, I then advanced with my whole force, to see how many had been killed. I found fifty killed, but I found also seven men severely wounded. I asked them the strength of the enemy; they told me 250, under the emir Giderri, who was the first man killed. The attack was made in order to rescue the seven prisoners whom the Bisharin took at El Adaliab; as they were approaching Messa they heard that I had come, and agreed to kill me.

I captured forty spears, five rifles, three shields, and a number of Mahdi clothes.

In my opinion these rebels did not return to Messa or anywhere in the vicinity of Elba.

During the attack I captured eight donkeys, but I gave them to the Aliab Arabs, who were guarding the prisoners.

I had no casualties amongst the men and only six camels wounded.

(Sealed) MOHAMMED MUSTAFA GIBRAN.

Bahr Karrar, though still at Ongat, took no part in these disturbances, but remained true to his word to Bishir to abstain from hostilities; he even went so far as to warn Bishir of Hassan Khalifa's intention to take possession of the wells of Murat, and asked Bishir to send him men to protect Ongat from being occupied by Hassan Khalifa!

On the night of June 3d the fortified post at Argin sent up a warning signal-rocket, whereupon 100 men were at once

despatched from Halfa, but before they had time to arrive the raiders had made off.

It subsequently transpired that some twenty-five Arabs mounted on camels had arrived, and representing themselves as refugees had obtained admittance to the village, where at once they began to raid; but on the garrison of the post appearing they retired precipitately, after having killed a villager.

In the meantime Colonel Wodehouse had decided on making a counter-attack on the Arab outpost of Matuka, on the west bank $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles south of Khor Mussa; he accordingly despatched Major Hunter with a force of 300 of the 13th Sudanese, 100 cavalry, and a company of the Camel Corps, with this object. These troops having collected on the west bank opposite Khor Mussa, Major Hunter pushed south to the high ground of Abu Sir, which the infantry reached at 7.30 A.M., while the mounted corps had already exchanged shots with the enemy, some of whom were on an island in the cataract, the remainder on the mainland. The latter, on the approach of the troops, fled to the island, which was then attacked by the infantry and half of the dismounted Camel Corps, who, wading across the river, rushed the island, killing eighteen Arabs in a hand-to-hand encounter, taking seven prisoners and capturing the small village, with a considerable quantity of arms, ammunition and cattle; the remainder of the Arabs escaped to the other islands in the cataract, while the village was burnt. The Egyptian losses were only one man killed and three wounded, three horses killed.

Up to this time the wells of Murat had been unoccupied, but on June 6th Hassan Khalifa left Abu Hamed with 500 men, and took possession of the wells on the 9th. Due warning of this movement was given by Saleh Bey, to whom Hassan Khalifa wrote, saying that he was forced to come to Murat by direct orders of the Khalifa, which he must obey, that his men had little food and must supply themselves by raiding on the river. With this news Saleh Bey received letters, a banner, and various articles of dress, from the Khalifa, which he at once handed over to the military authorities. All the letters received tended to confirm the success of the Mahdist arms over the Abyssinians and the Sudanese movements.

On receipt of this news, two gunboats were despatched from Halfa under the command of Captain Sillem, one to watch the various desert-roads debouching on the river, while the other went to Korosko, in case a raid were made on that station. On the 16th June Captain Sillem drew up his gunboat in a sheltered spot a short distance north of Gustol,¹ and put out his pickets to watch the khor by which he expected the Arabs would come. In the early morning the sentries reported hearing a noise of camels, and shortly afterwards a villager reported that a large party of Arabs with many camels had come to the river about a mile south. Captain Sillem, on receiving this news, sent a party to watch the entrance to the khor, while he, with the remainder, proceeded south in the gunboat, hoping that he would be able to drive the Arabs away from the river, and that in returning to the desert they would be intercepted by the party concealed near the khor. The river being low, navigation was difficult, and as the gunboat passed under a high rock a brisk fire was opened by some Arab riflemen from the top, who succeeded in killing one man on board. Up to this time the gunboat had not been observed by the main body of the Arabs, who were assembled close to the river bank, their camels being some distance from them, while a second party of riflemen were firing on some sailing-boats, which, loaded with government rations, had stuck on a sandbank within easy range. The gunboat now opened fire with the nine-pounder at 3000 yards' range on the camels, and the Arabs, rushing back, mounted and took to flight, some going straight into the desert, while others made for the khor, escaping the other party by making a detour through the hills. Captain Sillem, landing his men, pursued for some distance, and succeeded in killing four of the enemy and capturing some camels.

The opportune arrival of the gunboat thus saved the village of Gustol from what would probably have been a serious raid, and, moreover, prevented the capture of sailing-boats with a considerable quantity of Government stores. In consequence of the raid the wells of Glib were occupied by Bishir Bey.

Meanwhile Nejumi with his force was slowly marching north. He left Sakyet el Abd on June 13th, and passing

¹ A *khor* a little to the north of Belanga on the east bank.

through Dal on the 15th, he arrived at Semneh on the 19th, whence he despatched the following letter¹ to Abd el Halim, commanding at Sarras² :—

In the name of God, etc.—From Abderrahman Wad en Nejumi to his beloved Abd el Halim Mussaid.

After salutations, I beg to inform you that your letter, in which you mentioned the departure of the camel-men coming from our lord the Khalifa of the Mahdi, has been received, and the camel-men have also arrived and met us in the desert of Semneh. To-day (Thursday), the 20th of Shawal, is the day of our arrival at Semneh station with the army at 1:30 A.M. (Arabic time). By the will of God we will get rest, and complete our army at this station, and then proceed to join you. The cause of our delay was the difficulty in getting the army together.

You further mentioned in your letter that a soldier from the enemy at Sarras came to you. Therefore send him at once without a moment's delay for transmission to the Khalifa.

(Signed) ABDERRAHMAN WAD NEJUMI.

My seal *en route* written by my own hand.

20TH SHAWAL 1306

(19th June 1889).

Nejumi had by this time with him upwards of 4000 fighting-men, 300 horses, 550 camels, 3000 donkeys, 300 rifles, 8 mountain-guns, and 2 machine-guns. In addition to the above he had collected a vast number of camp-followers, women, and children, which brought his whole force to over 11,000 souls.

The emir Yunis still remained at Dongola, pushing on reinforcements. Already Makin en Nur had started from Dongola with 600 men, while Ali Wad Saad was at Hafir with 500 more. Osman Dekeim, nephew of the Khalifa, was at Berber, doing all he could to collect reinforcements for the

¹ Found on the battle-field of Toski, 3d August 1889.

² The movement of Nejumi's force and the actual dates of his arrival and departure at the various stations were only ascertained subsequently; and so rigidly did he prevent deserters from coming north, and so thoroughly did he scour the country of its inhabitants, that for some weeks previous to his arrival at Semneh his actual whereabouts and the strength of his force were unknown to the military authorities at Halfa, where, owing to the above facts, no trustworthy information was obtainable. The day previous to Nejumi's arrival at Semneh, Colonel Wodehouse was preparing a force to proceed to Sarras, where it would probably have come in contact with Nejumi, and would have encountered overwhelming numbers in unfavourable ground; but fortunately, as Nejumi approached the frontier, it was impossible to prevent his position becoming known, and on it being ascertained that he had actually arrived at Semneh, it was decided to abandon all projects of counter-attack and await events.

northern army; therefore he reserved for his own protection some 900 Bazingers, with whom he refused to part under any circumstances.

Abd el Halim awaited Nejumi's arrival on the west bank at Sarras with a force of 1200 fighting-men, of whom 300 were riflemen, a few camel and horse men, and some 1000 camp-followers.

It was now evident that operations on a larger scale than heretofore must be anticipated. All previous rumour pointed to an advance into Egypt by the west bank. Still the authorities could not bring themselves to believe that Nejumi, with his former reputation as a leader, could possibly undertake so wild a project as to advance over hundreds of miles of waterless desert, while the waterway was held by the enemy, who, if not strong enough to attack him, must harass him and prevent him from obtaining water; and he might be sure that if he descended into the villages they would be long before cleared of all supplies of food, and probably occupied by troops. It was therefore thought that when Nejumi himself saw the situation he would give up his project of invasion and confine himself to raids on a large scale; but the fanatical nature of the man had been misunderstood. He remembered that he himself had been the Mahdi's right-hand man, and that the conquest of Egypt had always been his late master's firm resolve. He had been taunted by the Khalifa for his inaction during the past years, and, well knowing the jealousy with which he was regarded by him, Nejumi was not a man to be put off by the difficulties and obstacles which any but a fanatical Arab leader would have considered insuperable. He had confidence in his men, and they in him. He had annihilated Hicks and had captured Khartum. Why should he fear to advance into Egypt and to fight against Egyptian troops, whom he had learnt to regard with contempt? His emirs were all picked men, who had scored success after success over the Government troops. He had denuded the country of supplies as he passed through, and knew that he need not expect to be supplied further from the south. Again, the country in which he found himself was too poor to support a force like his. Already many of his horses, camels, and donkeys had been sacrificed to keep off starvation. He must

therefore advance, and that without delay, or his army, gathered together with so much difficulty, would disperse.

He arrived at Sarras on the 22d, where he was joined by Abd el Halim and his force, and by the 28th the combined force had reached Matuka.

From here on the following day Nejumi, Abd el Halim, Osman Azrak, and a few of the emirs reconnoitred the position from a high hill close to the Abu Sir heights. In the distance could be seen the outpost forts at Khor Mussa, while still farther off the lines of Halfa were visible, and it is said that on Abd el Halim pointing these out to his chief, the latter with a curse swore that ere long the horse he rode should be tethered in the commandant's stables. From here, too, Nejumi and Abd el Halim anxiously discussed their plans for the future. Nejumi's orders were to march parallel with the river, but to keep well in the desert and not to descend to the villages, from which he anticipated no difficulty in obtaining supplies.

The villagers, he believed, were all Mahdiists at heart, and would flock to his standards when they saw his army. Abd el Halim, however, with the knowledge his previous experience in raiding had given him, suggested that the villages should be occupied as they advanced, for he feared the want of water would soon be felt. But Nejumi insisted that his plan should be carried out. It was then decided that the force should rest for two days and begin its advance on Egypt on July 1st. The fatality of delaying was soon apparent, and during these two days upwards of 500 desertions towards the south took place.

On the 30th a reconnaissance was made towards Khor Mussa, but a few shell from the fort soon drove off the enemy.

Meanwhile the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps were scouting vigorously on the west bank, and on the evening of the 30th news had been received that the enemy might march that night. Consequently Colonel Wodehouse left Halfa at dawn the following morning, with two gunboats towing barges containing 500 men of the 10th Sudanese Battalion, 250 of the 9th Sudanese, and the battery of four 6-cm. Krupp guns, and at the same time crossed the cavalry over to the west bank. He proceeded north as far as Ishkait, and there

received a message that the enemy had made no movement. He therefore returned to Halfa the same evening. A few hours afterwards came the news that the enemy intended advancing north at once, and that the village of Argin was their objective. The inhabitants of the district had some time previously been removed to a position of safety on the east bank.

The extreme south end of this village is some three miles north of the forts on the west bank opposite Halfa, and at this point was protected by a strong block-house, held by the 2d company Camel Corps and a detachment of infantry; thence the village stretches north for a distance of some four and a half miles, consisting of a belt of palm trees with detached groups of mud houses scattered along the entire length. At the extreme north end was a large building—the Omdeh's house—which had been recently constructed into a strong defensible post, and was garrisoned by 250 men of the 9th Sudanese battalion under Lieutenant Mitford and two machine-guns.

A mile south of this post the 13th Sudanese Battalion, under Captain Kempster, had taken up a strong position in a group of detached houses, which they had placed in a state of defence, while his gunboat, the *Tamai*, was moored to the right rear on the sandy foreshore, some 200 yards from the bank.

On the east bank, a short distance beyond the last house of the village, was the defensible post of Ishkait, garrisoned by a detachment of the 7th Battalion and one gun. Such were the dispositions made for the defence of the village of Argin, it being the intention of Colonel Wodehouse to reinforce any threatened point of this straggling line with the remainder of his flying column, which, it will be remembered, had been organised some time previously at Halfa. He had at his disposition for this purpose four armed stern-wheelers or gunboats armed with machine and Krupp guns, viz. the *Metemmeh*, *Abu Klea*, *El Teb*, and *Tamai*, and a number of barges and large native sailing-boats, which, moored on either side of the gunboats, formed ample transport for three battalions.

The composition of the flying column was as follows:—

Headquarters Staff Frontier Field Force.

Two squadrons of Cavalry (200 men).

Artillery { Six 6-cm. Krupp, 2d Field Battery.
Two 8-cm. Krupp, 3d Garrison Battery.

Two companies Camel Corps (120 men).

9th Sudanese Battalion (520 men). } Each battalion
10th Sudanese Battalion (520 men). } consists of
13th Sudanese Battalion (550 men). } four companies.
Medical Corps (32 men).

In all, some 1940 men.

But to return to the movements of the enemy. On the 1st July, shortly after sunset, the whole of Nejumi's force, men, women, children, horses, camels, and donkeys, forming a huge and dense crowd, streamed out of Matuka in a north-westerly direction, making a considerable detour into the desert.

The army was divided into four unequal divisions, the supreme command being vested in Nejumi, with Abd el Halim as his second.

The first division was known as Nejumi's division, and comprised some 2400 Baggara, Jaalin, Shaggieh, Battahin, Beni Hussein, and other tribes, under some fifty subordinate emirs. The second division was under the command of Ismail Haraka, and was composed for the most part of Baggara Arabs, some 800 men under forty emirs.

The third division was under Abd el Halim, and comprised some 1200 Jaalin, Danagla, Shaggieh, and other tribes, under twenty-four emirs; while Osman Azrak commanded the fourth division, consisting of about 600 Danagla under eighteen emirs.

Making a total of some 140 emirs¹ with 160 banners.

In all it is estimated there were over 5000 fighting-men, and upwards of 8000 camp-followers (exclusive of the desertions from Matuka), comprising the wives and families of the warriors, and a mass of impressed Danagla and others who had been swept along as the army advanced through their country.

This force, on the march, had the appearance of an enormous crowd, with the exposed flank and rear covered by

¹ For full details see Appendix.

cavalry, who performed the double duties of protection and preventing desertions and lagging on the line of march. Advancing through the night with one short halt, the enemy were seen at dawn at a distance of about two miles in the desert from the forts opposite Halfa and due west of them, while an hour later it was reported from Khor Mussa that Matuka had been completely evacuated. Colonel Wodehouse, on receipt of this news, repeated his previous dispositions, and crossing the cavalry to the west bank, proceeded to Argin with his staff and half the 9th Sudanese in the *Metemmeh*, accompanied by Major Donne and his battalion, the 10th Sudanese, in the *El Teb*; and learning at South Argin fort that the mounted troops were in touch with the enemy, he steamed to about the centre of the village, landing his troops and guns on the east bank, and sending the gunboats to cruise in front of the village, he awaited the development of the enemy's attack.

Meanwhile a portion of the cavalry under Lieutenant Beech having crossed to the west bank, got in touch with the enemy's rear at 8 A.M., and succeeded in cutting off a few stragglers and others making for the river. But being threatened by a much superior number of horse and camel men, he was obliged to retire, and shortly afterwards was reinforced by Captain Dunning with the Camel Corps and remainder of the cavalry. The enemy, continuing its advance, at 9 A.M. occupied the hills due west of Argin and some 5000 yards distant from the village, driving in the 2d Camel Corps, which had reconnoitred from South Argin fort.

Captain Dunning's cavalry and Camel Corps, following the enemy, now reinforced this post, and taking up a position in the valley on the enemy's flank, poured volleys into numerous parties of them as they advanced to and from the south end of the village.

In the meantime, from a commanding position on the east bank, Colonel Wodehouse perceived the hills opposite to him, and some three miles distant, gradually occupied by the enemy, who, planting their banners on the hill-top to mark their position, began to descend in considerable numbers towards the north end of the village. The artillery now opened on these from the east bank, and the 10th Sudanese Battalion, under

Major Donne, with Major Hunter in a gunboat, were sent to reinforce the posts held by Captain Kempster and Lieutenant Mitford.

These posts had been previously engaged with small parties of the enemy for some time, and at 8:30 A.M. three large parties, headed by their emirs, with numerous flags, having approached to within 1000 yards of Captain Kempster's position, were received with volleys which caused them to break up and take cover behind a long ridge running obliquely to the left of the position, from which their riflemen kept up a harassing fire. Major Donne, arriving with his reinforcements opposite Captain Kempster's position, perceived a number of the enemy passing north in the direction of the Omdeh's house, and in consequence landed the 10th Sudanese to the north of this post, whence they fired at long ranges on the enemy, now retreating under the fire of the 13th Sudanese. Their cavalry, attempting to water opposite Ishkait fort, were driven off by shell-fire from that place.

This first attempt of the enemy to occupy the village in force had completely failed, though small parties of the Arabs still came down to the river between Captain Kempster's position and South Argin fort, and, occupying some of the houses on the river bank, opened fire on the cavalry and the Camel Corps, and inflicted some slight loss on them.

So far Nejumi's orders not to occupy the village in force had been observed, though he was powerless to prevent parties going down to the river to water after their long night-march, and therefore, up to this stage, the fighting was of a desultory nature, and no serious attempt had been made to push home an attack. That part of the village, however, now held by the enemy was being continually reinforced, and about noon they managed to place a gun in position near the spot shown in the sketch-map, but after firing twelve rounds at the Egyptian guns on the east bank it was silenced by the latter. Colonel Wodehouse now sent a gunboat, under Captain Nason (D.A.A.G.), to cruise in front of the enemy's position and endeavour to drive them out. But after an hour's heavy firing on both sides the gunboat returned with Captain Nason severely wounded and two men of the gun detachment wounded.

In the meantime Abd el Halim had been urging on Nejumi

to occupy the village in force, pointing out that they already held a portion of the village, and that in consequence a firm footing could be easily obtained. But Nejumi was averse to acting contrary to his instructions and refused his consent. Abd el Halim, however, persisted, and, as some say, took upon himself to order the noggara to sound for the attack.

Collecting his own division and detachments from the other divisions, in all some twenty standards and upwards of 3000 men, he advanced rapidly down a khor, debouching near the centre of the village, his left flank protected by riflemen posted on the spur to which they had been driven by Captain Kempster in the early stage, while his right was covered by the fire from the houses now strongly held by his own men. So effective was the fire from these houses that the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps, who up to this time had held the position taken up by them in the early part of the day, were forced to retire, the Camel Corps to the south fort, and the cavalry to the hills in rear.

Colonel Wodehouse, perceiving the enemy in force pouring down towards the centre of the village, turned his guns on them, and must have inflicted considerable loss. But the Arabs, undaunted, still came on, and nearing the village broke up into three parties, the northern division being directed towards Captain Kempster's position, while the second occupied the centre of the village, and the third, entering near the houses already occupied, pushed south and threatened South Argin fort.

Seeing this new development of the attack, Colonel Wodehouse immediately sent orders to Major Hunter to re-embark the 10th Battalion to reinforce South Argin. Two companies of the latter under Lieutenant Fenwick in the *El Teb* were the first to arrive at Argin fort, and disembarking began to march north to clear the village and join the other half of the battalion, which, under Major Donne's command, had orders to land lower down and march south through the village. Before, however, Lieutenant Fenwick had advanced far he was charged by the enemy's cavalry, who had been concealed behind the houses, and the latter, followed by a large number of spearmen, forced the companies back to the river's edge, where they took up a position, and, assisted by the fire from the gunboat,

held their own against enormous odds, repelling attack after attack, and behaving with the greatest gallantry until reinforced by two companies of the 9th Sudanese under Captain Lewis and Captain Dunning's dismounted Camel Corps. Major Hunter now assumed command of these detachments, and advancing, the 10th on the right, Camel Corps in the centre, and the 9th on the left, he steadily drove back the Arabs, whose cavalry and spearmen charged him three times with desperate bravery, but were shot down to a man. Seeing that there was still a number of banners in front, and that the scattered horse and spear men were again rallying on the left, Major Hunter took up a position in the angle of some buildings in such a way that the houses stood for the right and rear faces, while the troops, moving up on front and left, formed a square with reserves in the centre.

Meanwhile Captain Kempster, seeing the enemy in force pouring down to the village on his left, kept up a continuous fire on them from his loopholed mud-walls, which was replied to by the Arab riflemen on the ridge. Hearing from a deserter from the enemy that a gun had been brought into position on the river bank a short distance to his left, he took out a party of forty men, with Lieutenants Cunningham and Judge, with the intention of capturing it; but finding that the houses in his front, a castor-oil plantation, and a sakia-pit were very strongly held, and that in all probability he had been drawn into an ambush by the deserter, he retired to his position, with a loss of seven wounded, including Lieutenant Cunningham.

By this time Major Donne had arrived opposite Captain Kempster's position. One of his companies had marched south along the bank. Seeing a party of the 13th engaged in a sharp skirmish, he landed his other company, and with his left resting on the river and his right thrown forward, he marched south, clearing several houses occupied by the enemy, being repeatedly charged by their spearmen, who on one occasion drove him on to the bank. But he rallied his men, and, perceiving the enemy's gun, advanced towards it, and after a sharp hand-to-hand encounter succeeded in capturing it. Seeing that the enemy were in considerable force in his immediate front, he re-embarked and proceeded to South Argin fort, eventually joining Major Hunter's force.

Colonel Wodehouse had by this time arrived on the west bank, and now despatched Major Hunter with two companies of the 9th to clear the plain to his left front, which he succeeded in effecting, though three times charged by horse and spear men. He eventually drove the enemy back through the khor down which they had advanced. But some fifty or sixty Arabs still remained in three separate houses. These were surrounded, and the inmates, fighting with the greatest determination, were burnt out of the houses and killed.

During these operations the cavalry had been usefully employed on the enemy's right flank, and inflicted some loss on them as they retreated.

The village was now (6 P.M.) completely cleared of the enemy, who had left some 900 men killed in and round about the village, including a large number of horsemen, while some 500 prisoners, men, women, and children, some thousands of spears, twelve banners, and arms of all descriptions were taken.

The important emirs killed on this occasion were sheikh Idris, Abd el Kader Garu, Elias, and Wad Abu Bishar, while Abd el Halim, Osman Azrak, and several other emirs were wounded. The Egyptian loss was eleven men killed and four officers and fifty-five men wounded.

The enemy's camp or dem still remained in its former position in the hills above Argin, while the Egyptian troops bivouacked for the night at South Argin fort, Captain Kempster and Lieutenant Mitford still holding their former positions.

The night passed quietly, and many deserters from the enemy gave themselves up. At dawn the cavalry, reconnoitring the enemy's position, found it to be unchanged. They cut off a number of stragglers, while Colonel Wodehouse demonstrated with the infantry towards the hills, but the enemy failed to show in any large numbers. Later on the cavalry succeeded in cutting off forty of them coming down to the water; these scattered parties frequently consisted of men, women, and children. All men who surrendered were spared, and with the women and children were sent north in barges and native boats to Korosko, and thence to Assuan (Shellal), where hospitals and shelters were provided and all arrangements made for their maintenance.

During the day the 10th Sudanese took up a position in the centre of the village opposite the khor, by which it was thought probable the enemy would again attempt to reach the river; and during the night large parties were seen in this direction, but retreated on being fired upon. Meanwhile a furious discussion between Nejumi and Abd el Halim had been going on in the Arab camp. The former visited the wounded Halim and remonstrated with him on his disobedience of orders; but Abd el Halim pointed out that he had been right throughout, that it was useless to attempt to maintain a force in the desert, and that the only chance of success was to secure a footing on the river. The experience of the 2d July had now shown that the villages were deserted of inhabitants and empty of supplies, and that the Egyptian troops, with their steamers and water transport, could always occupy the villages before they (the Arabs) could reach them.¹ To Abd el Halim, wounded and depressed with the result of his failure, Nejumi's undertaking now seemed impossible; he urged his chief to retreat back to Matuka, and thence to the richer districts of Mahass and Sukkot, where at least they could have dates to eat, and whence they could write to the Khalifa and tell him how futile it was to attempt an invasion of Egypt with insufficient men, no food, and enormous difficulties in obtaining water.

But Nejumi would not hear of this proposition, and assembling his entire force, he addressed them in stirring words. He told them that they were fighting a holy war and for a holy cause; that those who died in this cause would die as martyrs, and they all knew what joys awaited the martyrs in Paradise. That this undertaking was fraught with difficulty and danger, and must inevitably end in the death of those who remained faithful, he did not attempt to conceal, but (drawing his sword and flourishing it) he for one would never desist from the holy undertaking. That there might be weak hearts and recalcitrant emirs amongst them, and those he bid retire back to their homes, disgraced before God and His cause; but let those who thought as he did remain where they were, and he would lead them, if not to victory, at any rate to certain joys

¹ Statement of Hassan Effendi Habashi, chief clerk of Abd el Halim.

and happiness in the future life. So stirring had been this speech, so full of fanatical ardour was the man, and such powers had he over his followers, that many of those who had a short time since clamoured to be led back now came forward to say they were ready to follow their chief to the end and die with him. ✓

Some 500, however, less courageous than the rest, made their way back to Matuka, and thence southwards; and now Nejumi's force, reduced by some 2000 men, was once more ready to continue its northward march. ✓

The experience of Argin had proved that Colonel Wodehouse's flying column was not strong enough to attack the enemy's entire force. His plan of campaign was therefore to keep in touch with the enemy, harass him, and gradually draw him on until reinforcements arrived from Cairo, when it would be possible to strike a decisive blow.

The inhabitants of villages on the west bank as far as Tomas, some seventy miles north of Halfa, were removed with their supplies to the east bank, and Colonel Wodehouse, disposing his gunboats in front, rear, and centre of the enemy's advance, was enabled to watch their every movement.

The general disposition of the frontier force was at this time roughly as follows :—

At Halfa and posts in the vicinity	2000 men
Other posts on the frontier, including Korosko and Assuan	1400 men
The flying column	2000 men
Irregulars garrisoning desert posts	600 men
In all some 6000 troops.	

Considering the general situation, it was not possible to reinforce the flying column from the various frontier garrisons, and on news of a definite advance reaching Cairo, the 2d Egyptian Battalion had been already despatched to Assuan.

The 1st Egyptian Battalion, the Egyptian Horse Battery, a Mule Battery, and two squadrons of cavalry quickly followed.

On July 5th the Sirdar, Major-General Sir F. Grenfell, and his staff left Cairo, while a British brigade, under the command of Brigadier-General the Hon. R. H. De Montmorency, consisting of a squadron 20th Hussars, a division of a mule battery, a detachment of mounted infantry, 2d battalion Royal

Irish Rifles, and the 1st battalion Welsh Regiment, was to follow as quickly as possible.

As rumour persistently pointed to Bimban, twenty-five miles north of Assuan, being the enemy's objective, it was decided in the first instance to concentrate the reinforcements at Assuan, and if necessary take up a strong position at Bimban; but on the other hand, should the enemy's advance prove less rapid and formidable than had been at first anticipated, a second column was to be formed as rapidly as possible at Assuan, and joining Colonel Wodehouse's column, should bring on a decisive action at some intermediate point between Assuan and Halfa: and as events developed themselves, the latter plan was subsequently adopted. At midnight, on the 4th, from Argin the enemy's camp was seen in flames, and on the following morning a reconnoitring party discovered that Nejumi had moved his camp some three miles north and 3000 yards distant from the river. In consequence of this the flying column moved to North Argin, while the 10th Sudanese was sent on to Serra to head the enemy.

On the 6th the Arab force was seen in a dense formation extending some three miles, marching rapidly north towards Serra, a distance of five miles. Wodehouse, reinforcing the 10th by the 13th Sudanese, continued to descend the river, keeping parallel with the enemy's advance. Conflicts with small parties of the enemy frequently occurred, and their losses by desertion and fire from the gunboats were considerable. They halted for the night in the hills near Serra, and starting north again early the following morning after a march of five miles arrived at Farras, a number of their riflemen occupying the old castle opposite the north end of Adendan, whence they kept up a hot fire on the passing gunboats. Colonel Wodehouse, taking up a position on the east bank, sent on a portion of his force to the village of Belanga.

On the following morning (8th) the enemy's camp was discovered behind the village of Farras, and some 1500 yards from the river. This was shelled for two hours with considerable effect by the artillery on the east bank, and a desultory fire was kept up during the remainder of that day and the next. On the morning of the 10th the enemy was again

observed to be in motion, and, marching steadily northwards for a distance of twelve miles, they took up a position in the hills two miles to the south of Belanga and 3000 yards from the river. Colonel Wodehouse's column was by this time concentrated at Belanga village, with the Camel Corps advanced to Toski to watch for stray parties, which were continually being sent ahead of the main force to search for dates, while a small portion of the troops were kept in rear to cut off stragglers.

The day following his arrival at Belanga, Nejumi despatched the following letter¹ to Haj Ali Wad Saad, who with Makin en Nur was bringing up reinforcements :—

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his God, Abderrahman en Nejumi, to his friend and brother in God and great helper, El Haj Ali Saad Farah.

After compliments and blessings, I am pleased to inform you that both myself and men are in good health and spirits.

We arrived at Belanga yesterday, and if it pleases God we shall move down to Toski to-day, and thence on to Tomas.² All our people are much encouraged, and are ready to fight and destroy the enemy, which news I am sure will please you. Whenever we see the enemy we attack and defeat them, and drive them back. May God help the Ansars and defeat their enemies.

There are some who have deserted and will perhaps spread false reports. I beg you not to believe them. It is their weak faith which leads them to this shameful act. You may fully rely on the steadiness and bravery of the Ansars. Please arrest them, put them in irons, and bring them down with you when you come.

There are four men called Ali Ahmed, El-Hadi Hassan, El Mansur el Imam, and Ibrahim es Said, who deserted last night, taking with them the camels of El Abbas, Ahmed Abd el Makr, and others. Please use your utmost endeavours to arrest them. My best salaams.

(Signed) *Waffik ya Rahman abdak Abderrahman*
(i.e. Help, O Merciful, Thy servant ABDERRAHMAN)

In the meantime the Sirdar had arrived at Assuan, and assuming the general direction of affairs, he delegated full powers to Colonel Wodehouse to act according to his discretion, and to continue to command his flying column and all troops to the south, while he despatched Colonel Kitchener to report on the defensive capabilities of Bimban, and to attempt to discover the relations which existed between the inhabitants of that village and Nejumi's force.

¹ Found on the field of Toski on 3d August 1889.

² A little to the north of Ibrim on the west bank.

The inhabitants of the frontier province were warned by proclamation that any disloyalty would be punishable by death, but they need be in no fear of the enemy's forces, which would soon be thrust back to the Sudan or annihilated. They were promised compensation for all property destroyed, and were urged to give every assistance to the Government troops. Subsequent events proved that with the exception of the strong suspicion resting on the Bimban people, absolute loyalty prevailed throughout the province, and it is a noteworthy fact that during the whole of the operations not a villager fell into the hands of the enemy, nor was there proof of any complicity whatsoever with the invading army. Had matters been different in this respect, the difficulties would have been largely increased for the Government troops. Nejumi, who had counted so largely on the expected support of the villagers, was thus deprived of one of the most important elements of success to his enterprise.

Events, too, in the Eastern Desert were generally satisfactory. On July 10th Bishir Bey returned from Haimur and reported to the Sirdar that Bahr Karrar still maintained his inoffensive attitude, and that the Arab force which had been defeated at J. Messa was now besieged at a place near the scene of the fight by the Aliab and Homran Bisharin.

Saleh Bey of Korosko now came forward and pressed to be allowed to organise a force of his irregulars to drive Hassan Khalifa and his men out of Murat, where they still maintained their position, but were greatly reduced in numbers from want of food, and their raiding capabilities were moreover considerably minimised by the paucity of their camels, the greater number of which had already been sacrificed to save the force from starvation.

By this time the inhabitants of the frontier had become completely reassured. The daily arrival of British and Egyptian troops at Assuan inspired them with confidence, while large batches of prisoners clothed in their Mahdi uniform, reaching there from the front, were proof positive to the incredulous townspeople that so far the Government arms had been successful.

In the meantime the garrison at Halfa was not inactive. The surrounding country was patrolled in all directions in the

hope of cutting off fugitives or reinforcements; and on the 11th, Koki, the well-known sheikh of the second cataract, succeeded in bringing in from Matuka two mountain-guns, which Nejumi had evidently abandoned at the last moment for want of transport. On July 12th reinforcements under Makin en Nur and Haj Ali Wad Saad arrived at Sarras, while further reinforcements were stated to be following. It now became evident that Nejumi would not advance from his camp at Belanga until Makin's arrival. The commandant of Halfa made every effort to prevent him reaching Nejumi.

On the 30th the Sirdar left Assuan for Belanga to personally view the situation and consult Colonel Wodehouse. Arriving there on the 15th, he made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position, which was still unchanged. The enemy did not show in any considerable force, and the much-vexed question of Nejumi's actual numbers still remained uncertain. Desultory skirmishes took place daily, and numbers of camp-followers, women and children, were captured. One and all gave pitiable accounts of the state of affairs in the Arab dem.

The numbers of camels, horses, and donkeys were rapidly diminishing, as they constituted almost the sole food. Might was right; so the lion's share, such as it was, fell to the fighting-men, while the miserable camp-followers subsisted on powdered date-seeds and the core of the date palm tree, which, when ground, is said to have certain nutritive properties. But many of these unfortunate people were reduced to a state of starvation, and, flocking to the river bank in numbers, were received by patrolling gunboats and brought to the Egyptian camp, where they were fed and cared for, and if wounded admitted to hospital. In fact, all that was possible was done to save life. So desperate, indeed, was their situation believed to be that the Sirdar wrote a letter to Nejumi, which was taken to Belanga to the Arab camp by two trusted messengers on July 16th, and at the same time copies of this letter were sent to the important emirs. It ran as follows:—

This letter, Wad en Nejumi, is to tell you that after my commander, Wodehouse Pasha, has informed me of what has happened, I have come here to see with my own eyes the state of affairs. I am followed by thousands and thousands of English and Egyptian troops, who are now on their way up the river; and I had thought to have swept you and

your followers off the face of the earth, for you have taken the property of defenceless people, seizing their women and children, destroying their country and their lands, and making famine and desolation in a land which before was prosperous and happy. Know, then, that it was our intention to utterly destroy you, but behold when I come here I find that you are a poor and weakly crowd, dying of hunger and thirst. I know that you personally have been the victim of a base jealousy imposed upon you by the false Khalifa, who has put his own nephew Yunis into the post you formerly occupied, and then, to get rid of you and the Arabs whom he cannot trust, he has ordered you down to take Egypt, a task which is as impossible for you to do as to hide the sun from lighting the world. And this that false Khalifa knows, and you know also, but you are blinded by the belief you must obey what he has told you to do. Already you know how futile has been your attempt; how, instead of gaining a victory, you are dying of hunger and thirst; your power has been brought low, and you are in our hands. You wish to reach Bimban, where you think the inhabitants are friendly to you. Bimban is hundreds of miles from you, and over long and waterless deserts; and even if ever you should succeed in reaching there, you would find an army of English and Egyptian troops ready to receive you.

To turn back from where you are is impossible, for the garrisons of Halfa will cut off your retreat, and now there is nothing for you left but to die of hunger and thirst in the desert.

But again I tell you that I have seen your pitiable state. Know that our Government is a humane Government, and does not wish the death of the helpless women and children who are with you. I therefore summon you to surrender and give yourselves up. If you do so your life, the lives of your emirs, and the lives of all those who are with them will be spared, and this I promise you on the word of an English general; but if you refuse to surrender, then know that you will be utterly destroyed. I therefore send you this letter, that you may choose which you will do.

May God guide you in your decision.

Let me have an answer by bearer.

(Signed) F. GRENFELL, Sirdar.

BELANGA, 16th May 1889.

To each emir :—

I send you a copy of a letter I have sent to your leader, Wad en Nejumi. Judge for yourselves what you will do, and may God guide your decision. If you wish to surrender and save your life and the lives of those who are with you, then give me an answer by bearer that you surrender. If you send no answer, then I will know that you do not wish to surrender, and the blood of the helpless people will be on your head.

(Signed) F. GRENFELL, Sirdar.

On the following day a reply was brought back by one of

the messengers, the other having been sent on with the Sirdar's letter to Dongola and Omdurman.¹

In the name of the Merciful and Almighty God, and prayers on our master Mohammed and his followers.

. From the servant of his Lord, and who relies on God, Abderrahman en Nejumi.

To the Sirdar Grenfell Pasha, may God lead him to the right way. Peace be to those who follow the right, fear their God, and prevent themselves from becoming ambitious.

We inform you that your letter, in which you tell of your arrival and of the cause of your coming up here, has reached us ; we have also noted your endless statements and beliefs, and therefore inform you that we are sent by his holiness to preach to all people, including Moslems, and have them protected by the mercy of God in Mahdiyyism, and to occupy the whole country and convert its inhabitants.

We are not marching only to Bimban, as you have stated, but intend to take the whole country, and through the help of God to convert its people. Therefore those who believe and leave all matters in the hands of God, His Prophet (prayers and peace on him) and His Khalifa (blessings be on him), and give up all arms and ammunition, themselves, their property, and children, will be safe ; what we have will be theirs and they will share our fate ; but those who refuse us, follow their ambition, and insist on resisting, let them know that the sword is alive, and God will judge between us and them (He is the best judge). Let it be known to you that your said letters, and those to our three brethren, have been sent with your messenger, Abd el Hadi, to my master Yunis and thence to our master and redeemer the Khalifa of the Mahdi (peace be on him) for his perusal and reply, and had we the authority to answer such letters, we would have sent an answer that convinces you.

As regards what you say about the large number of your army, and the approach of its arrival, etc., that does not frighten us at all. We are not afraid of any one, we only fear God. We do not even fear the *Thakalain*.

¹ This messenger was kept a prisoner at Omdurman for several months, and only recently effected his escape, returning to Cairo in June 1890. He relates that on his arrival at Omdurman, he was hurried before the Khalifa, who earnestly inquired about Nejumi and his force. The messenger replied that the British and Egyptian troops were innumerable, and that he thought Nejumi's chances of success were small. This appeared to greatly annoy the Khalifa, and a few days afterwards the latter sent for him, and took him to a large parade of all the troops in Omdurman. Here the Khalifa addressed the assembled warriors, saying, "This man who is standing before you comes from Nejumi's camp in Egypt, and he says that Nejumi and his men are very well ; they have abundance of food, milk, butter, sugar, honey, and all they require" ; and then, turning to the messenger, he said, "Is not this true?" The unfortunate messenger, in fear of losing his head, readily agreed. But the news of Nejumi's defeat at Toski soon followed, and the Khalifa, no longer able to hide the truth, vented some of his wrath on the messenger, who endured great tortures in the crowded prison of Omdurman.

Before this, we were carefully awaiting a chance to fight you, and as God has now relieved us from the tyranny of your governors, let it therefore be known to you that we still insist on fighting and destroying you, leaving none of you on the face of the earth who does not embrace our beliefs and meet the wishes of God. Take this as a real fact, and do not be deceived by the large number of your troops, your guns, shells, and powder, while the help of God is far from you.

It is quite sufficient for you that your chiefs Gordon and Hicks, and others, were destroyed with their numerous armies, arms, and equipment; if you therefore surrender and give up your guns, arms, and ammunition, you will be saved, and on you will fall the peace of God, His Prophet (prayers and peace on him), His Mahdi (peace be on him), and His Khalifa (blessings be on him), what we have will be yours, and you will share our fate. You will live in happiness and prosperity, otherwise this letter will be a witness against, and your crime and that of your people will be on your head. One of your messengers, Fadl el Maula, is sent back to you with this letter.

There is no power nor strength but in God. On Him we rely.

(Sealed) WAFFIK YA RAHMAN ABDAL ABDERRAHMAN.

18 Zu'l Kada 1306.

The fanatical nature of the man was apparent; the messenger who brought Nejumi's reply reported that he assembled his emirs, and reading out the letter to them, he drew his sword and declared he would never surrender. His emirs followed his example, and a noisy scene ensued, vehement protestations against surrender were general throughout the camp, and all appeared eager to fight; but with all this outward show, Nejumi appears to have made no secret of his conviction that they must all die as martyrs. He reiterated the words spoken at Argin; and it is said many of his emirs would gladly have accepted the Sirdar's offer; but so great was their fear of Nejumi that they did not dare to oppose his wishes; and now, with their last chance of escape gone, they doggedly awaited the arrival of the long-promised reinforcements, which would be the signal for the advance.

General Grenfell returned to Assuan to bring forward the northern columns, which he now decided to push up the river as soon as possible.

Major-General the Hon. J. C. Dormer, commanding in Egypt, lost no time in pushing on the British troops from Cairo. The cavalry, artillery, and Royal Irish Rifles had already started, and reached Assuan on July 25th, while General De Montmorency, commanding the British column, followed two days later.

It was intended that the British column should be concentrated at the front before the decisive blow was struck, but, as subsequent events will show, the favourable moment to strike arrived ere any but the cavalry could reach the scene of action.

By this time the Egyptian troops had almost all arrived, and a column consisting of Horse Artillery (one division), Cavalry (one squadron), Field Artillery (one division), Garrison Artillery (one division), 1st Battalion Egyptian Infantry, 2d Battalion Egyptian Infantry, 11th Battalion¹ Sudanese Infantry, with the various departmental details, was rapidly organised, and placed under the command of Colonel Kitchener, C.M.G., A.D.C. (A.G. Egyptian army).

These troops were pushed forward as rapidly as possible. On July 18th the 2d Battalion arrived at Toski, and occupying the village, drove out a small advanced party of the enemy after a slight opposition. They then proceeded to place this long straggling village in a state of defence, and on the following day the 1st Battalion arrived.

The Egyptian cavalry and artillery had left Assuan on the 16th for the south, by march route along the west bank—the heavy nature of the ground necessitating the guns being transported by water.

Meanwhile Captain Lewis at Halfa was actively employed looking out for Makin en Nur. On the 18th he made a rapid reconnaissance as far as Sarras, covering the entire distance there and back, some sixty-eight miles, in the one day. Here he found a large number of huts, capable of housing from 4000 to 5000 people, but they were almost quite deserted. A few shots were fired at the party from the west bank. Makin, however, arrived almost simultaneously with the departure of the reconnoitring party, and crossing his women to the east bank with instructions to remain there, he proceeded north with his force, consisting of some 500 men, 100 camels, and a few horses. On the 22d he was seen near Gemai on the opposite bank by the Egyptian cavalry, and the same evening, watering at Matuka, he struck out into the desert—some ten

¹ This battalion having been ordered from Suakin, arrived at Kosseir on 16th, and performed the march from Kosseir to Luxor, a distance of 120 miles across the desert, in the unprecedentedly short period of five days and a half.

miles from the river, marching rapidly and avoiding all patrols sent to intercept him. He joined Nejumi at Belanga on the 25th, having marched upwards of forty-five miles in thirty hours.

On the 22d the chief clerk of Abd el Halim, Hassan Effendi Habashi by name, and a former official in the Sudan Government employ, succeeded in escaping, and reported to Colonel Wodehouse the accurate numbers of Nejumi's fighting-force, which had just been counted. It numbered 2821 fighting-men, 132 horses, 309 rifles, 200 camels, besides some 4000 camp-followers. Makin's reinforcements now brought the numbers of fighting-men up to 3300, including an addition of 300 rifles. This much-talked-of reinforcement, though small, inspired fresh energy into Nejumi's force, and on the 28th July, after a halt of eighteen days, the army again began its northward march. Arriving the same day at their new camp, some two miles above the celebrated temple of Abu Simbel, a distance of ten miles, they continued their march on the following day, and on the 1st August took up a position in the hills, four miles south of Toski, having covered the whole distance, thirty-five miles from Belanga, in three days, with three halts.

At this time proclamations were placed at prominent points on the river-bank to the effect that persons who gave themselves up without opposition would be well treated and need be in no fear of their lives.

Immediately after its evacuation by Nejumi, the camp at Belanga was visited by some Egyptian troops, and presented a gruesome spectacle. Those who were unable to accompany the force on account of wounds or sickness had been left behind in little shelters constructed of palm branches, and but for the timely Egyptian aid must all have died. They were at once conveyed to the camp, and consigned to hospital. Upwards of 250 graves were counted in this camp, and many bodies lay unburied. To such straits must they have been reduced that even the bones of the animals slaughtered had all been pounded for food. Quantities of arms, drums, saddles, and tents were found in this camp.

At the next halting-place the ground was strewn with suits of chain-armour, and subsequently two guns which had

been left behind for want of transport were discovered buried in the sand.

Meanwhile Colonel Kitchener's column was rapidly concentrating at Toski, and the British column at Assuan.

On the 26th Saleh Bey left Korosko for Murat, with instructions to drive out the Arabs, and leaving a small garrison there, to return at once with his force.

On the 27th July alarming news reached Bishir Bey at Assuan that the force of Arabs in the Eastern Desert had been reinforced, and they were preparing to advance on Abrak. Only five days' march from Assuan, Bishir had a small post of men at Abrak, and begged to be allowed to reinforce it with 400 camel-men.

A threatened flank movement from the desert at this critical moment might have had serious consequences. Bishir was therefore permitted to carry out his proposal, and left for the desert the following day.

On the 29th General Grenfell left Assuan for Toski, where he arrived on the 31st, followed by the British cavalry. In the meantime the Egyptian mounted troops, under Lieutenant D'Aguilar, were moving up along the west bank, and on July 30th, when within fifteen miles of Toski, they received information that an advanced body of the enemy was in the hills above the village of Anebi. Desultory firing was carried on during the night, and on the following morning Lieutenant D'Aguilar, taking two troops, half a company of 11th Sudanese,¹ forty dismounted men of the horse battery, and a few men of the slavery department,² advanced into the hills, and discovering a party of some 150 of the enemy, opened fire on them. The Arabs took up a position between two hills, which was surrounded and attacked by the Egyptian troops, and a sharp encounter ensued, in which seventy Arabs and an important Baggara emir, Wad Hamid, were killed, and the remainder, whose retreat was cut off by the huge boulders which blocked the space between the hills, surrendered. The Egyptian losses on this occasion were three men killed and two officers and six men wounded. The march was then continued. Another

¹ Sent to his support from Toski.

² This department was constituted after the Slave Trade Convention between Great Britain and Egypt in 1877. It is under the Ministry of the Interior, and has its own staff of police.

small skirmish took place at the village of Masmas; and the troops reached Toski on the 1st August, by which date the whole of Colonel Wodehouse's force had already concentrated there, and the long village was put into a state of defence.

The north end of the village was held by the first column, the south end by the second column, the Egyptian cavalry and Camel Corps occupied a large enclosure near the centre of the village, while the British cavalry held the omdeh's house.

Every effort was now made to hurry forward the British troops, which General De Montmorency reported would all have left Assuan by the 4th inst. Half of the Royal Irish Regiment left on 1st, followed two days later by the General and his staff.

With the exception of the British Brigade, the Nile field-force¹ was now combined at Toski under the supreme command of General Grenfell, with Lieut.-Colonel Settle as senior staff-officer.

On Friday 2d the Sirdar reconnoitred to within a short distance of the enemy's position, which was plainly seen by the officers from the top of a hill overlooking their camp. The Arabs were seen at their usual prayer assembly, while deserters reported that Nejumi intended to continue his northward march the following day.

In consequence of this news, and in view of the fact that the ground which Nejumi must traverse on leaving his present camp was exceptionally favourable for the movement of the troops, while farther north the ground, being considerably broken, would have been more favourable to the well-known tactics of the enemy, General Grenfell decided that he would endeavour to check the advance, and if possible oblige the enemy to remain in his present position until the arrival of the British column, when he would strike a decisive blow. Accordingly he ordered a reconnaissance of all available mounted troops,² under the command of Colonel Kitchener, to proceed at daybreak on the 3d August towards the enemy's

¹ For details of organisation see Appendix.

² One squadron 20th Hussars, under Lieut.-Colonel Irwin; 3 squadrons Egyptian cavalry, under Lieutenant Beech, C.M.G.; 1 Camel Corps, under Captain Dunning.

camp, and by showing as broad a front as possible induce him to delay his advance.

A slight description of the surrounding country is here necessary.

About four miles south of Toski a range of high granite hills runs from the river inland in a westerly direction for some three miles. It was towards the inner extremity of this range and south of it that Nejumi had pitched his camp.

Toski village differs little from the ordinary villages on the river-bank. Like Argin, it consists of clusters of houses scattered along an extent of some three miles of cultivated ground, dotted here and there with palm groves, while the cultivation extends for some 1200 yards in rear; then begin the usual sand dunes, gradually sloping up to the hard desert. From here a vast and slightly undulating plain stretches away, bounded on the north-west at a distance of some six miles from the river by a range of high granite hills; while another similar range rises up on the south-west. The south is bounded by the range already referred to, behind which lay Nejumi's camp, while to the north lies the broken hilly ground extending in ever-increasing ruggedness towards the heights of Ibrim.

The plain thus enclosed is intercepted here and there with hills and fantastic-shaped rocks and boulders, some rising to a considerable height, and affording sufficient cover to effectively conceal large numbers of men. It was across this plain that, on the early morning of the 3d August, the British and Egyptian mounted troops rapidly advanced. When within a mile of the enemy's camp a few camel-men were captured, who reported that Nejumi was on the point of starting northwards with his force. General Grenfell, who accompanied the reconnaissance, then pushed on rapidly to the foot of the hills, and through a narrow gorge obtained a good view of the enemy's camp (6.45 A.M.), distant some 1500 yards. All appeared bustle and movement. Camels were being loaded up, and preparations being made for an immediate march. The reconnaissance was soon sighted, and Arab riflemen, advancing rapidly in skirmishing order, opened a brisk fire on the cavalry. This was replied to by the dismounted Camel Corps, who had taken up a position on a commanding ridge, and poured

steady volleys into the enemy, now advancing in considerable force.

This position was relinquished, and the mounted troops retired north to a second position, whence they continued to fire on the enemy, still pressing forward in continually-increasing numbers. From here General Grenfell despatched Major Rundle to bring out the two guns of the horse battery. A third position, some 900 yards farther north, was now occupied, and being a detached hill with open ground towards the line of the enemy's advance, it was held for some time by dismounted cavalry and Camel Corps, who poured a steady fire on the enemy's riflemen. From here Colonel Wodehouse was despatched to Toski, with orders to bring out the 1st Infantry Brigade, consisting of the 9th, 10th, and 13th Sudanese Battalions—in all, some 1450 strong. At about 8.30 A.M. the Arab spearmen, with innumerable banners, poured out of two ravines in the range of hills directly north of their camp, and steadily advanced towards the position, preceded by a long line of skirmishers, who kept up a hot but ill-directed fire.

Following the spearmen came a dense mass of camp-followers, men, women, and children, camels, baggage, etc.

The whole force of the enemy now advanced rapidly, and a further retirement became necessary, the relinquished hill being occupied by the enemy ten minutes later. The position now taken up was at the foot of a conical hill, some two miles distant from the village of Toski, where the mounted troops arrived simultaneously with the two guns, which had galloped out from the village.

At 9 A.M. the guns opened fire, and the direction of the enemy's advance then appeared to deflect towards the north-west, forming into a dense column of march, with their exposed flank covered by a cloud of skirmishers.

This column now marched steadily across the front, some 2000 yards distant, while farther in rear could be seen the mass of camp-followers and baggage-animals deflecting still more to the north-west, where they were soon lost to view behind the intervening hills.

It now became evident that Nejumi did not intend to fight, and was making for the broken ground to the north, thus defeating the object for which the reconnaissance had been

made. To have permitted him to carry this out in face of the concentrated columns at Toski would have been construed by the Arabs into a victory, besides adding considerably to the difficulty of striking a decisive blow on ground unfavourable to the enemy. General Grenfell, taking rapid survey of the situation, at once decided that he would check Nejumi's advance, even at the risk of bringing on a general action some five miles distant from the river, and with incomplete transport and medical arrangements to meet any severe strain on his resources.¹ The correctness of the decision arrived at was fully justified by subsequent events.

From this position orders were sent in to Toski to bring out the 2d brigade, consisting of 1st Egyptian Battalion under Captain Coles, the 2d Battalion under Major Shakespear, and the 11th Sudanese under Captain Macdonald, while Lieutenant Gordon brought out the 1st and 2d field-batteries (six guns in all).

While, therefore, the guns continued firing at the head of the Arab advance, orders were given to Colonel Kitchener to make a considerable detour to the north with the mounted troops, and endeavour to check the enemy's advance. By taking up successive positions on the right Colonel Kitchener succeeded in achieving his object, and the head of the column was stopped. And now to divert for an instant to what was passing in the enemy's force.²

Nejumi, true to his original instructions, was not to be alarmed by the arrival of the northern column at Toski, of which he had full information, but determined to continue his northward advance.

On seeing the British and Egyptian mounted troops in the early morning, he is reported to have said, "We must all stand prepared to meet our Maker to-day."

The continual retirement of troops before his advance had inspired him with confidence, and until the guns opened on him he believed that, for that day at any rate, he had avoided the impending battle; but on finding that his advance was

¹ It will be remembered that the combined Egyptian columns had only just arrived at Toski, and though the plan of operations provided for the necessary transport to fight an action at a distance from the river, the concentration of camels at Toski for this purpose had not been completed by August 3d.

² From statements of several emirs who were taken prisoners.


checked to the north, and that, in the words of his emirs, "every hill-top in the direction of his advance was crowned with camel and horse men of the enemy," he decided that fight he must, and thereupon proceeded to make the best dispositions the nature of the ground would allow. Perceiving four semi-detached hills some 800 yards west of the high ground occupied by the mounted troops, he, under cover of his skirmishers, seized this position, and personally disposed of his troops in the following manner:

Abd el Halim with his division to hold the left hill and command the whole position, the centre and right being divided between Osman Azrak and Ismail Haraka, with theirs and Nejumi's divisions. The summits of the hills were now planted with banners and lined with riflemen, while the spear-men were ordered to keep completely out of sight until they should receive the order to charge. Nejumi himself then retired to the hills, some 1800 yards in rear, and planting his standard on a rocky knoll, he, with his bodyguard, prepared to direct the operations. His baggage-column had already made a temporary camp on the high hills just above his position, and here were collected his numerous camp-followers ready to join the fighting-line should they be successful, or to secure a retreat for the baggage should the latter be forced to retire.

In the meantime, whilst Nejumi was making his dispositions, the 1st Infantry Brigade, under the command of Major Hunter, had, under cover of the rising ground, and unseen by the enemy, followed in the rear of the mounted troops, and at 10 A.M. seized a rocky position some 1500 yards in length and directly opposite, and 800 yards distant from the hills now bristling with Arab banners and riflemen.¹

These troops were disposed as follows: 9th under Major Lloyd on the right, 10th under Major Donne in centre, and 13th under Captain Kempster on the left, while the artillery, massed under Major Rundle, occupied the ridge between the 9th and 10th. The mounted troops supported on the right of the

¹ When the orders reached Toski for the infantry brigades to march, they had just been dismissed from morning parade and were preparing their breakfast. Ten minutes after the order was given the troops had started without food, and with only thin small water bottles filled, and each man carrying 100 rounds of ammunition.



Hilly Range



A. M. Mc. Mendo. Pmb.
4.8.89.

infantry. The 2d Infantry Brigade, coming up shortly afterwards, remained in support to the left rear of the position.

Steady volley-firing was now opened along the line, which continued for about half an hour.

At the same time a harassing enfilade fire was kept up by some Arab riflemen concealed in the boulders of a high conical hill on the right, and it was not till after they had inflicted some loss on the Egyptian force that they were driven out and killed by a detachment of cavalry.

Up to this time it was quite uncertain what force of the enemy was behind the rocks, and Colonel Wodehouse, who now commanded the infantry division, was directed to prolong his line to the right, with a view to enfilading the enemy's left flank. After moving about 500 yards towards the right front, thus overlapping the left of the enemy's position, Major Lloyd, perceiving that there were a large number of the enemy about to charge from behind the hill, halted his battalion, and reinforced by his reserve company, poured volleys into the Arabs, who, with wild yells, rushed out from their cover and charged down on them.

The men, firing with great steadiness, mowed down the Arabs, who, though charging with great determination, were forced to retire, leaving 150 dead on the hill-side. The 9th now advanced, and, reinforced by a company of the 2d Egyptian Battalion under Captain Martyr, seized the first hill, inflicting still further loss on the enemy, who repeatedly attempted to charge in groups under cover of the smoke. These troops, while waiting for the development of the remainder of the infantry attack, were subjected to a hot fire from the neighbouring hills.

In the meantime General Grenfell, seeing the Arab charge repelled by the 9th, at once ordered the whole line to advance towards the enemy's position, which the artillery continued to shell with considerable effect. Arrived opposite the centre of the position, a large number of the enemy, shouting and waving their banners, attempted to charge, but were shot down by the 10th Battalion, who, with the 9th, succeeded in taking the sandy ridge connecting the hills, whence they continued to fire on the enemy still collected behind the centre position.

Meanwhile General Grenfell, from the top of the hill first seized, perceiving the 13th Battalion apparently checked before

the detached hill on the extreme left, sent orders that it should be at once stormed. This battalion, supported by the 1st Battalion on the left, was suffering severely from the enfilade fire of a number of the enemy's riflemen concealed behind some rising ground, losing in a few minutes some seventy killed and wounded ; but, headed by Major Hunter and gallantly led by Captains Kempster and Coles, their respective commandants, these two battalions assaulted and captured the hill after a severe hand-to-hand encounter, in which Major Hunter received a spear wound in the arm.

On gaining the top of the hill, numbers of the enemy who were collected on the farther side charged up again in the most gallant and determined way. Three successive attempts did they make to regain their lost position, until the last man, with spear and banner, dashed up almost to the top of the hill, to fall riddled with bullets a few paces from the Egyptian line. Here over thirty standards were captured, and now one hill only remained in possession of the enemy. The 9th and 10th had already almost surrounded it, while the 13th, wheeling to the right, completed the outflanking movement. With a wild cheer the battalions rushed the hill at the point of the bayonet, and drawing the Arabs out, inflicted terrible loss on them and captured seventy-five standards.

During this and the previous operations the 2d and 11th Battalions on the extreme left had materially assisted in the capture of the positions by bringing a heavy flanking fire to bear on the enemy concealed by the rocks from the fire of the front attack, and it was here that Lieutenant Cotton of the 11th Sudanese fell dangerously wounded, shot through the chest. The artillery at the same time operated on the left flank, enfilading the enemy's position at 600 yards distance, and on the final capture of the position the two guns of the horse battery, moving to the front at a gallop, came into action at case range against the now retreating enemy. By 11:30 the first position was captured, and the retreating enemy streamed towards the hills, behind which their temporary camp lay.

At this time a solitary rider was seen galloping towards the dispersed enemy, evidently with the object of attempting to rally them. An Arab prisoner indicated to the Sirdar that this was Nejumi, and the order was at once given to the

cavalry, who during the storming of the first position had formed up in rear of the infantry, to charge. The two Egyptian squadrons led off, followed by the 20th Hussars, and circling through the retreating enemy, completed the rout, while the Camel Corps brought a close fire to bear on the enemy's flank. Soon not an Arab remained in the plain; those who had escaped the cavalry had evidently taken up a second position on the heights, and Nejumi,¹ too, although his horse was shot and he himself again severely wounded, managed to reach the hills.

And now (noon) the Sirdar ordered a general advance on the enemy's second position, which it was thought would be strongly held. The 11th Sudanese, with the 1st and 2d Battalions, led the attack with drums beating and bugles blowing, supported by the 1st Brigade. The artillery had in the meantime shelled the position, while the mounted corps on the right conformed to the general advance.

During the artillery attack on the second position, a well-directed shell brought down the largest banner, which was subsequently discovered to be Nejumi's, and it is probable that the shell which broke his flag-pole also wounded Nejumi again.

On gaining the heights little opposition was encountered. The enemy were in full retreat, while their camp, which was situated on the low ground just beyond, fell into the hands of the Egyptian troops. Here masses of tent-equipage, drums, swords, spears, and chain-armour were captured. The pursuit was continued for some distance, and numbers of prisoners, men, women, and children, were captured.

All fighting appeared over, when a camel laden with what was at first supposed to be a gun was observed along the line of retreat, surrounded by some forty men. This party, on being observed, was fired on by a troop of cavalry; the camel fell, and most of the men appeared to have been killed; the cavalry then followed up, and called on the remainder to surrender, but as they approached the Arabs supposed to

¹ A relation of Nejumi's captured at Toski states that Nejumi was slightly wounded in the early stage of the fight. On the capture of the first position one of his emirs, escaped from the onslaught, breathlessly rushed by, crying to Nejumi that all was over, and that he should fly. Instead of listening to this advice he mounted his horse and dashed down to the plain, as has been explained, and vainly endeavoured to rally his men.

have been killed suddenly sprang up, and rushing at them, a hand-to-hand encounter ensued; a number were killed, and the remainder returned once more to their camel. They were again called upon to surrender, but their only response was a second charge, which resulted in all being killed except one, who, mounting a passing horse, succeeded in escaping. The cavalry, finding no gun on the camel as they expected, now continued the pursuit; but it was subsequently discovered that the camel had been carrying the dead body of an important chief, and under the direction of Captain Macdonald it was sent to Toski, where it was at once identified by all the prisoners as that of Nejumi. It eventually transpired that, being severely wounded, he had been carefully tended by his bodyguard, who, placing him on a rough camel-litter, had attempted to convey him to the rear. One of his sons, a boy of five years old, was found dead beside the camel, while another baby boy¹ scarcely a year old was brought by his nurse into the camp at Toski on the following day.

After this event the pursuit was continued for some two miles, but owing to the exhausted state of the horses, General Grenfell was forced to discontinue it. The "cease fire"² sounded at 2 P.M., and the last sight of the retreating enemy was obtained through a gorge in the range of hills bounding the south-west extremity of Toski plain. The troops, thoroughly exhausted and laden with every description of loot, did not reach the camp till 5 P.M., having been the whole day without food and with little water.

The defeat of the Arab force was most complete.²

On the 3d and following days upwards of 4000 prisoners and deserters were taken, as well as 147 standards, 4000 spears, and an immense number of swords, rifles, etc.

It is estimated that the Arab loss in killed alone was over 1200, while the Egyptian loss was comparatively slight,—25 killed and 140 wounded in all.

Almost all the important emirs were killed, with the exception of Osman Azrak, Ali Wad Saad, Hassan Nejumi, Morghani

¹ This boy is now cared for in the Kasr el Ain hospital in Cairo.

² For full details of Nejumi's fighting-force, names and numbers of emirs, lists of casualties which occurred in his force from July 1st to August 3d, see Appendix.

Siwari ed Dahab, and sheikh El Obeid, who escaped with some 1400 souls, the majority of whom were camp-followers.¹

By making a wide detour into the desert, they avoided all Egyptian posts, and succeeded in re-entering the Dongola province in a marvellously short space of time; but they lost heavily from hunger and thirst in this terrible retreat, the memory of which must for ever remain vividly impressed on those who took part in it.

On the day following the action of Toski a prolonged reconnaissance under Colonel Kitchener was made towards Abu Simbel, while the Egyptian cavalry continued on to Belanga, intercepting numbers of the enemy and rescuing many refugees who would otherwise have perished in the desert.¹ During the three days following the action upwards of 4000 prisoners and refugees came into the various camps, making a total of between 5000 and 6000 in all since the rebel army had first crossed the frontier.

The consideration shown to prisoners of the enemy by the officers and men of the Nile field-force was very remarkable. On many occasions Egyptian soldiers, taking prisoners when on patrol, shared with them their food and water, and many lives were saved by the humane treatment they received.

The disposal of so large a number of men, women, and children, the majority of whom came from most distant parts of the Sudan, and whose manners and customs differed considerably from those of the inhabitants of Egypt, was no light matter. Every possible care and attention was bestowed on those who stood in need of it, both as regards their treatment in hospital and their welfare, in the various camps which had been formed on the long line of river communication.

Upwards of 1000 of these people were consigned to the various landholders of the frontier province, under the direction of the sub-governor, while the remainder were passed on to Assuan and thence to Assiut. At the latter place they were taken over by the civil authorities and distributed throughout the various provinces of Egypt, one hundred

¹ It was subsequently ascertained that Makin en Nur made good his escape as far as Abu Simbel, but succumbed there from wounds and fatigue. A stone is erected over his grave in the hills above the temple.

only of the most important men, mostly emirs and mukkadums, were retained in the military prison in Cairo.

Amongst the captured prisoners was the notorious Abu el Yezid, who, it will be remembered, had previously deserted and had led the enemy in several of their raids, notably that on Dabrosa, which had resulted in the death of so many helpless women and children. He was tried and shot as a traitor in the presence of the villagers he had betrayed.

On the 6th August the Nile field-force was broken up, and the various troops returned to their several garrisons.

The reoccupation of Sarra was now considered necessary; it had been for the last two years a position of importance to the enemy, which was testified by the fact of there being some 4000 well-built mud huts there, capable of containing 15,000 people. It had been the recognised Arab outpost, from which raids on the riverain population to the north could be easily made; and therefore, in spite of the bad military position which it offered, owing to the proximity of the surrounding hills and its consequent difficulty of defence, it was reoccupied on the 11th August by the 3d Battalion of the Egyptian army under Captain Sillem. A few of the enemy had remained there, but on the approach of the troops they rapidly retired south.

Arrangements were now made to repair the railway as far as Gemai.

Meanwhile the expedition to Murat under Saleh Bey had been quite successful. The rebels offered a slight resistance only, and on the approach of the Ababdeh fled, leaving three men killed. Saleh captured the camp at Murat, and on the 3d August continued to advance towards Abu Hamed, which he reconnoitred, returning again to Murat on the 9th. He proceeded thence to Ongat, but on his arrival Bahr Karrar had fled to Berber. Bishir Bey's demonstration in the desert east of Assuan had also been effectual. On reaching Murat, he learnt that the force under the emir Baghdadi had returned to Wadi el Jimal in the Ariab country; but after the action of Toski orders were sent to Bishir to return to Assuan, which he did, leaving a force under his brother Mustafa Gibran to continue the pursuit. The Bisharin too were active in driving the hostile force out of their country, and had a successful

skirmish with them at Abu Doeim.¹ Baghdadi then retreated south, finally reaching Abu Hamed, having lost the greater part of his men from thirst.

Absence of rain in the Eastern Desert had wrought great distress amongst the tribes, and towards the end of October many of the Bisharin arrived in a state of sickness and destitution at Assuan, where a camp was formed for them and they were granted relief.

The effect of the successful action of Toski on the inhabitants of the country was very remarkable. That a large force of the enemy should enter their country and advance sixty miles, remaining in occupation for over a month, and that during all that time not a villager or a head of cattle should fall into their hands, was to them something unaccountable, and their enthusiasm at the final rout of the enemy knew no bounds. Farther north, too, the effect on the population was very marked, and all Egypt, which had viewed the apparently successful advance of the rebels with considerable anxiety, now loudly expressed their delight at the complete defeat of the invading force.

To the cause of Mahdiism the blow was perhaps the most severe that had as yet befallen it. Of all their campaigns in various directions, the Mahdi, and subsequently the Khalifa, had looked to Egypt as the goal for which to strive; and now, after long years of preparation and planning, their supreme effort had met with the most complete disaster.

Their bravest and most fanatical leader, one who had taken an important part in the defeat of Hicks and in the capture of Khartum, was slain; and of all his force but a few escaped to tell of the horrors of that desert march and the terrible hail of bullets which met and crushed them at last.

The country being now restored to tranquillity, General Grenfell returned to Cairo on August 17th.

The various reinforcements which had been advancing to join the invading force, on hearing of the defeat at Toski, beat a hasty retreat, and a reconnaissance made by Lieutenant-Colonel Hunter early in September showed the whole country as far as Ginnis to be practically deserted of inhabitants and completely devastated.

¹ In the Nubian desert in the neighbourhood of Jebel Messa.

The advanced post of the enemy was now at Suarda, some 130 miles south of Halfa, where a few hundred, under the emir Hamuda, had established themselves, sending patrols as far as Ferkeh. A few important emirs communicated to the commandant of Halfa their desire to obtain pardon from H.H. the Khedive; but in spite of promises of protection they were apparently afraid to desert, and nothing came of the negotiations.

Of the emirs who had escaped from Toski, those holding commands were at once superseded—Ali Wad Saad by the emir Yehia at Koyeh, while the emir Grieger succeeded Hassan Khalifa at Abu Hamed. This latter, being suspected of having made terms with Saleh Bey instead of opposing him at Murat, was thrown into prison.

The well-known emir Mohammed el Kheir died at Dongola a few days before the action of Toski. Yunis still remained emir at that place, while Osman Dekeim retained the command at Berber.

In October one of the prisoners taken at Toski, a Jaali, was despatched to the Sudan, with a proclamation to his own and other tribes, calling on them to submit to the Government; but on reaching Khartum he was thrown into prison, not, however, before he had warned his tribe of the good treatment he had received, and told the Khalifa that it was quite impossible for him to think of taking Egypt.

No doubt the tribes in central and other parts of the Sudan were as desirous as those in the eastern Sudan to shake themselves free of the Baggara yoke; but they too were equally powerless: their tribal systems had been destroyed, their chiefs imprisoned, and they themselves deprived of their weapons; and now there was nothing but to submit to the all-powerful Baggara, who ruled them with a cruelty which is perhaps unprecedented in the annals of history. The following extract from a letter received from the chiefs of an important tribe will best explain the miserable condition in which they now found themselves.

We have always been subjects of the Egyptian Government, satisfied with its rule, and never imagined that recent events could have happened as they have, to the destruction of ourselves and our property; so we are still the servants of the Government, awaiting, by God's mercy, relief from it from our present state of misery, ruin, and starvation.

The whole of the Sudan wishes the same, God having cleansed their minds of that devil-born heresy which has been the cause of their ruin.

And now numbers of destitute refugees and others, from the provinces of Sukkot and Mahass, now that the last remnant of Nejumi's army had left their country, poured into Halfa, seeking protection and relief from starvation. Some 500 acres of Government land at Deberra¹ were appropriated as a settlement for them, and relief-works established. It is estimated that during the year 1887 some 20,000 men, women, and children, including those captured at Toski, and the destitute Bisharin already referred to, were provided for.

The year 1889 closed on the frontier in complete tranquillity, a great relief after the years of incessant disturbances which had followed the close of the Nile campaign of 1884-85. Yet, in spite of this recent defeat, the council at Omdurman was still busily occupied in planning another invasion. The difficulties in collecting men for such an enterprise, after the recent defeat, appeared insuperable. But the spirit of Mahdism, *i.e.* the preaching of the "Jihad," must still continue; once that ceases, the collapse of Mahdism cannot be far distant. For them the year 1889 had been perhaps the most trying they had yet experienced. Defeated on all sides—on the Abyssinian frontier, in Darfur, and on the Nile—it was thought that collapse could not be far distant; but those who prophesied thus had not realised the power which the Baggara, the ruling race, had gained over the Sudan.

Famine, it is true, was one of their most formidable enemies, but so long as they could successfully combat with this spectre, and were not in fear of an invasion from Egypt or elsewhere, they felt secure; knowing that the local tribes were powerless to oppose their authority, and that even if the Sudan were threatened with famine, they must be the last to starve.

¹ To the north of Argin.

BOOK XII (*continued*)

1889

Events on the Abyssinian frontier—The Abyssinian delegate returns to Gondar—King John at the head of his army marches to attack Galabat—The battle of Galabat—Defeat of the Arabs—King John mortally wounded—He dies in the night—Effect of his death on the Abyssinian army—The emir Zaki Tumal makes a counter-attack on the retiring army—Captures the body of King John and all his baggage—Zaki Tumal's despatch on the battle—The supplementary despatch—The Khalifa's letter to Osman Digna—The revenge of the King's daughter—Envoys bearing letters for H.M. the Queen, H.H. the Khedive, and the British Agent in Egypt, arrive at Assuan—Translations of the letters—The Khalifa encloses H.M. the Queen's letter to King John, which was taken to the latter by Mr. Portal in 1887—Effect of the King's death in Abyssinia—Sheik Eguel—The Eastern Sudan—Lieutenant Beech's exploit—Osman Digna evacuates Handub—Dissensions between Osman Digna and Abu Girgeh—The attack on Halaib—Colonel Hotted-Smith's expedition—He re-establishes the Government authority at Halaib—The Hadendowa League: its operations; it is disbanded—Ahmed Mahmud's conduct—Osman Digna called to a council of emirs at Omdurman—He refuses to take Nejumi's place as emir of Dongola—Affairs in the Kassala neighbourhood—The death of Mahmud Bey Ali—Famine in the Eastern Sudan—Darfur—Abu Gemaizeh attacks Osman Adam at Majzun—Complete defeat of Abu Gemaizeh and collapse of the so-called Senussi Movement—Osman Adam's despatch to the Khalifa on the battle—Equatoria—Stanley's third arrival at the lake—Emin Pasha, Selim Bey, and fourteen officers, arrive at Stanley's camp—A meeting in which it is decided to completely evacuate the province by 10th April—Selim Bey returns to Wadelai—He writes, asking for more time to carry out the evacuation—Stanley addresses his officers—The decision not to postpone the date of departure—A mutinous spirit in the camp—Stanley and his column start for Zanzibar—The halt at Mazamboni's—The intercepted letters—Selim Bey's couriers—Affairs at Wadelai—The column continues its march—The discovery of the sources of the Nile—Ruwenzori—The Semliki River, and the Albert Edward Nyanza—Arrival of Stanley at Zanzibar—The state of Equatoria.

CONTINUATION OF EVENTS ON ABYSSINIAN FRONTIER, 1889

EARLY in 1889 the Abyssinian delegate, who had returned to Galabat, succeeded in escaping, and it is said secured the late Abu Angar's horse, on which he made his way as rapidly as possible to Gondar; here he found King John, and gave all information concerning the strength and movements of the enemy, the roads, etc. The King now decided to carry out his oft-repeated threat of capturing Galabat, and marching thence to Khartum. He collected together an enormous force, and towards the end of February quitted Gondar, and accompanied by Ras Adal (now advanced to the dignity of Teklehaimanot or King of Gojjam), Ras Aria Selasse, Ras Mikhail, Ras Mariam, Ras Alula, Saleh Shanga, and many others, advanced towards Galabat. Meanwhile the emir Zaki Tumal had made all preparations for the impending attack. He appeared to have fortified Galabat very strongly, and surrounded it with a deep ditch, forming a large zariba, which he connected with a smaller zariba, also strongly fortified.

Here the emirs Nur Angara and Abdullah Wad Ibrahim were stationed with a small portion of the force and the spare ammunition, while the remainder, estimated at between 60,000 and 70,000, under Ez Zaki Tumal, manned the fortifications and awaited the attack.

King John appears to have been confident of success, and when within two days' march of Galabat he wrote to Zaki Tumal to the effect that he would arrive on Saturday the 9th, and he informed him of this so that he might not say he had been surprised.

At dawn on the 9th the Abyssinian army drew in sight, a countless number of horse and foot men approached steadily, and throwing out the wings of the army, gradually encircled the whole of the immense zariba. A terrific onslaught was then made on the position, and after a fierce fight, lasting about five hours, in which the losses on both sides were said to have been enormous, the zariba, after being set on fire in several places, was penetrated, and the Abyssinians dashed into the town. Here the slaughter was continued, and soon the whole position with the exception of the small zariba was in the hands of the Abyssinians, the town burnt, and some thousands of

prisoners taken. The remainder of the Arabs, drawn out of their first entrenchment, had fallen back on the small zariba, which would probably soon have been captured, when King John, sitting in the centre of the captured camp and surveying the extent of his victory, was struck by a stray bullet in the chest, and fell mortally wounded. The effect of this mishap would not, in an organised army, have affected the eventual issue of the day; but with wild unorganised armies it is very different. The Abyssinians had scattered far and wide in search of loot; many, thinking the battle was over, left the scene of action, while the King's misfortune seemed to have paralysed the remainder. No attempt was made to follow up the success so nearly complete, but the Abyssinians, sorrowfully streaming out of Galabat with their thousands of prisoners, bore their wounded King to a spot some distance from the town, and all fighting ceased.

That night the King died, and in the confusion which ensued some of the captive Arab women succeeded in escaping and warning the Arabs, who still remained in the smaller zariba, awaiting with considerable consternation the attack, which they knew must annihilate them. Their relief on learning the news can readily be understood, and learning from the women the distress and confusion in the enemy's camp, they prepared for a counter-attack. Meanwhile, on the news of the King's death becoming known, the greater part of the army dispersed and made their way back towards Gondar, taking the prisoners with them, while the King's bodyguard, with the body of their late leader in a box and quantities of baggage, made the best of their way along the banks of the Atbara. These latter were followed by a party of Arabs under Wad Ibrahim, who on Tuesday March 12th fell on them suddenly and completely routed them, capturing the King's body and his baggage.

Having made this successful *coup* they returned to Galabat, where Zaki Tumul penned the following despatches to his master the Khalifa, and with them sent the King's head to Omdurman. These despatches must be read with the light of the preceding account, where it will be seen how adroitly the defeat had been construed into a victory; but the true events soon leaked out, and now any native arriving from the Sudan

will unhesitatingly admit that the Arabs on this occasion were completely defeated and well-nigh annihilated.

In the name of God, etc.—From the humble servant Ez Zaki Tumal to his lord and protector the Khalifa of the Mahdi, may the blessings of God rest upon him.

After many greetings, I have the honour to bring to your kind notice the events which have happened to the unbelieving Abyssinians, which are a great satisfaction and benefit to the faithful. I beg to inform you that the Abyssinians advanced to Galabat on Saturday the 6th of Rajab (9th March 1889), led by their accursed King John. They were so numerous and well equipped that God alone could know their number. We had seen their fires three days before they arrived, and when they were about two hours distant from our camp, such clouds of dust rose in the air that the believers could scarce see each other, and they became anxious to fight these wretched enemies of God, who drove before them wild beasts such as wolves, oxen, and gazelles. They surrounded us on all sides, and we were like a small ring in their midst. They superstitiously relied on their own strength and not in God's help, the strength of the Ansar. Besides those who carried spears, were 17,000, all armed with rifles. We were not very numerous, as the enemy coming rapidly did not give us due warning, and so we had no time to make preparations. Their King led them with encouraging words, and inspired by the evil spirit he was urging them by his satanic influence to extinguish the light of God. They first opened fire on us with guns and rifles, and then charged with terrific violence. The clash of arms was heard from afar, but neither their great strength nor numbers could shake the courage of the believers, who fought with a determination which has never been equalled, except in the days of the Sahaba (disciples of Mohammed). We answered their fire, and thanks to our determined Ansar, who were few in comparison to the numbers of the enemy, we completely annihilated the enemies of God after a fight of five hours.

The enemy could not face our fire, and when their accursed head was killed, they took flight, putting his body in a box, and saying that he was only wounded. Many of the King's ministers and followers were killed with him and the whole earth was strewn with the bodies of the unbelievers, and with their horses and mules.

When the fight was over we buried those Ansar who had met a glorious death on the field of battle, and whose souls had gone to Paradise. There were but a few of them, and the wounded were well cared for.

On the 8th Rajab (Monday morning) we pursued the Abyssinians and came up with them on the Atbara river. We put to flight some of their scouts who had been sent to discover our position, and on the following day we fought them with great gallantry and courage and killed most of them. This second battle lasted six hours, after which the remnant of their army took flight. We found the King's body lying in a box in his tent, and on his bosom lay a golden cross, which the

unbelievers worship instead of God. He was dressed in all his royal robes, with a collar round his neck, and the box was full of an embalming substance to preserve his body from decay. We immediately cut off his head, and raised it on a spear. When the believers saw this, they became fully satisfied that their victory had been complete.

I therefore beg to send you the head of this accursed and wicked man, together with the heads of his generals and ministers, such as Ras Alula, etc., so that you may be convinced of our victory and the enemy's destruction. I beg also to forward the King's crown, together with his tents and copper cooking-pots.

We have now buried those martyrs whose good fortune has sent them to God, and whose numbers were so few compared to the enormous mass of the enemy.

I believe that it is only by the help of God we gained this victory, for during the battle many of the faithful heard the word shouted "Ombaya" (my lord), and saw the Mahdi himself coming to succour them. Some of our men also saw persons descending from heaven with white flags in their hands, who killed numbers of the enemy; others noticed wonderful miracles, such as divine fire proceeding out of the wounds of the Abyssinians which burnt up their bodies.¹ This is indeed a great favour from heaven, and we cannot be sufficiently thankful for it.

The Ansar are worthy of all praise, they are ever ready to fight, and have asked permission to raid on the Abyssinian country; but as your wish must be obeyed, I therefore forward their request, which I beg may be granted.

As this victory is due to your Holiness and the help of God, who has willed the destruction of the impious and the strengthening of the true religion, I ask that the Almighty may preserve you, and that your enemies may fall into your hands.

FURTHER DESPATCH OF THE OPERATIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE 6TH RAJAB 1306

In the name of God, etc.—From his humble servant Ez Zaki Tumul to his lord and master the Khalifa of the Mahdi, etc.

After friendly greetings, I beg to inform you that after the battle of the 6th Rajab 1306 (9th March 1889), in the Batan el Markaz, in which the Abyssinians, those enemies of God, were so completely defeated, as we have already reported to you, we pursued the enemies of God by night until we came close up to them, and then we awaited the dawn, but they, being aware that we were near, sent a detachment of their guard, with whom we had a slight skirmish. They then moved their camp farther on, and in the morning we found that they had reached the river Atbara. They were in number as numerous as the sands of the sea. We attacked them with great gallantry, and they also resisted us with great bravery, and by two o'clock in the morning of Tuesday the 9th of

¹ This marvel can be explained by the smouldering of the tinder-like native cloth, when fired upon at close quarters, and has frequently been observed.

Rajab (12th March) the battle was over, we being victorious. The enemy lost heavily, and then took to flight, leaving behind them a large number of tents, horses, mules, donkeys, etc., which we captured. We also recaptured all the prisoners who were taken at the time our late brother, the martyr Wad Arbab, was killed. When looking over the bodies of those who were killed we found amongst them that of Johannes, the enemy of God. He was killed in the action on Saturday, but had been put into a box, and the news spread about that he was only wounded. This they did lest the army should be alarmed at the loss of their King. His uncle, who succeeded him, was also found amongst the killed, together with their archbishop (the head of the monks), also Digag Burahi and many others, all of whose heads we cut off. This is the greatest battle that has ever been fought, and now Abyssinia is open to us. There is no one left to command the troops, who are now dispersed far and wide. Our army is encamped on the river-bank, and we are inquiring in which direction the remnant of the defeated army has fled. The loot captured is beyond description. I send a portion of it by the hand of Abd el Kerim Hamid, as proof to the brethren of our victory. We also captured the guns and rifles of the enemy, together with a large number of prisoners, both men and women.

Full details of the plunder and prisoners captured will be forwarded to you later.

A few further details of this battle may be gleaned from the following letter, written by the Khalifa to Osman Digna, which was received by the latter early in April, accompanied by a head said to be that of Ras Alula—but the latter returned from Galabat unscathed.

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his God, the Khalifa of the Mahdi, to the honourable Osman Ibn Abu Bakr Digna.

After salutations I write to inform you that the Abyssinians, headed by their Negus Johannes and his vizirs and chiefs, of whom Ras Alula was one, came down, after the death of the honourable Hamdan Abu Angar, from all parts in great numbers to Galabat, and attacked the brethren who are there. The brethren met them and a desperate battle took place, in which the Ansar fought steadily and with great gallantry. The enemy was completely defeated and took to flight. They were pursued to a great distance and killed to a man. Their Negus Johannes and his vizir Ras Alula and all the other chiefs were killed, and their heads cut off. All their ammunition, guns, rifles, horses, mules, etc., were captured, and victory was quite complete.

We enclose letters from the brethren describing the battle; they are forwarded together with the head of Ras Alula for the brethren to see. The head of the Negus Johannes has been sent to our brother Yunis Dekeim, the commander of the naval forces.

ANOTHER LETTER

From the Khalifa of the Mahdi to the honourable Mohammed Khalid, Taher Magzub, Esh Shafid Ahmed, Ismail Ahmed.

I write to inform you that the Ansar gained a great victory over the Abyssinians at Galabat. I have already fully described it in my letters to the honourable Osman Digna, but I wish to add that I have received from Zaki Tumul numbers of golden neck chains, a golden bed, diamonds, precious stones, and plunder of all descriptions, also boots and articles of clothing, of which I send you specimens.

A curious story is told of the revenge taken by the King's daughter on hearing of the death of her father and the capture of his body, but its authenticity cannot be vouched for. It is said that when the numerous Arab prisoners reached Gondar she had them enclosed within a large zariba, which she ordered to be set on fire. All the captives perished in the flames. Whether this be a fact or not, certain it is that none of the prisoners taken on this occasion ever returned to Galabat. Amongst the King's baggage captured on this occasion were found the letters taken to him by Mr. Portal and Mr. Beech on October 1887,¹ and this important capture, together with Ez Zaki's account of the battle, formed an excellent reason for the despatch to Egypt of four envoys, the bearers of eight letters. These envoys, travelling *via* Berber and Haimur, arrived at Assuan on the 5th May and pressed to be allowed to proceed to Cairo and deliver their letters personally; but with the recollection of the former similar episode, the translations of these letters with the enclosures were despatched to Cairo by mail, while the bearers were retained at Assuan. The first, from the Khalifa to H.H. the Khedive, ran as follows:

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his God, the Khalifa of the Mahdi, to Mohammed Tewfik, wali of Egypt.

May God guide you in the right way as mentioned in His holy book. Know you that God has guided us in the right way by sending into the world our Prophet Mohammed, who converted us to the true religion, and has continued to guide us by sending us the expected Mahdi, who has revived the Moslem religion. You are highly honoured by witnessing the life of the Mahdi. God has given you the sense to distinguish between right and wrong. The Mahdi has summoned you to assist in reviving the religion, and I, after the Mahdi, have likewise called upon you to do so, and have explained to you the truth of the Mahdiah. I did so from my pity for you, and my desire to save your life in the world to come. Repent to God. I did not think that a reasonable man like

¹ Mr. Portal of H.B.M.'s agency in Cairo, accompanied by Lieutenant Beech of the Egyptian army, was despatched, in October 1887, on a mission to King John of Abyssinia, bearing letters from H.M. the Queen and the British Government, to mediate between King John and the Italians.

yourself would join with the unbelievers and refuse God's call : you are a Mohammedan and the son of a Mohammedan. It does not become you to prefer this world to the world to come, and to permit the faithful to live with the unbelievers. Do you not know God's saying in his precious book, "O believer, make not the ungodly your rulers" ? and again he says, "O believers, do not live with Jews and Christians, etc. etc."

As you have heard these sayings, which are known to all Moslems, and as you believe in God, His promises and His punishments, why do you go against God's will, in combining with the ungodly, and make the faithful your enemies ?

What answer will you give when you stand before God and give an account of your deeds and the deeds of those who are the people of our Prophet ?

Look to your soul ere you die. Use your sense and think of the future while you have still time. Understand that I have no interest in writing to you on this subject, but I have pity for you and wish your welfare in God. Accept my advice and hear what the Apostle of God says. He who accepts advice concerning his religion receives God's mercy ; if he refuse to listen to advice God will vent His wrath against him. Be not flattered because of your kingdom and the comfortable life you lead. This world is fading away, and is not valued by God. He has shown us through His book that this world is like water dropped from heaven, which waters the plants and makes the food for men and animals, and when the earth became covered with flowers He ordered it to fade away and made it a desert. (Here follow two long verses from the Kuran.)

You have sense to understand the vanity of this world. Do not rely on its vanities, accept our summons before it is too late, and prepare for the last day. Know that the Mahdiah is the only religion which God will accept. I therefore call you to embrace this religion, and we shall accept you and pardon you, and you shall receive honour ; but if you do not answer our summons and remain with the unbeliever your sins will be on your head, and the sins of your people will be brought up against you in the day of judgment. Know that the religion of God is ever victorious, its enemies are ever defeated, and all who do not embrace this religion shall fall into our hands by God's will.

(Sealed) HASBONA ALLAH WANIMA EL WAKIL.

Dated 5 Shaban 1306

(6th April 1889).

The second letter contained copies of the letters from the Khalifa to King John of Abyssinia, dated 1304 (1887) and 1305 (1888).¹

And also another letter, a translation of which here follows, from the Khalifa to His Highness the Khedive, relating the recent events on the Abyssinian frontier, which are intended

¹ These letters have already been given in full on pages 332 and 369.

to be a warning lest the same fate should overtake the wali (Governor) of Egypt.

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his God, the Khalifa of the Mahdi, to Mohammed Tewfik, wali of Egypt.

This is to inform you that in the year 1304 I wrote a letter to the King of Abyssinia, calling on him to embrace the Moslem religion and warning him of the penalty he would incur in disobeying these orders.

I told him that unless he attended to my summons I would send an army of Ansar to invade his country. When he received our letter he was angry, and showed pride, accordingly I ordered the army at Galabat to invade his country; and in compliance with orders, they left that station for Abyssinia and found the enemy collected together in thousands in the neighbourhood of Gondar, under the command of Ras Adal. A battle was fought, the Abyssinians were defeated, and almost all of the killed and their arms, ammunition, horses, etc., fell into our hands. Our army then entered Gondar, burnt the churches there, and then attacked the villages. Here also they destroyed some 200 churches and captured a large number of women and children, including those of Ras Adal, then by our orders they returned to Galabat laden with plunder.

On the return of our army I again wrote to the King of Abyssinia, ordering him to adopt the true religion, but he again refused, and in consequence I bade the Ansar renew the attack. On the arrival of the army in the Abyssinian country they found it empty, for most of the inhabitants had accepted the true religion and become Moslems. The army went to Gondar, but the Abyssinian army had disappeared. After remaining some time in the country, our men returned again to Galabat.

When King John was informed of this fact he was again very angry, and in his false pride he again collected all his armies and advanced to attack us. He came with thousands and thousands of his troops to Galabat in the month of Rajab 1306 (March 1886). When I received information of his advance, I ordered the troops—our brave Ansar—to attack him. A fierce battle took place which lasted four and a quarter hours, at the end of which the Abyssinians were utterly defeated and the miserable John was killed with a large number of his vizirs, such as Ras Alula and many others, besides thousands and thousands of his followers. The remnant of their army put their king into a box and carried him away, but the Ansar pursued them and found them encamped near the river. They had made the king's uncle the new king. On the next day a battle took place which lasted two hours, the Abyssinians were again beaten, not one was left alive, even the new king was killed, and all his vizirs. The Ansar also brought the head of King John and the heads of his ministers, their arms, ammunition, etc. etc., to me at Omdurman. As this has been the fate of the Abyssinians, I now write to inform you, and hope you will take this as a warning for yourself.

(Sealed) HASBONA ALLAH WANIMA EL WAKIL.

Dated 5 Shaban 1306

(6th April 1889).

The third letter was from the Khalifa to H.H. the Khedive,

sending suits of Mahdiist clothing, shoes, beads, turban, etc., for use at prayer. It runs as follows :—

In the name of God, etc.—From the Khalifa of the Mahdi to Mohammed Tewfik, wali of Egypt.

As I have already written to you advising you to follow the true religion of the Mahdi, which will be for your welfare, I herewith send you one robe, one set of beads, one pair of drawers, one belt, one grass cap, and one pair of shoes, which articles comprise the clothing of a follower of the Mahdi. If you wish to inherit everlasting life, then wear this clothing, and advise those who are your subjects to follow your example.

(Sealed) HASBONA ALLAH WANIMA EL WAKIL.

Dated 6th Shaban 1306

(7th April 1889).

The fourth letter was to the British Minister at Cairo, urging him to join the Mahdiist faith without delay, and sending him articles of Mahdiist apparel (it is needless to say that both these articles, and those sent to H.H. the Khedive, were returned to the envoys on their departure from Assuan to Omdurman).

In the name of God, etc.—From the Khalifa of the Mahdi to the Agent of the British Empire in Egypt.

This is to warn you that God said in his precious Book that only those are known to Him who are true believers in the Islam religion, and he who believes in any other religion shall have no part in the world to come. As you have not joined our religion, we call on you to do so at once, for God has said in the Kuran, "Ye believers in the Book, come and believe in our word, which is the same as yours; for we worship only the one God, who has no other partner, and we should assist each other in cleaving to the true God."

If you believe in our religion, and confess that there is no God but God, and that Mohammed is His Prophet, we shall receive you with the greatest hospitality.

We herewith send you a robe, belt, carpet, drawers, grass cap, beads, and pair of shoes, which are the articles of clothing of a believer in the Mahdi. Wear these things, for such is our order; if you refuse to do so you must bear the consequences, and you will fall into our hands.

(Sealed) HASBONA ALLAH WANIMA EL WAKIL.

5th Shaban 1306

(6th April 1889).

The fifth letter was curt and peremptory, as follows :—

In the name of God, etc.—From the Khalifa of the Mahdi to the British consul in Cairo. This is to inform you that the letter enclosed

herewith and addressed to Victoria, Queen of Britain, should be forwarded to her as soon as it reaches you.

Sealed as usual.

The enclosure referred to was the sixth letter, being Her Majesty the Queen's original letter to King John, which had been conveyed to the latter by Mr. Portal in October 1887. Across this letter was written in Arabic, "Here is a letter found in the possession of King John when he was killed."¹

The seventh letter was from the Khalifa to Her Majesty the Queen, expressing his readiness to receive Her Majesty into the Mahdi faith. It runs as follows :—

In the name of God, etc.—From the Khalifa of the Mahdi to Victoria, Queen of Britain.

I have to warn you that God in his precious Book said that He can only recognise those who are believers in the true Moslem religion, and any one who believes in any other religion will lose the life to come. As you are not yet a follower of the true religion, I hereby summon you to adopt the religion of the Mahdi, for God has said in his holy Book, "Come and believe in our word, which is the same as yours." For we worship only the one God, who has no other partner, and we should assist each other in cleaving to the true God. If you believe in our religion, and confess that there is no God but God, and that Mohammed is His Prophet, we shall receive you with the greatest hospitality ; but if you refuse to obey our summons, then do not doubt that your sins, and the sins of your people, will be on your head, and that you will fall into our hands.

Sealed as usual.

The eighth letter contained the original credentials of Mr. Portal to King John, signed by Lord Salisbury, and dated Foreign Office, 12th October 1887.² These missives were the first really authentic proofs of the death of King John. Up to this time there had been only vague rumours of an important battle having been fought, but with the previous knowledge of the readiness of the Arab leaders to turn a reverse into a victory, they had received little credence.

The death of the king threw the country into a state of anarchy. It was rumoured that before his death he had nominated his nephew Mangasha to succeed him, but the latter's claims were disputed by King Menelik of Shoa, who had always been a firm friend of the Italians, and consequently

¹ This letter was forwarded at once to England.

² This was also forwarded to England.

was bitterly opposed to Mangasha, who by this time had secured the support of Ras Alula. These internal troubles quite paralysed all attempts to raise a force to avenge the death of King John. The emir Wad Ibrahim made a successful raid as far as Ghabta without meeting any serious opposition; but on attempting to attack Walkait, he was defeated by an Abyssinian named Garazmat, and forced to retire on Galabat.

The force at Galabat had been greatly weakened by the recent reverses, and on application being made to Omdurman for reinforcements, the Khalifa counselled a withdrawal to Asar. But it appears that this was never carried out, and towards the end of 1889 it was reported that the Abyssinian tribes in the immediate vicinity of Galabat had established friendly relations with the Arabs, and that a brisk trade had sprung up between them.

Sheikh Eguel,¹ after the battle of the 9th of March, appears to have quarrelled with Ali Nurein of the Sabderat. In consequence, he was imprisoned by the Abyssinians, but, writing to the Governor-General of Suakin in June 1889, he states that Dagag Tasamma had been replaced as governor of Walkait by Warghani, who has now released him, and he again hopes that the Government will support him, as he still entertains most loyal feelings towards Egypt.

EASTERN SUDAN

Subsequent to the action of Gemaizeh the attitude of the tribes was satisfactory, and the country in the neighbourhood of Suakin was fairly tranquil. Small bodies of the enemy were occasionally seen, but Osman's power at Handub had been crippled, and offensive action was reduced to attempted cattle raids, to which the friendly tribes retaliated with effect.

On January 12th Ahmed Mahmud returned to Handub from Omdurman, having been nominated emir of the Amarar by the Khalifa.

On the 25th Colonel Kitchener left Suakin, by the end of the month the last of the British troops had gone, and the garrison

¹ This sheikh is now subsidised by the Italian authorities at Massawa, and has recently paid a visit to that town.

once more reverted to its usual strength. On the 7th February a cavalry reconnaissance was made in the direction of Handub, and Lieutenant Beech, sighting two of the enemy's camel-men, gave chase, and coming up with them engaged them in a hand-to-hand combat. He had cut one down, and was on the point of being cut down himself by his companion, when an Egyptian trooper, dashing to his assistance, despatched his assailant and thus saved his life.

On the 8th February a meeting took place between Ahmed Mahmud and Lieutenant Prinsep, who was accompanied by Mahmud Bey Ali. The former protested that he had no real intention of joining Osman Digna, and that he proposed to unite with the Hadendowa and occupy Handub on Osman's departure. There was great protestation of loyalty, but little result came of it.

On 11th Osman left Handub for Tokar, burning his camp, which was visited a few days afterwards by the Egyptian cavalry, and found to be completely destroyed. There were the remains of some 2000 huts, while the camp was estimated to have held at some time at least 12,000 people.

After Osman's departure the situation considerably changed ; Arabs freely came and went from Suakin, greater tranquillity prevailed throughout the district than had been known for long.

Tokar was now the centre of rebel authority in this part of the Sudan, and towards the end of the month Taher Magzub, accompanied by a brother of the Khalifa, arrived from Omdurman with a considerable sum of money, with which he intended to buy over the allegiance of the tribes, and to settle the numerous complaints between them and the Baggara.

Towards the end of March, Abu Girgeh returned to Tokar, and the dissensions, which were inevitable when Osman and Girgeh were together, broke out afresh.

The state of the country north of Suakin was generally satisfactory, except that, for some time, a small hostile force under Ahmed Nasrai had been in the vicinity of Halaib. On the 12th of March reinforcements passed through Abu Hamed from Berber under the emir El Baghdadi, to join Nasrai's force. It was believed that these were little more than slave-trading Arabs, though the presence of Baggara and

Jaalin amongst them rather belied the apparent object of the expedition. On the 21st April, however, H.H.S. *Ajemi* arrived at Suakin, and reported that at daybreak on the 19th a slave escaped from the rebels and rushed into the mamurieh, saying that 300 of the enemy were advancing to the attack, and would arrive within half an hour. The mamur at once manned the partially-built fort with his small garrison of twenty-seven policemen, at the same time he sent the women and children on board the two dhows lying in harbour, while the local Arabs fled to a peninsula, from whence 360 of them were subsequently rescued by the *Ajemi*.

Half an hour after the first alarm the enemy had rushed the fort, where they were received with volleys, but the meagre garrison was soon driven out on to the reef, where they were rescued by the dhows with the loss of two killed and five wounded; the Arabs then turned on the village, where they massacred some fifty women and children, mostly of the Hamed Orab tribe (a section of the Bisharin), but were forced to retire under the heavy fire of the *Ajemi*, which drove them to take shelter behind the fort. The position being now completely in the hands of the Arabs, further action was useless, and the *Ajemi* retired with all speed to Suakin. In consequence of this news, Colonel Holled-Smith left Suakin with 500 men of the 11th Sudanese Battalion under Captain Macdonald and a few details in H.H.S. *Mukhbar*, and accompanied by H.M.S. *Starling*, with the object of re-establishing the Government authority, and, if possible, punishing the rebels. He arrived at Halaib on the morning of the 27th. The enemy, on sighting the ships, retired some miles inland; and on the troops disembarking, the place was found to be deserted. Absence of transport prevented the troops from following up the enemy farther than their first camp, which was found deserted; the troops remained some days at Halaib, while the Arabs retired to Agwamteri,¹ some six hours distant, and they displayed no further activity. Colonel Holled-Smith returned to Suakin on the 13th, leaving a small force under Captain Jackson to complete the new fort and re-establish the Government authority in the mamurieh. The latter returned to

¹ It was this force which subsequently operated against the Bisharin and Ababdeh Arabs at Messa, and threatened an advance on Abrak in July.

Suakin a few days later, having left a garrison of fifty police in a strongly fortified position.

In the meantime the Hadendowa with few exceptions had been steadily combining against the rebels, whom they considered in the light of foreign intruders; and in April the Shebodinab had raided the country to the north of Berber. The Amarar still continued passively hostile, though Gwelaïor, the son of shiekh Ali Rekab, shiekh of the Senderai section, established an independent position, and raided freely on the friendly tribes, no doubt with the consent of Osman Digna.

Towards the end of May, Ali Omar, sheikh of the Gemilab, wrote to the Governor-General that he had now returned to his country from Omdurman, where he had been forced to go, but that he still entertained the most loyal feelings, though he was obliged to hide them on account of Osman.

In June several important Hadendowa sheikhs came into Suakin, and begged the assistance of the Government in the active measures which they now proposed to take against the Arabs. Previous experience had shown that so far these anti-Mahdiist leagues had not been successful; intertribal quarrels, fear of reprisals on the part of the rebels in case of failure, and an ignorance of the real strength of their common enemy, all combined to make tribal confederation a difficulty. But now the dissatisfaction against the Baggara was more general than it had been before; these latter were harrying the country, appropriating all the supplies to themselves, and want, almost amounting to famine, was prevailing throughout the country.

The present, therefore, seemed a really favourable opportunity for granting these tribes some assistance in money and food, to enable them to take active steps against the intruders.

Mohammed Mussa Digna had just been appointed emir of Sinkat, and it was proposed to operate in the first instance against him, and if successful, then to turn their efforts towards Tokar.

The Hadendowa now allied themselves with the Amarar, and receiving the assistance they demanded, a combined force of 700 men left Suakin on August 12th and advanced to Sinkat. But on arrival there, they found that Mussa Digna

had escaped, leaving behind him, in his hurry, a few cattle, which fell into the hands of the league.

Mussa now applied to Osman for reinforcements, and soon collected a force of 600 Baggara, Jaalin, and local tribesmen at Harassab; these were attacked by the league on 1st September and driven back, but on the following day the Arabs in turn attacked the league and forced it to retire to Tamanib. Both affairs were small and unimportant, but the result was considered somewhat unsatisfactory, after the violent protestations on the part of the league to exterminate the *Aghrab* or foreigners. Consequently Government refused further assistance, and the league, deprived of support in arms and food, soon broke up and was disbanded. About this time a small body of irregular cavalry, known as the Kheyala Orban, was organised at Suakin, and proved of considerable use in checking cattle raids, etc.

The condition of affairs altered little in the neighbourhood of Suakin until Osman Digna's departure from Tokar on the 7th October. He had received a summons to attend a council at Omdurman, where the general situation was to be discussed, consequent on the death of Nejumi and the destruction of the force sent to invade Egypt.

Abu Girgeh now assumed the management of affairs at Tokar, and a great change was soon noticeable; many of the tribes in the Tokar delta freely came into Suakin; Ahmed Mahmud had been, up to the present, at Handub, his loyal assurances had so far taken no very practical effect, and he was gradually becoming a robber chieftain, levying blackmail on all he could lay hands upon; the greater part of his proceeds usually finding their way into Osman's hands, while the latter judiciously encouraged him in his desire to become the emir-in-chief of the Amara. When, therefore, Osman left for Omdurman, Ahmed Mahmud joined him *en route*, and together they proceeded to the Khalifa. It was now thought that negotiations with Abu Girgeh would be possible, and a correspondence was carried on between him and the Governor-General; the former, however, was being carefully watched by the Khalifa's delegates Magzub Abu Bakr and Taher Magzub, and whatever may have been his real motives, he did not dare commit himself, and subsequent events have shown that he

was little inclined to abandon Mahdism, though in matters of dress and food he was by no means a staunch upholder of the tenets of his late master Mohammed Ahmed; and this latter fact probably gave rise to the idea that he intended to submit to the Egyptian Government.

The year 1889 closed, therefore, in this district with a marked change in the relations with the surrounding tribes; active hostilities were temporarily suspended, trade had to some extent revived, though it perforce gravitated into the hands of the ruling power at Tokar, and still left the tribes, already weakened by constant warfare, in a state of considerable destitution; relief, as far as possible, was given to these latter, but only those in the immediate vicinity of the town were in a position to benefit by it.

Meanwhile the great council had assembled at Omdurman. Osman, it was said, was urged by the Khalifa to take Nejumi's place in the Dongola province, and prepare another army for the invasion of Egypt; but Osman pleaded inability to gather together the tribes in a district in which he was not even known, representing that his difficulties in the Suakin neighbourhood had been great, but that his authority there was paramount, and he would be likely to meet with greater success there than at Dongola. He was therefore permitted to return, and left Omdurman on December 20th, travelling *via* Galabat, Gedaref, and Kassala, where it was intended he should make a prolonged inspection, and if possible gather more troops for future operations from Tokar.

Ahmed Mahmud arrived at Handub on the 3d January 1890, and again occupied himself with collecting taxes, much to the annoyance of the Hadendowa, who claimed the right of the road, and at least a fair share of the profits.

KASSALA

The condition of affairs at Kassala did not materially alter during 1889. Said Hamed was still emir at that place. In the early part of the year an expedition was sent to subdue the Barea tribe, but, after a series of skirmishes, returned without having fulfilled its object.

The Gemilab continued openly hostile, and frequently cut

the communication between Tokar and Kassala, while the Beni Amer raided continually in the vicinity of Kassala itself. About this time sheikh Kantibai received a consignment of 1000 rifles from the Italians, with which he proposed to defend himself against Arab incursions; he also entered into a league with the Beni Amer against the rebels, but nothing appears to have come of it beyond the despatch of an expedition in June to Khor Baraka, under Mustafa Hadal, from Tokar, to punish the Beni Amer for recent raids.

The old relations between the Arabs and Hadendowa of this district had not improved. Towards the end of June a combined attack of Hadendowa and Beni Amer under sheikh Mahmud Omar defeated them with considerable loss at Filik. The Ashraf too, towards the end of October, combined in force, under their sheikh Abu Fatma, and caused some anxiety to the Arab leader at Tokar, but this movement had little practical result, and towards the end of the year Abu Fatma left for Massawa. The Shayyab tribes also submitted, and with their chief and families arrived at Suakin. This small tribe had long been amongst the staunchest of Osman's followers, and their submission was a matter of some importance.

Sheikh Onur Anoyab of the Gemilab also collected a small force, and established himself at Setirab, where he openly defied the Arabs and maintained an independent position for some time.

On December 22d the Government sustained an important loss in the death of Mahmud Bey Ali, whose influence with the neighbourhood had been considerable, and who had rendered good service for many years.

Such was the general condition of affairs in the Eastern Sudan at the end of 1889, and may be briefly summed up in a few words. The country was still in occupation of the rebels, who by their lawless and ruthless conduct had completely estranged the local tribes; these latter, though anxious to free themselves from this rule of terror, were unable, for intertribal and other reasons, to combine, but continued severally hostile to Arab supremacy. The power of Osman Digna had considerably waned, there was no longer that restless active hostility; the whole country seemed exhausted with the constant turmoil of war; a plague of locusts added to the general distress, and grim famine spread over the land.

DARFUR, 1889

At the close of 1888 we left Osman Adam at El Fasher, anxiously preparing for the expected attack of Abu Gemaizeh, who was still at Dar Tama gathering the tribesmen.

Early in February the latter again advanced towards El Fasher, but on the way was attacked by smallpox, which detained him at Kebkebieh, while his army, under his second in command, the Fiki Adam, continued its advance towards El Fasher, halting for two days at Majzun, some 12 miles west of the town. Fiki Adam had expected that Osman would have attacked him here, but the latter deemed it inadvisable to move far from his base, and consequently waited till the enemy should advance, which they did on February 22d.

The fierce battle which was fought within a mile of El Fasher may, in the absence of more authentic information, be best understood by a perusal of the accompanying despatch, which Osman Adam addressed to the Khalifa on the conclusion of the fight, which resulted in the complete defeat and dispersion of Abu Gemaizeh's force. That celebrated leader died the following day, and the great movement, which had begun under such auspicious conditions, entirely melted away.

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his Lord and the prisoner of guilt, Osman Adam.

To the standard example of the faithful, the upholder of the law of the highest of the Apostles, our Lord our supporter, our mediator to God, the Khalifa of the Mahdi, El Khalifa Abdullah Ibn Mohammed, the Khalifa of the righteous, Abu Bakr.

After humble salutations. We have already informed you of the nefarious designs of the enemies of God, who, incited by their Satanic leader, were gathering together from all parts in order to attack us, and by this present letter we beg to inform you that they all assembled at Majzun, four hours distance from El Fasher. They received reinforcements from all parts of Darfur, and also from the remote countries, such as Dar Sila, Fur, Bornu, and other places.

They remained at Majzun for two days, expecting us to attack them, but, deeming it wiser to act on the defensive, we remained in our position.

On the third day, Friday, the 21st of Jamad Akher (22d February 1889), at 6 o'clock Arabic (noon), they advanced towards us from the direction of Wad Baira. They were in such numbers that they covered the whole earth, and the dust they raised in their march rose up to the sky. It is no wonder that they were so numerous, for they have been gathering for the last four months. They advanced towards us, with their women and children behind, beating the noggaras.

Seeing this I stood up amongst the Ansar and addressed them briefly, reminding them that they should put their whole trust in God, and fight valiantly, and not fear the numbers of the enemies.

I then divided my force into four columns, with orders to follow after each other at short distances apart, while I placed the cavalry as wings on both flanks, as is usually done.

We then steadily advanced towards the enemy, till the distance between the two forces became small, and the fight began.

The two forces soon came into contact, and a fierce battle raged, in which swords, spears, and knives were used. The followers, our faithful Ansar, fought most gallantly, and after the space of an hour the enemy, having suffered heavily, took to flight.

The Ansar, not satisfied with their victory, pursued the retreating enemy till sunset, and after that the cavalry still continued pursuing till almost all were killed. They followed them even as far as the caves and forests, where they tried to conceal themselves, but they were all killed, even those who transformed themselves into apes, wolves, dogs, and rabbits (for the natives of the western countries can be so transformed) were also all killed even to the very last.

The number of their dead was countless. Many of their women and children also were killed, and the remainder taken prisoners.

God was with us, and we saw several miracles during the battle.

God sent down fire, which burnt up the dead bodies of the enemy and also their wounded, showing how violent was His wrath upon them.

The brethren also saw sixteen white flags with green borders waving in the air.

They also heard the sound of drums beating in the air, and saw objects like mountains falling upon the enemy. The Prophet also revealed himself to many of the followers previous to the battle.

The combined tribes which fought against us in the battle were the Borgo, Bornu, Masalit, Tama, Tarjane, Asnakon, Dar Silia, Zaghawa, Beni Helba, Fezkan, Bedayat, Arnalat, and Fur, etc.

Amongst the chiefs who were killed in this battle were (1) the Khalifa of the Devil¹ and his brother Isagha, who changed his name and took your name, pretending that he descended from heaven, and that no one could stand before him, who made the lawful unlawful, and the unlawful lawful. Also (2) the son of Sultan Sali, named Mohammed Bakhit. (3) His brother. (4) His agent Abu El Kheirat. (5) Abdel Fiki Hanafi. (6) The vizir Adam Bosheh. (7) Their Kadi Imam Haria. (8) Two courtiers of the Sultan of Bornu, and many other chiefs of other tribes.

It had been my intention to send the heads of all these chiefs to you, but as they have by this time decayed, and would be heavy for the post, I must be satisfied in sending you only two heads, viz the head of the Devil's agent, and the head of the son of Sultan Sali, together with some of the enemy's flags and other articles of plunder, which may serve as a proof of our glorious victory.

Their devil, Abu Gemaizeh, died from smallpox in his home some

¹ Owing to his religious and anti-Mahdi pretensions, Abu Gemaizeh had acquired the name of the devil amongst the Ansar.

days ago, and thus Darfur is left without a head. Those who escaped our slaughter are dispersed throughout the whole country, and most of them are now anxious to join the brethren. We shall inform you later of our further proceedings.

May God lengthen your days, make your followers ever victorious, and place all power in your hands. Amen.

Dated JAMAD EL AKHER 1306

(February 1889).

A warning consequent on the defeat of Abu Gemaizeh, etc.

In the name of God, etc.—From the servant of his Lord, Abd el Hamid Awad, Ahmed Mohammed Mahmud, and Fakr ed Din Omar, to Abd el Kader Mohammed Ayala, chief of the island of Bahdur, near Suakin.

After salutations, we write to inform you that God has put all power into the hands of the Mahdi and his followers. On Tuesday the ninth of Rajab 1306 (12th March 89), the agent of the Mahdi and the honourable Zaki Tumul met the Abyssinians and defeated their hosts and killed them all. The tribes of the western regions were also defeated by the followers, and their devil Abu Gemaizeh died from smallpox. The attached letters give full details of these victories, from which you will see that there is now no power left to oppose the followers of the religion of God. We therefore advise you to be wise and join Mahdism, lest you will lay yourself open to destruction.

This defeat placed Osman Adam in possession of the entire country as far west as the confines of Waddai, and for some time crippled all attempts on the part of the disaffected tribes to again combine against him, but all these chieftains whose names are given in his vainglorious despatch were not killed; Abu Kheirat and his brother Abbas escaped the slaughter, as well as the magdums Juma, Hamid, Adam Bosheh, and Babakr Naga. These, with a few hundred followers, now retreated to the far west, and were a source of continual annoyance to Osman Adam. They still formed the nucleus of a movement, which might at any time develop into another serious conflict against the Khalifa's power.

The neighbouring powerful kingdoms of Waddai, Bornu, and Borgo, a very hotbed of Senussiism, were now on the confines of the Khalifa's territory, and sooner or later he felt that a conflict between the two great religious reformers, himself and the Senussi, was inevitable.

EQUATORIA, 1889

For the third time Stanley reached the lake on 18th January 1889, and this time pitched his camp on the plateau overlooking the plain near Kavalli's village.

He had been absent on this last journey about nine months.

He arrived at Banalya on 17th August 1888, only to find that the officer in command of his rearguard, Major Barttelot, had been treacherously murdered, and that Mr. Jameson had succumbed to fever; the other officers had been invalided, and many of the men comprising the rearguard had died or deserted.

Stanley, however, collected the remnant, some 350 men in all, under Mr. Bonny, set off on the 23d August, and for five long months toiled once more through the great forest.

Two days after his arrival at Kavalli's he despatched letters to Emin Pasha and Mr. Jephson at Tunguru, which were received by the latter on the 26th January. Jephson started off the following day, and through the loyalty of Shukri Agha, the commandant of Mswa station, who procured a native canoe for him, he succeeded in making his way to Kavalli's, where he arrived on February 6th.

Meanwhile the rebel officers at Wadelai had heard of Stanley's arrival at Kavalli's. Report had magnified his following into an army, and Emin had already despatched an order from Tunguru to Selim Bey to come to him at once with his officers and see Mr. Stanley.

Selim Bey therefore set out with fourteen officers¹ and the steamers *Nyanza* and *Khedive*, and arriving at Tunguru they, on Emin's order, wrote a letter, regretting their previous conduct, soliciting pardon, and begging him to again resume the

¹ This sudden change of front on the part of Selim Bey and the officers of Wadelai necessarily gave rise to suspicions. Their previous conduct had been hitherto so far removed from loyalty that it is difficult to realise the motives which actuated this sudden change. On the one hand they may have been alarmed at the rumoured magnitude of Stanley's force, and decided to throw in their lot with the stronger side, or—and what is perhaps more likely—another vile plot was being concocted by which they might gain possession of Stanley's rifles and ammunition. Under any circumstances Selim Bey's deputation appears rather to have been actuated by a desire to spy out the land, and having taken survey of the situation to decide later what step to take. The subsequent events leave little doubt as to what the intentions of these mutinous officers really were.

position of governor. Emin Pasha appears to have accepted his avowal of repentance and submission, and started off for Nsabé, accompanied by Selim Bey and his deputation.

They arrived on February 13th at Nsabé, and on the 16th Mr. Jephson was sent to escort them to the camp. The whole party, consisting of Emin, Casati, Vita Hassan, and Selim Bey, with seven other officers and a number of followers, arrived at Stanley's camp at Kavalli's the following day.

Meanwhile Stanley had called in his outlying posts in Mazamboni's country, and now, all the European officers being present, it was decided that a council should be held the following day to discuss the situation.

At this meeting it was unanimously decided that the evacuation of the provinces should be carried out, and that sufficient time should be given to the officers and officials to collect their families at the camp. A written agreement to this effect had already been drawn up at Wadelai and was now presented by Selim Bey to Mr. Stanley, and the latter indited a reply, specifying the conditions of the evacuation, which was handed to the officers, who on 26th returned in the steamers to carry out the evacuation of the southern stations, which it was agreed should be completed by the 10th April.

Previously, however, to their departure, Selim Bey received an official letter from Fadl el Maula Bey, who had been left in command of the troops at Wadelai during his absence, to the effect that he had been deposed from his position as commander-in-chief, and that he, the Pasha, and Casati had been sentenced to death. Selim, however, does not seem to have considered this matter seriously; or it may have been part of the plot, for he at once proceeded to Wadelai, and it was not till a month later, the 26th March, that he wrote from there to the effect that he and all the officers were ready to return to Egypt with Mr. Stanley, and that they were carrying out the evacuation of Duffileh.

Emin Pasha, on communicating this news to Mr. Stanley, expressed his opinion that the concentration at Kavalli's must take at least three months longer, and he requested Mr. Stanley to give his advice as to the nature of the reply he should send. Mr. Stanley thereupon convened a meeting of his officers, and in the presence of Emin Pasha addressed them as follows:—

Gentlemen—Before giving me the benefit of your advice at this important period, let me sum up some facts as they have transpired.

Emin Pasha has received a mail from Wadelai. Selim Bey, who left the post below here on 26th February last, with a promise that he would hurry up such people as wished to go to Egypt, writes from Wadelai that the steamers are engaged in transporting some people from Duffileh to Wadelai, that the work of transport between Wadelai and Tunguru will be resumed upon the accomplishment of the other task.

When he went away from here, we were informed that he was deposed, that Emin Pasha and he were sentenced to death by the rebel officers. We now learn that the rebel officers, ten in number, and all their faction, are desirous of proceeding to Egypt; we may suppose, therefore, that Selim Bey's party is in the ascendant again.

Shukri Agha, the chief of the Mswa station—the station nearest to us—paid us a visit there in the middle of March. He was informed on the 16th of March, the day that he departed, that our departure for Zanzibar would positively begin on the 10th April. He took with him urgent letters for Selim Bey, announcing that fact in unmistakable terms.

Eight days later we heard that Shukri Agha is still at Mswa, having only sent a few men and children to the Nyanza camp; yet he and his people might have been here by this if they intended to accompany us.

Thirty days ago Selim Bey left us with a promise of a reasonable time. The Pasha thought once that twenty days would be a reasonable time. However, we have extended it to forty-four days. Judging by the length of time Selim Bey has already taken, only reaching Tunguru with one-sixteenth of the expected force, I personally am quite prepared to give the Pasha my decision. For you must know, gentlemen, that the Pasha, having heard from Selim Bey intelligence so encouraging, wishes to know my decision, but I preferred to call you to answer for me.

You are aware that our instructions were to carry relief to Emin Pasha, and to escort such as were willing to accompany us to Egypt. We arrived at the Nyanza, and met Emin Pasha in the latter part of April 1888, just twelve months ago. We handed him his letters from the Khedive and his Government, and also the first instalment of relief, and asked him whether we were to have the pleasure of his company to Zanzibar. He replied that his decision depended on that of his people.

This was the first adverse news that we received. Instead of meeting with a number of people only too anxious to leave Africa, it was questionable whether there would be any except a few Egyptian clerks. With Major Barttelot so far distant in the rear, we could not wait at the Nyanza for his decision, as that might possibly require months; it would be more profitable to seek and assist the rear column, and by the time we arrived here again those willing to go to Egypt would be probably impatient to start. We therefore, leaving Mr. Jephson to convey our message to the Pasha's troops, returned to the forest region for the rear column, and in nine months were back again on the Nyanza; but instead of discovering a camp of people anxious and ready to depart from Africa, we found no camp at all, but heard that both the Pasha and Mr. Jephson are prisoners, that the Pasha has been in imminent danger of his life from the rebels, and at another time is in danger of being bound on his bed-

stead and taken to the interior of Makaraka country. It has been current talk in the province that we were only a party of conspirators and adventurers, that the letters of the Khedive and Nubar Pasha were forgeries concocted by the vile Christians, Stanley and Casati, assisted by Mohammed Emin Pasha. So elated have the rebels been by their bloodless victory over the Pasha and Mr. Jephson, that they have confidently boasted of their purpose to entrap me by cajoling words, and strip our expedition of every article belonging to it, and send us adrift into the wilds to perish. We need not dwell on the ingratitude of these men, or on their intense ignorance and evil nature, but you must bear in mind the facts to guide you to a clear decision.

We believed, when we volunteered for this work, that we should be met with open arms. We were received with indifference, until we were led to doubt whether any people wished to depart. My representative was made a prisoner, menaced with rifles, threats were freely used, the Pasha was deposed, and for three months was a close prisoner. I am told this is the third revolt in the province. Well, in the face of all this, we have waited nearly twelve months to obtain the few hundreds of unarmed men, women, and children in this camp. As I promised Selim Bey and his officers that I would give a reasonable time, Selim Bey and his officers repeatedly promised to us there should be no delay. The Pasha has already fixed 10th April, which extended their time to forty-four days, sufficient for three round voyages for each steamer. The news brought to-day is not that Selim Bey is close to here, but that he has not started from Wadelai yet. In addition to his own friends, who are said to be loyal and obedient to him, he brings the ten rebel officers and some 600 or 700 soldiers, their faction.

Remembering the three revolts which these same officers have inspired, their pronounced intentions against this expedition, their plots and counterplots, the life of conspiracy and smiling treachery they have led, we may well pause to consider what object principally animates them now—that from being ungovernably rebellious against all constituted authority they have suddenly become obedient and loyal soldiers of the Khedive and great “Government.” You must be aware that, exclusive of the thirty-one boxes of ammunition delivered to the Pasha by us in May 1888, the rebels possess ammunition of the provincial Government equal to twenty of our cases. We are bound to credit them with intelligence enough to perceive that such a small supply would be fired in an hour’s fighting among so many rifles, and that only a show of submission and apparent loyalty will ensure a further supply from us.

Though the Pasha brightens up each time he obtains a plausible letter from these people, strangers, like we are, may also be forgiven for not readily trusting those men whom they have such good cause to mistrust. Could we have some guarantee of good faith there could be no objection to delivering to them all they required, that is, with the permission of the Pasha. Can we be certain, however, that if we admit them into this camp as good friends and loyal soldiers of Egypt, they will not rise up some night and possess themselves of all the ammunition, and deprive us of the power of returning to Zanzibar?

It would be a very easy matter for them to do so after they had

acquired the knowledge of the rules of the camp. With our minds filled with Mr. Jephson's extraordinary revelations of what has been going on in the province since the closing of the Nile route, beholding the Pasha here before my very eyes, who was lately supposed to have several thousands of people under him, but now without any important following, and bearing in mind the "cajoling" and "wiles" by which we were to be entrapped, I ask you would we be wise in extending the time of delay beyond the date fixed, that is, the 10th of April?

Mr. Stanley's meaning in thus addressing his officers was clear. He dreaded that the rebel officers had once more prepared a plan to entrap him, and his officers unanimously agreed with him.

It was definitely decided that the march towards the coast should begin on the 10th April, and replies in this sense were at once despatched to the commandants of Wadelai and Mswa.

On the 4th of April letters were received from Wadelai which described the situation there as anything but satisfactory.

The concentration of the troops there from the northern stations was proceeding slowly enough. Dissensions between the officers and all those symptoms of mutiny which had previously shown themselves were now more than ever apparent at Wadelai, and it was clear that neither Selim Bey nor the garrisons were likely to arrive by the date fixed for the departure. That night, April 4th, an attempt was made to steal some of the Zanzibaris' rifles.

Here, in the very camp itself, the spirit of mutiny seemed to have entered. But Stanley was prompt to put it down with a strong hand. On the following day he assembled the troops in a square, ordered all those in camp who belonged to the province to attend, and those who showed a disinclination he ordered to be driven in forcibly. Once assembled, Stanley addressed them, told them plainly what had occurred, and his determination to visit with capital punishment the slightest sign of hesitation to comply with his orders. He then called on those who wished to return with Emin Pasha to the coast to stand on one side. All but one showed their willingness to accompany him, and the unwilling one was at once made a prisoner. This determined manner of dealing with the first symptoms of sedition probably averted serious consequences; but it decided Stanley not to delay his departure a day longer


than the fixed date, and accordingly on April 10th the whole force, consisting of some 600 Egyptians and others from the Equatorial province, including their wives and children, the combined relief columns, and a number of native carriers—in all, some 1500 souls—marched out of Kavalli and directed their faces eastwards on their long march towards Zanzibar.

Before they had proceeded but a few days on the journey desertions were numerous; one man, Rehan, with twenty-two followers, returned to the lake, but was recaptured, brought back to camp, and hanged.

The serious illness of Mr. Stanley delayed the expedition some days at Mazamboni's, and while there, on May 3d, mails to and from Wadelai were intercepted, which showed that the spark of sedition was still smouldering in the camp. An officer, Ibrahim Eff. Elhem, who was at that time in the camp, had written "begging not to delay sending them men, because if we have them to help us we can delay the march of the expedition in many ways, but if you come yourself with 200 soldiers we could obtain all you and I wish."

Stanley now decided that should Selim Bey arrive after all, he would not admit him nor his followers into the camp armed. Selim Bey never came. Shukri Agha, the loyal commandant of Mswa, came, it is true, but the men, whom he brought deserted before he reached Stanley's camp.

On the 8th May the expedition at length moved away from Mazamboni's. From the date the order was first given for the withdrawal from Equatoria, *i.e.* February 25th, till the 8th May, a total of ninety-two days, ample time had been given to the garrisons to retire and join the expedition returning to Zanzibar; but they had not availed themselves of the offer, or rather dissension was so rife that it was impossible for the officers to arrive at a decision. Consequently the expedition quitted Mazamboni's on May 8th, and the same afternoon couriers arrived with letters from Selim Bey to the effect that another disorder had broken out at Wadelai which paralysed all his efforts to carry out Mr. Stanley's orders. Fadl el Maula Bey was his sworn enemy. He had suborned the greater part of the troops, and with them, in the dead of night, he had marched to the magazines, possessed himself of



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all the ammunition there, and left Wadelai for Makaraka, leaving Selim Bey with some 200 officers, clerks, and soldiers, and an empty magazine. He had proceeded with his few followers to Mswa on April 22d; but here he again delayed, and now asked that the expedition should halt until his arrival.

With his previous experience, however, Mr. Stanley decided that he would not halt, but would march slowly, and perhaps wait a few days on the farther side of the Semliki river. If he wished, Selim Bey could easily overtake the caravan. Such was the reply the messengers took back, and it was the last communication that passed between the remnant of the Egyptian authority in Equatoria and the relief expedition, which now slowly sped on its way to the coast, where it arrived on December 6th, after a host of strange adventures and discoveries—amongst the latter the all-important discovery of the sources of the Nile, the great snow-capped Ruwenzori, the Albert Edward Nyanza, and the Semliki river, by which the latter drains into the Albert lake, are discoveries the importance of which cannot be over-estimated. But it is not intended here to enter into the details of this return journey to Zanzibar; suffice it to say that the great column arrived there towards the end of the year considerably reduced in numbers.

The Egyptians were soon transferred to Cairo. The vast enterprise undertaken by the relief expedition had occupied them close on three years to fulfil, and the total distance traversed was upwards of 6000 miles in the African continent alone. A truly wonderful exploit, which will go down to the annals of history as one of the grandest on record. Of the further history of events in Equatoria nothing is known. It can only be presumed that the province has lapsed into its pristine barbarism. The Mahdi may or may not have annexed this to his already vast dominions, but it is more than probable that the negro tribes, who people that vast country, and who have already experienced the slave-trading proclivities of the Arabs, will do their utmost to preserve their freedom until a European power takes them under its protection and opens out this great country to commercial enterprise.

CONCLUSION

FOR obvious reasons the actual state of affairs at the present time in the Sudan, and the various measures taken to guard against the invasion of Egypt, entering as they do into the region of undeveloped plans and current political questions, cannot here be touched upon. It only remains, therefore, to describe the conditions under which the Sudan is ruled, and to give an account of the present state of affairs to enable the reader, with the information he has gleaned from the preceding pages, to follow intelligibly the course of present and future events as they occur.

The authority of the Khalifa is still supreme in the Sudan, but how changed from the early days of Mohammed Ahmed !

When the latter began his divine mission, the country was ripe for revolt ; there had been maladministration throughout, and the rebellion flourished in a fertile soil. The tribes and inhabitants, smarting under the tyranny of their foreign governors, welcomed the expected Mahdi, who was to set them free and enable them to become once more the rightful owners of their lands. For about a year, at most, the imposture flourished, and the great majority of the people believed that the true Mahdi had at length appeared. But as time went on they saw their spiritual ruler steeped in the wildest debauchery, and blindly led by his chief khalifa, Abdullah Taashi, who, with his all-powerful Baggara, ruled the land with an iron hand. In place of a religious kingdom, where the inhabitants would live in peace, when there should be a communism of property, and poverty should be unknown, they found the country drifting into a state of anarchy. Rapine, bloodshed, and horrors filled the land. Tribe after tribe attempted to shake itself free from the Nessus shirt which clung round it ; but the power they had unwittingly raised had now become a

huge spectre which overawed and crushed them. The more they tried to drive off the horrible nightmare, the more closely and heavily did it press upon them, and eventually they became its abject slaves. Their chiefs fell victims to the cruel caprice of an Oriental ruler of the most debased and tyrannical nature. Whole households were swept away to become the slaves of the fierce Baggara emirs. No man could call his soul his own. Dare he speak in private to his friends, there was one watching who would report him to his master, and death or the loss of a limb would be the punishment. What wonder that the tribes longed for the return of a government which, with all its faults, had never treated them thus? But the cry of distress came too late. The invariable and just answer of the cast-off master was, "You must free yourselves from the rulers you have raised up ere you can hope that I shall again take you under my protection. At best you were a source of trouble and expense to me; why should you expect my help when you of your own free will rejected me?" To this answer no reply can be given, and so the situation must continue until such time as the master can again extend his protection to his unruly children.

The Baggara rule of terror is still supreme. But all this tyranny and bloodshed has weakened the power of the Khalifa; even the dreaded Baggara are tired of continuous warfare, and only a few months ago a mutiny occurred in which some 3000 of the tribe made good their escape to their own country. And rumours are frequent that the Khalifa has constantly-recurring visions, in which he is told to make a "hejira" to Abba Island or to the mountains of southern Kordofan, in case of which it is not improbable that a revolt against his authority would at once break out. But, on the other hand, it is premature to presume that his power has so far decreased as to make his "hejira" a necessity, and beyond the signs of the times, and the longing expectancy of the tribes to see themselves once more free, there are no strong grounds for believing that the collapse of Mahdism is approaching.

Several details have come to hand from time to time regarding the Khalifa's rule at Omdurman, which give a clearer conception of the arbitrary and tyrannical nature of the present Khalifate; but before entering on this subject a

slight description of the Khalifa Abdullah et Taashi's¹ personal appearance may be of interest. He is said to be a tall, stout man of some fifty years of age, his hair is beginning to turn gray, his face is much marked by smallpox, and he wears a large beard and slight moustache; he was wounded by a bullet in the thigh at the siege of El Obeid, which makes him slightly lame; he is proud of his wound, and frequently relates how he received it, and talks of his own bravery; he neither reads nor writes, and is said to be a man of exceptional ignorance, but withal of great determination, and well versed in every sort of fraud and deception; in the words of one who knows him well, "as sly as a fox"; he is intensely vain, and is incensed at the slightest mention of any one being more powerful than himself. This vanity causes him to be frequently befooled; as an instance of this, it is said, he often throws men into prison for spreading reports as to the superior strength of his enemies, but if the prisoner will admit that his fetters are merely the honourable marks with which a just Khalifa binds him, he is at once released. Opposition to his will means death; pandering to his vanity will secure much.

Frequent reference has been made to the system begun by the Mahdi, and mercilessly pursued by his successor, of destroying all opposition and accumulating all property by the operation of *ghenima*, or "driving a tribe as a flock of sheep"; and a further instance of this is to be found in the latter history of the Shukrieh tribe, as described by two of its important leaders who have recently escaped from the Sudan. This great tribe, inhabiting a vast extent of country between the Nile and the Atbara, and extending to a considerable distance north and south of Khartum, is now almost extinct. In 1880 it was estimated as some 40,000 men strong, and possessing over 100,000 camels; they were the main carriers of merchandise in the Sudan. A few of the important members of the tribe joined Mahdiism on its first rise, but the bulk of the tribe showed a lukewarmness to the cause; in consequence the leaders were summoned to Khartum, where they were imprisoned or executed; their men, disarmed, were forcibly driven to the standards of the Mahdi, the tribal

¹ It should be stated here that this word is more properly *Taashi*, i.e. of the Taaisha tribe (Dar Taaisha).

system destroyed, the camels taken, and the property of the tribe seized for the *beit el mal*. There are now said to be hardly 1000 men left, and but a few hundred camels. This is but one of many similar instances, and would appear to point conclusively to the impossibility of the tribes hostile to Mahdiism being able to make common cause against the Khalifa's rule unsupported. It is undoubtedly true that the inhabitants of the Sudan are tired of the misrule and tyranny now existing, and would gladly welcome any form of settled government; but with their tribal systems destroyed, even whole tribes deported and whole districts depopulated, it is at present impossible for them to cast off the yoke which oppresses them so heavily, though they would undoubtedly throw in their lot with any invading force, *pari passu* with the successful advance of that force.

The Khalifa Abdullah may therefore be described as a despotic and tyrannical ruler, utterly ignorant and regardless of all recognised laws and forms of government.

His domestic life is not calculated to inspire his followers with that religious asceticism which his preaching and proclamations so fervently enjoin. He has some thirty-four wives, one of whom is a certain Keltum, the daughter of Mohammed Ahmed. He employs one of his most trusted followers to find out all the good-looking women, and after due report has been made to him the husband of the woman required is secretly advised to divorce his wife, who is at once brought to the Khalifa; an attempt to evade such an order would result in the immediate execution of the unfortunate husband. Once in his harem the women are very carefully guarded, and are not even permitted to see their parents; they are given no liberty, and never leave the house.

No one is permitted to look at the Khalifa's face; should any man interview him he is obliged to enter the Khalifa's presence on all fours, his eyes fixed on the ground; he dares not raise his head. On arriving near the Khalifa he retains the same position, his sword being placed on the ground at his side. The mode of address is always "Ya Sidi" (O my Lord); when the interview is ended he is permitted to rise and take up his sword, but his head must be bent and his eyes still fixed on the ground as he retires backwards. When the

Khalifa mounts the "mimbar" or pulpit in the great mosque to address the people, all are obliged to keep their heads bent and eyes downcast while he is speaking.

It will be remembered how, in 1885, on the death of the Mahdi, the Khalifa Mohammed esh Sherif nearly succeeded in effecting a revolution in favour of the Mahdi's son for the succession to the Khalifate, and how the more astute Abdullah et Taashi secretly collected all the arms in Khartum, and thus caused the complete collapse of the budding opposition factions. Quite recently a second attempt was made to press the claims of the Mahdi's son, but this time it was the Khalifa Ali Wad Helu who was bold enough to try, and his failure was even more signal than that of Mohammed esh Sherif. He assembled a secret meeting to discuss the action to be pursued, and took into his confidence a certain Ahmed esh Sherafi, who had been placed in charge of the Mahdi's family; this man, on learning Ali Wad Helu's plans, at once communicated them to the Khalifa Abdullah, and the latter straightway ordered the disarmament of all Ali Wad Helu's men, comprising a large number of the Degheim,¹ Kenana, Lahawin,¹ and Battahin Arabs. Abdullah has thus reduced his two rival Khalifas to merely nominal positions, and to further ensure the retention of the Khalifate in his own family he is said to have recently received divine instructions to proclaim his brother Yakub as his successor. Yakub Mohammed is a short stout man, very dark, and his face pitted with smallpox; he has high projecting cheek-bones, deeply set eyes, and is about forty-five years of age. He has no great reputation as a warrior, but is celebrated for his stratagem and cunning; he is commander-in-chief of all the "Ansar," but never leaves Omdurman; he is in the full confidence of his brother, and is consequently directly responsible for the *beit el mal* and *beit el amaneh*, in which all arms and ammunition are stored. The Khalifa Abdullah is said to be quite unapproachable except through the intermediary of Yakub; it is this latter who is the Khalifa's adviser in all projected expeditions, and the various spies which are sent to Egypt and other parts of the country are all despatched under his directions. He reads and writes well, and accompanies his brother on all occasions.

¹ Not shown on the map.

It will thus be seen that the Mahdi's family is, for the present, completely ousted from all chances of succession to the Khalifate, though they are undoubtedly a source of anxiety to the Khalifa Abdullah. The Mahdi left three sons, three daughters, and two wives, besides a host of so-called wives and concubines—of these latter there were originally 110, but the number is now reduced to some 70. They are called the *omhat el mo' uminin* (or the mothers of the faithful), though very few of them have any children, and the Mahdi once dead they are not permitted to re-marry.

The military organisation in the Sudan—such as it is—has been touched upon in the preceding pages, but a few further remarks on this subject may be of interest. The nucleus of the Khalifa's army is composed of Bazingers, or, as they are called in the Sudan, the *Jehadiehs* (regulars)—these are all armed with rifles, and are for the most part blacks, while his sword and spear men consist mainly of Arabs of many different tribes, but of these the most trusted are the Taaisha and Habbanieh Arabs. Originally there were many old Government soldiers amongst the Mahdi *Jehadiehs*, but these are being gradually replaced by men recruited from the southern districts, who now outnumber the old soldiers in the proportion of about three to one. None of the old Egyptian (fellahin) soldiers are admitted into the ranks; they are employed for the most part as cooks, servants, watercarriers, etc. The Khalifa seems gradually to have recognised the fighting value of black troops, and has recently issued an order that no able-bodied black is to be sold as a slave, but that he will pay thirty dollars a head for blacks suitable for soldiers. All blacks recently enlisted are branded with the word "Abdullah" on the left hand.

There is no special uniform, all men are dressed alike whether soldiers or not; the dress consists of

The *jubbah* or *marrakahieh*, a long shirt made of *dammur* or native cloth and covered with patches of various colours.

The *sirraul* or drawers.

The *sayidan* or sandals.

The *karabeh* or girdle of goos (straw).

The *takia* or skull-cap.

The *immeh* or turban.

The *sibhek* or beads.

The Arabs are armed with sword, long lance (or *kibbi*), four small spears (or *tabaig*), and a small dagger.

There is no cavalry organisation; a certain number of the Arabs have horses, and if a number of horsemen are required, an order is merely issued to the owners of *raya* (or standards) that they are to supply a certain number; they are armed in the same manner as the footmen.

In place of large standing garrisons at the principal military stations, a garrison suitable for their requirements only is kept up, while large numbers of Arabs are permitted to return to their own districts under recall. When the wholesale gathering (*ghenima*) of the tribes took place, much land was left uncultivated; in the years of distress which followed, many of the inhabitants of the country to the south of Khartum (the island of Meroe, and as far south as Fashoda) died, and gradually the country had become depopulated; the Khalifa therefore caused several of the tribes from the far west to emigrate and settle in that fertile country as well as on the west bank of the White Nile, with orders to recommence cultivation. Thus a considerable number of fighting men have been placed more directly under the Khalifa's eye, and though they are at present occupied in cultivating, they can at any time be called to Omdurman should necessity arise.

A mukaddum (magdum) or under-officer is appointed over every 20 Jehadiehs, and over every 100 men an emir; each emir has a flag (*raya*); in ordinary nomenclature, therefore, 100 rayas would be equivalent to 10,000 men. There is one Emir of Emirs for the whole of the Jehadiehs; this post was held by Abu Angar up to the time of his death, and he has been succeeded by Abd el Maula, a *muwallid* of the Taaisha tribe.

The Arab fighting organisation is based much on the same lines as the Jehadiehs, but the numbers of men under each *raya* vary greatly. The most trusted man of a tribe or sub-tribe is made an emir, and he is responsible for collecting all the fighting men of his tribe; each emir has several mukaddums, but the numbers under the command of these latter also vary considerably.

The principal *raya* is, of course, the Khalifa's, which is practically Yakub's, and is known as the blue *raya*—the colour of the Prophet's standard—that is to say, the ground-work—is

blue, on which are worked sentences in white, while the borders consist of strips of red, green, and white. The Khalifa Ali Wad Helu's *raya* is known as the green *raya*. Every *raya* should carry the following sentence, "Mohammed el Mahdi is the Khalifa of the prophet of God," and in addition to this, emirs embroider various extracts from the Kuran, which vary on almost every standard; the passages which occur most frequently are, "There is no God but God"—"The true sovereign"—"Mohammed is the true and veritable Prophet of God"—"Abd el Kader el Gilani"—"God is my Lord, I believe him to have no co-equal," etc. etc.

The *emir el umara*, or emirs of emirs, come next in rank to the khalifas—of these there are upwards of twenty, of whom the most celebrated in the time of the Mahdi were Osman Digna, Abu Angar, Wad en Nejumi, Abu Girgeh, etc.; but some are dead, and now the emirs of emirs are Osman Digna in the Eastern Sudan; Ahmed Ali, a Taaishi, on the Abyssinian frontier; Osman Wad Adam (Ganoo) in the Western Sudan, Darfur,¹ etc.; and Osman Khalid Zogal in the Northern Sudan, Dongola, etc.

These emirs of emirs are in entire military control of their districts, and are responsible directly to the Khalifa Abdullah and to Yakub; they must keep up the necessary military forces in their districts, and can, with the Khalifa's permission, call up men to the standards of their various emirs.

When the Khalifa has decided to despatch an expedition from Omdurman, the standards of all emirs ordered for the "Jihad" are taken out of the store with great ceremony, and are planted in the ground at certain spots near or in the town. Should the expeditions be destined for the north, the *rayas* are planted at the "Hejira"; for the south, at the "Hadra tree"; and for the east, on the east bank of the Nile, near Khojali. The men gradually assemble at their respective *raya*, and those first completed up to strength are despatched, then follow the others at intervals of a few days, until the entire expedition has started. Should the force be going north, the Khalifa generally accompanies each detachment as far as Kerreri, and addresses some encouraging words on quitting them. Expeditions destined for Egypt are generally accompanied by their

¹ It is rumoured that this emir was recently killed in a conflict in Darfur.

families—as a rule the non-fighting portion, inclusive of women and children, exceeds the combatant branch in the proportion of about three to one. Should the expeditions be only going on short campaigns, a very small percentage only of women is permitted to accompany the force. The usual route followed by an expedition to Egypt is *via* Khartum-Debbeh, and it is on account of the supply of water along this road that expeditions are generally sent in detached parties. Nejumi's expedition came *via* Berber, because he recruited largely from his own tribe, the Jaalin, who inhabit the districts between Omdurman and Berber.

The Khalifa has a bodyguard of generally about fifty men, known as the *Harras el Khalifa*—they are specially selected blacks, and celebrated for their fidelity—they always accompany the Khalifa on foot. In addition to these he has some twenty *Mulazimin* or aides-de-camp. Of these, some are the special adherents of the Khalifa, while others, such as Slatin Bey, are given this position so as to be more especially under the Khalifa's eye lest they should attempt to escape. The special duty of these *mulazimin* is to accompany the Khalifa on all occasions; ten of them are Taaisha men, and they always ride; of the others, some ride and some walk; they always attend the Khalifa to and from the mosque, and remain in the outer courtyard of his house when he is within.

The supply of horses at Omdurman is not large. Some come from Abyssinia through the Galabat market, but they are found not to thrive well in the Sudan. There are some twenty specially large horses which are said to have been taken from Hicks Pasha's force.

Some 2000 camels are generally kept grazing near Omdurman; they are intended to act as transport in case of necessity. When an expedition leaves Omdurman a supply of dhurra is always sent ahead, it being the Khalifa's intention to keep the force well supplied till some distance from Omdurman, so as to prevent desertion.

Food in the shape of dhurra is supplied to the regulars and to the Taaisha and Habbanieh Arabs only; the other Arabs are obliged to find their own food. The daily ration per man is roughly two handfuls.

Pay is not issued to the troops regularly; there is no scale

of pay except amongst the Jehadieh; each man nominally receives one-eighth of a dollar a month, but frequently he receives nothing. Emirs receive 20 to 100 dollars a month, according to their respective status, with which they are intended to relieve the pressing wants of their poorer adherents; but, as a rule, the money generally remains in the hands of those to whom it is issued in the first instance.

On an expedition each emir is held responsible that his men have a sufficient number of donkeys and camels—their individual property—to carry supplies, and in addition the camp followers act as carriers. Each man is supposed to have his own *girbeh* or water-skin; if he be too poor to obtain one, his emir must supply him. It is almost impossible to estimate with accuracy the number of rifles and guns in the possession of the rebels, but at Omdurman alone they are said to have some 12,000 Remington rifles, 9000 rifles or guns of different sorts, 32 brass mountain guns, 4 Krupp guns, 4 or 5 machine guns, and some rockets. It is not probable that all these guns are in good working order, though those at Omdurman are kept clean and bright. Constant warfare has greatly diminished the supplies of ammunition, and it is now one of the Khalifa's greatest difficulties to obtain sufficient for his requirements. Every regular armed with a rifle is supposed to carry in his bandolier some 40 rounds, but so careful have they become that at present all rifles and ammunition are stored in the arsenal at Omdurman and are only issued on special occasions, such as feast days, when large military parades take place—on ordinary occasions a stick is substituted for a rifle. The great difficulty in making new ammunition is the scarcity of powder, lead, and fulminate. The only old powder available is that contained in the shells for the guns, and this is now being taken out, ground smaller, and used as charges for cartridges. Lead in some quantities has been successfully smuggled from the Red Sea coast, while the ground around Khartum has been most carefully searched, and the finders of lead sell it to the *beit el mal* at the rate of a dollar a pound. Fulminate for caps has also been a great difficulty, but small quantities reach Omdurman from time to time. An attempt was recently made by one of the European prisoners to manufacture new powder; he obtained some salt nitre from the

base of Jebel Arda—a hill near Omdurman—which he mixed with some burnt willow and with sulphur, of which there is a considerable quantity; this powder produced good results at first, but a month later it deteriorated rapidly; the manufacturer was threatened with death, but obtained a reprieve on condition that he would secure the necessary ingredients elsewhere, and for this purpose he despatched messengers to the coast. In war time every emir is supposed to carry a rifle, while every regular is to carry a reserve of 100 rounds in a bag; it is the special duty of the *mukaddumin* to see that the soldiers have a supply of ammunition and to issue reserve supplies during a battle. It is said that in 1886 and 1887 merchants carried on an extensive trade in ammunition, which they obtained from the emirs, and which they sold to the rebel negro tribes in Jebel Dair, Tagalla, etc.; but this trade was stopped by the Khalifa's orders some time ago.

The arsenal at Omdurman is in charge of a Taaishi Arab, and he has still stored there considerable quantities of Krupp and mountain gun ammunition.

The Tersana¹ or dockyard at Khartum is now the only working establishment outside of Omdurman. Many of the former Egyptian workmen are still retained, and there are now no less than five steamers in working order, viz. the *Ismailieh*, *Safieh*, *Mansura*, *El Khartum* (formerly Gordon's small steamer *Mohammed Ali*), and the *Et Tahira*; the latter now plies between Dongola and the south, and is used mainly for the transport of food; the others are also employed in bringing grain from the south to Omdurman. In addition to the military commander of a district, there is also the *a'amil* or mudir charged with the civil administration, and this latter is assisted by a staff of two kadis or judges and an *amin beit el mal* or treasurer. The *a'amil* is directly under the military commander, and is responsible to him for the collection of tithes on grain and the *zeka*, or tax on camels, cattle, property, and money. Of the kadis, one performs all legal and religious matters, while the duty of the other is to settle all disputes between the people and the *beit el mal*. The *a'amils*, kadis, and *amin beit el mal* are all responsible to the principal *amin*

¹ Originally *dar es sena'*, lit. "establishment for handicraft," Europeanised into *darsena*, *darse*, and *arsenal*, and readopted into Arabic as *tersana*.

beit el mal at Omdurman as well as to their respective military chiefs, and for this purpose they are summoned yearly to Omdurman to render their accounts. They are supposed to be changed every year lest they should get into the way of accepting bribes from the people and thus impoverish the *beit el mal*; if, however, the Khalifa is satisfied with the services of these officials, he does not change them, except the kadi of the *beit el mal*, who is always changed. The *amin beit el mal* at Omdurman receives a salary of 50 dollars a month, while the a'amils of districts draw from 15 to 30 dollars a month.

The Khalifa Abdullah has four special clerks, besides two others known as the *Hadra* clerks, whose duty it is to describe the visions in which their lord and master so frequently indulges. The *zeka* already referred to signifies alms given to the poor, and in a religious administration such as that of the Khalifa, it is the holy tax which covers wholesale plundering. It is demanded on all grain, property, and money, and is gathered either in money or in kind.

Another source of the revenue is the *ard el ghenima*, or booty land; this is all land within a gunshot of the *beit el mal* of a district, and becomes the property of the *beit el mal*. Being close to water, it is as a rule the most valuable land in the district, and it is leased out at an exceptionally high rate. All boats on the river are also considered exclusively the property of the *beit el mal*, and are leased out at the rate of two dollars per *ardeb* per annum.

The meshras or ferries are also *beit el mal* property, and are leased out at high rates, as are also the gardens round Khartum; the same remarks apply to all woods and forests. It may thus be readily understood that the Khalifa's revenue is by no means inconsiderable, while his expenditure is, in comparison, ridiculously small. Moreover, it may be remarked that when the Egyptian government was in occupation of the Sudan, it was the custom of both inhabitants and officials to secrete money and jewellery in their houses, which they buried under ground; consequently, when the Sudan passed into the hands of the Mahdi, a wholesale search was instituted, and everything found was brought to the *beit el mal*. The Mahdi, as Artin Pasha has explained in his interesting pamphlet,¹ em-

¹ See Appendix.

ployed the jewellers taken in Khartum to hammer down all silver ornaments, cut them to the dollar shape, and stamp them. This new circulation was compulsory, but all Egyptian money was hoarded. Abdullah, since his succession to the Khalifate, has adopted the same system, merely substituting the word *makbul* (i.e. accepted), for the words "by order of the Mahdi," and his dollar is now known as *el makbul*. All payments are made in these dollars, and if merchants bring Egyptian money to Omdurman, they are obliged to exchange it, thus the Khalifa continues to hoard Egyptian money. As it has been previously remarked, some state that this silver is secretly conveyed to Kordofan, while others affirm that it is put into ammunition boxes and stored in a large trench dug underneath Yakub's house. In the eyes of his followers the Khalifa is of course a very poor man, but the system adopted for securing the money is an open secret. The *amin beit el mal* is directed to submit daily to Yakub a statement of all moneys received and goods sold; when the receipts amount to 10,000 dollars, Yakub writes an official note to the *amin beit el mal* demanding this money for the payment of the Ansar, and it is at once handed over.

A restricted trade with the Sudan is now permitted, and merchants usually import sugar, coffee, Manchester goods, honey, butter, oil, scents, cheese, etc., and secretly tobacco, hashish, and opium. Merchants are generally taxed twice before reaching Omdurman, and on arrival at the latter place their goods are, as a rule, purchased by the *beit el mal* on the system already described.

The slave trade is said to be flourishing in the Sudan, the main collecting depots, in addition to Omdurman, being Galabat, Beni Shangul, and El Fasher, where there are large slave markets. Those collected at Galabat are for the most part Abyssinians, while those at El Fasher are generally captured in the raids made on the surrounding tribes. Beni Shangul is the collecting station for Dar Bertat, Rosaries, and Dar Fazoglu. From these three stations slaves are sent in gangs to all parts of the Sudan.

The principal slave market is of course in Omdurman, and is situated near the *beit el mal*. The prices of slaves are as follows :—

For a young and pretty girl, from 50 to 100 dollars.

„ an ordinary woman,	„	20 to 45	„
„ a young man,	„	20 to 30	„
„ middle-aged man,	„	5 to 10	„
„ a young boy,	„	5 to 25	„

At the out stations the prices are reduced by about a half.

Abyssinian slaves are a drug in the market; they do not, as a rule, stand the Sudan climate, and are always ailing.

Considerable numbers of slaves leave the Sudan *via* the Red Sea ports, for whom Arab merchants generally exchange contraband goods such as lead, fulminate, etc.

The Court at Omdurman is known as the *Mahakamet el Islam*, and is presided over by the *Kadi el Islam*—a certain Ahmed Ali, formerly Government kadi in Darra—he is assisted by ten other kadis. The Court sits all day, and all cases are brought before it. The *Kadi el Islam* submits daily to the Khalifa a list of all defaulters, together with the punishments awarded, for his final approval; but before trying cases the kadi generally ascertains privately the Khalifa's wishes, and “arranges” justice accordingly. Serious cases, such as mutiny, disobedience of orders, and theft, are summarily dealt with by the Khalifa himself, who daily condemns a number of persons to death or the loss of one or sometimes two limbs. Executions are carried out in various ways, either by hanging or cutting off the head; ordinary theft is punished by the loss of the right hand, a serious case by the loss of the right hand and left foot. All punishments are accompanied by complete confiscation of property.

There are a large number of Government officials and others now detained in the Sudan who are divided into *Muslimanieh* or Europeans who have adopted the Mohammedan religion, and *Wad er Rif*,¹ or Egyptians. Of the former it is most difficult to ascertain the exact numbers, and as all European names have been suppressed and the Mohammedan names substituted, it is almost impossible to connect the various individuals with their former surnames. The majority are Greeks, for it will be remembered that when Colonel Stewart quitted Khartum in 1884 he was towing some native craft which he was eventually

¹ *Rif*, meaning “cultivated country,” is applied to the northern Nile valley *par excellence*.

obliged to cut adrift. These vessels contained a number of Greeks, who were all made prisoners. Of the Austrian mission (most of whom are Italians) there are now, it is said, at Omdurman—

Father Don Giuseppe Ohrwalder, whose Arabic name is Yusef. Father Paul Rossignoli, whose Arabic name is Sobah el Kheir. Brothers Domenico Polinari and Joseph Rognotto, whose Arabic names are unknown. Sisters Teresa Grigolini, Concetta Corsi, Elizabetta Venturini, Catterina Chincarini. These sisters are said to have retained their Christian names.

The two Fathers are now living in the principal market. Father Ohrwalder makes a few piastres daily by weaving, and two of the Sisters earn a livelihood by making bread. Sister Teresa Grigolini is said to be living with the late Doctor George Bey's daughter in the house of a Greek merchant.

Lupton Bey was superintendent of the powder factory, and suffered severely from an accident to his eyes caused by an explosion; he was subsequently attacked by fever, lingered on for some weeks, and died on 17th July 1888.

Besides Slatin Bey, the other Austrians in Omdurman are Martin Hansal, son of the late Consul Hansal, and the children of Mr. Klein, who was killed at the fall of Khartum, also Marno Bey's son. Martin Hansal is known as Abdullahi. Neither he nor Marno Bey's son has any special position in the Khalifa's entourage. Charles Neufeld, the enterprising German merchant, who, it will be remembered, was captured at Selima in 1886, is said to be still in prison, but has been promised release on condition that he learns the *Ratib* by heart. Adolf Klootz, the servant of Baron von Seckendorff, who was captured shortly before the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's force, is said to have left Omdurman in 1889 for Galabat, where he was seen subsequent to the battle in which King John was killed.¹ An Armenian named Artin—Arabic name Abdullah—is now watchmaker to the Khalifa, and earns about forty dollars a month.

Giuseppe Cuzzi, celebrated in Gordon's journals, is now a

¹ Since that time nothing has been seen or heard of him. Some say he has escaped to Abyssinia, while others say he must have been killed. He was formerly a sergeant in the Prussian Uhlans, and was known as Mustafa in the Sudan.

mulazim of the Khalifa. He is known as Mohammed Yusef, draws three dollars a week, and has a large family.

Besides the above there are many others—in all, it is said, some eighty-five European men, women, and children. They live in the *Mustimanieh* quarter. A certain Greek—Arabic name Gaber—has been appointed mukaddum of this quarter, and is responsible to the Khalifa for all Europeans. The danger of attempting to escape is too great for any to risk, as in case of recapture the penalty of death would almost certainly be inflicted.

In addition to the various former Government officials whose names have already been mentioned as holding posts under the Khalifa Abdullah, there are several others who do not hold any special position. Of these latter the best known are Iskander Bey, a brother-in-law of Abd el Kader Pasha, who was taken prisoner at the fall of El Obeid. He draws seven dollars a month, and accompanies the Khalifa to the mosque, where he has a place in the front row; he has also a shop in the merchants' bazar.

Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi, General Gordon's secretary, who was taken prisoner at the fall of Khartum, was for a time in great favour with the Khalifa, but is now in disgrace. He has now a place in the third row in the mosque, and keeps a coffee shop in the grain bazar.

Yusef Mansur, a former official of El Obeid, is still emir of the artillery, while Said Bey Guma, formerly mudir of El Fasher, is second in command of the artillery.

A large number of former Government kadis and clerks have taken up similar positions under the Khalifa.

The police officer, Mohammed Famir, who was taken prisoner in the raid on Kalabsheh in 1888, was, on his arrival in Omdurman, obliged to declare publicly in the mosque that the Egyptian army was very small and weak, and that the inhabitants of the frontier were anxious to join Mahdism. He was then given fifty dollars a month, two slaves, and a donkey; but shortly afterwards he was seen smoking a cigarette, and in consequence all he had was confiscated. He is now a cook in the grain bazar. The Morghani ladies, Fatima and Nefisa, having steadfastly refused to enter the Khalifa's harem, have been forcibly married to two of his

emirs. The husband of Fatima is a certain Mohammed el Kheir, now in charge of the steamer *Bordein*, which is still stuck in the suds near Latuka. The husband of Nefisa is a certain Mohammed Abdullah.

Two messengers were recently despatched to Omdurman bearing a letter, requesting the return of General Gordon's clothing, letters, etc. After some eight months one returned bringing back with him the letters apparently unopened, and a verbal message to the effect that the Khalifa would hold no communication with Egypt. On their arrival in Omdurman the messengers were kept under a strict guard, and were constantly threatened with death. Meanwhile, in order that they should be impressed with the magnitude of the Khalifa's army, the latter ordered a general assembly of the ansar. Some five months elapsed before all arrived at Omdurman. At length some 45,000 were collected, and solemn military parades lasting some three days were held. The Egyptian messengers were shown everything, but one of them, having remarked that the armies of Egypt were even more numerous and powerful, was relegated to prison for daring to doubt the prowess of the Mahdi arms, while the other was despatched to Egypt with instructions to describe fully all he had seen. The ruling principle of Mahdiism being universal conversion and universal conquest, communication on ordinary matters is regarded by the Khalifa as impossible.

Arabic newspapers printed in Cairo frequently find their way to Omdurman, and are attentively studied by the Khalifa. On reading of the Anglo-Italian negotiations regarding Kassala, he is said to have remarked that as Kassala belonged to him, he was at a loss to understand on what grounds either England or Italy laid claims to it.

The Khalifa does not permit pilgrimage to Mecca, on the grounds that at present the Turks in Mecca are not true believers; this is one of his strong arguments for the Jihad, by which he hopes to conquer Mecca, and thus re-establish the pilgrimage purified from the hated Turk. He enjoins all persons to visit the Mahdi's tomb, but rather on the understanding that it is not a pilgrimage but rather a visit to the tomb of a very superior wali or saint of extraordinary sanctity.

Omdurman itself requires a few words of description. The



ROUGH PLAN OF KHALIFA ABDULLAH'S HOUSE

M O S Q U E

ENTRANCE TO MOSQUE

MAIN ENTRANCE
TO KHALIFA'S HOUSE

LARGE TWO
STORIED TOWER

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSURE

HAREEM

THIRD
SECOND

KHALIFA'S
ROOMS

STORE

HAREEM

ROOMS OF
EUNUCHS

ROOMS OF
EUNUCHS

ROOMS OF EUNUCHS

OPEN SPACE IN WHICH
THE KHALIFA'S MULAZIMIN
ARE ALWAYS IN WAITING

GUARD
HOUSE

GUARD
HOUSE
50 MEN

PRIVATE
ENTRANCE

PRIVATE
ENTRANCE

PRIVATE
ENTRANCE

small village has now sprung up into an extensive town, stretching for a considerable distance along the west bank of the Nile, almost as far as Khor Shamba; the south end is protected by the old fort built by General Gordon, which has been greatly enlarged, while Khor Shamba forms a natural barrier at the north end. An outpost fort is being built south of Kerreri, while the west, bounded by the desert, is unprotected. The south fort now forms the barracks of the Jehadieh; in the centre of the town is a large mosque which is connected with the fort by a good carriage road, along which the Khalifa occasionally drives in one of the two carriages taken at the fall of Khartum.

The *beit el mal*, *beit el amaneh*, slave market, etc., are all close to the river and not far distant from the mosque.

All important emirs are obliged to have houses in Omdurman in which a portion of their families must remain; the Khalifa thus holds the latter as guarantees for the loyalty of his chiefs.

All the principal markets and bazars, including the Muslimanieh quarter, are situated in the north-west part of the town. The Khalifa Abdullah possesses various houses, but his principal residence is that near the Mosque—a portion of it is two-storied, thus completely overlooking the town, of which the houses are invariably one-storied. It is built of brick taken from the houses in Khartum, and is well furnished, with glass windows and lattice-work screens and shutters: the annexed plan, drawn by a man long resident in Omdurman, will give some idea of the curious construction of this house. The two-storied tower is used by the Khalifa on special occasions when he is engaged in prayer and “*hadras*,” and here he occasionally retires for several days at a time. His central rooms are those in which he ordinarily lives. It is said that when the house was first built he personally conducted a number of his influential people through the various yards and rooms, which were all of the barest description; his own room contained only an ordinary *angarib* and sheepskin, the floors were simply sanded; but since that day no one is permitted to enter, and it is rumoured the rooms are now well furnished with divans, bedsteads, carpets, curtains, etc., taken from Khartum; while the women of his harem are dressed in good silk

and adorned with much jewellery and ornaments. He has some eight aghas (eunuchs), of whom the chief is a certain Abd el Gayum; the name "agha," being of hated Turkish origin, has been changed to "amin," i.e. one who is faithful.


The Mosque is merely an enormous rectangular yard, about 1000 yards long and 800 yards broad, and quite uncovered: a number of labakh trees (*Acacia albizzia*) are enclosed at the western end, which marks the position assigned to women, and which is partly roofed in by matting. The "mihrab" or niche which marks the direction of Mecca, is situated some distance south-east of the centre. The "mimbar" or pulpit is situated in the extreme south-east corner. A smaller mosque, known as the iron mosque, projects partially into the east portion of the great Mosque; the roof is made of the iron plates of steamers, of which there were a large number in the Khartum dockyard, and instead of being flat, the roof resembles that of a modern church; the walls are built of thick wood, and the whole is supported by twelve iron pillars. This mosque only holds some 200 persons, while the large Mosque will contain at least 10,000 people. The Khalifa enters the iron mosque on Fridays only; on other days he takes up his position on the raised mihrab in the great Mosque and leads the congregation in prayers; he is said to be a very ordinary preacher, and many people do not understand his Arabic, which is full of Western dialect words. Every emir and person of note is given a special locality in the mosque. Any absentees are at once reported to the Khalifa, and unless two witnesses are prepared to state that they are ill they are at once imprisoned. The Jehadieh are exempted from attending prayers in the great Mosque; few of them say any prayers, though they are supposed to attend at the mosque in the barracks.

A telegraph connects the Khalifa's house with the *beit el mal*, the dockyard, and Khojali on the east bank, a cable being laid across the river.

The population of Omdurman or El Buka'a (literally the "spot"), as it is called by the Arabs, is said to be in ordinary times between 15,000 and 20,000 souls. The lithograph press was removed from Omdurman and brought to a house close to the *beit el mal*; five Egyptians are employed at this work, and turn out a large number of proclamations; some

ROUGH PLAN OF THE GREAT MOSQUE AT UMUURMAN

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thousands of Mahdi prayer-books (*ratibs*) have been printed and bound in this establishment. Also a certain number of books, entitled *Nasieh el ikhwan*, have been prepared here. This book contains a history of the Arabi rebellion of 1882, and was written by a certain clerk named Ahmed el Awam, formerly one of Arabi Pasha's clerks in the Cairo War Office, but who was exiled to the Sudan for complicity in the revolt. It appears that this individual wrote the account during the siege of Khartum and sent it to the Mahdi. General Gordon discovered this, and at once had the traitor hanged.

The Mahdi's tomb is very similar to that of an ordinary holy sheikh, *i.e.* a *kubbeh* or dome, inside which and round the grave are well-carved railings. The dome is about 50 feet high, and is surmounted by a crescent, from the centre of which enormous spear-heads point upwards. The dome is painted white; it is the most conspicuous object in Omdurman, and can be seen from some distance. The Mahdi is buried on the spot where he died.

An outline of the Khalifa's daily life may be of some interest. It is said that he rises at dawn and proceeds to the great Mosque, accompanied by his *mulazimin*, who are armed with swords, which they carry on the right shoulder. On entering the mihrab the *mulazimin* range themselves on each side, while a mukaddum lays the sheepskin on which the Khalifa prays. The Khalifa opens the prayer, which lasts a quarter of an hour, he then returns to his house and sleeps for two hours, after which he proceeds to the outer enclosure of his house, where all the important emirs and officials are assembled, converses with them on current topics, and transacts any business there may be. He is addressed on all occasions as "Ya Sidi": an old Egyptian soldier recently addressed him as "Effendim" (the Turkish mode of respectful address adopted in the Egyptian army), and was at once attacked by the *mulazimin*, who beat him so mercilessly with the butt-ends of their spears that he died a few days later. Such is the determination to abolish all words which remind them of the hated Egyptian or Turkish authority. After conversing with the emirs, the three large noggaras are beaten, which is the signal for the horses to be brought, and that he intends to ride to the barracks. The Khalifa never mounts

horse, camel, or donkey by himself, but is always lifted on by a certain Kordofani called Abu Takka, known as the tallest and most powerful man in the Sudan. The procession is then formed as follows: Some 200 cavalry in front, then two buglers, after whom follows the Khalifa; behind and on either side of him, in a crescent formation, are some twenty black and Abyssinian boys armed with swords; then follow the bodyguard, armed with rifles, and the *mulazimin* bring up the rear. On arrival at the barracks, he assembles the *mukaddumin*, talks to them for a few minutes, and then returns to breakfast at his house. At noon he proceeds to the mosque for midday prayers, after which a certain Hamad Omar el Bama reads aloud a few pages of a book entitled *Es sira el halabieh*, which relates the various wars of the Prophet and the methods of fighting; a few pages are also read of the *Nasih el ikhwan*, already referred to; the Khalifa then talks to various people in the mosque, and returns to his house about 2 P.M.; instead of listening to the reading, he sometimes proceeds to the *beit el mal* or to the "Hejira" to inspect; he generally rests till late in the afternoon, and then proceeds to the mosque to hear the ratibs read; when this is over he again sees his Khalifas and chief emirs, discusses the wants of the day, and has letters read to him by his clerks; if they are specially private he retires to his room with his brother Yakub. At sunset he again proceeds to the mosque, and mounting the mimbar, preaches to the people, announces any special news or hadras he considers suitable for the occasion, and then retires for his evening meal, after which, for the fifth time, he proceeds to the mosque for prayers, and then to bed.

On Fridays, at 10 A.M., the Khalifa holds a parade of all his troops, the signal for which is the beating of the large noggaras and the blowing of an immense ivory horn called the "umbaya." The Khalifa then heads the procession as already described, the Jehadieh follow, and after them come the sword and spear men. All proceed to the open space at the foot of the hills known as Jebel Arda, opposite the great Mosque. The troops are then drawn up in various ways, sometimes in two lines, the cavalry on the right, then infantry, then regulars, and the artillery on the left. At other times the infantry are drawn up in a long line with cavalry wings thrown out. A

third formation is two lines of infantry, behind which comes a line of regulars and then a line of camelmén, the flanks being covered by cavalry and artillery. There is yet a fourth formation consisting of three concentric hollow squares of spearmén and jehadieh, the right and left flanks and rear being covered by horsemén. The Khalifa slowly inspects the lines, and then the troops return to Omdurman. As a rule no manœuvres are executed.

Frequently, when the Khalifa intends to undertake some special enterprise, he parades the troops in the usual place, and then proceeds alone a short distance up the valley to a spot where there is a curious echo. He then shouts out "Ya Khudrun," the echo of which can be distinctly heard by the troops. This he pretends is the Khudr's response to his call, and a species of mimic conversation takes place which constitutes a "hadra." On the following day he communicates to his credulous adherents the purport of the hadra from the pulpit in the mosque.

The course of events in various parts of the Sudan will now be briefly traced from the point at which they were left in the concluding chapter up to the present time. The Nile frontier of Egypt has been undisturbed. The military command of the Dongola province is still vested in Mohammed Khalid Zogal, who has a force at Dongola and detachments at Sannum in Dar Shaggieh, and at Suarda. From this latter post strong patrols are sent to Mograkeh, and sometimes they proceed as far as Tangur, north of Akasheh. The date harvests in Sukkot and Mahass have been plentiful, while an exceptionally high Nile and abundant rains have produced good grain crops. The state of famine may now be said to be over, and the Khalifa, who has at length recognised the all-importance of cultivation, has taken steps to promote this by issuing instructions to his emirs to encourage the people in their districts to cultivate assiduously.

A few months ago Saleh Bey, of Korosko, reconnoitred towards Abu Hamed with some of his irregulars, and succeeded in capturing one of the outpost forts for a few hours. During his retirement a skirmish took place in which Suliman Wad Gamr, the murderer of the late Colonel Stewart, was killed. After this raid Abu Hamed was reinforced, but as no further

attack was made, the reinforcements were withdrawn, and Idris Harun replaced Grieger as emir.

The force at Berber is still very small. Abu Girgeh, on his withdrawal from Tokar, was temporarily placed in command, but has been quite recently summoned to Omdurman.

At Suakin some changes have taken place.¹ Osman Digna, it will be remembered, was collecting a force to bring to Tokar, but the state of famine in that part of the country greatly delayed him. He at length succeeded in collecting a considerable number of men, women, and children, reported by an important deserter to be over 10,000, whom he brought to Tokar with the intention of marching through the Bisharin country to the Kermeh-Kosseir road, thus threatening the eastern flank of Egypt, and relying on the free export of grain from Suakin to supply his requirements. His plans, however, leaked out, and the gates of Suakin were suddenly closed. The result was immediate. Osman Digna's force broke up in all directions, some going to Kassala, others to Berber, while a large number sought shelter and food under the walls of Suakin, and to relieve their wants considerable sums of money were contributed both by the Government and by private individuals.

Osman Digna is still at Tokar with a number of his emirs, but his force is merely a nominal one. A plentiful rain has produced good and abundant crops in the Tokar delta, and the state of famine in this district may also be said to be over. The emir, Ahmed Mohamed, who, it will be remembered, had established a large mart at Handub, was recalled to Omdurman some time ago, and quite recently was specially appointed emir of the whole district to the north of Handub, independent of Osman Digna. When on his way from Berber, he was suddenly taken ill at the wells of Obak, where he died. Osman Digna, therefore, still remains supreme in the Eastern Sudan.

The situation at Galabat is little changed. Friendly relations still exist between the Arabs and Abyssinian frontier tribes, in consequence of which the garrison has been considerably reduced. Some time ago, when there was a great want of food in the neighbourhood, the Khalifa instructed Zaki Tumul to despatch a force to Jebel Tabi

¹ The events, which within the space of two months from the date of writing this so entirely altered the situation, are related in the following supplement.

to raid on the people and send supplies. This force, consisting of some 2500 Jehadieh and 1500 Arabs under the emir Abd er Rasul, subjugated the tribes, sent over 1000 head of cattle to Galabat, and in November 1889 advanced to Beni Shangul in Dar Bertat, south of Fazoglu. The governor of the district was a certain Wad Tur el Guri, who had been originally placed there by General Gordon, but who joined the Mahdiists and had secured a considerable number of firearms in his various encounters. Abd er Rasul on approaching Beni Shangul demanded these arms of Tur el Guri. The latter refused, and taking up a position in some impassable hills defied Abd er Rasul for some time, but was at length obliged to flee to the Galla country, where he secured large reinforcements of horsemen, and returned to Beni Shangul only to find that Abd'er Rasul had received the Khalifa's instructions to retire to Khor Dender and to cease fighting him. Meanwhile a serious occurrence had taken place in Galabat. A certain emir named Johar, who had risen to a high position under Abu Angar, found himself greatly reduced on the arrival of Abu Angar's successor, Zaki Tumul, but being popular with the garrison he secured a following of some 4000 regulars and deserted from Galabat. The Khalifa, hearing of this, sent instructions to Abd er Rasul at Khor Dender to intercept Johar. He set off and came up with him in Dar Roseries, but 1000 of his men deserted to Johar, who was now too strong to be attacked, and he succeeded in joining Wad Mek Kumbo at Jebel Dair. The Khalifa will therefore find it more impossible than ever to subdue these hardy mountaineers now strongly reinforced. The emir Nasri, at the head of an inconsiderable force, now commands at Kassala. The position of the Italian forces with reference to this most important strategical point gave rise to a conference between the English and Italian Governments in Naples in September last. The question at issue was the occupation of Kassala by Italy, but on the representation of the British Commissioners that Egypt claimed for herself the first right to reoccupy her lost territory when occasion offered, the negotiations fell through.¹ The

¹ They have since been resumed, with the result that a line of demarcation between the spheres of interest of the two Powers has been laid down, as shown on the map.

Italians have acquired considerable influence over the Beni Amer and other tribes to the north from which they have recruited freely. These well-armed native levies are a considerable menace to the Arab force in Kassala, and it is said that some alarm prevails in that town, where recently four of the chiefs were executed for corresponding with the enemy. Senhit is held by the Italians, and Bisha, Kufit, and Khor el Basha have been occupied at various times by their levies. From all accounts the Khalifa is determined to resist any encroachment on Kassala, but his capability of offering any prolonged resistance would appear to be somewhat problematical.

The situation in Equatoria since the departure of the Emin Pasha Relief Expedition is unknown, but all the recent arrivals from the Sudan report that the Mahdist forces have been withdrawn some time ago from these districts. The Dinka and Shilluk, besides the tribes farther south, have long been in open revolt against the Arabs, whom they regard with the most intense hatred as the slave-traders who have depopulated their countries and destroyed their homes. It is more than probable that the troops left in the province after Emin Pasha's departure are still living in their stations. By this time their ammunition must be well-nigh exhausted, but there is no reason to suppose that they are on unfriendly terms with the natives of the country. Most of them, indeed, were themselves born and bred in the country, and those have, in all probability, returned to their homes and reverted to their pristine barbarism.

The various expeditions, both British and German, which are now penetrating into Central Africa, will soon disclose the state of affairs in these far-off districts, and it is by no means impossible that of the entire Sudan, the most distant provinces will be the first to return to the civilisation which was progressing so favourably before the Mahdi revolt began.

Once under European administration, the dreaded slave trade of Central Africa will receive its death-blow.

The Bahr el Ghazal is said to have been entirely forsaken by the Mahdists. There has been no communication with Omdurman for upwards of a year, though some state that the emir Karamallah's successor still maintains authority there with a small force.

Kordofan is now said to form part of the military command of the emir of Darfur—Osman Adam Ganoo. Since Abu Gemaizeh's revolt there have been constant small wars on the Borgo-Darfur frontier, in spite of the Khalifa's injunctions to refrain from hostilities with the Sultan of Borgo. In one of these conflicts it is rumoured that Osman Wad Adam was killed, and some say that the Khalifa has actually announced his death in the mosque.

The plentiful crops in the Sudan this year, and the absence of any very serious internecine warfare, coupled with the fact that the life of Mahdiism is the "Jihad," allows it to be presumed that Abdullah Taashi's forces will not long remain inactive. Moreover, the various conflicting influences at work in Omdurman are apt to give rise to a feeling of insecurity which a period of tranquillity would be likely to augment.

From what has preceded, it may be concluded that though Mahdiism as a religious movement has in a large measure lost the fanatical ardour which made it so formidable, it has, nevertheless, become a barbaric power—not, it is true, very consolidated—but at the same time of sufficient importance to necessitate due precautions being taken to check its northward progress.

Enough has already been said concerning the past administration of the Sudan under Egyptian authority, and should that country again become an integral portion of the Khedival dominions, there is no doubt that the lessons learnt during the past ten years will not be forgotten. That a new and better Sudan will be raised up over the ashes of Gordon, and all those brave officers and men who have perished in the loyal performance of their duty, is the fervent hope of every well-wisher for the prosperity of Egypt.

CAIRO, 1st January 1891.

SUPPLEMENT

THE REOCCUPATION OF TOKAR

19th February 1891.

SINCE writing the foregoing, the Tokar district has been reoccupied by the Government troops, and Osman Digna, with a small remnant of his followers, has been driven south towards Kassala.

The following is a short account of the events which led to the capture of this important and fertile district, which has been dominated for the last seven years by the tyrannical Osman Digna, and to whose cruelty and misgovernment the recent severe defeat of the Mahdists is largely due.

It will be remembered that the situation up till quite recently in the Eastern Sudan was as follows:—Handub was occupied by a band of marauders who were continually committing robberies and outrages in the vicinity of Suakin, and harassing all friendly natives bringing their supplies into that town. At Tokar Osman Digna was still supreme, and though his force had greatly diminished, he had many important emirs with him, which pointed to his intention to again collect a large force; the troops in the district were plentiful, but bitter complaints came from the local Arabs who had long since abandoned Mahdism, and who were suffering intolerably from Osman's ruthless oppression, but who were powerless to act unsupported by Government. The situation was therefore far from satisfactory; it is true a restricted trade had been opened with Suakin, but it was impossible to guarantee that supplies would not fall into Osman's hands, and thus help him towards his next hostile movement. It was known that contraband and slave trade flourished as long as Osman was in control of this district; and there was little doubt that munitions of war found their way into the Sudan through this intermediary.

It was admitted by all that the only way to put a stop to this most unsatisfactory state of affairs was to drive the enemy out of

Handub, Tamai, and the various posts in the vicinity of Suakin, and to reoccupy the Tokar district by Government; but with the experience of the previous campaigns in that neighbourhood, there was a natural hesitation on the part of the authorities to enter into operations which might lead to an extended and costly campaign; and it is probable the situation would have remained unchanged had not an event occurred which was calculated to greatly diminish the opposition with which any Government force advancing into the country would be likely to meet.

This event was the departure of Osman Digna with almost all his fighting men for the Habab country. His exact intentions were unknown, but it was believed he was proceeding on a tax-collecting expedition, and would probably be absent some weeks.

The Governor-General of Suakin, Colonel Holled-Smith, then conceived the idea of capturing Tokar by a *coup-de-main* during Osman's absence—it being the general impression that the Tokar Delta once held by the Government troops, the loyal support of all the surrounding tribes for a considerable distance would be obtained, and they would vigorously oppose any attempt of the dervishes to regain possession of the country; and this would be rendered still more difficult if Government held the only place in the neighbourhood in which there was a plentiful supply of food.

Such were the arguments advanced when Colonel Holled-Smith, on January 15th, telegraphed urging for permission to carry out his proposal.

Before definitely undertaking an expedition of this description, it was necessary to weigh the matter carefully: numerous telegraphic despatches passed between Suakin and Cairo, and for some days no decision was given.¹

In the meantime the post at Handub was proving more and more troublesome, constant raids were attempted in the vicinity of Suakin, and several outrages were committed on the friendly Arabs. Consequently, on January 26th, the Egyptian Cavalry under Captain Beech, C.M.G., were directed to proceed towards Handub, and succeeded in capturing a party of forty-two marauders; but no sooner had they returned to Suakin than information arrived that some horse and foot men were raiding a herd of cattle grazing outside the forts. The cavalry and native "kheyala" (horsemen) at once started in pursuit, recaptured the cattle, and pursued the enemy into Handub, inflicting some loss on them, while the cavalry lost one man killed and one wounded; they then returned to

¹ At this time General Sir F. Grenfell was accompanying His Highness the Khedive in an inspection of the Frontier Province, but returned to Cairo as soon as possible to consider the Tokar proposition. It may not be here out of place to remark that the effect of His Highness's visit on the inhabitants of the frontier has been most beneficial, and the unbounded enthusiasm by which he was received was undoubted evidence of the change that has come over these districts since the expulsion of Nejumi's force in 1889.

Suakin. Shortly afterwards another party of horse and foot men with banners was seen about 5000 yards from the forts. This defiant attitude of the marauders decided Colonel Holled-Smith to advance with a force to Handub and disperse them. Accordingly he set out the following morning, the cavalry in front, followed by the 11th Sudanese battalion, while the 12th Sudanese followed some distance behind as reserve. A party of the enemy was seen gradually falling back, and on the approach of the troops, it was found that Handub was occupied as well as the hills on the left of the advance, where banners were flying and the noggara was being beaten. The 11th Battalion, under Captain Macdonald, D.S.O., now advanced towards the centre of Handub, while the cavalry were directed to move round the north hill and cut off the enemy's retreat; this turning movement was timed with accuracy, and, as the enemy retired before the infantry, the cavalry fell on them with crushing effect, accounting for over forty of them and their principal emir Raga; the remainder escaped into the hills, and Handub was occupied without further opposition. The *beit el mal*, a stone building, and conveniently situated, was rapidly converted into a strong blockhouse capable of holding fifty men, a strong zariba was made around it, and it was temporarily occupied by the 11th Battalion, while the remainder of the troops returned to Suakin.

The capture of this dervish stronghold, which had been for long a source of intense annoyance to Suakin, gave universal satisfaction, while the neighbouring tribes were now free to bring in their supplies.

The occupants of Handub had made use of the rails of the old Suakin-Berber railway to construct their dwellings.

The mosque was an iron building composed entirely of rails and fish-plates artfully interlaced, and affording considerable protection.

On January 31st, Lieutenant Cotton, with ten native horsemen, thirty friendly Arabs, and twenty-five Suakin police (Arabs), proceeded by sea to Sheikh Barud, and marched thence to Darrur, where a well-known Mahdiist and slave-dealer named Omar Lahai, with a small party, was collecting taxes. The house in which Lahai was living was surrounded, and he and his men captured without resistance.

Lieutenant Cotton then proceeded to Fejir and thence to Raweiya, where he arrived on the afternoon of February 1st, and disembarking his men at once went in search of a party of tax-collecting Mahdiists under the emir Mohammed Taher el Amin. He came up with these about six miles from Raweiya, just as they were making for the hills, and, after a slight resistance, captured the emir and sixteen of his men.

On February 2d, a party of friendly Arabs advanced to Tamai,

where it was known there was a post of some fifty of the enemy with the Sherif Gabba. The friendlies attacked the post, and succeeded in capturing Gabba and most of his men.

These sudden and successful blows seriously affected the cause of Mahdism in the immediate neighbourhood of Suakin, and the result on the relations of the Government with the surrounding tribes was soon apparent; supplies poured freely into Suakin, and the sheikhs announced their delight at the expulsion of the dervishes; but it was useless to expect any permanent tranquillity in the country whilst the fertile district of Tokar remained in the hands of the Mahdists. The question of an expedition was still pending, but it was not until the 8th February that the Governor-General was informed that his proposal was sanctioned. The force was to consist of at least 1500 infantry, 100 cavalry, 2 field and 2 mountain guns, while relief battalions were ordered from Cairo and from Assuan to aid in garrisoning Suakin and supplying reinforcements if necessary. No time was lost in pushing forward the troops by sea, and on February 11th, Trinkitat was occupied by the 4th Egyptian battalion and the 11th Sudanese. Colonel Holled-Smith and his staff followed on the 13th, and on the next day the cavalry, 12th Sudanese battalion, and one company of the 1st Egyptian battalion, reached Trinkitat. Considerable supplies were brought from Suakin, and all preparations made for an early advance on Tokar.¹

A force of some 500 friendly Arabs had also been raised at Suakin, and were placed under the direction of Mr. Wylde (the consul), who was instructed to proceed by land towards Temeren, and, keeping himself informed of the movements of the Egyptian force, he was to be prepared to intercept the retreat of the enemy.

Meanwhile information was received from deserters from Osman Digna's village of Afafit, who arrived at Trinkitat on the 14th, that Osman had returned with his force from the Habab country a few days previously, and learning of the capture of Handub and Tamai, he had left Afafit for the north with a force of 100 horsemen, 1800 sword and spear men, and 100 Sudanese armed with rifles. It was his intention to raise the tribes on the road and retake Handub; he had reached Taroi on the 13th, and would probably attack Handub on the 15th; he had left Wad Esh Sheikh Taher Magzub as emir of Afafit with a force of 500 men, 350 of whom were *Aghrab*, with a few horsemen and some *Jehadie*h. The accuracy of this news was doubted, but at midnight on the 14th a party of the enemy's horsemen raided on a settlement of friendly Arabs near

¹ The latter and the remainder of the 1st battalion, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Settle, R.E., and other officers of the Egyptian Staff, arrived at Suakin on the 14th from Cairo. Three companies were disembarked to serve as garrison of Suakin, under the command of Captain Coles, D.S.O. (East Kent Regiment), and the remainder disembarked at Trinkitat on the morning of the 15th.

Suakin, killing three and wounding seven women ; there was therefore little doubt that a force was not far distant, and in consequence Mr. Wylde's friendly Arabs proceeded to reinforce Handub.¹ The intentions and movements of Osman were further confirmed by two deserters who had escaped from his force at Tamai, and who stated that Osman Naib had been in command of the raiding party sent to obtain supplies of cattle for the force intended to attack Handub.

Later on in the day (15th inst.) two other deserters from the enemy arrived at Suakin, stating that Osman had just received a letter from Magzub at Afait, informing him of the arrival of a force at Trinkitat in steamers, consisting of thousands of English and Egyptian soldiers, but that the latter were all fastened together by iron bands so that they could not escape ; however, Magzub begged Osman to return at once with his force to fight the infidels and unbelievers ; Osman had therefore given up the idea of attacking Handub, and was returning by forced marches to Afait, *via* Taroi and Setirab.²

Meanwhile all preparations for the advance to the Wells of El Teb were completed by the evening of the 15th, and no further news of the enemy's movements having reached Trinkitat that day, it was decided that the force should start early the following morning, leaving one company of the 1st Battalion as garrison of Trinkitat. Accordingly, at 8 A.M. on the morning of the 16th, the force left Trinkitat, marching in the following order :—Cavalry ; 11th Battalion ; 4th Battalion ; 12th Battalion ; Medical Corps, and Regimental Transport.³

¹ Handub was at this time occupied by a small body of native police who had replaced the troops withdrawn for the expedition to Tokar.

² It will be noted that this information was received at Suakin on 15th, but did not reach the expeditionary force until two days later.

³ The following were the composition and numbers of the Eastern Sudan Field Force :—

Commanding—Colonel Holled-Smith, King's Royal Rifles.
 Chief of Staff—Lieut.-Colonel Settle, R.E.
 A.A.G. for Intelligence—Major Wingate, D.S.O., R.A.
 Staff Officer—Captain Barrow (South Lancashire Regiment).
 " —Lieutenant Curtis, R.E.
 Senior Medical Officer—Surgeon Myles (Medical Staff).
 D.A.A.G. Line of Communications—Captain Machell (Essex Regiment).
 D.G. Base of Communications—Major Mukhtar Effendi.
 Commissariat Officer—Lieutenant Fuad Effendi.
 Senior Naval Officer—Commander Dudding, R.N. (*H.M.S. Dolphin*).
 Naval A.D.C.—Lieutenant Craddock, R.N. (*H.M.S. Dolphin*).
 Arabic Secretary—Milhem Shakur Bey.

TROOPS.

Cavalry—Two Troops under Captain Beech, C.M.G. (20th Hussars).
 Artillery—59 Men, 2 Field and 2 Mountain Guns, under Lieutenant Pullen, R.A.
 Infantry—4th Egyptian Battalion, under Captain Hacket Pain, R.W. Surrey Regiment. Second in Command—Captain Sidney (Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry).
 Infantry—11th Sudanese Battalion, under Captain Macdonald, D.S.O. (Gordon

For the first five miles the march was over very heavy sand, and the morning being unusually close and oppressive, frequent halts were necessary.

The route lay along an extensive bend of Trinkitat harbour, at the extreme south end of which it was intended to form a water depot, thus saving a considerable detour and lessening the strain on the transport. The baggage columns halted at this spot at noon, and with an escort of artillery and two guns under Lieutenant Pullen, were soon entrenched. The advance was now continued in a somewhat different formation; the cavalry, upwards of a mile in front, screening the centre and left of the advance. The infantry advance was led by the 11th Battalion, followed by the 4th in *echelon* 100 yards to the left, while the 12th followed directly in rear of the 11th and 100 yards to the right rear of the 4th, then the Medical Corps, and in the rear of them a small column of camels and mules carrying water and ammunition. The Arab horsemen acted as guides. The line of advance lay over the site of the late General Baker's action on February 14th, 1884, of which there was still ample evidence in the heaps and whitened bones scattered over the plain.

It was thought that Teb might be held by the enemy, but only a few horsemen were seen retiring in the distance, and the cavalry reporting Teb to be unoccupied, the troops marched in at 3 P.M. A bivouac in square was marked out in the open ground to the south of the wells, which were found to be filled up, but were soon opened by the native well-diggers accompanying the force. The transport camels arrived later in the afternoon from the water depot (which was now designated as "Fort Dolphin") and returned to Trinkitat to bring up some supplies. Every precaution was taken to guard against surprise at night, and as there was no further news of the enemy's movements, Arab spies were sent out in the direction of Tokar. In the meantime the former news concerning Osman's movements was further confirmed at Suakin, and messages

Highlanders). Second in Command—Lieutenant Jackson (Gordon Highlanders); and Lieutenant Cotton (Shropshire Light Infantry), and Lieutenant Duplat Taylor (Grenadier Guards).

Infantry—12th Sudanese Battalion, under Captain Besant (Norfolk Regiment); and Second in Command—Captain Martyr (Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry).

Medical Corps—Surgeon Graham (Medical Staff).

Also details of Engineer, Commissariat, Ordnance, and Veterinary Departments. In all—18 English Officers, 57 Native Officers, 6 English Non-Commissioned Officers, 1855 Non-Commissioned Officers and Men, 55 Civilians (including Interpreters), 12 Arab Horsemen of the Suakin Police, 40 Footmen, 150 Camel Drivers, 150 Horses, 45 Mules, 50 Donkeys, 200 Camels, and 5 Guns (including 1 Maxim Gun).

The following officers subsequently joined the force at Teb on 17th inst.—

A. A. G. Lieut.-Colonel Rundle, D.S.O., R.A.

Assistant to O.C. Lines of Communication—Captain Palmer (Somerset Light Infantry).

Veterinary Surgeon Griffith and Major Ramzi Effendi.

were sent to Mr. Wylde instructing him to push on with the friendly Arabs as rapidly as possible, and open communication between Suakin and the expeditionary force.

During the night a party of some thirty men, Shaggiehs, and women gave themselves up at Fort Dolphin, reporting that they had just escaped from Afaft, which they described as a large village about four miles south-east of the ruined mamurieh of Tokar; it was known that the latter place had not been occupied by the enemy since 1884. These deserters stated that they had heard Osman was on his way back from Handub, but they did not know if he had arrived at Afaft; they further stated that a party of the enemy's horsemen was at Wadait, a few miles south of Teb, and the Arab scouts returning on the morning of the 17th reported that the road in that direction was blocked by eleven horsemen.

A redoubt was now constructed overlooking the wells of Teb, supplies were rapidly thrown in from Trinkitat and Fort Dolphin; the artillery garrison at this latter place, under Lieutenant Pullen, R.A., being sent on to garrison the Teb redoubt, and being replaced by a detachment of the 1st Battalion.

It was intended to advance from Teb on the morning of the 18th, but owing to a blinding sandstorm, which lasted several hours, the march was postponed.

The same morning one of the enemy's spies was captured by the Arab horse police; it transpired that he had quitted Afaft the same morning with orders from Osman to bring him accurate news of the movements of the advancing force; he stated that Osman had returned to Afaft on Monday morning (16th), and had at once executed Wahaj (Wag) Hassan and two other important sheikhs whom he suspected of wishing to desert. He had brought back reinforcements with him from the north, and had beaten the noggara continuously since his arrival; death was threatened to any one who refused to obey the summons to arms. On Tuesday he had moved to a camp outside Afaft with the whole force, consisting of several thousand men, but of these the greater number were local Arabs who did not wish to fight, but whom Osman had forced into joining his standards; some of Osman's emirs, including Osman Naib and Mussa Fiki, were still out in the districts collecting men, and all the tax-gathering posts had been recalled to increase the numbers of the fighting force; every day numbers of willing and unwilling men joined Osman's force, bivouacked between two high sandhills known as Shababit, not far from the village of Kurbajit, and about two miles south-east of old Tokar ruins; it was Osman's intention to await the advance of the troops through the thick bush which they must traverse, and then fall on them on the flank when they were tired after a long and difficult march.


This information, coupled with the fact that the wells at Tokar




were known to have been filled up for years, and would have taken a long time to dig out, decided Colonel Holled-Smith to advance direct on Afait at dawn on the following morning (19th inst.), halting at Tokar, where he would leave the ammunition and water columns, and thus be prepared to meet the enemy unhampered by camels and mules.

Accordingly at dawn on 19th the force, consisting of 81 officers, 1762 non-commissioned officers and men, 149 horses, 36 mules, and 83 camels, marched out from Teb, where a garrison of 60 artillerymen, half-company of 12th Battalion, and 2 guns was left under the command of Lieutenant Pullen.

The troops advanced in the following formation :—The cavalry about a mile in advance screening the front, both flanks, and left rear. The infantry were disposed as in the diagrams.



Should the troops be attacked on the march, the companies would wheel into position as under :—



It was known that the bush on the left was considerably thicker than on the right, consequently the march was directed in a south-westerly direction until Tokar and the sandhills were visible, and when these two points were in line it was decided that the direction should be changed and the column marched straight on Tokar.

The cavalry in front drove in some of the enemy's mounted scouts, and at 9.20 A.M. the ruined mamurieh of Tokar was sighted ;

some of the enemy's scouts were also reported retiring to the left rear. The left cavalry flanking party then pushed on and occupied the ruins, followed by the troops, who arrived at the north-east end of the village at 10 A.M. In the meantime the right flanking parties of the cavalry, swinging round to the south, discovered the enemy in force in the thick bush between Tokar and the sandhills.

The mamurieh and village of Tokar, formerly a thriving settlement built of mud bricks, and standing in the midst of gardens, was found to be now a veritable ruin; a few walls only left standing; the roofs had long since fallen in, and the whole presented the appearance of a succession of rubbish and sand heaps, rising slightly above the level of unusually dense bush, which grew almost up to the dilapidated walls. The trace of the mamurieh was quite lost, being indicated merely by a few ruined walls outlying the village.

Colonel Holled-Smith, with Colonel Settle and the staff, now rapidly rode round the position, which, owing to its extent and irregularity, presented a difficult one for defence; it was clear that the enemy were rapidly advancing, their presence being shown by an occasional glimpse of moving men, while in a semicircle masses of banners waving over the thick bush showed that their advanced parties were not more than a few hundred yards distant, and the sandhills in rear could be seen covered with men and flags.


There was now no time to be lost. The troops, moving at the double, took up position as follows:—The 4th Battalion lined the ruined buildings on the right, the 11th occupied the left of the position, while the 12th had previously moved up to cover the left of the 4th Battalion. In this manner a semicircular and connected line of defence was made; but the nature of the position rendered it impossible to effectively protect the rear in which the transport camels and mules had been collected, while the cavalry was drawn up close to them. Almost before the troops were in position, the enemy was within fifty yards of them, and Captain Martyr, with a company of the 12th Battalion, dashed forward and seized a ruined building outlying the general line of defence, thus momentarily checking the rush and accounting for a considerable number of the enemy within a few feet of the walls; this company then slowly fell back into the general line.

Meanwhile firing had begun along the whole line as the enemy was seen to be rapidly advancing and gradually enveloping the position, whilst their horsemen, dashing round the right flank, threatened the rear. Here the camels, deserted by their Arab drivers, had begun to stampede. Some were driven back by officers of the staff, but the enemy's horsemen seeing the weak point attempted to dash in. A few of them actually succeeded in breaking through, but were instantly killed, one of their principal emirs being shot with a revolver by Captain Machell within the position.

ACTION OF AFAFIT

19. 2. 91.

N.B. All houses were in ruins.





The situation at this moment was critical, for it was clear the enemy was attempting to get round both flanks, but the 11th Battalion bringing up its reserve company checked the left turning movement. The whole battalion then changed to its front through the outlying ruins, driving back the enemy at the point of the bayonet, clearing the left front and occupying some rising ground about 500 yards in front of its original position. During this advance Captain Barrow, while gallantly performing his duties, was shot dead through the body. The battalion lost 8 men and 29 wounded, and Captain Macdonald and Lieutenant Jackson had their horses shot under them. Meanwhile the 12th Battalion was steadily beating back the enemy, who, with the greatest determination, were charging against the centre of the position, and the 4th Battalion by steady volleys checked the turning movement on the right.

The enemy could now be observed retreating rapidly towards the south, crushed and broken, and Colonel Holled-Smith, seeing that the favourable moment had arrived, ordered the cavalry to charge and clear the right front, which they succeeded in doing after some hand-to-hand fighting, in which Captain Beech was wounded while saving the life of an Egyptian officer who had been attacked by three of the enemy and severely wounded. Captain Beech, galloping forward, killed one of the assailants with a sword cut, and being set upon and almost dragged off his horse by the other two shortened his sword and drove it into the heart of the one who had closed with him, while the other, seeing his companion fall, made off but was despatched by the cavalry.

The 4th and 12th Battalions now advanced from the position, and clearing the bush joined the 11th Battalion on the rising ground. Here all the troops halted for a rest prior to advancing on Afait. The high sandhills about a mile distant were still occupied by the enemy, and it was thought a second stand might be made. The troops were, therefore, formed up in square, and preceded by the cavalry resumed the march south, leaving the hills to the left, while the wounded, of whom there were 47, and the transport were left at Tokar, which was held by three companies under the command of Lieut.-Colonel Rundle.

As the force advanced the enemy disappeared from the hills, from the top of which the cavalry obtained a view of the enormous village of Afait some two miles beyond, in front of which lay Osman's camp. It was reported by prisoners that a stand would be made in the village, and in consequence the square moved cautiously to the north-east, while the cavalry moved round to the right front. If it was found that the village was occupied it was the intention to fire it while the cavalry cut off the retreat; but as the square approached numbers of inhabitants poured out

begging for the *aman* or pardon, saying that the remnant of the defeated army had fled towards Temeren with Osman two hours previously, and that all those now in the village were friendlies.

The troops were then halted outside the village, and at 4 P.M. Colonel Holled-Smith and the staff rode in, being welcomed by numbers of the inhabitants, who expressed their loyalty to Government and delight at their release from the tyranny of Osman.

The troops now moved in and occupied the north-east end of the village, the transport and wounded arriving from Tokar the same evening, while Osman Digna's tents were utilised to form a hospital.¹

The total Egyptian losses were in all 10 killed and 48 wounded.² Upwards of fifty of the enemy's standards were captured, and a large number of arms of all sorts.

A curious coincidence may be noted that Tokar was recaptured and the Egyptian flag hoisted over the ruined government building on the anniversary of its fall seven years before.

The following account of the action, given by two of Osman's followers, is of interest, written in Arabic by two Bashi-Bazuk officers who were obliged to join Osman Digna's attacking force:—

"Osman Digna returned to Afait from Handub on Monday the 16th February, and learning of the advance of the Government troops to Tokar, he at once made all preparations to defeat them on the same day. He executed Wag Hassan and two other sheikhs, as he suspected them of wishing to desert. He also sent spies in various direction to get news of the movements of the troops, and sent patrols at night as far as the wells of Abdullah Arei³ to stay there till the morning.

"He ordered the noggaras to be beaten without stopping, so as to gather all men to fight.

"On Tuesday afternoon he marked out a camp for the whole force outside the village of Afait, and ordered all the men in the village to stay out there, leaving only the women, children, and sick people in the village. The market was transferred out to the camp, and the women had to bring out the water, while the horsemen prevented any of the men from returning to the village. He pitched tents for himself and his principal emirs.

"Having heard from his spies that the troops had arrived at the wells of Teb, he ordered a party of 200 men armed with Remington rifles and five rounds of ammunition and forty horsemen under the emir Haj Yakub Mohammed to proceed to Teb, and to conceal themselves in the bush near. A few of them were then to advance and fire at the troops, who would probably follow, then

¹ These tents had been captured from Baker's force in 1884.

² Of these two died the following day.

³ These wells are about two miles south-east of Tokar.

they were to retreat and draw the troops into the ambush where they would be surprised and attacked by the rest. This force returned early on Thursday morning, and reported that they went close to Teb, but finding the troops in a good position and quite prepared, the horses being all saddled up, they did not dare to carry out the stratagem, and so retired.

"Osman Digna had also sent two camelmen the day before to get news, and only one of them returned.¹

"Very early on Thursday morning another man was sent on a dromedary to find out where the troops were, and he returned about eight o'clock in the morning, saying that the troops were advancing towards the old mamurieh of Tokar.

"Osman Digna was, from the early morning, encouraging his men to fight, telling them that God had put all the Egyptian force into his hands, and that those who fought in the Jihad would gain great rewards.

"Osman on his way back from Handub had collected all his other posts and brought them with him, so that the dervish force consisted of about 7000, but of these there were not more than 700 to 800 Aghrab, while the rest were local Arabs such as Artega, Gemilab, Shayab, Nurab, Hassanab, Ashraf, Shagalai, Dignai, Khaseh, etc. Of these latter many were opposed to Mahdiyyism in their hearts, for Osman's cruelty was very great, and most of them had suffered and become very poor; but as long as he was amongst them they could do nothing. He had taken away all courage from them, taxed them unjustly, and plundered their cattle; many of them had been executed; some of them had hands and feet cut off, and had suffered the greatest tyranny at his hands. These people longed to see the Government return to the country, and Osman knew that he could not depend on them. That is why he forced many of them into the front of the attack, so that his Arabs and horsemen might kill them if they attempted to run away.

"Amongst the local Arabs there were also a certain number who had always been with Osman, and many of his relations and connections. These were all Mahdiyyists at heart and ready to fight to the end.

"Besides the above there were a number of Government prisoners like ourselves, also merchants and officials of all sorts. The whole force was divided equally into four divisions. Each division a certain number of Aghrab and local Arabs. The first division commanded by the emir Shaib Ahmed on the left; second division commanded by the emir Hamad en Nil on his right; third division commanded by emir Mohammed Ahmed on his right; fourth division commanded by emir Ahmed Bedawi Abu Safia on his right.

¹ The other was captured at Teb, and gave important information concerning Osman Digna's intentions.

Each of the above divisions included a number of important emirs. About 600 men had rifles, while the rest were armed with swords and spears. There were also 120 horsemen under the emir Osman Naib.

"When the news reached Osman that the troops were advancing he ordered the whole of his force to march forward in the above order, while he himself with a bodyguard of about 200 men remained near the tents. It was said that he wished to join in the fight, but his emirs dissuaded him. His orders were to advance as rapidly as possible to the old mamurieh (Tokar) ruins, and thus fall on the troops as they were advancing through the thick bush, and when they would be tired after a long march.

"The force advanced rapidly in the above formation, a few cavalry on the flanks but most in rear, and when the Government troops were seen on the ruins, the dervish riflemen of each division formed a skirmishing line in front, and pressed on quickly so as to gain the outlying buildings. Some of them succeeded in hiding themselves behind the walls and began to fire. The division of emir Shaib Ahmed was the first to attack on the left, and his men advanced in front of the others and tried to get round the right flank of the troops, while Ahmed Bedawi and his men attacked the left of the position, and the two other divisions pressed on towards the centre. Some of the horsemen came round to the left, intending to get in rear of the troops, who were by this time all in position amongst the ruins. The battle raged very fiercely, and the bullets came amongst us like hail. Still those who were real Mahdists pressed on, while all the local Arabs who could, and men like ourselves, tried to hide among the thick bushes, and numbers remained on the sandhills. Some of the horsemen from behind tried to drive us forward, but we tried to escape from them. Then the emir Shaib passed us badly wounded, flying back towards Afait, then others, and soon we realised that the Government troops were victorious, and we all began to retreat. Many remained on the high sandhills, not knowing what to do, wishing to surrender, and yet fearing to be attacked. At length we could see the Government troops halted on a hill some distance in front of the mamurieh, and then all firing ceased. After a time one shot was fired at us, and fearing an attack we all retreated towards the village, and changed our clothes and busied ourselves with our ordinary work. As soon as the first men came retreating back towards Afait, Osman, learning that the battle had been lost, mounted his horse and rode off with his mulazimin towards Temeren. He did not even halt in the village but passed rapidly through. Many followed him, but stayed to take some of their women and children from the village and then continued their flight. Wad Taher Magzub, on reaching Osman's tents and finding he had gone, again beat the

noggara to rally the people, but no one took any notice of it, and he too was obliged to fly, but he was one of the last to leave the village, and only did so as the Government troops marched on. All merchants and Government officials who had been watching the fight from the hills came back before the troops arrived, and then came to welcome them and thank them for delivering them from Osman. Many of the local Arabs also came back to the village, but others were frightened and scattered into the neighbouring hills, and did not return till the next day.

"All are greatly rejoiced to be free from the tyranny and cruelty of Osman. There were over 700 of the dervish force killed, including 17 of the principal emirs, viz.—

"Osman en Naib-Dongolawi, commander of dervish horsemen.

"Hamad Mohammed el Kheir-Dongolawi, the emir Abu Girgeh's wakil.

"Mussa Fiki (Arteg).

"Mohammed Wad Fanna (Dongolawi).

"El Khadr Ali (Hassanabi).

"Dafallah Wad Khandakawi (Dongolawi).

"Fadl Wad Abdullah (Mahassi).

"Hassan Wad el Kindi (Jaali).

"Esh Sherif Abu Sukra (Dongolawi).

"Esh Sherif Osman (Baggari).

"El Hag Fadlallah (Jaali).

"Idris Wad Fanna (Dongolawi).

"Esh Sherif Ali (Baggari).

"Osman Esh Shaib (Dongolawi).

"Osman Mohammed Ali (Dongolawi).

"Ibrahim Affad (Dongolawi).

"Karamallah (Dongolawi).

"About 400 men and twice that number of women and children escaped with Osman, but many left him from Temeren, and came back to Afafit."

The sketch opposite page 499 shows the immense size of the village of Afafit, which has a circumference of about four miles, and in which there cannot be less than 6000 tokuls. The tokul is a round hut about 10 feet in diameter, the walls are formed by branches of wood, the interstices being filled up with dhurra stalks, while the inside is generally plastered with mud; the roof is a conical structure of branches thatched with straw, forming a completely wind- and rain-proof dwelling. An emir has a larger tokul than the rest, and generally incloses his own and the tokuls of his immediate followers within a strong and high zariba. In addition to these huts, some thirty strong mud-built houses were scattered in various parts of the village; these were, for the most part, the houses of merchants—a number of whom had been retained in

Afaft against their will by Osman. The *beit el mal* is also a strongly-built mud-brick building. Here all money, stores of grain, etc., collected by Osman, were housed; but it was found to be practically empty, Osman having previously sent off most of his valuables in anticipation.

A word of explanation as to Osman's system of administering his country may be of interest: the original owners of the soil were permitted to cultivate, but were obliged to pay one-tenth of the produce as ordinary tax, $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent "*zeka*," or alms for the poor, half of what remained being then handed over to the *beit el mal*, while the remainder went to the cultivator—and it was generally found that this amounted to practically nothing—the money collected in the *beit el mal* was transmitted periodically to the Khalifa's treasury in Omdurman.

Osman's system of justice was of a very summary nature; small theft he punished by the loss of the left hand, which is cut off by the principal butcher in the market-place; serious theft involved the loss of the right hand and left foot, any more serious crime was generally punished by hanging. A large scaffold was erected in the market-place, where, two days before the fight, three important sheikhs had been executed for suspected leaning to the Government. The mode of execution is primitive, and is practically strangulation, the victim being hauled off the ground and left suspended until life is extinct. A visit to the market-place, strewn with human bones, amply proved the severity of Osman's rule, while the number of handless and footless men in the village was a living testimony of his tyrannical brutality.

The mosque was merely a large rectangular space, inclosed on three sides by a rough wooden structure supporting a thatched roof, to the east a small inclosed space represented the "*mihrab*," marking the direction of Mecca, and in which Osman directed the prayers of the congregation. Close by hung numbers of *nog-garas*, the beating of which constituted either the call to arms or the call to prayers. Near the mosque is the tomb of sheikh Taher Magzub, who died upwards of a year ago. He was formerly the tutor of Mohammed Ahmed, the late Mahdi. Since his death he has been venerated as a saint, and frequent pilgrimages were made to his tomb, while his place as *aamil* was taken by his son, who succeeded in escaping with Osman after the fight, though severely wounded.

Osman Digna's house differed little from the others—merely a collection of tokuls, more numerous than those of other emirs because his harem was more extensive; in his quarters, as in those of the other emirs, quantities of curious articles of Sudanese furniture were found.

In the outskirts of the villages are numbers of gardens in

which vegetables of all sorts are grown; cotton also flourishes in this fertile soil, which is annually brought down by the Baraka floods.

The Tokar district may be not inaptly compared to the delta of the Nile, though of course on a very much smaller scale. For some nine months the Baraka, which rises in the hill country on the Abyssinian frontier, is dry, but about the middle of July it becomes a large river, in parts some hundred yards broad and several deep. At Temeren, 15 miles south of Afait, it is diverted into several smaller channels and inundates the whole country almost to the sea, covering the land with the same rich alluvial soil that the Blue Nile brings down to Egypt. The country does not remain continuously under water for these three months; after a freshet the water quickly runs off to the sea, and the land dries for three or four days until the next freshet, and so on till the flood season is over about the end of September. Immediately after these inundations the dhurra is planted, and somewhat later the dukhn, a hardy sort of maize. It is estimated that the cultivable area of the Tokar delta cannot be less than 300,000 acres, and that of an unusually rich and fertile soil.

On the morning of February 20th the cavalry reconnoitred in the direction of Temeren, and took a few prisoners, who reported that Osman, accompanied by about 300 followers and twice that number of women and children, had passed through Temeren, and was travelling fast in the direction of Kassala; almost all the local Arabs had deserted him and were coming in to submit. Later in the day the force of friendly Arabs under Mr. Wylde arrived, having followed Osman Digna's tracks from Handub—they had heard of the victory, but were too far away to cut off the retreat.

Communication by land was now opened with Suakin, and the country becoming rapidly pacified many important sheikhs arrived at Afait to express devotion to the Government and delight at the expulsion of Osman and his followers. Arrangements to at once establish a civil government were made, and instructions were sent to Abud Bey, the mamur of Akik, to capture the Mahdiist post at Adobana, which had long been one of Osman's principal slave-trading and contraband marts.

On the 23d General Sir F. Grenfell, Sirdar, arrived at Afait,¹ and on the following day reviewed the troops, congratulating them on the recent victory, and acknowledging the valuable services rendered by the officers and men of the Royal Navy in connection with the disembarkation and subsequent operations of the force. Proclamations were sent out to the various important tribes, announcing the reoccupation of the district and the intention of the Government to

¹ The sirdar was accompanied by Colonel Lane, A.D.C., Captain Custance, R.N., Commander Dudding, R.N., Major Maxwell, D.S.O., and Lieut. Phillimore, R.N.

re-establish its authority in the country; at the same time calling the principal sheikhs to a meeting at Suakin at an early date.

On the 25th the Sirdar and Governor-General and staff proceeded by route march to Akik, distant some forty miles; on arrival there it was found that the Mahdiist *beit el mal* at Adobana had been secured by Abud Bey, as well as eleven Massawa merchants with contraband and thirty-seven camels, which Osman had sent to transport their goods to Afafit. A few days later a celebrated slave-dealer and a number of slaves were captured in the same neighbourhood on their way to Taklai. The Sirdar and party returned to Afafit the following day, and after interviewing the sheikh of the Gemilab and a number of important natives who had tendered their submission, he proceeded with the cavalry to Temeren on the 28th, returning on the 29th.

On the 2d March the Eastern Sudan Field Force was broken up and the garrisons of Afafit, Teb, and Trinkitat were formed into a sub-district designated the Tokar sub-district, with headquarters at Afafit.

On this date Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins arrived at Afafit,¹ returning to Trinkitat the following day.

On the 3d General Grenfell and Colonel Holled-Smith,² with an escort of cavalry and friendly Arabs, left Afafit for Suakin, travelling *via* Setirab, Tamai, Tamanib, Sinkat, and the Khor Abent. After a severe march through wild and mountainous country, this party arrived at Suakin on 7th, having found the districts entirely clear of the enemy. This locality had not been visited since 1884; the fort at Sinkat was still standing, but the mamurieh had fallen into ruins; throughout the entire route the tribes showed a most friendly disposition, and were rejoiced at the re-establishment of a settled form of government after the oppression they had suffered at the hands of Osman.

On the 8th March a meeting took place at Suakin of all important sheikhs of the neighbourhood, at which General Grenfell proclaimed, in the name of His Highness the Khedive, a general amnesty. This was received by the assembled sheikhs with every expression of loyalty and assurances that they would not permit Osman Digna to re-enter their country. On the following day General Grenfell returned to Cairo.

The acquisition of the important Tokar district by the Egyptian Government must prove one of the severest blows ever dealt to the cause of Mahdism; the fertility of the country rendered it a most

¹ Admiral Hoskins was accompanied by Captains Bruce and Tillard, R.N., and Lieutenants Mark Kerr, R.N., and Osmaston, R.M.A.

² The following officers accompanied the Sirdar, viz.—Lieut.-Colonel Settle, Surgeon-Major Rogers, D.S.O.; Colonel Lane, A.D.C.; Colonel Colville, C.B.; Major Maxwell, D.S.O.; Lieutenant Frederick, A.D.C.; Second Lieutenant Wood; Messrs. Brooke, Wylde, and Shakur Bey.

valuable possession to Osman, and the accounts taken in the Beit el Mal show how largely the Khalifa's treasury at Omdurman was benefited by the extensive traffic in contraband and slaves which has been going on for the last seven years.

The annexed map is the last of the series of the "spread of revolt" maps, and shows how circumscribed the power of Mahdism has now become. The prestige of the movement being gone, it seems unlikely that the province will ever be assailed in force by the dervishes, or even that it will ever be again visited by them.

EXTRACTS FROM OSMAN DIGNA'S CORRESPONDENCE, CAPTURED
AT AFAFIT ON THE 19TH FEBRUARY 1891.

Amongst the mass of correspondence captured after the recent action, the following few extracts are of some historical interest as showing the rise and progress of Mahdism from Osman Digna's own point of view.

The majority of these letters were found in the house of the civil governor of Afafit, Wad Taher Magzub, by whom it is said a compilation was being prepared in book form, for record in the Khalifate archives at Omdurman, but unfortunately a large portion of this book was found to be missing, notably that part relating to the British campaigns in 1885, and subsequent operations in the neighbourhood of Suakin.

The captured book begins with a letter addressed to Mohammed Ahmed, the Mahdi, at Omdurman, in which Osman Digna says:—

"After saying farewell to you, I proceeded to the Bisharin Arabs, to whom I delivered your letters; but as my aim was to arrive speedily at Suakin, I contented myself with sending proclamations to the more distant tribes and delivering the *Beia*¹ only to those Arabs through whose country I actually passed.

"After quitting the Bisharin country, I came to the Mussayab Arabs at Ariab, and delivered your letters to them; their head sheikh, Fiki Ahmed Adam el Kulhayabi, was the first to join Mahdism. He is a good man, and became a Mahdist heart and soul; he is still with me, and has proved himself one of my best emirs.

"From Ariab I came to Kokreb, where I gave the *Beia* to the various branches of the Hadendowa tribe, and proceeded thence towards the mamurieh of Sinkat, which is a day and a night's march distant from Suakin to the west. When I approached close to the mamurieh I sent your letters to the Morghani Khalifas and to the Hadendowa and Amarar sheikhs who were there, by the hands of Onur Dishada and his brother Taha, whom you sent to

¹ The Mahdi Creed.

assist me. These two brothers were afterwards killed at the battle of Kabab, which I shall describe further on.

"On entering the mamurieh they delivered the letters to the Khalifa es Safi, Khalifa Abdullah, and Mohammed Osman Sir El Khattam, and they asked the latter for his advice; he replied that they must deliver the letters to the Turks, which they did.

"I myself proceeded to Erkowit, where my people live, and some six hours' march from the mamurieh. I gave them the *Beia*, as well as all the Arabs. Sheikh el Haj Hassan Bishara was greatly pleased on reading your letter, and he and all his men at once joined Mahdiyyism; this sheikh is now with me, and giving me every possible assistance.

"I then went to see Sheikh et Taher el Magzub at Kabab, and was warmly welcomed by him. On receiving your letter he kissed it and raised it to his head and eyes, and felt greatly honoured. As you are aware, this sheikh believed in Mahdiyyism from the beginning; and for this I thank God, for he is a most influential man amongst the Arabs and natives of Suakin, by whom he has long been known as a Mahdiyyist; so much so, that when the God-forsaken Ala ed Din¹ was on his way to Khartum, he ordered his arrest, thinking that he might raise an insurrection, but God preserved him, and he is now with me, giving me every possible help. I am not able to speak too highly of his zeal and valuable services, which are daily strengthening the cause and increasing the number of the ansar—as, indeed, the God-forsaken Ala ed Din truly reported by telegram. Amongst his followers are sheikh Abderrahman el Magzub; his son, Mohammed Magzub; his cousin, Haj Omar Kamar ed Din; also the emir Madani Magzub, who is one of my able and energetic emirs; also Mohammed el Amin, the sons of sheikh Yasin, Abd el Kader, kadi of Suakin; his brother, Mohammed en Nur Khatib, and Sadik the mufti—all these men are worthy of praise for having left their occupations and devoted themselves to the service of God and His cause.

"I arrived at Erkowit on the (1st August 1883) 27th Ramadan, and the same evening I heard that the Turks were coming to look for me with orders to arrest me, and if they could not find me they were to arrest my brother, Ahmed Digna, and take him to the mamurieh. The Turks had received a telegram from Berber, informing them of my arrival at Damer, and of my giving the *Beia* to the Arabs on the road. Also, your letters to the Morghani had roused their suspicions, and they intended to spoil my work.

"Hearing all this, I stayed up in the hills that night, while my brother Ahmed Digna, knowing their intentions, collected our men and prepared to fight them, and when the Turks knew this, they became alarmed and returned to the mamurieh. Early the follow-

¹ This refers to Hicks Pasha's colleague.

ing morning I rejoined my people. I delivered all your letters to them, and they received them with great joy, as did all those who belonged to Suakin and the other Arabs. All were rejoiced to accept Mahdiism, especially my brothers Ahmed Digna, Fiki Mohammed Digna, Mohammed el Amin, and his brothers, etc., etc. The first two—viz. Ahmed and Fiki—were killed in the battle of Sinkat, which I shall presently describe. The remainder are still with me, giving me all assistance and gallantly performing their duty for God's cause. May God recompense them for all their work. Amen.

"I spent all that day giving the *beia* to the Arabs.

"I will now describe the battle of Sinkat, which I will call the first battle.

"On the morning of 29th Ramadan (3d August 1883), sheikh Taher el Magzub and Ahmed Digna received letters from the Governor at Suakin—a certain Tewfik, one of the ablest of the God-forsaken Ala ed Din's men, and well known for his bravery and good administration; these letters summoned them at once to the mamurieh, so as to arrange for my arrest. Tewfik had arrived at the mamurieh the day before from Suakin.

"These two letters were at once torn to pieces and the messengers seized; sheikh Taher then sent to me to know what he should do, and I replied that he should meet me at Tawai, a place near the mamurieh, and prepare to fight. Accordingly the following day, the 1st Shawal (5th August), we met at that place, and advanced till we were within rifle range of the mamurieh. On our approach, all the villagers, Suakinese and Arabs, came out and took the *beia* except the Morghani khalifas, who merely took your letter to the mamur and governor, and returned an hour afterwards to ask for a three days' truce. At first I refused to wait, but at length consented to delay the fight till noon, so as to give them a chance of capitulating; but I would not permit the khalifas to return, until they had taken the *beia*, which they did after much hesitation and talking amongst each other; and they went away, saying that they would act as mediators between me and the Turks. Soon afterwards they returned, asking for a further delay till four o'clock, but I said, 'I will give you only three paces.' It was then noon, and I saw the Turks preparing for battle; some were making loopholes in the walls, others were collecting the women and children inside the fort, and some could be seen preparing to fire from the roofs of the houses, while the rest of the Turks were drawn up outside the fort. I then knew that the Khalifas must be deceiving us, so at once prepared to fight. The Khalifas, seeing this, stood aside while we attacked suddenly and entered the fort, killing every Turk we found there; and as our men were inside, the Turks, who were outside, could not get in, but some of the others had taken refuge

in the small houses inside the fort, and these, as well as those on the roofs, fired on our men and inflicted some loss on them. I was wounded in the hand, head, and side, but my men carried me outside the fort, and then all withdrew. We had great difficulty in entering the fort, for there were many Turks at the gates and many of our men were killed.

"My brother, Fiki Mohammed Digna, led the attack with a heart of flint, forcing the entrance and killing many of the Turks with his own sword. One Turk tried to strike him down with his rifle, but he cut the rifle in two with his sword and killed the Turk, but was afterwards killed himself. He led the attack so as to encourage the ansar, according to my orders.

"I myself was placed on an angarib and brought on a camel to Erkowit. Our losses were 60 men, while the Turks lost 57.

"I will now describe the second battle, or Battle of Kabab.

"Soon after the attack on Sinkat, Governor Tewfik began his preparations for another fight, and asked for reinforcements from Suakin and Egypt. I also gathered my men and prepared to besiege Sinkat. My intention was to advance against them on 12th Zu'l Kada (14th September 1883), but when that enemy of God received reinforcements he advanced against us on the 9th (11th September), and I despatched my brother, Mohammed Mussa Digna, with a force to meet him. The Turks, on their arrival at Khor Kabab, hearing of our advance, halted and made a zariba for the night; and the following morning our men surrounded them on every side. The Turks seeing themselves hemmed in by a strong force and in a place where they had no shelter from the burning sun, and with food sufficient only for a day and a half, became greatly disheartened, and blamed their leader for having brought them to such a place and exposing them to danger, saying, 'You told us that Osman Digna and Taher Magzub were alone and with no followers; why have you brought us here to kill us?' Their leader was a Morghani Arab called Mahmud Ali, who is the sheikh of the Amara, and lives near Suakin. The Turks wanted to return to the mamurieh, but it was impossible for them to do so without fighting; they therefore formed up on two sides of the zariba, while with their two guns they protected the other two sides, and then they began to fire in all directions. The ansar attacked the zariba, but it was too strong and they could not enter. Three succeeded in breaking through, but they were killed, one of these was Taha, who accompanied me from you.

"In this fight we lost 27 men and many wounded, amongst them the gallant emir, Mohammed Mussa.

"The Turks lost their leader, Mahmud Ali, six soldiers, and one *saghkolaghasi*. After the battle they returned to the mamurieh and began digging a trench and strengthening themselves within

their fort, being greatly alarmed. Also they placed bags full of sand along the trench, so as to protect themselves—as if we had guns—this shows how frightened they were. They also cut down thorns and made a thorn hedge around the zariba, and put a gun at each corner and made the zariba as strong as possible.

“In the meantime I sent your letter to the Gemilab, who were then in the Kassala mudirieh; they were greatly pleased to receive it, and were guided by its contents. A sanjak and a few soldiers quartered in their country, having refused to join Mahdism, were slain in attempting to fight against the true cause. The Gemilab emir, who conducted this fight, as well as that at Tokar, is Haj Ibn Hassan Abu Zeinab, who is truly one of my ablest and most energetic emirs—firm in his belief, and his services are deserving of all praise.

“I also instructed the Arabs to cut the telegraph wire between Kassala and Suakin; this was soon done and all the poles removed. All the soldiers at the various stations had been either killed or made prisoners.

“At this time I also detailed El Khadr Ibn Ali as emir of Tokar—a place of more importance to the Turks than Sinkat, as there is much cultivation there. This emir has, with his sword, cut the cords by which the Turks have bound us, and exterminated them, as will be presently seen.

“I will now describe the third battle, or Battle of Abint.

“On the 23d of Zu'l Hejjeh (25th October 1883), I despatched a force of ansar under the emir, Ali Taleb Ibn Mohammed—a good and active man—to besiege Sinkat. This emir was subsequently killed in the battle with the English, which I shall describe afterwards.

“He halted at a place called Abint, between Suakin and Sinkat, and on the same day he encountered a detachment of 200 Turks going from Suakin to Sinkat to reinforce the garrison there. He fell on them and killed them all, capturing their arms and baggage. In this battle only three of our men were killed.

“The following is an account of the siege and fall of Sinkat.

“After the battle of Abint, I strengthened the force besieging Sinkat until it numbered some 750 men under the Emir el Fiki Ali Ibn Hamed, known as the Emir of Sinkat, for it was taken by him. He is a pious and godly man and much feared by the Turks in these districts; he is still working with me and is of great assistance. I instructed this emir to take his men within range of the fort and heavily besiege it.

“At that time the mamurieh was full of Morghani followers and Suakinese.

“The ansar besieged the mamurieh heavily, and by the end of Zu'l Hejjeh, the garrison was in great distress, and the Morghani

Khalifas surrendered to Fiki Ali with all their followers, and begged to be allowed to see me. At that time I was besieging Suakin, so as to prevent all communication between Suakin and Sinkat. Fiki Ali permitted them to come to me; but before they arrived they heard that the God-forsaken Ala ed Din was victorious, so, instead of coming to me, they went straight to Suakin, where they now are, and where they are employed by the English in government service, such as kadis, muftis, and katibs; whereas the followers of our good sheikh Taher el Magzub have left their government positions and have joined us.

"The head Morghani sheikh Mohammed Osman went to Suakin before we pressed the siege, and he is now at Massawa doing all he can to prevent the Arabs from joining Mahdism.

"The Turks were now alone in the mamurieh; they kept on firing their guns at the besieging ansar, but they did no harm. At length the siege was more heavily pressed, and communication was completely cut. No letters could reach them from the Turks at Suakin, and their provisions were all finished. The governor, with a sanjak called Ahmed Ibn el Muzeiin, then made a sortie, but the ansar met them with hearts of flint and drove them back to their fort, killing about twenty of them, including the sanjak.

"The garrison then became greatly distressed from want of food, and had to eat their donkeys and mules. They also ate the *hajlij* and *arak* leaves and plants which grow in the neighbourhood, but the ansar prevented them even from eating these plants.

"At length the Turks decided on a final sortie, and on Friday 10th Rabia el Akher (8th February 1884) they marched out from their fort and advanced in square, the women in the middle, against the ansar; but our brave troops surrounded them on all sides and made a sudden attack, putting all of them to the sword, till not one was left. They lost about 600 men, including their governor—our loss was only 57 men.

"After this the emir Fiki Ali joined me in the siege of Suakin.

"I will now describe the siege of Tokar by the emir Khadr.

"As I stated previously, I despatched the emir Khadr to besiege Tokar towards the end of Zu'l Kada.

"On approaching near the mamurieh all the natives, Artega and others, welcomed him, for our sheikh Taher had given him a letter to his followers, ordering them to join this emir. On this account they were all pleased to see him, especially their emir Mussa Ibn el Fiki, who gave him every assistance; he is an excellent emir, and worthy of all praise. Also the Kadi of the mamurieh, Kadi Saleh, at once deserted his government post and joined the ansar of his own accord, preferring the Jihad in the name of God to service under the Turks.

"The Turks had, however, dug trenches and strongly fortified

themselves in their 'geger' (fort) before the emir Khadr had arrived. On his arrival he called on them to surrender and join Mahdiism; but they refused, saying they would fight, and were expecting reinforcements from Suakin, Tokar being nearer to the sea than Sinkat. Khadr, therefore, despatched a part of his force under the emir Abdullah Ibn Hamed, who was afterwards killed in the battle with the English—a very excellent emir—to cut the communication and prevent reinforcements reaching them. The emir Khadr himself stayed with the main body besieging Tokar."

The following is an account of the

First Battle near the Sea.

"On the 4th of Moharram (5th November 1883), the same day on which the God-forsaken Ala ed Din was destroyed,¹ a detachment of soldiers, accompanied by a pasha and a Christian consul,² landed from Suakin, intending to come to Tokar. The ansar, seeing them, made a sudden attack on them and killed all of them, amounting to 400 men; the ansar lost only 27 men killed.

"On the same day a mamur, on his way from Kassala to Tokar with a number of soldiers, was met by the emir of the Gemilab, El Haj Ibn Hassan, who called on him to surrender and embrace Mahdiism; and as he refused, he and all his party were killed; the ansar lost only one man in this fight."

"In the meantime the Turks made a sortie from Tokar, but the ansar drove them back to their fort, killing a number of them, including a *bulukbashi*."

The following is an account of the

Second Battle near the Sea.³

"Soon afterwards a force of 508 soldiers, with a number of cavalry and guns, arrived by sea from Suakin, and landed at Trinkat for the relief of Tokar. The emir Abdullah and his ansar met them. The soldiers on seeing them fired their guns; but the ansar made a deadly attack on them and fought heroically for one or two hours until they killed 450 of them; the rest fled away, embarked on their steamers, which were waiting close by, and returned to Suakin.

"In this battle the ansar lost 300 men, amongst them emir fiki Mahmud, brother of the emir Khadr; he was strong in the faith, bold in battle, and much feared by the enemy.

¹ This refers to the annihilation of the army of Hicks Pasha at Shekan.

² Commander Lynedoch Moncrieff, R.N.

³ This refers to the action of General Valentine Baker at Et Teh.

"This battle took place on 5th Rabia el Akher (4th February 1884), and after this defeat the Egyptian Government acknowledged its inability to fight against the Sudan, and entrusted the government of Suakin to the English.

Suakin is therefore now under English rule."

The Fall of Tokar.

"In the last battle with the Turks the ansar captured the guns of the Turks. These are very big guns, and their shot will pass through three or four walls; they took these guns to Tokar, and the emir Khadr pressed the siege heavily. The Turks had enough provisions to last them for two or three years; but when they heard of the destruction of the force which was coming to relieve them, and that there was no hope of any other force coming to their help, and that they were quite cut off from the outer world, they surrendered, and Tokar was occupied by our men.

"This took place in Rabia el Akher, four days before its end."

*The Third Battle of the Sea, or the Battle of the English.*¹

"Three days after the fall of Tokar, the whole sea-coast became full of steamers, and it was rumoured that the Egyptian Government, knowing its inability to defend the country, entrusted its affairs to the English Government. The steamers were filled with English soldiers, who were coming to reoccupy Tokar. On learning of this I sent my brother's son Midani—a strong and brave man—to assist the ansar of Tokar against them.

"The English soldiers, I was told, numbered 24,000 men. The ansar waited until they had all landed; they did not attack them while they were landing, fearing that some should escape and return in the steamers; but at length, when all had landed, the ansar fell upon them and a hot fight ensued, which lasted till night-fall, when both forces retreated. The soldiers advanced to the mamurieh. The losses of the ansar were heavy in this battle. When I heard this I sent my entire force, except a very few men, to fight against the soldiers at the mamurieh, and I sent the two best men I have with me as leaders; these were Hamed, the son of my brother Ahmed Digna, and Idris. I gave orders to these two emirs to attack the English whenever they came either by day or night, and no matter at what hour; but the English did not stay there long. God struck fear into their hearts, and they went back the next morning, staying only one night at the mamurieh, and then they started back in their steamers.

¹ This refers to General Graham's Battle of El Teb, 29th February 1884.

"The ansar, seeing the mamurieh evacuated, returned to me; but the emir Khadr is still there with his men watching the coast.

"In this battle the ansar lost about 1500 men, including the emir of the coast, Abdullah, the emir Midani, and the emir Taher Ibn el Haj Omar Kamar ed Din el Magzub, a cousin of sheikh Taher Magzub's. This last was a true and brave man, and had no fear of death when fighting against the enemies of God. It is said that before the battle he said to his friend, 'If I am wounded before I get close to the infidels, then drag me by the leg until you get to the battlefield, perchance I may be able to satisfy the desire of my heart to plunge my spear into the enemies of God even as I die, and at the last moment of my life, ere I leave the world, to enter Paradise.'

"Amongst our dead was also the emir Mussa Kilai, who is equal to 1000 men, and is as the drawn sword of God in fighting against the infidels.

"We have as many wounded as killed, while the enemies of God lost over 3000."

The Battle of the Emir Mustafa Hadal at Kassala.

"Towards the end of Muharram (November 1783) I despatched the emir Mustafa Hadal as emir of Kassala to besiege that town. He is a good and pious man, ever ready to fight for God's cause. I had previously sent your letters to the people of that mamurieh, and in consequence, when Mustafa Hadal arrived, he was well received, and soon many people joined him ready to fight. He then advanced towards Kassala, intending to lay siege to it; but the soldiers, hearing of it, advanced with a force of 1500 men on 3d Rabia el Akher (1st February 1884).

"A fight ensued, which resulted in a complete defeat of the Turks, who lost 1100 men, and the remainder retreated to the fort, which was heavily besieged by Mustafa Hadal. It is said that the Turks wished to surrender, but Es Sayid Osman el Morghani prevented them. This man is greatly opposed to Mahdism, and has led many people away both before and after the arrival of Mustafa Hadal."

The Battle of the Atbara

"In Muharram (November 1883) I ordered the emirs Kulhayabi and Taher Kilai of the Bisharin to proceed with their men to the Atbara, and to attack a sanjak, who was stationed near with a number of soldiers, and after killing them they were to proceed to Berber and lay siege to it. A fight took place near the river,

resulting in the loss of 114 soldiers and 80 of our men. The soldiers who escaped fled to Berber, and our emirs returned to me. I retained Kulhayabi with me, but sent Tahir to the siege of Berber, and he is now with Fiki Mohammed el Kheir, emir of that place."

The Battle of the Turks at Tamanib

"When my men first began to besiege Suakin, the garrison made a sortie on the 1st Safar (1st December 1883), under a certain Kassim, who is one of Ala ed Din's trusted men, and as clever in the art of war as Tewfik. He had 1100 men with him, and he promised the governor that he would bring me and sheikh Taher Magzub alive to Suakin, or that he would kill us. He was ignorant of the power of God's cause, and trusted in his men, whom he selected from the trained Jehadieh. He started from Suakin at midnight without any of the natives knowing, so that he might surprise us. They came up with us on 1st Safar, and began to fire at us, while their chief was mocking at us; but the ansar soon surrounded him from all sides and fell upon him suddenly. In this attack all the Turks were killed, including their chief and a sanjak called Muzeiin, the brother of Muzeiin who was killed with Tewfik. The ansar lost 80 men. Again, on 20th January 1884, 1000 cavalry made a sortie from Suakin, but when they approached us God struck fear into their hearts, and they fled back to Suakin. The ansar pursued them, but as they were on horseback the ansar could not overtake them, and succeeded in killing only seven, though when they arrived at Suakin many of their horses died from being overridden in the flight.

"In Rabia el Akher (February 1884), 100 of the ansar encountered a body of Arabs under Mahmud Ali; and the latter, seeing that there were but a few ansar, fell upon them and killed 22, losing only one man himself. This is the same Mahmud Ali who was the leader at the battle of Kabab. He is always gathering men to fight against us, and is more zealous than the Turks and English. The emir in command of the ansar in this fight was Mohammed Adam Sadub of the Amarar; he is one of my best emirs, and was severely wounded."

The English Battle of Tamanib¹

"On the 14th Jamad el Awal (12th March 1884), an English army of, it is said, 20,000 men, including 6000 horsemen, arrived in the neighbourhood, and making a strong zariba, spent the night there. The ansar surrounded them, and kept up a continuous fire

¹ This refers to General Graham's victory at Tamai on 13th March 1884.

on them during the whole of that night, so that the English got no sleep, and suffered some loss.

"When the morning broke the English began firing their guns and rifles. The ansar attacked them, and fought them the whole day until both forces retreated; the English returned to Suakin with a loss of 8000 men. In this battle the ansar lost 2000 and had a similar number wounded.

"At the end of Jamad el Awal, the English returned with a force of 13,000 men, but before they reached us, God struck fear into their hearts, and they returned again to Suakin without fighting; but only 5000 or 6000 of them reached Suakin, and the remainder were destroyed on the road, by what calamity is not exactly known, unless it was that the earth opened her mouth and swallowed them up.

"In short, the English army, with the exception of 5000 or 6000, was completely destroyed. They had about 28 steamers waiting for them in the harbour, but on their return they only filled five of them, and the rest returned to their country empty. One of these steamers was wrecked on the way; and previous to this, the Egyptian Government lost many steamers carrying soldiers, horses, mules, and treasure."

The Battle of Hashin

"In the month of Rajab (May 1884), Mahmud Ali collected a number of Arabs, who were unbelievers in Mahdiyyism, at a well called Hashin, and tried to drive us away from the neighbourhood and raise the siege of Suakin. He did all this in order to help the English. He sent a few horsemen against us, armed with rifles; these came towards us and returned two or three times during the night, capturing seven of our ansar, whom they sent to the English at Suakin. The English supplied him with horses, arms, money, and ammunition.

"In consequence of this, I sent a force of ansar under the emir of Sinkat, El Fiki Ali, who, on approaching them, called on them to join Mahdiyyism. At that time Mahmud Ali was at Suakin; and his followers at once sent him a message to say the ansar had come, so he collected a number of men at Suakin and came out against us. In the meantime Fiki Ali had been trying to gain them over to his side, and when Mahmud Ali arrived, he instigated them to fight; but on drawing near to the ansar, they became afraid and fled away, being followed by the ansar, who killed 16 of them and wounded several more. The ansar lost no one in this fight, and many of the other Arabs now repented and joined Mahdiyyism; 49 women and a number of camels and donkeys were also taken. During the fight Mahmud Ali was riding a camel a long way to the

rear, and when he saw his men put to flight, he too returned to Suakin as quickly as he could, and is still there with the English.

"On 1st Rabia el Awal (30th December 1883), a Khatmieh sheikh named Mohammed Sir el Khattam el Morghani—a brother of the Osman already referred to—arrived in Suakin from Cairo in order to extinguish the light of God. Before his arrival the people of Suakin were embracing the true cause in large numbers; but when he arrived, he and his Khalifas wrote to the Arabs, telling them that it is a false Mahdi, and that you are a wicked and evil-minded man; he therefore called on them to forsake Mahdiism and return to the Government. This man is an unbeliever, and is leading many people astray.

"I do not think there are any people in the world who disbelieve in Mahdiism so much as he, his brother Osman, his khalifas, and his cousin at Kassala.

"He insists on all who come to him washing themselves for three days, and purifying themselves with incense, and makes them swear every day on the Kuran that you are not the Mahdi, and that no Mahdi has yet appeared, nor has he yet been born; and he tells people that the Prophet has entrusted him with the duty of putting down these disturbances, and that they have only to follow him, and he will be responsible to God for their deeds. If any of the Turks, English, or Arabs wish to fight us, he gives them a flag, which he calls the flag of victory, and every month he prophesies that I (Osman Digna) will die in that month. In some of the English expeditions he used to come out with them, and if any of those weak-minded Arabs, who used to follow us, come to him, he tells them that they must stay at home for 40 days, because they receive the *beiu* from Osman. He also continually writes threatening letters, saying that the whole of Europe will collect and fight against us. He is still at Suakin carrying on in this way, and has led many people astray from God's light, and he says many strange and unaccountable things.

"There is also another man at Suakin called Es Sanghetti Ahmed, who has led many men astray. When your letter was sent to him he returned it with an answer written on the back, and in it, as you will see, he says words which show he has no faith at all. He also wrote to me to say that when he sees any men who fought against us, he kisses their hand, saying, 'Give me your hand which fought against Osman and his men that I may kiss it.'

"The Morghani khalifas continue to warn the natives against Mahdiism, and so do the Omdehs of Suakin, and one of these—a certain Shenawi—pays money from his own pocket in order to lead people astray from the path of God.

"The Government are, however, strengthening the fortifications and putting guns into position ever since we came to besiege

them. They have built five forts on the south, north, and west, two of them near the wells. They have connected the houses by walls of mud and stone, and have made only one gate for the whole town. The soldiers drink water, which is sea-water made fresh by steam-engines.

"We are at present heavily besieging the town, and continually annoying the inhabitants both by day and by night. They fired their guns at us, both from the forts and from the ships at sea.

"Such is the present state of affairs, and I will inform you of any change that may take place."

Operations after the Battle of Hashin

"After the battle of Hashin, already described, I ordered the ansar to return to the well near Suakin called Handub. It is the nearest place to Suakin where water is found, and is the best place from which to lay siege to the town.

"The ansar settled at this place in the middle of Shaban (June 1884), and soon afterwards Ali Rekab's men and the Fadlab of Mahmud Ali made preparations to drive the ansar away from the wells, and open up the road to Suakin, so that people might be able to bring in their cattle and milk to Suakin for sale. They sent out their scouts, and the ansar did the same. The two parties met; we had only three men; and the enemy's scouts numbered 30; two of our scouts were killed, and the third returned; one of the enemy's scouts was killed. The ansar then advanced to the camp where the Arabs were collected, attacked it, and killed 22 men, the rest took flight. Amongst those killed were five Suakinese, one of whom was a Morghani khalifa. Their bodies were burnt with fire, which is the reward of infidels. The ansar lost no men, and captured a number of cattle and 40 women. Amongst the things captured was a flag of peace belonging to the Turks. This fight took place on the 1st Ramadan. The ansar then returned to Handub, and again cut the road to Suakin, so that the Arabs had to communicate with Suakin by Mersa Barghut (Barud).

"The ansar saw a party of Arabs driving cattle to this Mersa to be taken in dhows to Suakin; they attacked them, killing five men and capturing 70, including all the cattle, camels, cows, sheep, and donkeys. These events took place in the middle of Ramadan."

Here a number of pages of the book are missing; then follows an account of the various skirmishes between the forces of Osman Digna and Mahmud Ali, which it is not necessary to repeat here, as they have already been referred to in the body of the work.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX TO BOOK I

EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT ON THE SUDAN BY
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL STEWART

KHARTUM, 9th February 1883.

History

It is said that between the first and second century after the Mohammedan era the Arabs of the tribe of Beni Omr, being hard pressed by the Beni Abbas tribe, began to emigrate from Arabia in small numbers to the opposite shores of the Red Sea, and to settle in the districts about Senaar, on the Blue Nile. Whether the Beni Omr led the van of the great Arab invasion it is impossible to say, nor is it known whether all the tribes chose the Red Sea road. Some authorities appear to think that several came into the Sudan from Egypt and Morocco.

Be this as it may, the fact remains that the Beni Omr settled gradually in the districts round Senaar, the inhabitants of which were negroes belonging to the tribes of Fung, Hamagh, etc.

The Beni Omr, becoming gradually stronger, by degrees succeeded in becoming the masters of the whole of the Senaar districts, and converted the negroes to Islamism.

By degrees the distinction between Arab and negro diminished, and in 1493 the name of Beni Omr is no longer heard of, and the old tribal names of Fung, Hamagh, and others reappear.

In that year Amara Dunkas, the sheikh of a sub-section of the Fung, either through the fortune of war or his superior capacity, succeeded in getting himself declared king of all the Fung tribes. He then allied himself with Abdulla Gemaa-el-Kerinani, the powerful

chief of the Keri district (east of the Blue Nile), and conquered all the country on both sides of the river between Fazoglou and Khartum.

These districts were inhabited by negroes belonging to the Nuba (Nubian) tribes, some of whom, after the conquest, remained in the country, while others emigrated into the mountains of Fazoglou and Kordofan. Those who remained embraced Islamism, intermarried with their conquerors, and, losing their language and nationality, were soon lost in the tribes known collectively under the name of Fung.

Of these tribes, some settled in towns, while others retained their nomad habits, such as the (1) Khamir, (2) Rebia, (3) Kakhtan, (4) Kenana, (5) Kawaklah, (6) Geheena, (7) Beni Shekr, (8) Beni Ziban, (9) Beni Abbas. From this last have descended the (1) Kababish, (2) Ferara, (3) Beni Selim, (4) Ahamdeh. The latter two tribes are Baggara, or owners of cattle and horses.

All these tribes are now to be found along both banks of the White Nile.

In 1523 Amara Dunkas was succeeded by his son Abdul Kader.

In 1539 Abdul Kader was succeeded by his son Nule.

In 1545 Nule was succeeded by his son Amara.

Amara was surnamed Abu Sakakin; during his reign sheikh Abdulla Gemaa died, leaving the province of Keri to his son.

In 1553 Amara died. Between that date and 1596, four kings, all of the family of Dunkas, succeeded each other.

In 1596, in the reign of Adlan, sheikh Agheeb, a descendant of Gemaa and governor of Keri, rebelled. Adlan defeated him near Alati. His children fled to Dongola, where Adlan sent sheikh Idris to offer them a free pardon and invite them to Senaar. They came, and Adlan invested the eldest with the government of Keri.

This emissary of Adlan's, sheikh Idris, was celebrated for his ability. He is also said to have lived to the great age of 147. During this reign many learned men came from Cairo and Bagdad.

In 1603 Adlan was succeeded by his son Baadi.

In 1606 Baadi was succeeded by his son Rubat.

In 1635 Rubat was succeeded by his son Baadi-Abu-Dakn (Father of the Beard).

This king attacked the Shullook negroes and took a large number of slaves. The Shullook inhabited the country on both sides of the White Nile south of Kaua. Thence he invaded the mountain of Tagalle and destroyed Kordofan, where he again took a large number of slaves. On his return to Senaar he built a number of villages in that district for his prisoners.

The prisoners named these villages after those they had left,

hence the number of villages now near Senaar with names similar to those in the Jebel Nuba, Tagalle, and other districts about Kordofan.

In time these slaves supplied the kings of Fung with recruits for their armies.

Besides his warlike enterprise Baadi built the mosque now at Senaar, and furnished it with copper window-bars.

In 1671 he died, and was succeeded by his son Ansu. During this reign there was a great famine and an outbreak of smallpox.

In 1683 Ansu was succeeded by his son Baadi-el-Akhmar. In this reign a number of the Fung tribes and the people of Keri, under their prince, rebelled, but they were defeated with great slaughter, and the prince of Keri was killed. Sheikh Hamid-Welid-el-Terabi, a celebrated sheikh, lived during this reign. His tomb is now at Senaar.

In 1710 Baadi was succeeded by his son Ansu II. This monarch caused such great dissatisfaction by his extravagance and debauchery that the southern Fungs revolted, deposed the king, and placed a noble called Noor on the throne. This happened in 1714.

In 1719 Noor was succeeded by his son Baadi Abu Shellook. In this reign the Abyssinian king Kedem Yassoo invaded the Senaar with a large army. He was, however, defeated with great slaughter by sheikh Emin, near the village of Tekiyah, on the Dinder river. It is said that the reason for this invasion was that some presents sent by the king of France to Abyssinia had been seized by king Baadi.

After this great victory the renown of Senaar spread in all directions, and eventually even reached to Constantinople. Crowds of learned and celebrated men flocked into the country from Arabia, Egypt, and India. Notwithstanding this, in 1758 Baadi, owing to his bad administration, was deposed and exiled. He was succeeded by his son Nasser.

1758. Under this reign the Hamag or Hamagh tribe became very powerful, and the Fung lost a great deal of their influence and prestige. In 1765 Nasser was killed by a rebellious vassal, and was succeeded by his son Ismael.

In 1774 Ismael was deposed, exiled to Suakin, and succeeded by his son Adlan. During this reign many intertribal wars went on both in Senaar and Kordofan, and the power and influence of the Hamagh grew so great that they eventually became the masters of the king.

In 1786 Adlan was deposed by the Hamagh, and the kingdom of the Fung totally disappears, anarchy prevails throughout the country, and the kings succeed each other in such rapid succession that in the year 1788 four kings successively reigned. During the

succeeding thirty-three years of anarchy the Hamagh continued supreme, and under sheikh Nasser they devastated the northern and eastern part of the Sudan with fire and sword.

In 1819 Mehemet Ali, hearing of the anarchy prevailing in the Sudan, and wishing to introduce the benefits of a regular government, of civilisation, and at the same time to occupy his troops, ordered his son Ismael, with a numerous army of regulars and irregulars, with many learned men and artisans, to invade the country.

Ismael reached Khartum without meeting with any resistance, and thence marched on to Senaar. There he was joined by his brother, Ibrahim Pasha, and they together advanced to Fazoglou. Shortly after Ibrahim returned to Egypt, and the report spread that Ibrahim had been killed in the Fazoglou mountains. The Arab nomads immediately rose, but Ismael returned, defeated the rebels, and appointed new sheikhs. He then went on to Shindi, on the Nile. The Meg (ruler) Nemr (tiger) of that place, wishing to be revenged of all the cruelties and barbarities Ismael had been guilty of, invited him and his followers to a great banquet at Shindi. During the banquet, and while the guests were all more or less intoxicated, the house was set on fire, and Ismael and all his followers perished.

When the news of this catastrophe reached Kordofan, Achmet Bey, the Defterdar, who had wrested that province from the Darfur Sultan, put himself at the head of a large army and marched on Shindi. When he reached Metema, opposite Shindi, the inhabitants sent to ask for pardon. This was granted. One of the people, however, happening to throw a lance at the Defterdar, the pardon was at once rescinded, and a general massacre took place. The Meg-el-Nemr, however, escaped, having fled towards Abyssinia.

After this the Defterdar marched to Zezir Atuti (Jeziret Tuti), opposite Khartum, where he again defeated the rebels with great slaughter. He then marched to Wed Medeni, near Messelemia, and then returned to Kordofan.

It is said that when Kordofan was conquered it was found that the governor of the province had the title of Makhdum, which is a title only given to palace eunuchs. It would appear that it was the custom of the Darfur Sultans to send eunuchs to govern provinces and districts.

In 1822 Osman Bey was named Governor of the Sudan, and the Defterdar, Achmet Bey, returned to Egypt. This was a year of rebellions and famines.

In 1824 Mokhoo Bey was appointed governor.

In 1826 Khurshid Pasha became governor. He is renowned for his rectitude and honesty. He led some expeditions up the White

Nile against the Dinka negro tribe, opposite Fashoda, and also into the mountains of Tagalle. In 1834 he went to Egypt for a few months. Towards the end of that year he went to the Abyssinian frontier to repel the attack of the Abyssinians, who were coming to the assistance of the Senaar rebels. The Abyssinians were defeated, and Adlan, their leader, was taken and impaled. During this year cholera and other diseases ravaged the country. In 1836 the Abyssinians, after attacking the Gallabat provinces, retreated into their mountains.

Khurshid Pasha was the first Governor who taught the people of Khartum to build with bricks, and to give up their huts made of skins and reeds. In 1837 he was recalled to Egypt, and was succeeded by Achmet Pasha Abu Udan (Father of large ears). During this Governor's reign Mehemet Ali came to visit the Sudan, and went as far as Fazoglou, where he remained till the end of 1837 exploring the goldfields. In 1838 Achmet Pasha went to Shindi to seize the Meg-el-Nemr, who had returned. The Meg, however, again not only succeeded in effecting his escape, but also killed one of the Pasha's lieutenants.

In 1841 a rebellion broke out at Kassala, which was quelled. The Sudan was divided into seven mudirihs: (1) Fazoglou, (2) Senaar, (3) Khartum, (4) Taka, (5) Berber, (6) Dongola, (7) Kordofan.

In 1842 Achmet Pasha Menikli was appointed Governor-General. Soon after his arrival, owing to the bad administration and ineptitude of the officials, another rebellion broke out at Kassala. The Pasha went there, beat the rebels, and, bringing back many prisoners to Khartum, beheaded them.

In 1845 he was succeeded by Khalid Pasha. This Governor spent most of his time travelling about the country.

In 1849 Abd el Latif Pasha became Governor-General. He spent his time in rectifying the wrongs committed by his predecessors, opened schools, and built the Government Palace.

In 1850 he was succeeded by Rustem Pasha. He organised a tribunal at Khartum, and brought judges and councillors from Cairo. He died in 1851, and was succeeded by Selim Pasha, who left Egypt much against his will.

In 1853 Ali Pasha Serri became Governor-General.

In 1854 Ali Pasha Tcherkess was appointed Governor-General. Shortly after, Abdul Khalim Pasha, son of Mehemet Ali, visited the Sudan, and remained till the cholera broke out. In 1856 Mohammed Said Pasha, the Viceroy, also visited the Sudan. This Viceroy, after due consideration, had almost decided to abandon the country, and was only restrained from doing so by the sheikhs and notables pointing out the inevitable anarchy that would result from such a measure. He ordered many reforms, such as (1) forbidding the

collection of taxes by soldiers, and directing that they should be removed from the districts; (2) that the villages should in future pay the taxes through their sheikhs; (3) diminution of all the taxes on irrigation; (4) that the imposts should only be collected after the harvest; (5) that an assembly of notables should be convoked every year to inquire into the state of the country, etc.

In 1856 Arakel, surnamed "the Franzawi" (the Frenchman), became Governor-General. He is distinguished for his justice and administrative capacity.

In 1858 Hassan Bey was named Governor-General.

In 1861 Mohammed Rajik Bey was named Governor-General.

In 1862 Moosa Pasha Hamdi succeeded him. He rearranged the system of taxes, and supplied the natives with stamped paper declaring the taxes due by each. He marched to the Abyssinian frontier, but, as usual, the Abyssinians retreated into their hills. Before returning, he, however, directed that the district of Wolkait, a part of Abyssinia where the Meg-el-Nemr had taken refuge, should be ravaged. This Pasha was an old Sudan official, and had seen a great deal of service in many places, and, amongst others, at Kordofan and Tagalle, where he had suppressed several rebellions with great cruelty. He died at Khartum in 1864, and was succeeded by Osman Bey Fakhry.

In 1865, just as this official was returning to Cairo, the military mutiny at Taka occurred. This mutiny was caused by the negro troops not having received any pay for many months. After eighteen months' delay they began to murmur. This was reported to Cairo without the reason for the dissatisfaction being given. Orders were at once issued to send them to Egypt, and replace them by Egyptians. They then broke into open rebellion. The mutineers amounted to 8000 men. As they, however, had no leader and no ammunition, they could not effect much, and the Government had time to send reinforcements to save the town of Kassala.

In 1865 Jaaffar Pasha arrived as Governor-General. He brought a large number of troops from Cairo *via* Korosko. At the same time Jaaffar Pasha Mazhar was sent from Egypt with some other troops by Suakin to Taka. He succeeded in quelling the rebellion. From Kassala he marched to Khartum, and was appointed Governor-General *vice* Jaaffar Pasha Sadyk, who returned to Cairo. The negro troops were sent to Egypt and replaced by Egyptians.

In 1866 Jaaffar Pasha made a journey of inspection through the Sudan, and, on his return to Khartum, asked to have the negro troops sent back. He returned to Cairo, leaving an acting Governor-General.

It was in this year that the territory of Massowah and Suakin was given to Egypt by the Sultan of Turkey.

In 1868 Jaaffar Pasha again returns, and at once gives orders to send back the Egyptian regiment.

In 1870 Sir S. Baker's expedition to the Equator left Khartum, and another expedition, under Helale, a native of Darfur, was sent into the Bahr Ghazelle to seize the copper mines at Khöfrat (mine) el Nakhars (copper) (Hofrat-en-Nahass). This expedition gave rise to the first idea of conquering the Darfur.

In the same year Munzinger, a German, annexed the Senheit territory for the Egyptians. Senheit, although it paid tribute to Abyssinia, was practically independent, under its own sheikhs, and under French protection. Munzinger, who had been residing there for many years, and who had acquired a great deal of influence, proposed to hand the country over to the Egyptians. This was accepted, Munzinger was named Bey, appointed Governor of the Red Sea Provinces, and the country was quietly annexed. The Abyssinians, however, have never recognised this annexation, and still continue to exact taxes from the people. Practically the country is Abyssinian, and the Egyptian territory does not extend beyond the limits of the citadel at Keren. The people are miserably poor, and never pay their tribute of 600 dollars to the Egyptians.

In 1871 Mumtaz Pasha was named Governor-General. He encouraged and promoted the cultivation of cotton, but his indifferent, not to say foolish, administration having given rise to many complaints, he was dismissed and imprisoned at Khartum, pending an inquiry. He died there in 1875.

In 1873 Ismail Pasha Eyoub was named Governor-General. He set to work to remove the "sudd" (vegetable obstruction) from the White Nile. This year Sir S. Baker returned from the Equator, leaving Reouf Pasha in command.

In 1874 Colonel Gordon is appointed Governor-General of the Equatorial Provinces.

In 1875 Zibert (Zubheir) Pasha, with his Bazingers (slave soldiers) and Dongolawis, begin the conquest of Darfur, under the orders of Ismail Pasha Eyoub, who assists him with troops, rifles, etc.

This year also Munzinger Pasha proposed to annex the territory to the south of Massowah, but was treacherously murdered. In the same year another expedition, under Reouf Pasha, left to conquer Harrar. The expedition was successful, and a large extent of territory was annexed.

In 1876, owing to frontier quarrels, war was declared with Abyssinia. The Egyptians were defeated. The Abyssinians took a very large number of prisoners, including Hassan Pasha, the son of the Khedive.

In 1877 Colonel Gordon is appointed Governor-General of the Sudan, including Harrar and the Equatorial Provinces. He spent most of his time in travelling. During his rule the rebellion of

Haroun, in the Darfur Province, was put down, as well as that of Suleiman Zibert, in the Bahr Ghazelle Province. Suleiman Zibert, who was the son of Zibert Pasha, was taken and shot. Vigorous efforts were also made to suppress the slave trade.

In 1880 Reouf Pasha was made Governor-General. During his rule vigorous efforts were made to limit the expenditure. In August 1881 Mohammed Achmet, the Mahdi, began his divine mission.

1882: Abdul Kader is appointed.

Extent of Country now held by the Egyptians.—Boundaries

The country now occupied by the Egyptians, under the name of Sudan, covers an enormous area. Its length from north to south, or from Assuan to the Equator, is some 24 degrees, or about 1650 miles. Its width, from Massowah (about 40° east) to the western limit of the Darfur Province (about 22½° east), is from 1200 to 1400 miles.

Beginning near Berenice, on the Red Sea coast, the Sudan boundary follows the 24th parallel to some indefinite point in the Libyan Desert, say the 28th parallel of longitude. Thence it follows a south-westerly direction till it meets the north-western corner of the Province of Darfur, in about the 23d parallel of longitude. From that point it trends almost due south till about the 11th or 12th parallel, and then following a south-easterly direction through Monbutoo and the Albert Nyanza till it strikes the entrance of the Victoria Nyanza.

From this point it trends north-east, and including the Province of Harrar, reaches the Indian Ocean about Cape Guardafui, and thence follows the coast-line back to Berenice.

N.B.—I have thought it best to include the Province of Harrar within the boundaries of the Sudan, as not alone is Harrar under the Sudan government, but also so little is known about the intervening country that it is impossible to say where one province should begin and the other end.

All this large tract of country to the south of Abyssinia, and stretching from the Victoria Nyanza to the Indian Ocean, is practically almost quite unknown. The inhabitants are Gallas, Somalis, and others, and do not encourage travellers.

Character of the Country.—Line of Demarcation between Races.—

Climate, &c.

In the northern division, between Assuan and Khartum, beyond the narrow strip of cultivation along the Nile, the country is almost a desert, and inhabited by nomads belonging, it is said, to aboriginal tribes. A low range of broken and barren hills

separates the Nile valley from the coast. Another low range to the west shuts in the Nile from the desert of Bayuda.

The climate is dry and enervating. The summer heat is excessive. Regular rains occur as far north as Chendi (Shindi), between the 16th and 17th parallels of latitude, during the months of June, July, and August. In the winter, say between the 1st September to the end of November, occasional heavy rains occur on the eastern slope of the hills overlooking the Red Sea.

Of the country west of the White Nile, between the parallels of Khartum and that of Kaka (or Caka, about 11° latitude), the general appearance is that of a vast steppe, covered with low, thorny trees (mimosa, gum trees, etc.) and prickly grass.

Occasionally low groups of bare hills are met with. The villages and the patches of cultivated ground are few and far between. Water is scarce, and stored in wells and trunks of baobab trees.

In the extreme west of the Darfur Province the country greatly improves in appearance. The hills are more lofty and continuous, and the cultivation is luxuriant. In summer the heat is excessive. From September to May the climate is dry, with no rain. The rainy season lasts from about the middle of May to the end of September.

As far south as the 11th parallel the inhabitants are mostly Arab nomads, and nearly all Baggara (owners of cattle and horses). South of that parallel the negro race begins. To this general rule the Darfur Province forms an exception, as there the negro and the Arab are intermixed.

East of the White Nile, and for some degrees south of the parallel of Khartum, the country is a well-cultivated and well-watered plain. In the parallel of Kaka (11° north latitude), and near the Blue Nile, the hills begin and increase in height till the Abyssinian frontiers are reached.

The inhabitants of all this zone of country are mostly pure Arabs, and many of them nomad tribes. The exceptions are the Barker tribe of negroes on the northern frontier of Abyssinia, and the Takruri, or inhabitants of the Gallabat country; also negroes who have emigrated from the districts west of the Darfur Province.

All the district east and west of the White Nile, between Djebel Nuba and the Abyssinian Hills, and from latitude 8° north to within a short distance of Khartum, is infested with the tsetse fly. This fly, which is so destructive to cattle, appears and disappears with the rainy season. It acts, however, as a very efficient tax-collector for the Government, as all the nomad tribes have to emigrate north towards the Government stations.

In the Kordofan, Darfur, and some districts of the Bahr Ghazelle Provinces, during and immediately after the rainy season,

a microscopic egg or insect ("ferenteet") frequents the vicinity of water. This insect lodges itself between the skin and muscles of the human body, causing excruciating pain. Opinions differ as to how it effects a lodgment, some saying that it is through bathing, while others that it is due to sleeping on the ground.

From the parallel of Kaka (11° north) to that of Gondokoro (5° north), the country is a perfectly level plain, with huge marshes on both banks of the Nile and the Bahr Ghazelle. South of Gondokoro to the Equator the country becomes more and more mountainous. The forests are everywhere very extensive, and with a large variety of trees, fruit trees, etc. Water is everywhere abundant, and owing to it the climate to the west of the Nile is unhealthy. The heat is very great.

At Gondokoro the rainy season begins in April and lasts till September. The rains are very heavy, lasting sometimes for ten or twelve hours. From Gondokoro south to the Equator the rainy seasons increase in length, till on the Equator it may be said that rain and sunshine succeed each other in rapid succession all the year round. January, February, and March are, however, the wettest months.

Owing to this great rainfall and the very hot sun, the vegetation is exceedingly luxuriant, and the rivers become blocked by masses of vegetation which, having been torn up by the current, lodge in the narrower part of the rivers, forming almost impassable barriers ("sudd").

In these regions there is also a small greenish bat and greyish bird, which suck the blood of horses, asses, and other animals.

Roads

These are but camel-tracks, and the wells are few and far apart.

With a view to give some idea of the extent of the country, and also to illustrate the great delay in communicating between the centre and the outlying parts, I give a few of the distances in marches:—

1. Khartum to Obeid, 12 caravan marches, 5 post marches.
2. " Fasher (Darfur), 32 caravan marches, 22 post marches.
3. " Gondokoro, 18 days by steamer.
4. " Geuz Redjeb, 6 marches. Plain cultivated in the rains.
5. " Dongola, 8 marches. Many wells.
6. " Abu Haraz-Guedaref, 3 days by steamer, and 5 days by camel.
7. " Geuz Redjeb, Kassala, 8 days by camel.
8. Guedaref to Gallabat, 4 days by camel.
9. " Guiré, $1\frac{1}{2}$ days by camel.

10. Guedaref to Kassala, 5 days by camel.
11. Geuz Redjeb to Suakin, 11 days by camel.
12. Massowah to Sennehyt (Senheit), 7 days by camel.
13. Senheit to Kassala, 7 days by camel.
14. Gondokoro to Daffle, 9 days on foot.
15. „ „ Monbutoo, 34 days on foot.
16. „ „ Foweira, 18 days on foot.
17. „ „ Latooka, 7 days on foot.
18. „ „ Makrako, 7 days on foot.
19. Fasher (Darfur) to Siut, 40 days by camel through desert.

During the rainy season, owing to the spongy nature of the soil and the dense vegetation, it is almost impossible to travel.

In the country west of the White Nile, as the soil is hard and sandy, the rains do not prevent travelling.

Telegraph Lines

are as follows :—

1. Cairo-Dongola-Berber-Khartum.
2. Khartum-Abu Ghurrad-Kordofan-Foggia.
3. Khartum-Abu Harez-Messelemia-Senaar-Fazoglou.
4. Messelemia-Kaua.
5. Abu Harez-Guedaref-Kassala-Sennehyt-Massowah.
6. Kassala-Geuz Redjeb-Berber.
7. Suakin-Kassala.
8. Guedaref-Doka-Gallabat.
9. Guedaref-Guiré, on the Setit River.

Races, Tribes, etc.

Besides the main division of the people into Arab and negro, they are again subdivided into a number of tribes and sub-tribes, some sedentary and others nomad. Of the negro tribes, all are sedentary and cultivators, but the Arabs are for the most part nomads, or wanderers, each tribe within certain well-known limits. All these Arab tribes are large owners of cattle, camels, horses and slaves. These last, along with the Arab women, generally cultivate some fields of doora (a kind of millet), or corn, sufficient for the wants of the tribe. The Arab himself would consider it a disgrace to practise any manual labour. He is essentially a hunter, a robber, and a warrior, and after caring for his cattle, devotes all his energies to slave-hunting and war.

Among these Arab tribes, some are called Baggara (cattle-owners), but I have been unable to find a satisfactory definition of the distinction between a Baggara and an ordinary nomad tribe. Some assert that all the tribes that do not own camels are Baggara.

Besides the above, in the north of the Sudan there are the inhabitants of the Province of Dongola, said to be the repre-

sentatives of the ancient Nubian race. Besides Arabic, they have a language of their own.

The area of cultivable ground in that province being very limited, the people are mostly boatmen and small traders (Djellabs). In the latter capacity they are to be found all over the Sudan. Many of them are or were engaged in the slave trade.

Between the Nile and the Red Sea, in the latitude of Berber, there are the tribes of Beshareen, Hadendowa, and others. These tribes are also said to be very old residents in the country, and to belong to a race different from that of the Arab. They have a language of their own, and some of them hardly understand Arabic.

Religion

The Arabs, Dongolawis, negroes, and others settled within the Arab zone are all Mohammedans of the Maliki school. This religion, however, owing to the prevailing ignorance among the people, partakes mostly of an emotional and superstitious nature. Hence the enormous influence of the Fakis, or spiritual leaders, who are credited with a supernatural power, and are almost more venerated than the Prophet. Similarly, the general estimation in which Dervishes are held, the miraculous power attributed to the repetition of certain words, such as "Bismillah," the influence of charms, the evil eye, etc.

The negro tribes, notwithstanding their being officially inscribed as Mohammedans, are all Pagans, or have no system of religious belief.

Administrative Divisions

Prior to 1882 the Sudan was divided into a number of provinces, each under a Governor, or mudir, or mudir umoom, and with a Governor-General resident at Khartum.

Early in that year it was decided to appoint a minister for the Sudan, who should reside at Cairo, and to divide the country into three large divisions, of several provinces, each under a Governor-General, or Hukumdar.

These divisions were to be independent of each other, and to correspond directly with Cairo.

First Division.—The Hukumdirieh of West Sudan, with the capital at Fasher. Comprises the provinces or mudirieh of Darfur, Kordofan, Bahr-el-Ghazelle, and Dongola.

Second Division.—The Hukumdirieh of Central Sudan, capital at Khartum. Comprises the provinces of Khartum, Senaar, Berber, Fashoda, and Equator, or Hat-el-Istwa (Khat-el-Istiwa).

Third Division.—The Hukumdirieh of East Sudan, capital

Massowah. Comprises the mudiriehs of Taka (capital Kassala), Suakin, and Massowah as far as Bab-el-Mandeb.

There is also a Fourth Division, formed by the Hukumdirieh of Harrar, capital Harrar.

This was divided into the provinces of Zeyla, Berbera, Harrar, and attached to the Sudan Ministry.

This arrangement has been carried out, and several of the Hukumdars have been appointed. The ministerial staff and offices at Cairo have also been organised, but force of circumstances has, so far, compelled the minister to reside at Khartum.

Each of the above Hukumdiriehs is divided into a number of mudiriehs, or provinces, each under a mudir. The province is again divided into a number of *aksam* (sing. *kism*), or districts, each governed by a nazar. The *kism* is again subdivided into *akhtat* (sing. *khot*), or communes, each governed by a hakem.

The nomad tribes can, of course, hardly be included in this system. They are governed by their own sheikhs, who are responsible to the Government.

The following provinces are somewhat differently organised :—

1. The Darfur Province. Owing to its size, it is governed by a mudir umoom (Provincial Governor-General), whose duties are somewhat those of a travelling Inspector-General.

The province is divided into the mudirieh of Fasher and the two *memurieh idaret* of Kolkol and Dara. These *memurieh idaret* are each governed by a *memur idaret* (Head Councillor), residing at Kolkol and Dara. Except in the matter of the control of their finances, these officials are quite independent of the Fasher mudir.

The usual subdivisions into *aksam* follow.

2. Bahr-el-Ghazelle. This province is administered by a mudir umoom, with an assistant residing at Dem Idria.

As the country is inhabited by negro tribes, each under its own sheikh, it is not further divided. No regular taxes are paid. Some of the mudir's chief duties are (1) to collect ivory, caoutchouc, etc. : (2) to prevent slave trade.

3. Equatorial or Hat-el-Istwa Province. It is administered by a mudir umoom. The inhabitants are broken up into tribes, and pay no taxes.

The province is subdivided into the *memuriehs* of (1) Latooka, (2) Bor, (3) Makraka, (4) Monbutoo, (5) Wadilai, (6) Foweira.

4. The Senaar Province. Also under a mudir umoom. The *memurieh idaret* of Fazoglou is under him.

5. The province of Taka ; capital, Kasala. Also under a mudir umoom. The *memurieh idaret* of Gallabat belongs to this province. The province is further divided into *aksam*.

6. As the provinces of Massowah and Suakin are mostly inhabited by nomad tribes, they are not subdivided.

APPENDIX TO BOOK III

A list of the Letters and Proclamations of Mohammed Ahmed the Mahdi, and of his successor, the Khalifa Abdullah Taashi, found in the manuscript letter-book captured at the action of Toski on 3d August 1889.

Together with a short *résumé* of the contents of each letter, etc.

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	[Contents.]
3	Mahdi .	His followers	That women should not mix with men in public.
3	Mahdi .	His followers	To like "holy war," and feel assured of its high reward.
4-6	Mahdi .	His followers	29th Zu'l Hejjeh 1300	31.10.83	To forget this world and prepare for the world to come.
5-6	Mahdi .	His followers	12 Zu'l- Hejjeh 1300	14.10.83	To forget this world and prepare for the world to come.
7-8	Mahdi .	His followers	Enjoining the followers to compare their state under his government with that under the government of the Turks, and warning those who fled away with the booty that if they do not return with it they will be destroyed.
8	Mahdi .	His followers	1299	1882	To reduce the cost and ceremonial of marriages.
8-9	Mahdi .	His followers	1300	1883	Describing to them the character of a true Mohammedan.
9-10	Mahdi .	His followers	1300	1883	Warning those who fled with booty, that if they do not bring it all back they will be treated as enemies.
10	Mahdi .	His followers	5th Mohar- ram 1301	...	That if any one hides any of the booty captured he will be considered and treated as an enemy.
10	Mahdi .	His followers	1300	1883	If any one has anything against him or his Khalifas and Emirs let him declare

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
10	Mahdi .	His followers	it, and he will receive redress for any wrong done him by them.
10-11	Mahdi .	El-Ashraf (nobility)	15 Rabia- el-Awal 1302	2.1.85 .	To be attentive to their religious duties.
11	Mahdi .	His followers	6 Rama- dan	...	To obey God and their Emirs, and give up their souls and property for the sake of Holy War (Jehad).
11	Mahdi .	His followers	To have patience in afflictions and troubles.
11-13	Mahdi .	His followers	1300 .	1883 .	That they should talk only of religious matters in the Mosques.
13	Mahdi .	The govern- ment at Khartum	1300 .	1883 .	That they should all rise and join in the holy war, which is binding, and a duty, and that God is miraculously helping him, bidding them at the same time to obey and follow Osman Digna, who is sent by him to them.
13-14	Mahdi .	All Beiraks or owners of flags (standards)	1298 .	1881 .	To obey and follow him.
14	Mahdi .	The Ulema who denied his mission	17 Zu'l- Hejjeh 1300	19.10.83	Not to beat brass drums except when necessary, and not to copy any of the customs of the Turks.
14-15	Mahdi .	His followers	Rebuking them and calling them hypocrites.
15	Mahdi .	His followers	23 Rajab .	19.5.84 .	Calling them to Jebel Dair to pay their allegiance to him, and all unite in fighting against infidels upholding the religion of God.
15-16	Khalifa Abdullah	His followers ...	20 Shaban 1301	15.6.84	That those who have no hope in God, and cling to the vanities of this world, are fools.
					That there are between God and man nine difficulties to overcome, the easiest of which is death, and most difficult is the last day, i.e. the day of judgment, and that martyrs are exempted

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
16-17	Mahdi .	His followers	1300	1883	from judgment on that day. That the Khalifa Abdullah is to be his successor, and that he should be obeyed in like manner to himself.
17-18	Khalifa Abdullah	Abderrahman en Nejumi, Hamid Abu Angar, Ab- derrahman Abu Dagal, Musa Mo- hammed Helu, and Yunised De- keim	That he has received their letters and was pleased to hear of their success, and that they should always be one in God.
18	Mahdi .	Followers	That they should not be luxurious as the Turks, but rather decent and humble regarding dress, food, etc.
18-19	Mahdi .	Followers	That they should not use firearms in the camp. If any does so he will be punished.
19	Mahdi .	Friends	To trust in God and try to please Him.
19-20	Mahdi .	Followers	The four virtues of wearing the <i>murak-kahich jubbeh</i> , i.e. Mahdi uniform.
20	Mahdi .	Followers	On what they should say on meeting the enemy.
20-21	Mahdi .	All tribes	That they should be combatants in holy war rather than anything else.
21-22	Mahdi .	Followers	To build a mosque in every village for prayer and to abstain from liquors and other sins; also not to mourn over the dead. He also fixes a certain sum for the dowry of a wife.
22-23	Mahdi .	Followers	A parable of this world.
22-23	Mahdi .	Yusef Hassan esh Shellali and his men	That he received his letter, and that he will have no further communication with him if he still con-

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
24-26	Mahdi .	Gordon Pasha, favourite of Great Britain and of the Khedive	tinues to deny his true mission, except by sword. That he received his letter in which he promises to make him Sultan of Kordofan if he will submit; that he will never do so, but that Gordon Pasha should submit to him, as he is the true Mahdi, who cares not for the glories of this world but rather for those of the world to come.
26-28	Mahdi .	Gordon Pasha, favourite of Great Britain and of the Khedive	Jamad el-Awal 1301	March 1885	Calling on him to surrender before it is too late, and that if he surrenders he may be assured that no harm will happen to him.
28-29	Mahdi .	Followers	His laws respecting divorce.
29-30	Mahdi .	Followers	The orders on keeping the fast of Ramadan.
30	Mahdi .	Followers .	30 Shaban 1301	June 1885	The orders on keeping the fast of Ramadan.
31-32	Mahdi .	Followers .	1302	1885	A sermon; that repentance is of no avail unless preceded by a good life, and a description of paradise.
		From page 33	to page 38	missing.	
39-40	Khalifa Abdullah	Followers	Annulling the et Tijani order of worship and all other orders except that of the Mahdi.
40	Mahdi .	His agent in the island	Answering him on some judicial points on which the agent asks for information.
40-43	Mahdi .	Followers	He who pays allegiance to him must give up the pleasures of this life, and look only to those of the world to come.
43-47	Mahdi .	Followers besieging Khartum	Rajab 1300	June 1883	Praising them for their unity and encouraging them to stand even at the risk of their lives, reminding them of the noble reward of martyrs.

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
47	Mahdi .	Followers besieging Khartum	Warning them of the penalty incurred by transgressing certain laws of morality.
47	Mahdi .	Followers	Laws respecting divorce and women married to Turks.
47-48	Mahdi .	Followers	To follow the example of the disciples of the Prophet in being humble, forgiving, abstaining from all evil, and working for God and faith.
48-49	Mahdi .	Followers besieging Khartum	1800	1883	To be completely united in the siege, and to consider this only as an effort to attain the joys of the world to come.
50-51	Mahdi .	Followers	That they should meet death with great joy.
51-53	Mahdi .	Followers .	End of Rabia el Akher 1302	Feb. 15, 1885	An appeal to convince them that it is dangerous for a man to have riches, and that if they trust in God, He will provide them with what is necessary for them and make them satisfied.
53-54	Mahdi .	Sheikh Mo- hammed et Taib el Basir	That he should encourage the people to come to him to pay him allegiance, and that if they cannot travel they may pay allegiance to sheikh et Taib. A vision.
54	Mahdi .	Ahl el gerdeh (Hicks Pa- sha's army)	I. Shaban 1299	July 1882	That their guns and arms are of no consequence as long as fates are in the hands of God, and that he advises them to join Mahdism and not listen to their ulemas lest they be destroyed.
54	Mahdi .	The clerks of his govern- ment	To write distinctly each letter and not copy the Turks' system of handwriting, who are in the habit of mixing up the letters and changing the meaning.
54-56	Mahdi .	Followers	A speech: instigating them to fight in holy war, showing them

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
56-58	Khalifa	Emirs and chiefs under command of Mohammed el Kheir	how virtuous it is to fight in such a war and to be killed. To proceed without delay with Mohammed el Kheir to Dongola and be all of one mind, at the same time, explaining to them the glory of Paradise which they shall enjoy if they stand faithful to the end.
58-59	Hayat Abu Said, Ibn Mohammed, Ibn Bilwa, Ibn Osman, Ibn Fodi, at Dar Fellata	Mahdi at Kordofan	1300	1883	That he received his letter and that he believed in him in his heart.
59-65	Mahdi	Followers	A long letter showing the necessity and virtue of prayers, and at the same time, teaching them how to pray.
65-66	Mahdi	Followers	To thank God for being Mohammedans, and to do good in this world, aiming rather for the world to come.
66-68	Mahdi	Followers	8 Zu'l Hej- jeh 1301	29.9.84	That God is able to destroy his enemies without war, but for the honour of his people he wishes to carry out his designs by their means.
68-69	Khalifa	Abderrahman en Nejumi and the emirs and followers under his command	Telling the emirs to be all of one mind, which is indispensable, and that the followers must obey them.
69	Mahdi	Abdullah Abu en Nur	To preach to the followers the virtue of poverty and holy war.
70-71	Khalifa Wad Helu Mohammed, Sherif Ibn Hamid, and all the nobility of the Mahdi	Mohammed el Kheir and the followers under his command	8 Rama- dan 1302	22.6.85	Informing them of the death of the Mahdi (8 Ramadan 1302, Monday morning.

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
71	Khalifa Abdullah	Followers .	5 Rama- dan 1302	18.6.85 .	Speech by the Mahdi before his death to the effect that death is a natural law and that they should pre- pare for it before it is too late.
71-72	Mahdi .	Friends	That this world is of no consequence and that they should look forward to the world to come.
72-74	Khalifa Abdullah	Mohammed Abdullah Khojali and chiefs under his com- mand	16 Zulka- da 1302	27.8.85 .	To do good, have patience in affliction, to love holy war, and a description of Para- dise.
74-75	Khalifa Abdullah	Natives of Berber Mu- dirieh, espe- cially el Abbassieh el-Jaalin	To love holy war, and to join Mohammed el Kheir and fight under his command.
75-77	Mahdi .	Natives of Berber Mu- dirieh and Dongola Mudirieh.	1 Rajab 1302	61.4.85 .	To be at peace with one another and unite together in holy war, adding, that paying allegiance to him is in reality equivalent to despising this world and longing for the world to come.
77-79	Khalifa Abdullah	Natives of Darfur	29 Jamad el Akker 1303	...	That in the month of Rajab, the Mahdi before his death de- clared that he was to be his Khalifa, being marked with the let- ter ﴿ He then tells him a vision which he saw on Monday, the night of the Mahdi's death, in which a hand took his right hand and gave him over duties of the Khalifa.
79-84	Mahdi .	Followers	A long sermon demon- strating the duties of the Mahdiah, that they should give up their souls to God and the faith, that they should not think of themselves: God will provide them with all their wants.

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
84	Mahdi .	Et-Ta ^h er, Ibn el-weli, Et Taib, Ibn Ka ^m are ^d -Din el Mah-jub	A kind answer to some questions regarding prayer, also telling him that it is not necessary that he should come to pay his allegiance to him: it is sufficient if he pays his allegiance to any of his emirs.
84-88	Mahdi .	Followers	Evidences to prove the necessity of holy war. Punishment of those who do not join in it, and a noble reward of those who die martyrs in it.
88	Mahdi .	Followers	Explaining the words and meaning of "Bis-millah" (in the name of God).
88-93	Mahdi .	Followers	That the spirit of true religion had died out, and as Khalifa of the Prophet he is to restore it to its original vigour, and that therefore they should listen to him and obey his orders.
93-94	Mahdi .	Sheikh el Minneh Is-mail	1300	That he appointed another emir in his place as commander, and that he should not be distressed at this, as his aim and object should not be to possess the glories of this world, but rather he should long for the glories of the world to come.
94	Mahdi .	His agents and follow-ers	1300	That he has appointed Ahmed Suliman as head of the <i>Beit el Mal</i> , as he has found him to be most honest and trustworthy.
94	Mahdi .	His agents and follow-ers	That they should not call themselves Dervishes any longer, but rather "Ansar" (followers), and that "Mohammed el Bedawi Ibn Ahmed el Kinan Abu Sa ^t id is to be called Es Sadik the righteous."

Page of Letter-book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
94-96	Mahdi .	His agents and follow- ers	16 Shawal 1301	9.8.84 .	That they should give themselves up with all their property to God.
96-98	Khalifa Abdullah	His agents and follow- ers	Telling them a vision which he saw on a certain Tuesday night. Also of the hair which he swallowed up and which was entrusted to him by the Mahdi.
98-99	Mahdi .	Followers	Warning them not to busy themselves in worldly affairs during the month of Ramadan; that they should arrange cases among themselves, and that if they could not do so they must apply to his agents and Khalifas. And teaching "fate."
99	Ibrahim, Mah- di's friend	Mahdi	Requiring instructions respecting prayers.
99	Mahdi .	Ibrahim his friend	A reply to the above.
99-101	Mahdi .	Followers un- der Moham- med el Kheir, Ber- ber	19 Shaban 1302	3.6.85 .	That Dongola had become an important station, as the enemy was advancing, and that therefore they should proceed to Dongola with the agent whom Mohammed Saad may be pleased to send them, and that Mohammed Saad is to remain with Mohammed el Kheir at Berber.
101 to 102	Mahdi .	His agents and follow- ers	1 Rajab	To the agents to be just in their government, upright in their judgment, and to the followers to be obedient to their emirs and his agents.
102 to 106	Mahdi .	Followers .	1301 .	84 .	To trust in God and work for Him alone.
106 to 107	Mahdi .	Followers	To prepare for the world to come. A sermon.
107 to 110	Mahdi .	Mohammed el-Kheir Ibn Khojali	1302 .	1885 .	That Khalifa Abdullah, the commander in chief of his army, and Ahmed Suliman, head

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
					of <i>Beit el Mal</i> , are performing their duties to his utmost satisfaction, and that he expects him to be even more zealous than they in defending the faith and working to his satisfaction: also adding that if anybody hides anything of the booty taken in war he is to be sent to him for chastisement.
111 to 112	Mahdi .	Mohammed el Kheir Ibn Abdul- lah Khojali	A vision in which he states that he saw those who stole booty tormented in hell.
112 to 113	Mahdi .	Mohammed el Kheir Ibn Abdul- lah Khojali	Statement in Mahdi's own handwriting regarding certain future events told to him by a Weli (friendly spirit), which he says have turned out to be true.
113	Mahdi	A vision related by the Mahdi that God told Mohammed, the Prophet, three times that he was his khalifa.
113½	Mahdi .	Natives of Bara and Obeid	3 Zulkada 1300	5.9.83	Instructions concern- ing wives.
113 to 114	Mahdi .	Fakir ed Din	Explaining to him the meaning of the word khalifa.
114 to 115	Mahdi .	Sheik Mo- hammed el Amin	28 Shaban 1298	15.7.82	That argument does not necessarily lead to truth, but that God is the Guide, adding that he should believe in Him lest he be destroyed.
115	Abdullah en Nur	Mahdi	Regarding wives whose husbands are absent.
115	Mahdi .	Abdullah en Nur	His answer to the above.
115 to 116	Mahdi .	Sheikh Mo- hammed Ja- bra and his friend	Comforting him on the death of his son who died as martyr, adding that he should not be sorry but rather rejoice.
116	Mahdi .	Followers	That they should only ride horses in battle and that they should

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
116 to 118	Mahdi .	Followers	strive to be meek and humble. To love each other and to unite against the enemies of God in upholding the true faith.
118 to 119	Mahdi .	Followers	Instructions on matters which make prayer acceptable ; matters which make it unacceptable.
115	Mahdi .	Followers	Disappointment of those who do not trust in God.
119 to 120	Khalifa Abdullah	Followers .	21 Rabia el Akher 1305	6.1.88 .	That he saw a vision in which the false prophet "Isa" and his followers were tormented in hell ; that he asked God to forgive them but they could not be forgiven.
120 to 121	Khalifa Abdullah	Followers .	Shaban 1305	April 1888	That he saw a vision in which the Prophet approved of his proceedings, and that he disclosed to him many future events.
121 to 122	Khalifa Abdullah	Followers	That all cases either criminal or financial prior to 8th Ramadan 1302 (death of the Mahdi) are to be put aside except cases concerning : 1, debt ; 2, trust ; 3, orphans' property ; 4, and liberation.
122 to 123	Khalifa Abdullah	Agents ga- thering tri- bute	That they should only ask for what is required, and that if any of them make the natives pay more than is due they will be severely punished.
123 to 126	Khalifa Abdullah	Followers	That they should keep to their vows and not fail at any time to present themselves for the "Holy War ;" he adds a description of paradise to which martyrs go after death.
126 to 127	Mahdi .	Sheikh Dafa'- allah	1298 .	81. .	That God and the Prophet named him the Mahdi and gave him

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
127 to 129	Mahdi .	Khalifa Mo- hammed el Mahdi Ibn el Weli es Senussi	1300	83 .	victory over all his enemies. Similar to the above. Adds that he expects a satisfactory answer from him.
129	Khalifa Abdullah	Emirs and followers	That all cases either criminal or financial prior to Moharram 1302 (the date of his arrival at Omdur- man) are to be put aside, except 1, debt ; 2, trust ; 3, orphans' property ; 4, libera- tion.
129 to 130	Abdullah el- Mahjub Ibn Ahmed, a Mahdist agent	Kadi (el- Islam) Ah- med Ali	Asking him his opinion on 12 judicial points.
130	Kadi (el- Islam) Ah- med Ali	Abdullah el Mahjub, etc.	Reply to the above.
131	Kadi (el- Islam) Ah- med Ali	Agent, Kadi Mohammed Madan	23 Zu'l- Hejjeh 1302	5.10.85 .	The same.
131	Kadi (el- Islam) Ah- med Ali	All	Proclamation concern- ing divorce.
131	Khalifa Abdullah	All	Proclamation to the effect that they should accept money ; rais- ing no objections to "soft dollars and piastres" and that they should sell 4 yards of "dammur" for a quarter of a dollar everywhere.
132	Khalifa Abdullah	Agents and emirs	That they should not levy taxes on the followers unless they are authorised by him to do so.
132 to 133	Mahdi .	Followers	Instructions for keep- ing Ramadan.
134	Mahdi .	Followers	Sermon : To give them- selves up to Holy War, for which sacri- fice they shall receive eternal reward in paradise.
134	Mahdi .	Followers	That they should not fight in order to gain booty but to subdue

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
134	Mahdi .	Followers	the enemies of God, upholding His faith. That only those who are healthy and strong are to travel with the combatants: the sick and weakly women who cannot walk are to stay at home.
134 to 135	Mahdi .	Kadis, agents, and emirs	To be just in their government, upright in judgment, and to settle all cases by God's law. Also that all cases before 12th Rajab 1298 (battle of Masat) are to be dropped, except cases of 1, debt; 2, trust; 3, orphans' property; 4, liberation.
135	Mahdi .	Khalifa Abdullah	To severely punish those who do not obey his (the Mahdi's) orders, adding that Gordon Pasha's orders are obeyed as soon as given, why should not his orders be also obeyed?
135	Mahdi	The smoking of tobacco is a greater sin than drinking wine.
135 to 136	Mahdi .	Mohammed el Kheir Abdullah Khojali	Instructions concerning cases of lands, calling his attention to the instructions sent to him (16 Zulkada 1301) on the 18th September 1884 on the same subject.
136	Mahdi .	Ibrahim Mus- tafa	Answering four ques- tions regarding smok- ing of tobacco and the wearing of orna- ments.
136	Mahdi .	Followers .	14 Shaban 1302	29.5.85	Instructions respecting lands and wives.
137	Khalifa Abdullah	Followers	Reminding them of Mahdi's instructions concerning divorce, and not to allow women to lament at funerals.
137 to 138	Mahdi .	His agents	Instructions respecting marriage and divorce.

Page of Letter-Book.	From	To	Moham- medan Date.	Christian Date.	Contents.
138	Mahdi .	His agents	To preach the will of God to all followers and publish all his orders and proclamations.
138 to 139	Mahdi .	Friends	That he received their letter and thanked God for having brought them to the true faith, adding that as soon as they receive his letter he wishes them to choose one to be their leader and to join such and such an one and proceed to the siege of Khartum.
139	Mahdi	A vision, written by his own hand.
139 to 140	Mahdi .	Followers	To have patience in affliction and that such will bring high and noble rewards.
140	Mahdi .	His relatives and friends	Rebuking them for their want of faith.
140	Mahdi	Not to depend on the world which is but a shadow, but to yield the soul to God.
	Mahdi .	Followers	To be united; and ordering the khalifas and all the emirs to help the Khalifa Abdullah in gathering in supplies to the <i>Beit el Mal</i> ; arranging that all followers are supplied from the <i>Beit el Mal</i> , and that when this is emptied God will provide.
	Mahdi .	Followers	A vision in which the Prophet declares that he was the Mahdi and tells him of future events.
	Mahdi .	Followers	That they should thank God for permitting them to become defenders of faith and combatants in "Holy war."

There are 133 Letters in this Letter-Book—

99 from the Mahdi.

19 from the Khalifa Abdullah.

15 from various persons.

133 Total.

APPENDIX TO BOOK IV

SUPPOSED ITINERARY OF THE MARCH OF HICKS PASHA'S ARMY
FROM DUEM TO SHEKAN

Departure from	Date.	Arrival at	Date.	Distance in Miles.	No. of Days' halt.
Duem	24th Sep. '83	Shatt	24th Sep. '83	16	3
Shatt	27th Sep. '83	Zeregga	27th Sep. '83	16	3
Zeregga	30th Sep. '83	Drefissa	30th Sep. '83	16	2
Drefissa	2d Oct. '83	Serakna	2d Oct. '83	16	5
Serakna	7th Oct. '83	Nurabi	7th Oct. '83	22	3
Nurabi	10th Oct. '83	Glebenhar	10th Oct. '83	10	1
Glebenhar	11th Oct. '83	Aigella	11th Oct. '83	14	1
Aigella	12th Oct. '83	Shirkeleh	12th Oct. '83	14	2
Shirkeleh	14th Oct. '83	Johan	14th Oct. '83	18	1
Johan	15th Oct. '83	10th Station	15th Oct. '83	14	1
10th Station	16th Oct. '83	Abli	16th Oct. '83	14	1
Abli	17th Oct. '83	Beliab	17th Oct. '83	22	1
Beliab	18th Oct. '83	Umsheikh	18th Oct. '83	12	2
Umsheikh	20th Oct. '83	Rahad	20th Oct. '83	14	6
Rahad	26th Oct. '83	West Rahad	26th Oct. '83	5	1
West Rahad	27th Oct. '83	16th Station	27th Oct. '83	5	1
16th Station	28th Oct. '83	17th Station	28th Oct. '83	8	1
17th Station	29th Oct. '83	Alluba	29th Oct. '83	10	6
Alluba	4th Nov. '83	19th Station	4th Nov. '83	5	1
19th Station	5th Nov. '83	Shekan	5th Nov. '83	2	1
Total . .				253	43

Approximate state of Egyptian troops in the Sudan in the beginning of 1883.

N.B.—It is almost impossible to arrive at any absolutely accurate estimate of the numbers. There appears to have been very little system in keeping account of the changes which necessarily took place. The following rough calculations are therefore given with all reserve; but from careful comparison, it is believed that in round numbers the totals are fairly correct.

TABLE A

TOTAL IN ALL STATIONS

Stations.	Officers and Men.	No. of Battalions and Corps.
Berber . .	2170	9
Khartum . .	7470	31
Kordofan . .	5830	30
Sennar . .	2350	9
Kassala . .	3940	25
Dongola . .	1950	7
Amadib . .	920	3
Galabat . .	1610	4
Senhit . .	1900	6
Gera . .	800	2
Gedaref . .	200	2
Harrar . .	3470	8
Darfur . .	4863	15 (?)
Bahr el Ghazal . .	886	3 (?)
Equatoria . .	2131	7 (?)
Total . .	40,490	161 (?)

TABLE B

THE ARMY OF HICKS PASHA

N.B.—Hicks Pasha's army consisted of the following troops ; but of these, 4906 were left in various garrisons, and have been included in the preceding state, while the remainder marched into Kordofan, and were annihilated almost to a man.

Regiments or Ordeh.	Commanding Officers.	Officers and Clerks.	N. C. O. and Men.	Total. E = Egyptians. S = Sudanese.
1st Regiment Infantry	Selim Bey Auni	100	2300	2400 { 2160 E. 140 S.
2d " "	Es-Said Bey Abdel Kader	100	2400	2500 { 2250 E. 250 S.
3d " "	Ibrahim Pasha Heidar	100	2500	2600 { 2340 E. 260 S.
4th " "	Ragab Bey Siddik	100	2857	2957 { 2630 E. 327 S.
Regt. Art. & Cavalry	Abbas Bey Wahbi	95	2305	2400 { 2160 E. 140 S.
Ordeh Bashi-Bazuks	Kheir ed Din Bey	30	470	500 B.
Ordeh " "	Abd el Aziz Bey	30	470	500 B.
Ordeh " "	Wali Bey	30	470	500 B.
Ordeh " "	Milhim Bey	30	470	500 B.
Ordeh " "	Yehya Bey	20	481	501 B.
Grand Total . .		635	14,723	15,358

Subsequent to the fall of El Obeid and the annihilation of Hicks Pasha's army, the garrisons of the Sudan were estimated at 32,610 men.

Many changes had taken place in the garrisons ; some had been withdrawn to reinforce others ; but information is so very limited that only an approximate disposition of the troops can be arrived at, and this approximation is given in the body of the work (Book IV. p. 50).

TABLE C

The following table shows the number of persons who have returned to Egypt of the garrisons mentioned in Table A, including their families, etc., up to date 1890.

Garrison.	Regulars.	Irregulars.	Civil Employees.	Families.	Emigrants.	Total.
Harrar . .	3091	129	248	4818	...	8,286
Zeila . .	211	...	17	250	...	478
Berbera . .	257	...	17	391	...	665
Massawa-						
Suakin . .	3272	469	35	876	84	4,736
Kassala . .	99	55	15	...	3	172
Gera . .	450	450
Galabat . .	185	4	2	458	30	679
Amadib . .	434	...	5	812	...	1,251
Senhit . .	807	1111	...	1,918
Gedaref
Sennar . .	16	15	31
Khartum . .	296	167	18	...	600	1,081
Duem
Kaua
Fashoda . .	2	2
Bahr-el-Ghazal	...	2	2	4
Darfur . .	4	4
Berber . .	211	97	10	...	1,183	1,501
Dongola . .	507	683	50	...	9,400	10,640
Equatorial Pro-						
vinces . .	7	1	14	90	382	494
Grand Total .	9849	1622	433	8806	11,682 ¹	32,392

¹ The majority of these did not return to Egypt.

A comparison of Tables A, B, C, shows that the approximate casualties in the Sudan since the first outbreak of revolt may be estimated as follows:—

Total garrisons in the Sudan (Table A)	40,490
Hicks Pasha's army (Table B)	10,452
Baker Pasha's army	2,375

Total . . . 53,317

Deduct Hicks Pasha's army, less 475 who are

known to have died or escaped . . . 9,977

And Baker Pasha's losses . . . 2,375

12,352

Remainder . . . 40,965

Of this number 11,472 can be accounted for as
having returned to Egypt, deducting therefore
this number . . . 11,472

Remainder . . . 29,493

It may therefore be roughly concluded that subsequent to Hicks Pasha's and Baker Pasha's disasters some 30,000 troops were lost.

Of these a large number have been killed or have died, and the remainder have become amalgamated with the Arabs and dispersed throughout the Sudan.

In addition to the above, there were a large number of men, women, and children, the wives and families of the garrisons, of officials, merchants, and others, who in many cases shared the fate of the soldiers.

It is impossible to estimate with any degree of accuracy the losses under this heading; but a glance at Table C shows that a considerable number of these as well as civil government officials have returned to Egypt: and if these figures be taken as a basis of calculating the proportionate number of women, children, and civilians attached to the 30,000 troops which are considered as lost, we may conclude roughly that their number was upwards of 5000, and that these have shared the same fate as 30,000 troops already referred to.

Calculating therefore, generally, the total casualties which have occurred in the Sudan, of whom perhaps 40 per cent have been slain, we arrive at the following figures:—

Destruction of Hicks Pasha's army . . .	9,502
" Baker " " " . . .	2,375
Casualties in different parts of the Sudan . . .	30,000
	<hr/>
Total . . .	41,877
	<hr/>

or, in round numbers, 40,000 troops, and 5,000 civilians and wives, children, and servants of the above.

N.B.—It must be remembered that the above figures are exclusive of Arab levies, etc. etc., of which considerable numbers were raised by the Government from time to time to fight against the rebels.

APPENDIX TO BOOK V

GENERAL GORDON'S PROCLAMATION

I

. . . I also give you the right to keep the slaves in your service without any interference from the Government or anybody else . . .

GORDON,
Governor-General of Sudan.

II

Whereas my sincerest desire is to adopt a course of action which shall lead to the public tranquillity, and being aware with what regret you have regarded the severe and stringent measures which have been taken by the Government for the suppression of the traffic, and the seizure and punishment of all concerned in the slave trade, as provided by the convention and by the decrees, I therefore confer upon you these rights: that henceforth no one shall interfere with your property; that whoever has slaves in his service shall have full right to their services and full control over them without any interference whatsoever.

(L. S.)

GORDON,
Governor-General of Sudan.

(On 21st of February General Gordon telegraphed)—

Several telegrams have been sent from the press, asking me what I said respecting slaves. The question asked me was this: Did I insist on the liberation of slaves in 1889 as per Treaty of 1877? I answered that the Treaty would not be enforced in 1889 by me, which, considering the determination of Her Majesty's Government respecting Sudan, was a self-evident fact. The question is one of *slave-holding*, not of *slave-hunting*, and in my opinion that Treaty of 1877 will never be carried out in Cairo as to slave-holding.

SIR HENRY GORDON'S EXPLANATION

(23d February 1884)

It has reference to *keeping* slaves, not to *taking* them.

In the year 1807 the taking of slaves was made piracy in Great

Britain, but it was not until 1833 that the slaves were emancipated, and on their getting their freedom in 1839 the planters or owners got £20,000,000 by way of compensation.

In 1877 the taking of slaves in Egypt was by an edict made punishable by death. The selling of slaves from one person to another in Lower Egypt was to cease in 1884 (this year, 14th August), and in the Sudan in 1889. You will observe that the slaves remain as such, but they cannot be sold, they must remain with the families they are with at the time the edict comes into force. Slaves are money; if you emancipated them without compensating the owners (as was the case with England when you gave £20,000,000) it would be robbery.

According, therefore, to existing laws, the owners of the slaves in the Sudan may traffic with their property until 1889, and General Gordon tells the people so.

He merely tells them that he has not come to break the law and confiscate their property.

H. W. GORDON.

Copied 13th October 1884,
Eastney Barracks,
W. S. GORDON, Lieutenant, R.M.A.

APPENDIX TO BOOK VI

Evidence taken before a General Court-Martial held in Cairo, in June 1887, for the trial of Hassan Bey Bahnassawi, Colonel commanding the 5th Regiment, who held that portion of the fortifications of Khartum through which the enemy first entered, and who was charged with having treacherously delivered up his post to the enemy.

First witness for the prosecution.

ABD EL KADER BEY HASSAN, being duly sworn, is examined by the prosecutor.

I was in Khartum of the White Nile on the fortification. No. 1 battalion 5th regiment was on my west, and Fort Mukran was behind me, and there were some soldiers in it.

Examined by the prosecutor.—Q.
How many?

A. One gun and some Bashi-Bazuks, about twenty or twenty-five.

Q. Were there any boats on the Blue Nile?

A. There was nothing on the Blue Nile; on the White Nile there were boats with soldiers armed with rifles (Remingtons).

Q. How many Arabs stormed the city?

A. Perhaps 50,000.

Q. Were many of our men killed on the fortifications?

A. Yes, many. I do not remember the number.

Q. How many were left alive?

A. About 1000.

Q. How many were there on the fortifications?

A. At first 9000, but at the last only about 5000.

Q. How many guns were there on the fortifications?

A. About six between the rivers. Some mountain, one Krupp, one field.

Q. Which day did Khartum fall?

A. 26th January 1885. Monday, 9 o'clock, Arabic time of the night (3 A.M.)

Q. On which part of the fortifications were most of the soldiers killed?

A. On the west. On the post of the 1st battalion 5th regiment.

Q. Who was the commander-in-chief?

A. Farag Pasha.

Q. What was Hassan Bey Bahnassawi's command?

A. The 5th regiment. The 1st regiment was under Bakhit Bey.

Q. What battalions, companies, etc., were under him?

A. He was a general commander.

Q. Where did the Arabs enter?

A. In a vacant space between the 1st battalion and the boats on the White Nile.

Q. Who was the officer commanding the 1st battalion 5th regiment?

A. Yusef Effendi Erfat.

Q. What did the boats do when the enemy entered between them and the battalion?

A. They fired on the enemy.

Q. What did Fort Mukran do?

A. It fired.

Q. How far off were the enemy when they began to charge?

A. I did not see, it was at night.

Q. Did the enemy charge with steel, or did they begin by firing?

A. They only fired a little. The remainder charged with steel.

Q. What happened to the arms and ammunition when the enemy entered?

A. They took possession as they were.

Q. Had you no orders as to assembling at an alarm post?

A. No.

Q. Who is said to have caused the fall of Khartum? (The Court disallows this question.)

Q. Who ordered the gates of Khartum to be opened?

A. I don't know, but I heard that Farag Pasha did so and also Bahnassawi Bey.

Q. How many gates were there to the fortifications?

A. One gate under Farag Pasha, but on the side of the White Nile the line was open.

Q. Did any correspondence take place with the enemy?

A. Some took place.

Q. From whom? To whom?

A. From Osman el Multizim and Abdullah Wad es Selieh and the kadi and the mudir Ahmed Ali el Jellab, eighteen persons in all.

Q. Did they remain in the town?

A. They were in prison for a time and afterwards released.

Q. Did you with your own eyes see Hassan Bey Bahnassawi jumping out of the trenches, leaving them?

A. When the enemy rushed on us from the west and were killing us, Hassan Bey is said to have jumped over the ditch. I did not see him.

Q. On the day of the fall of Khartum were there many inhabitants in Khartum?

A. Many. Perhaps 30,000.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey Bahnassawi afterwards as a prisoner?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any others?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Hassan Bey Bahnassawi well or badly treated by the enemy?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know who were well treated?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know the Sanjak Omar Agha Ibrahim?

A. I know him. He is alive with the Arabs. He was on the fortifications, but deserted before the fall.

Q. Who was in his post?

A. I do not know.

Q. Is Farag Pasha alive or dead?

A. Dead.

Cross-examination by the prisoner.

—Q. How was the southern front of the fortifications of Khartum divided?

A. The western half under Hassan Bey Bahnassawi, and the eastern under Bakhit Bey Betraki, and the whole under Farag Pasha.

Q. Do you know that in Safar (November-December) Gordon Pasha ordered the line to be divided into four sections?

A. I did not know this.

Q. Do you know who was in command of the point where the enemy entered, i.e. on the White Nile?

A. Yusef Effendi Erfat.

Q. Where was Osman Bey Heshmat in command?

A. I do not remember.

Q. What was his post?

A. I do not know.

Q. Where were you at the time of the rush?

A. On the fortifications.

Q. What did you do?

A. I defended myself as well as I could until I was taken.

Q. How long did you resist?

A. I do not remember how many hours.

Q. What sort of arms did you defend yourself with?

A. A sword.

Q. And your soldiers?

A. Remington rifles and other firearms.

Q. When the enemy attacked your post did you defend yourself from all sides or only one?

A. On all sides.

Q. Where was your post exactly?

A. On the division of the White Nile.

Q. When you were made a prisoner where were you taken?

A. To my house.

Re-examination by the prosecutor.

—Q. Where is your house?

A. In Khartum itself. They took me to clear away my things, and afterwards I was sent to the "dem" in Khartum, and afterwards to Omdurman.

Examination by the Court.—Q. When you were taken prisoner were you on the line of defence?

A. On the line of defence.

Q. Did the enemy attack all along the line or at one point only?

A. They attacked all along the line of fortifications.

Q. Were the battalions of the 5th regiment together or separated?

A. Separated.

Q. Where was the Bey's (Hassan Bey Bahnassawi's) post?

A. El Kalakala.

Q. Where was the Kalakala? in the middle of the line, or where?

A. In the nearest, third to the White Nile.

Q. When Hassan Bey was in prison how was he treated?

A. The same as the others as far as I saw.

Q. Under whose command was the part of the fortifications through which the enemy came?

A. In the general command of Hassan Bey, but under Erfat Effendi.

Q. The detachment of men on the Blue Nile on your left, of Bashi-Bazuks and your men, and the battalion on your right were under whom?

A. Hassan Bey Bahnassawi.

Q. Did you receive no orders that night from him?

A. No special orders.

Q. Were there any special arrangements in Hassan Bey's command?

A. The same as usual.

Q. Who told you Hassan Bey or Farag opened the gates?

A. I heard it from the Arabs.

Q. From which side did the Arabs attack your post?

A. From the White Nile, not from the gate which I heard had been opened by Farag Pasha.

Q. What was the width of the open space through which the enemy entered?

A. 150 yards about.

Q. Why were no works made there?

A. The enemy used to fire at the working-parties.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha know of this place?

A. Yes, its length depends upon the height of the Nile.

Q. What was the daily ration of a soldier just before the enemy came?

A. Gum for the last five days. Before that there was a little bread brought from Tuti, one-third of the ration.

Q. Had there been no meat?

A. Every living thing had been eaten ten days.

Q. Were your men strong enough to fight on the last day?

A. No, on account of hunger.

Q. Did you know that the English army was coming to help you?

A. Yes.

Q. During the defence on the last night did you not see Hassan Bey at all?

A. No.

Q. Were there no field officer's rounds by night?

A. Yes, every night.

Q. Did they go round the night of the fall?

A. Yes; I saw them.

Q. Who were they?

A. I do not know.

Q. Used Hassan Bey Bahnassawi to inspect his line?

A. Yes, by day and night.

Q. Did he inspect the night of the fall of Khartum?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the Arabic date of the fall of Khartum?

A. 9th Rabia el Akher (26th January 1885).

Q. At the time of the attack was there any moonlight?

A. No.

Q. Was there a mine before Khartum?

A. It had been destroyed, and did not work when the Arabs entered.

Q. How was it fired?

A. Mechanically.

Q. Was there any electric light?

A. No.

His evidence is read over to the witness for him to correct.

The witness withdraws.

The Court adjourns at 1.15 P.M. till 8.30 A.M. on the 15th.

The Court decides that in future the witness will only be questioned with direct reference to the charge.

The Court is reopened at 9.15 A.M., 15th June 1887.

Second witness for the prosecution.

MULAZIM AWAL ALI EFFENDI HASSAN, 4th battalion 5th regiment, duly sworn, states:—

I was present at the fall of Khartum in the fighting line. The Arabs stormed at dawn.

This witness being unwell is allowed to withdraw.

Third witness for the prosecution.

MIKHAIL BEY DAUD, being duly sworn, states:—

I was in Khartum on the day of the fall, but not in the fighting line. On the night before I was in the house of the American Consul. At 9 o'clock, Arabic time, on the night of Monday the 26th January 1885, I heard the voices of the Arabs. I went up on the roof. I saw the Arabs entering the town. They asked, Where is Gordon Pasha's house? They most of them ran on to his house. I went back into the house and shut the doors and stopped there till after sunrise. Then two Arabs came to us and said, "We have killed Gordon Pasha, we wish to kill you." We asked for mercy and they granted it. Afterwards eight came and killed the consul and his brother, etc., but I hid in the garden four hours. After that more Arabs came looking for one Osman Handuk, and saw me and wanted to kill me. But while they were taking me to my house that I might show them my property before they killed me, orders came from the Mahdi that no more should be killed. They imprisoned me five days in my house, took away my property, and then turned me out of Khartum.

Q. When you were on the top of the house looking for the Arabs did you see Hassan Bey Bahnassawi?

A. No.

Q. On the day before the fall of Khartum what did you eat?

A. Two pounds of wheat.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha say nothing to you about the fall?

A. No.

Q. Did you hear that he was displeased with any of the officers or men?

A. No.

Q. Did you not hear that any one had caused the fall of Khartum?

A. After I had left the town I heard that the enemy had entered by the White Nile at the part where Hassan Bey Bahnassawi was in command.

Q. When you were on the top of your house did you see firing from Fort Mukran or from the White Nile?

A. No. The house of the consul is far off in the middle of the town.

Q. Did you see the men on the part of the fortification near your house fire?

A. Those near Buri fired a great deal, but those on the other side only fired two guns, and after that there was some confused firing.

Cross-examined by the prisoner.—

Q. How long were you hidden in the lemon tree drain?

A. Four hours.

Q. When you were on the house could you tell from what side the fire was?

A. I could not see. I could only hear.

Q. But could you tell whether the firing was from the soldiers or Arabs?

A. No.

Q. What did the soldiers eat before the fall of Khartum?

A. Six days before everything had been eaten up—dogs, cats, etc.

Q. Did you not visit any of the officers on the fortifications?

A. Yes. Gordon Pasha ordered the majlis (committee) to do so.

Q. Do you know how the line was divided?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if it was definitely laid down?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you not hear the soldiers were eating gum?

A. Yes, they were. It was bought from the merchants for them. Also the core of the palm trees.

Q. How many days had they eaten gum?

A. Seven, about.

Q. Did you see or hear how the gum affected the soldiers?

A. It produced diarrhoea.

Q. Do you know Hassan Bey Bahnassawi?

A. I have known him since the siege.

Q. Do you consider him an honourable man?

A. Yes.

Re-examined by the prosecutor.—

Q. Did the soldiers eat the palm pulp before the gum?

A. No, the gum first. When that was finished the pulp.

Q. How many days did they eat pulp?

A. Two. Khartum fell on the third. All the cows of the *sakias* were killed the day before the fall and given to the soldiers—100 or more.

Q. How was it you still had wheat?

A. I am a merchant and kept a private store.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey on the night of the fall?

A. No.

Examination by the Court.—Q. Did you see Hassan Bey in prison?

A. I saw him fifteen days later.

Q. How was he?

A. Like the rest of us. Dressed as a dervish—dirty. He said the Mahdi had taken his daughter.

Q. When the Arabs took the town, did you hear that any one had deserted to them?

A. No.

Q. Did you expect the Arabs that night in particular?

A. No. Everything was the same as usual.

Q. What did you hear about Hassan Bey's daughter?

A. The Mahdi had all the girls collected and chose for himself first. He took all the pretty ones and distributed the remainder to his Arabs.

Q. How many gates had Khartum?

A. Three—Bab el Messalamieh, Bab Buri, Bab el Kalakala.

Q. Who was the officer commanding the fighting line?

A. Farag Pasha.

Q. Who were the officers commanding sections?

A. Bakhit Bey, Hassan Bey, Bahnassawi Bey, and two others.

Q. Who made the fortifications of Khartum?

A. Abd el Kader Pasha.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha repair them?

A. Yes. He made a wall inside them and barracks.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha increase the ditch?

A. Yes, he made it half a metre wider.

Q. Did Abd el Kader Pasha try if the Arabs could jump the ditch?

A. Yes, he widened it until no one could jump it.

Q. What sort of soil was the bank of the White Nile between

the river and the end of the fortifications?

A. Wet clay, in which a man sank to his knees.

Q. The party who attacked came from which bank?

A. From Jeziret Sennar, between the two branches of the Nile.

Q. How many are supposed to have attacked that night?

A. 50,000. Some said 30,000.

Q. How many were the garrison?

A. More than 8000, including those that went to Metemmeh with Nushi Pasha. On the night of the attack perhaps 7000 or more.

Q. From what part did the Arabs enter, and who were the officers commanding?

A. From the Bahr el Abiad. Hassan Bahnassawi.

Q. What was done with the arms and ammunition?

A. The enemy put guards over them.

Q. Who were the other officers commanding besides Hassan Bey and Betraki Bey?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was their office the same as those two?

A. They were also beys, the same as the others.

Q. Where were the two whose names you do not know?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know what was Hassan Bey's command?

A. No.

Q. Where was his headquarters?

A. His tent was east of Bab el Kalakala.

Q. Whereabouts is Bab el Kalakala?

A. In the fifth section, nearest the west bank.

His evidence having been read over to the witness, the witness withdraws.

Fourth witness for the prosecution.

EL BIMBASHI SAID EFFENDI AMIN, 5th regiment, 4th battalion, being duly sworn, states :—

I was in Khartum on the day of the fall. I was in a room attached to the fortifications, sick. I had been there then twenty-four days. Before that I was in command of the 4th battalion.

Q. When you were sick was the battalion still under you ?

A. Yes, but I did no duty outside. The miralai (Hassan Bey) appointed a bimbashi, Farag Effendi Ali, to do that for me.

Q. Where was your battalion posted ?

A. On the left of the 5th regiment, on the right (W.) of Bab el Kalakala.

Q. Who were on the right of your battalion ?

A. The *ordeh* (company) of Mohammed Bey, a Shaigi. Perhaps 120 men.

Q. What was the strength of your battalion ?

A. 420 rank and file.

Q. Who was your commander ?

A. The miralai Hassan Bey Bahnassawi.

Q. What was his command ?

A. His regiment and some *aradeh* (companies) of Bashi-Bazuks. The left had three battalions—1st, 2d, and 4th—of which the second was in Omdurman. There were also twelve companies.

Q. Was Fort Mukran under him ?

A. No.

Q. How far did his command extend on the fortifications ?

A. From Bahr el Abiad to Bab el Kalakala. First battalion from Bahr el Abiad, then a company of Bashi-Bazuks, then the 4th battalion as far as the fort at Bab el

Kalakala, then the company of the sanjak Mohammed Ahmed to Bab el Kalakala.

Q. How long was his command from Bab el Kalakala ?

A. 7000 metres from the Fort Mukran. He would go over it in an hour on a horse walking.

Q. Did the men stand along the parapets in one rank or two ?

A. One man every four paces.

Q. Was the parapet continuous as far as the Nile ?

A. It reached as far as low Nile mark. When the Nile rose it broke down, but when it sank we made a new one.

Q. Then the parapet reached the water ?

A. Yes.

Q. Draw the line on a piece of paper.

A. Yes.

Q. In the month of January, in which the town fell, had the Nile broken the parapet ?

A. Yes, and had fallen away from it. They were working at repairing it.

Q. How many yards of parapet were there destroyed ?

A. About 1000.

Q. Do you know how many men were on the defence on the day of the fall ?

A. I do not know.

Q. What was the men's rations in January ?

A. None were issued.

Q. Was no rice issued in January ?

A. No—I do not know—I was sick.

Q. Were there mines in front of the fortifications ?

A. There had been, but they had been destroyed by the Nile.

Q. Were there any artificial obstacles ?

A. Yes. Wire and pits with explosive bombs.

Q. What time did the Arabs enter?

A. At 8.30 or 9, Arabic time. Before dawn.

Q. When the enemy rushed were no guns fired?

A. I do not know. I did not hear.

Q. What did you see of the enemy's advance?

A. Nothing. I was asleep.

Q. Had you no orders from the miralai as to a rendezvous in case the first line was broken?

A. No. We did not expect it would be broken.

Q. Were no townspeople on the line to help you?

A. Yes. As many as chose. Sometimes many, sometimes only a few.

Q. Do you know a certain Omar Ibrahim?

A. I do not. I have heard of him.

Q. Who was the general commander?

A. Farag Pasha.

Q. Did you patrol?

A. Yes. Every night.

Q. Were there many patrols?

A. Yes. Every officer inspected his division.

Q. Used Hassan Bey to inspect you at night?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you last see Hassan Bey before the fall?

A. On the night at 1 o'clock Arabic, he came with Farag Pasha.

Q. When did your men last eat meat before the fall?

A. The 1st January.

Q. When did they eat pulp?

A. During January, and gum.

Q. Which did they eat first?

A. The gum.

Q. Was there a council of defence?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you know who have been accused of treachery?

A. Ali Jellab and others, merchants.

Q. Have any of them come here?

A. No.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey in prison?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see Wad El Ahhad there?

A. No.

Q. Who were best treated there?

A. All were treated alike.

Q. Were most of the soldiers who were killed Sudanese or Egyptians?

A. Egyptians.

Q. How many Sudanese were there in your battalion and in the 1st?

A. None.

Q. Were many killed in the company of Shaggieh?

A. Not many, for most had deserted.

Q. What did you do if you saw a deserter?

A. We shot him.

Q. How many were shot?

A. Three or four, some time before.

Q. Did many regulars desert?

A. One. He was caught and shot.

Cross-examination by the prisoner.—

Q. Was the distribution of the defence not changed?

A. There was a man called Osman Bey Heshmat, kaimakam, who had charge of the 1st battalion and the company of Shaggieh next the White Nile, and Ibrahim Bey Saleh on the left, and Hassan Bey used to inspect the whole.

Q. Was this done by written orders of Gordon Pasha?

A. Yes.

Q. Was the first regiment also divided?

A. I do not know.

Q. Was Osman Bey under Hassan Bey or equal to him?

A. Under him, but responsible for his own piece.

Q. What did the dervishes do with Hassan Bey's wife and children?

A. I heard that Mohammed Ahmed took his daughter, and the Arabs took the other women.

Q. Did he take her by force?

A. By force. He took all the nice girls.

Q. Were the battalions of Hassan Bey strong on the day of the fall?

A. No. They had been much reduced.

Q. How many men had been taken away from Hassan Bey's battalion?

A. Nushi Pasha had taken two companies from the 1st, one from the 4th battalion, and eighty men to the Government House, and eighty to the steamers.

Q. Had not Hussein Effendi any men with him?

A. Yes; but we had received other men instead of them from the 2d battalion.

Q. Can you say how many fighting men were there on the day of the fall?

A. No, it varied, and I had been sick.

Q. Do you know how many were sick in Hassan Bey's division?

A. Almost all sick on account of hunger and eating gum.

Q. Do you know what happened when the Arabs entered?

A. I heard nothing at the time, until they came to my room. I asked about it afterwards. They fired a little, and so did the soldiers.

Q. Could the soldiers have defended themselves on the day of the fall?

A. No; they were very ill.

Q. Was the Bab el Kalakala in working order?

A. No, it was disused. The bridge in front of it had been taken away, the gate remained open, but the ditch could not be crossed.

Q. Was there a gate in Buri?

A. It had been closed like Bab el Kalakala. Bab el Messalamieh was the only one used.

Q. How far is it from Bab el Messalamieh to Bab el Kalakala?

A. 1500 metres.

Q. Who was the officer commanding the eastern division?

A. Bakhit Betraki miralai, 1st regiment.

Q. Under whose command was Bab el Messalamieh?

A. Bakhit Bey Betraki.

The Court adjourned at 1.30 P.M. till 9 A.M. on the 16th. Examination continued on the 16th.

Examined by the Court.—Q. Why did you not expect that the line would be broken?

A. We were confident and strong.

Q. From whence did the enemy come in?

A. I did not see, and do not know.

Q. Who was commander of the line next the White Nile?

A. Yusef Effendi Erfat, officer commanding the 1st battalion.

Q. Who was the officer commanding Fort Mukran?

A. Bimbashi Ibrahim Effendi esh Sheikh.

Q. What soldiers?

A. Bashi-Bazuks.

Q. How many guns?

A. One. Sometimes another would go to help it.

Q. Are there any officers of the 1st battalion here?

A. Salem. Sid Ahmed Effendi.

Q. How far was Fort Mukran from the line of fire?

A. 2500 or 3000 metres.

Q. If a bullet was fired from the Mukran would it reach the place where the dervishes entered?

A. No.

Q. How many men were there in No. 1 battalion of the 5th regiment?

A. Four companies of 105 men. The numbers of the 4th battalion were the same.

Q. Were there posts between Fort Mukran and the line?

A. There were posts and boats on the river. The posts were under the officer commanding the fort, and the boats under Hassan Bey; and the officer commanding the fort took orders from the Governor-General by telegraph, but sent states and information to Hassan Bey, who also patrolled there.

Q. How deep and wide was the ditch of the fortifications?

A. Three metres deep and four metres broad from Bab el Kalakala and westwards as far as the place where the Nile had broken it down.

Q. If a man fell into the ditch could he get out without assistance?

A. Yes. The surface was broken by rain.

Q. In January was there rain?

A. Yes.

Q. Opposite Bab el Kalakala could a man get out of the ditch without assistance?

A. Not unless the rain had made footsteps.

Q. Out of the 7000 metres how much was good?

A. 1000 metres. 6000 were broken down.

Q. On the night of the fall was there water in the ditch?

A. The 1000 metres next the Nile were very damp clay.

Q. For these 1000 metres how deep was the ditch?

A. Two metres deep. The breadth varies.

Q. What earth was it?

A. Black earth.

Q. How many days longer could the garrison have held out?

A. Perhaps one more day, but only because we were expecting the English army.

Q. When the enemy entered were there any provisions left?

A. Some of the soldiers had gum.

The examination is discontinued at 1-20 P.M. The Court is adjourned till Saturday at 9 A.M.

The Court is reopened on 18th June at 9.30 A.M. After a discussion of the relevancy of the evidence already produced, the examination of the witness is continued.

Q. Your battalion was 420. How many had died before the fall?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did any die?

A. Some were killed and some died of hunger.

Q. How many metres of parapet did your battalion take?

A. 600 metres. 150 metres to each company.

Q. Did the 420 include the detachment in the steamers?

A. Yes.

Q. Did natives come and help your battalion?

A. Yes.

Q. How did the Mahdi take Hassan Bey's daughter, as a wife or as a concubine?

A. I do not know. I think as a concubine.

Q. Did the emirs take his wives regularly after Hassan Bey had divorced them, or as concubines?

A. As concubines.

Q. Hassan Bey's post was Bab el Kalakala. Did the bey command Osman Bey Heshmat's division or not?

A. Yes, he commanded the whole line.

Q. You said Bahr el Abiad and Bab el Kalakala were 7000 metres apart. The garrison was two battalions and some Bashi-Bazuks. You say now that a battalion held 600 metres. Who occupied the remainder?

A. Fort Mukran was 3000 metres from the corner of the parapet on the White Nile—1200 metres the regular troops, 2800 metres the Bashi-Bazuks.

Q. How was the broken-down part of the parapet occupied?

A. 1st battalion 5th regiment. The right of this battalion was on the Nile.

Q. How many companies of Bashi-Bazuks were there between the 1st and 4th battalions?

A. I do not know. It depended on the height of the Nile.

Q. How did the Nile alter?

A. The same as the Nile here.

Q. At the time of the fall the Nile was falling. How many companies were there?

A. Twelve, I think.

Q. How many of the enemy entered your tent?

A. Four. They struck me with two lances, and fired two bullets, one of which struck me. Then they took me outside by the White Nile.

Q. Do you know if the enemy entered by the Messalamieh gate?

A. No, I do not know.

Q. How far is Fort Mukran from the end of the fortifications?

A. 3000 metres about.

Q. From the end of the fortifications to Bab el Kalakala?

A. 4000 metres.

Q. Bab el Kalakala to Bab el Messalamieh?

A. 1000 to 1500 metres.

Q. Bab el Messalamieh to Bahr el Azrak?

A. 3000 metres.

Q. If you walked from the Blue to the White Nile—how many hours?

A. Four hours.

Q. Did you know that the English army was coming soon?

A. Yes.

Q. Were there telegraphs in your forts?

A. Yes, at headquarters, every regiment and post.

Q. To the palace and to one another?

A. Yes.

Q. Had you no orders as to reporting approach of enemy?

A. Yes, to inform every one, and the others had men told off to assist us.

Q. Did you practise night alarms?

A. Every night the enemy attacked, so there was no necessity.

Q. When the enemy attacked did the officer commanding take out the supports and go there?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Hassan Bey take a support that night, and go to the point threatened?

A. I do not know.

Q. Who was supposed to take the support out to the place?

A. I do not know. There was no one told off.

Q. How is this?

A. There were no proper supports. A few men from each company were sent to the threatened place.

Q. Before you were ill were you on the parapet? Were you never attacked?

A. Never. They only fired from a distance.

Q. Had you never occasion to report that the enemy were advancing on you?

A. No.

Q. Did the enemy ever advance on the town before?

A. Yes.

Q. On which part did they advance on this occasion?

A. From the White Nile.

Q. Were you on the parapet or not?

A. On the parapet.

Q. How did you know they attacked there?

A. I saw them.

Q. What time did they advance?

A. By day.

Q. Did you send a support from your company?

A. Yes, a company under its yuzbashi, Imam Effendi, who is dead.

Q. Who did you tell the yuzbashi to report to?

A. To the officer commanding the post.

Q. Did Hassan Bey Bahnassawi go to support them?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was in command at that time?

A. I do not know.

Q. What day was this attack? Was it after Mohammed Ahmed came from Kordofan?

A. 4th Moharrem (24th October 1884).

Q. Who saw you in prison the first day?

A. Sid Ahmed Effendi, Abd el Razak, mulazim awal, 5th regiment; Mohammed Effendi Imam, mulazim tani, 5th regiment; Hassan Effendi Ali, mulazim tani, 5th regiment.

Q. Was Farag Ali Effendi there?

A. No, he was killed on the fort.

Q. Were there any of the 1st regiment there?

A. No, I do not know them. They were Sudanese for the most part.

Q. In Khartum were there only the 1st and 5th regiments?

A. There were no other regular troops.

Q. Did you see any artillery officers in prison?

A. One lieutenant, Mohammed Effendi Khalifa, commanding a battery attached to the 1st regiment.

Q. Did you see any officers of the staff and departments?

A. No.

Q. Where were you when you were in prison?

A. In the sun on the sand. A doctor came to see me secretly.

Q. Did you see Ibrahim Bey Fauzi?

A. Yes. He was not wounded at the time of the fall.

Q. How many officers of the 1st battalion 5th regiment did you see?

A. Mulazim awal Desouki, mulazim awal Radwan Mohammed, mulazim awal Sid Mohammed Salem, mulazim tani Ahmed Rashwan. No yuzbashieh nor bim-bashi; they were all killed.

Q. Who told you those had been killed?

A. The survivors.

Q. Were the survivors wounded?

A. No.

Q. How many rank and file did you see survivors of the 1st battalion 5th regiment?

A. About twenty.

Q. Have any of them come here?

A. Yes; Sid Ahmed Effendi Salem.

Q. And men?

A. I do not know.

Q. What date did Omdurman fall?

A. About the 5th January.

Q. What date did the *Bordein* leave for Metemmeh?

A. Before the fall of Omdurman.

Q. How did Omdurman fall?

A. They used up all their bread, and the Governor-General sent over steamers to bring the garrison, but they could not get to the steamers, so Gordon Pasha ordered them to surrender. Faragallah Pasha was the officer commanding.

His evidence is read over to the witness. The witness withdraws.

The Court is adjourned at 12.30 P.M. till the 27th.

Fifth witness for the prosecution.

Sergeant HUSSEIN YUSEF AGUR, 4th battalion 5th regiment, being duly sworn, states :—

Q. Who was your last sergeant-major?

A. Ahmed. He died at Khar-tum.

Q. Who was your major?

A. Said Effendi Amin and Farag Effendi Ali, who died there.

Q. Who was your captain?

A. Imam Effendi Abu Nur. He was killed there.

Q. Which was your section?

A. No. 4.

Q. Who was your lieutenant?

A. Moharrem Effendi. He died there.

Q. Was your company on the fortifications the day of the fall?

A. Yes.

Q. What day was it?

A. I do not know.

Q. Where was it?

A. East of Bab el Kalakala.

Q. How many men were there in the company?

A. 80 to 85, but men used to come from the town to help us.

Q. How used you to stand on the line?

A. One rank. Every man opposite his loophole.

Q. How far apart were the men?

A. One and a half metres.

Q. How many men to a loophole?

A. One.

Q. When the enemy entered were you on the parapet?

A. Yes.

Q. Tell me what you saw.

A. We were firing, and they were firing at us, and it was dark just before dawn, and Hassan Bey Bahnassawi was standing with us as we fired. The Arabs came at us from every side, and attacked us with swords and lances; no rifles. Those who joined the enemy were spared. They collected us in the ezbeh of El Kalakala, and the bey with us, and they took us and gave us over to an emir called Haj Khalid, a Jaali, and they took from us all our money, and we were prisoners, and the bey with us. And on the third day Farag Pasha ez Zeini was killed by order of the Mahdi, as we heard, because he had betrayed his army.

Q. When you were on the parapet did you see who deserted first?

A. No, I could see nothing.

Q. Did the enemy fire at you just before charging?

A. Yes. There was a good deal of firing going on.

Q. What other officers were taken with you?

A. They did not collect us all at once, but by degrees. Every one who was taken was put into the ezbeh.

Q. While you were in prison were any better treated than others?

A. No one was well treated, but for Mohammed Ahmed we should have been killed. We used to beg.

Q. Did Ibrahim Fauzi beg?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did Hassan Bey beg?

A. I did not see him.

Q. Wad el Ahhad. Did he beg?

A. Nothing happened to them.

Q. Did you hear that any one had betrayed the town?

A. Yes, Farag Pasha and Hassan Bey, but I saw nothing. I only heard so. The bey was with us directing us to fire, and encouraging us. He was always doing so. Even in the sun he did not carry an umbrella. He could not go to his room because it was shelled.

Q. On the night of the charge was Hassan Bey in his room?

A. He was with us on the parapet at the time. I saw him. He came from the 3d company. The Arabs came at us from the west. We ran east. Then we found them coming from the east, and from the town, and from all parts.

Q. Was there a patrol at night?

A. Yes. Every major made one.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey patrolling that night?

A. Yes, four orderlies behind him.

Q. Did many of your company survive?

A. I only saw three or four, but I do not know.

Q. Had you much ammunition?

A. Yes, plenty. A pouch of seven packets, in the loophole ten or fifteen packets, and a box between every two men, besides what was in our tents—perhaps seventy boxes.

Q. How many days before the fall did you eat meat?

A. Two months before the fall we ate gum and pieces of hide from angaribs and the pith of the palm trees.

Q. When you ate gum what happened to you?

A. Diarrhœa.

Q. When you heard of Farag Pasha's death, what did you hear?

A. That he had been killed for treachery; we were with the army of Abderrahman en Nejumi at Kalakala. Farag Pasha was killed at Omdurman.

Q. Who did you hear from?

A. The people.

Q. Did you know Salameh el Pasha (a place)?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Farag Pasha killed on a tomb there?

A. I do not know where he was killed.

Q. Were not three okes of rice issued to you?

A. Once one oke, once half an oke, not all at once.

Q. Were not five okes of fat-arecteh (grain) issued to you?

A. A fatigue party found some in the town and divided it, two months before the fall.

Cross-examination by the prisoner.

—Q. On the day of the fall what was the condition of the men?

A. Not all the same—some strong, some not.

Q. Can a man who is hungry be strong, then how could there be strong men?

A. Strong in comparison to others; not like a man here.

Q. Could they fight or go far?

A. They fought as well as they could. All men defend themselves. We used to go out and fight every day, and go great distances.

Q. Were some of your men swollen?

A. Yes, from the gum, and others were not well. The calves swelled.

Q. Were many sick on the parapet?

A. I do not know. All remained at their posts.

Re-examined by the prosecutor.

Q. Were you told to expect the enemy from any particular side?

A. From all sides.

- Q. Were you orderly-sergeant ?
 A. No.
Examined by the Court.—Q. Where did the enemy enter ?
 A. Most from the White Nile.
 Q. What sort of a place ?
 A. The parapet ended 200 to 300 metres from the water. The water was falling every day, but we used to try and repair it ; it had progressed very little.
 Q. What did your bash shawish die of ?
 A. Of hunger after the fall.
 Q. Farag Effendi ?
 A. He was killed on the parapets fighting.
 Q. Did you see him ?
 A. No.
 Q. How do you know he was killed ?
 A. Some of our men used to get pieces of cloth to put patches on our clothes and they saw him. Yusef Effendi died there. I did not see him. I did not go myself. Those who went I did not remember.
 Q. Who told you Farag Effendi died so ?
 A. I do not remember.
 Q. When you left the fortifications to give yourself up what did you do ?
 A. We jumped into the ditch and helped one another out.
 Q. How many of you jumped into the ditch ?
 A. I do not know.
 Q. Had you strength to pull a man out of the ditch ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the night of the fall did your assistants come to help you ?
 A. Yes, on the parapet.
 Q. Then the distance between the men was what on the parapet ?
 A. As close as we could stand and fire.
 Q. Were they there at the time of the attack ?
- A. Yes.
 Q. Did Hassan Bey order you to jump into the ditch, or did you go of your own accord ?
 A. Of our own accord.
 Q. At the time of your jump were the enemy inside or outside ?
 A. Many both before and behind us. Those who jumped were spared, and those who stayed were killed.
 Q. How did you know that if you jumped you would be spared ?
 A. We did not know. We jumped to escape from those behind us.
 Q. Did you ask for mercy, or did they give it you ?
 A. They took me, and took away my rifle and pouch, and said, " You kafir (heathen), why did you not come before ? "
 Q. Did you receive any order not to defend yourselves ?
 A. No, all encouraged us.
 Q. When you were prisoners did they strip Hassan Bey ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. Did you hear of the death of Farag Pasha from the prisoners or from the Mahdiists ?
 A. From the Mahdiists and from the prisoners.
 Q. Wad el Ahhad, did you hear or see, had been ill treated ?
 A. I heard.
 Q. Did you eat gum and pith just before the fall ?
 A. Yes.
 Q. On the day of the fall were there rations in store ?
 A. Gum for a day or two.
 Q. How were the rations issued to the company ?
 A. In such periods as were required.
 Q. Did you see the store just before the fall, and was there anything left ?
 A. I saw the store ; I did not see if there was anything there.

Q. Were the men who met you from the east the same as those from the west?

A. No, different.

Q. Were the men captured and spared only those who jumped the parapet?

A. Of all sorts.

Q. From whence did they get Hassan Bey?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you see the dervishes enter from the Bab el Kalakala?

A. No.

Q. Did you put on the "takia"¹ when you were captured or afterwards?

A. Afterwards.

Q. Did you jump with your gun and bag or not?

A. Yes, with them.

Q. What was the distance between Fort Mukran and the lines of the parapet near the White Nile?

A. 700 or 800 metres.

Q. Who were the garrison?

A. Artillerymen and Shaggieh.

Q. Who was the officer commanding?

A. Farag Effendi Ali, afterwards Ibrahim Effendi es Sudani, who died there.

Q. Whose command was it in?

A. It was attached to our regiment.

Q. When you were collected in the Kalakala were the prisoners all of your battalion or of all sorts?

A. Of all sorts, Shaggieh, Bashi-Bazuks.

Q. How long did you defend yourselves?

A. From 9 o'clock to sunrise.

Q. When did you hear of the Mahdi's going to spare you?

A. After we were taken.

Q. Why did you jump into the ditch?

A. I saw people jump in before me, and followed them.

Q. Do you know them?

A. No, we were all mixed up.

Q. When you were in the ditch could you get out yourself?

A. No.

Q. How deep was it?

A. A man standing on another one's shoulders could just reach.

Q. When the enemy rushed did the buglers sound the alarm?

A. No, there was no necessity. Firing was always going on. We always fired all night.

Q. Do you know on what day of the week Berber fell or Kordofan?

A. No.

Q. While you were defending yourselves did you kill any one, and what did you use?

A. No, I did not see any one fall. I only fired.

His evidence having been read over to the witness, the witness withdraws.

Seven other witnesses for the prosecution were examined, but their evidence is not considered worthy of record.

The Court is reopened at 9.30 A.M. on the 29th June 1887.

Thirteenth witness for the prosecution.

MIKHAIL EFFENDI BOKTOR, late chief clerk of pensions in Khartum, is examined by the prosecutor, and states:

I was in Khartum the day of the fall. I was there all the siege.

Q. What did you see on the day of the fall?

A. I was in my house asleep, and the Arabs entered and took me and took away my money, and

¹ The "takia" is the head-dress worn by the Arabs.

while they were doing so the orders for mercy came.

Q. From whence did the enemy come?

A. They came from all sides—Buri, Tuti, Omdurman, Bahr el Abiad, etc.

Q. Do you know if there was any treachery on the part of any officers in Khartum?

A. I did not see anything, but I heard afterwards that Farag Pasha and Hassan Bey Bahnassawi had done so.

Q. Who told you?

A. All the prisoners and Arabs.

Q. Have none of them come here?

A. I do not know. I cannot identify them.

Q. Do you know Hassan Bey?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he treated the same as the others?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he get no pay?

A. Yes, from the Beit el Mal. Ten dollars a week. He and Ibrahim Pasha Fauzi.

Q. Why?

A. For expenses.

Q. Did you get anything?

A. No.

Q. Did any one else get any?

A. Ibrahim Bey el Bordeini and Mohammed Abu el Beled, the *sarraf el malieh* (accountant).

Q. Why did those get this allowance?

A. I do not know.

Q. When you were taken from the house and went to prison, was Hassan Bey there?

A. Yes, he went the first day.

Q. Did they strike Hassan Bey to make him give up money?

A. I did not see him.

Q. Did you go to Gordon Pasha?

A. Two or three times.

Q. Did you hear that letters had been written to the Arabs by any officers?

A. Yes, a good many people, officers and merchants. I heard so from the bash-katib (chief clerk), who was killed.

Q. Did you ever hear that Hassan Bey el Bahnassawi had written?

A. No, I heard that Gordon Pasha was angry with that regiment. He was contented with 1st regiment, and gave them triple pay. He never would send the 5th regiment out on sorties.

Q. Why did Gordon dislike this regiment?

A. They did not fight. On account of the behaviour of this regiment he was angry with all the Egyptians.

Q. How do you know this?

A. I heard so.

Q. From whom?

A. From Gordon Pasha. He ordered the chief accountant to give pay to the men and widows of 1st regiment, but not to 5th regiment, as they did not deserve it, they had not done their duty.

Q. Did he say anything else before you?

A. No. I heard something from one of the pay department officials.

Q. What did you hear from him?

A. I heard about the 5th regiment, and their doings, and that Gordon was angry for their neglect of duty.

Q. What was their neglect of duty?

A. There was a wire entanglement outside the parapet, and one day Gordon Pasha found it taken up near the Bahr el Abiad. Gordon Pasha was very angry and ordered the officers to pay for new pickets.

Q. How far was the break from the Bahr el Abiad?

A. 1200 metres.

Q. How much was taken away ?

A. About 300 metres.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha make an investigation ?

A. No. He said that the present moment would not allow it. He gave a written order to stop their pay. I saw the order.

Q. When was this ?

A. About the middle of December.

Q. Did any one else see the order ?

A. There were others, but they are dead.

Q. Whose pay was stopped ?

A. All the officers 5th regiment, and the officers of the *ordeh* of Ismail Bey Abdullah.

Q. Was this place repaired ?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were said to have destroyed that part ?

A. The people who were inside, and Gordon Pasha said so after his inspection.

Q. What was the last day you went down to the fortification ?

A. The day before the fall. We went to do our work there.

Q. Where did you go to ?

A. The camp of the 5th regiment.

Q. Which side of Ismail Bey Abdullah ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Did you go on the parapet ?

A. I went up and looked over, but did not go along.

Q. Was there any opening between Bahr el Abiad and the parapet ?

A. A part of the parapet was said to have been broken down and that the soldiers could not use it, but I did not see it myself.

Q. Do you know all about the issue of rations ?

A. Yes.

Q. What rations were there five days before the fall ?

A. None, the soldiers used to collect as much as they could in the town, from 1st January.

Q. The 178 ardebs of dhurra which Gordon Pasha found, whom did he take them from ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Do you think Gordon Pasha had ordered the issue of dhurra to the natives ?

A. Yes, from the beginning of the siege until 1st November.

Q. Can you tell us anything special about any officer on the parapet, e.g. Bahnassawi Bey ?

A. No.

Q. Do you know of any collusion with the enemy on the part of Bahnassawi Bey ?

A. No.

Q. Are you sure there was not any neglect of duty ?

A. I do not know of any special neglect, but the whole regiment was neglectful. After the fall I saw their arms on the parapet and their ammunition, and most of the officers and men survived, but the officers and men of the 1st regiment defended themselves properly and were killed.

Q. Can you give evidence to the effect that any officer caused or ordered his men not to fire ?

A. I did not see so, but I heard that Farag Pasha and Hassan Bey had given this order.

Q. Do you know if two buglers went over to the enemy and Hassan Bey saw them ?

A. No.

Cross-examined by the prisoner.—

Q. How do you know that some people, including Hassan Bey, received pay from the Beit el Mal ?

A. I heard and saw them give the money.

Q. Where were you there ?

A. I was in the Beit el Mal, asking for alms.

Q. For what reason was this issued to them?

A. I do not know.

Q. How was this issued?

A. After taking a receipt from them.

Q. How many colonels were there in the 5th regiment?

A. One, Hassan Bey el Bahnas-sawi.

Q. How many majors?

A. I don't know.

Q. How many colonels in the 1st regiment?

A. One.

Q. How many lieutenant-colonels in the 5th regiment and 1st regiment?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha promote Hassan Bey?

A. Yes, to ranks of "salisseh" and "sanieh"—civil ranks.

Q. Does not any one but yourself who has come from Khartum know whether Gordon Pasha was angry with 5th regiment?

A. I do not know.

Q. Can you name any one whom we can examine about this?

A. I do not know, but one of them must know, perhaps it is mentioned in Gordon's journal.

Q. Where were you at the day of the fall of Khartum?

A. In my house.

Q. What happened to you?

A. The dervishes took me, and they would not kill me till they had taken over all the money, and while we were handing it over orders were issued to spare us.

Q. Where was your house?

A. Near the river (Blue Nile), opposite Tuti on the east of the town; near the Catholic Church, which was the magazine.

Q. Do you know that Farag Pasha surrendered a post or made the enemy's entry easy?

A. I do not know. I heard so.

Q. Do you know that Hassan Bey did so?

A. I do not know. I heard so.

Q. Do you know that any post was surrendered by any one?

A. I do not know.

Prosecutor declines to examine.

Examined by the Court.—Q. How long were you confined?

A. Three days.

Q. Which day did you see the parapet?

A. On the second day.

Q. Where did you see it?

A. Near the Blue Nile; next day I saw the place near the White Nile, where 5th regiment arms were thrown down.

Q. How did you see the arms of the 5th regiment?

A. They were put in the loopholes.

Q. Where were the men who had been killed of 5th regiment?

A. There were very few on the parapet.

Q. On the part of 1st regiment, where were the arms?

A. Thrown down alongside their owners.

Q. Where were the killed of 1st regiment?

A. On the parapet, below the slope, some in the village, but all heaped up as if they had been fighting in groups.

Q. Did you go along the parapet?

A. After ten or fifteen days.

Q. Were the killed and the arms there?

A. The killed, not the arms.

Q. What was 5th regiment's section?

A. From Bahr el Abiad to one-third or one-half the line, there were Bashi-Bazuks under the officer commanding, besides his own men.

Q. Were there killed all along their line?

A. There were very few in that part.

Q. Where did you cross the parapet?

A. Near the Bahr el Abiad.

Q. Did you go out through a gate or an easy place?

A. An easy place; parapet was broken down.

Q. Were there no killed there?

A. Single bodies.

Q. Arms?

A. No.

Q. How many paces between the bodies?

A. 200 or 300.

Q. How many did you see?

A. Very few, twenty or thirty.

Q. And on the western half?

A. There were a great many on the places where there had been regular troops.

Q. Where were the companies of Bashi-Bazuks under Hassan Bey?

A. On the left of his regiment.

Q. Were there many dead Bashi-Bazuks on the parapet?

A. I did not see.

Q. Did you see the dead at Bab el Kalakala?

A. Yes, they were inside the parapet.

Q. What men were they?

A. Bashi-Bazuks and volunteers.

Q. Did you see the end of the parapet near the Bahr el Abiad?

A. There were no killed there.

Q. What were the companies of Bashi-Bazuks?

A. Shaggieh and slaves and Sudanese and cross-breeds ("mualledin").

Q. How did Gordon Pasha treat them?

A. He trusted them to send out fighting.

Q. Did 5th regiment ever go outside and fight badly?

A. They were always in support; they went out in steamers but did not succeed.

Q. Why did they not succeed?

A. I do not know.

Q. Were you in the steamers?

A. No.

Q. Did not the enemy attack Khartum once?

A. Yes, from Buri.

Q. Did they never attack from the Bahr el Abiad?

A. They made a fort and fired from it, but did not advance.

Q. The 5th regiment, did not they answer?

A. Yes, the fort returned the fire. Tabia (Fort) el Kalakala, and Tabia el Mukran.

Q. Did the Mutamahdi¹ not attack when he first came?

A. Yes, he attacked Omdurman.

Q. They made no attack except the last one?

A. No.

Q. Was there any rain in December?

A. No, nor fog.

Q. Were the enemy on Jeziret Sennar the day the wire was cut.

A. Yes, far off.

Q. What happened to Hassan Bey's wife?

A. I did not hear, I heard that the Mahdi had taken his daughter.

Q. In prison did Hassan Bey associate with the Mahdiah?

A. I did not see him.

Q. Were you given badges?

A. I made my own.

Q. Did not the Mahdi give uniforms and five dollars to some prisoners?

A. Yes, he gave some 100 dollars.

Q. To all?

¹ Mutamahdi signifies "he who pretends to be a Mahdi," i.e. the false Mahdi.

A. To those from whom he had taken money.

Q. Do you know if the Mahdi took Hassan Bey's money?

A. He took every one's money.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey in prison?

A. Yes; in a hut, in Omdurman and Khartum.

Q. Did you see any of 1st regiment?

A. No, they were all dead.

Q. Who was with him when you first were in prison?

A. Ibrahim Bey Fauzi.

Q. On the day of the attack did you hear if the men on the parapet fired?

A. There was firing from near the powder magazines, I heard most of it from Buri, because we were near it. I could have heard firing from the other side.

Q. When was Hassan Bey promoted to "sanieh"?

A. Six or seven months before the fall.

Q. Did the men of 5th regiment in Omdurman fight well?

A. Yes.

The witness withdraws.

The Court adjourned at 2 P.M. till 9 A.M. on 30th June.

At 9 A.M. on 30th June the Court opens.

After the evidence of the last witness had been read over to him, the fourteenth witness is introduced.

Fourteenth witness for the prosecution.

HASSAN EFFENDI ABDULLAH, WAKIL EL MUDIRIEH, is duly sworn and examined by the prosecutor.

Q. Were you in Khartum on the day of the fall?

A. Yes.

Q. Where were you?

A. In my house.

Q. Do you know anything of how the enemy got into Khartum?

A. The first reason was the hunger of the garrison, they were in a very bad condition.

Q. Do you know anything of the men who used to leave the parapet and desert?

A. They were shot.

Q. Do you know anything against any officer?

A. I do not know, except by hearsay, except that Farag Pasha had opened the gate of Messalamieh, and that they came in on the side of Hassan Bey Bahnassawi's line.

Q. Do you know anything against Hassan Bey?

A. No, up to the last he was on the parapet.

Examined by the prisoner.—Q. In what regiment was Omar Agha Ibrahim?

A. At the time he was in 5th regiment, but I don't know if he stayed there.

Q. How long was he in that regiment?

A. So far as I know till November.

Q. When did he desert?

A. Four or five days before the fall; he took with him four soldiers and the pay of his *ordeh*.

Q. Where did he desert from?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you know if Gordon Pasha promoted Hassan Bey?

A. Yes, lieutenant-colonel and colonel.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha not increase his pay "£5 a month" while he was a colonel?

A. I don't know.

Q. What happened after Omar Ibrahim deserted?

A. We heard that he went and pointed out the weak places.

Q. What happened to Omar Ibrahim?

A. He was well treated.

Examined by the prosecutor.—Q. Do you know no officer who was imprisoned?

A. Yes, Abdullah Bey Ismail of the Bashi-Bazuks was imprisoned up till the day of the fall by order of Gordon Pasha after an investigation by Farag Pasha and Hassan Bey Bahnassawi.

Q. When?

A. One or two months before the fall.

Q. Do you know if Hassan Bey saw Omar Ibrahim when he was deserting, or if he knew he was going to desert?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if any changes were made in the parapet after this desertion?

A. I do not know; Gordon was angry with the officers.

Q. Who reported to Gordon Pasha?

A. Farag Pasha.

Q. Did Hassan Bey report it to Farag Pasha?

A. I do not know; "but he always reported everything."

Examined by the Court.—Q. Do you know well who Omar Agha Ibrahim was under when he deserted?

A. I don't. I heard afterwards he was with 5th regiment.

Q. From which regiment and corps did the soldiers desert?

A. From 1st regiment and from Bashi-Bazuks; none deserted from 5th regiment.

Q. His evidence is read over to the witness; the witness withdraws.

First witness for the defence.

Lieutenant SIB AHMED ABD EL RAZAK, 4th battalion 5th regiment,

being duly sworn, and examined by the prisoner, states:—

I was in Khartum on the line of defence. I was a lieutenant in the 5th infantry regiment, 4th battalion, under Major Said Eff. Amin under Colonel Hassan Bey Bahnassawi. He commanded the regiment on the lines. He got the rank from Gordon Pasha. My post was on the right of the Kalakala gate. There was no gate there, though the piers for the bridge had been made.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey on the day of the fall?

A. Yes.

Q. Who first reported the attack?

A. The division of the White Nile.

Q. What was the character of the defence of the 5th regiment?

A. Very good.

Q. Were many of the 5th regiment killed?

A. Many; I do not know how many.

Q. On the day of the fall did the enemy leave the arms with the dead?

A. No; they collected them.

Q. Did any men of the 5th regiment desert during the siege?

A. No.

Q. Was Gordon Pasha angry with 5th regiment?

A. No.

Q. Were 1st regiment paid more than 5th regiment?

A. Never.

Q. How late did you receive rations?

A. Up to the end of December.

Q. From 1st January what did you eat?

A. Crushed core of palm trees and gum; the bodies and legs of the men swelled from it.

Q. What was the condition of the men?

A. Sick.

Q. Were they strong enough for a hand-to-hand fight?

A. No.

Q. What happened to the survivors of 1st battalion?

A. The dervishes made them soldiers, with rifles, as they were Sudanese.

Q. Was any wire entanglement broken down in front of the line?

A. No.

Q. Do you know if Gordon Pasha increased Hassan Bey's pay by P. T. 500 monthly?

A. While he was a lieutenant-colonel.

Q. Up to the day of the fall did he draw this increase?

A. Up to the last issue of pay.

Q. Why did he get this increase?

A. For hard work.

Q. Did you see him in prison?

A. Yes; we were taken there together.

Q. Was your post near Hassan Bey's?

A. Yes, in sight.

Q. What did you see at the time of the attack?

A. I saw the enemy coming from behind us. The Arabs came in shouting, they broke in near Bahr el Abiad; we fired in that direction, and when we saw that the enemy were behind us, Nos. 3 and 4 companies formed square, and we remained firing until the square was broken, then we formed groups and fell back on 1st regiment. Then Arabs broke in among us and there was a *mêlée*, and then some were taken prisoners, others were killed.

Q. What did you see Hassan Bey do?

A. He encouraged us.

Q. Was he with you or elsewhere?

A. With us.

Q. Did you see him with your own eyes when he was taken prisoner?

A. Yes.

Q. Was he well or ill treated?

A. Ill treated.

Q. After they had struck him, were the marks apparent?

A. Yes.

Q. What did they do with his wives, daughter, and property?

A. Mahdi took his daughter as loot, and Arabs married his two wives. They took him to his house and took his property from him there.

Q. How long were you in prison?

A. Seven months.

Q. How was Hassan Bey treated?

A. He was like us; we all used to beg, though I did not see him do so.

Q. Did you ever hear or know of any treachery on his part?

A. No; I have never heard so.

Q. Who opened Messalamieh gate?

A. The enemy, after they had taken the town.

Q. What men held Bab el Kala-kala?

A. There was a fort there, containing Bashi-Bazuks and a gun.

Q. Did the men of 5th battalion never go out on sortie?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. Did 1st regiment also send out men?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Farag Pasha your general officer?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Farag or Gordon Pasha prefer Sudanese to Egyptians?

A. No, he rewarded good service from either.

Q. Was Hassan Bey properly obeyed by his men?

A. Yes.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha like him?

- A. Yes.
- Q. Was everything properly carried out in his command?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you eat meat two or three days before the fall?
- A. No; a fortnight before the fall we had meat one day.
- Q. Do you know a certain Omar Agha Ibrahim?
- A. Yes; he was a Bashi-Bazuk, I think a sanjak; he was attached to 1st regiment.
- Q. Was he ever attached to 5th regiment?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. What do you know about him?
- A. Gordon Pasha issued half a month's pay for his men; he took it and deserted with it.
- Q. Did he desert alone?
- A. Yes, alone.
- Q. Had you ever heard, up to the time of the fall, that Hassan Bey corresponded with the enemy?
- A. No.
- Q. Had you ever heard, up to the time of the fall, that he had gone to Kordofan or Darfur?
- A. No.
- Q. Who were the Commandants on the parapet?
- A. O. C., 1st regiment, and O. C., 5th regiment.
- Q. Who were in command with 1st regiment?
- A. Bakhit Bey.
- Q. In prison did you ever hear that Hassan Bey received pay from the Beit el Mal?
- A. No; except that we all received P. T. 1 a week.
- Q. Before the fall, when 5th regiment made a sortie from Bab el Messalamieh, what happened?
- A. They killed Arabs and emirs.
- Q. What did Gordon Pasha do to this force?
- A. He sent the Pasha Fauzi to the gate; and sent a the promotion of
- Q. When was
- A. Thursday,
- Q. Did 5th sorties from Bahr
- A. Monday, 6th killed some Arabs
- Q. Tell us what they went out in a fight?
- A. It was in the *Mansurah* at Erfat, the adjutant self, and we were days' reconnoissance
- Abiad. In the h when we came Muhi Bey,¹ the en Afterwards we re on which there v sheep. We killed took the sheep. four hours from tl Bey. Afterwards Khartum with the heads and the arm This was, I think, i (May-June). The sued as rations, and
- Cross-examined by*
- Q. Did you know
- A. By sight. I him.
- Q. Do you know Hassan Bey?
- A. I was in the as Hassan Bey; re
- Q. What sorts of
- A. Letters and to
- Q. Did you ever mouth of Gordon Pa Bey was a friend of
- A. No; from the
- Q. Could Gord speak Arabic?
- A. I never heard

¹ Just north of Kalakala.

Q. Was Gordon Pasha content with 5th regiment?

A. Yea. I know by the remarks his interpreter made when he used to go round.

Q. How did you know?

A. From his remarks on his rounds and orders.

Q. Where did the enemy enter on the day of the fall?

A. Bahr el Abiad.

Q. Were you with Hassan Bey all the time?

A. No; I did not join him till we formed square, when he came from the side of third and second companies.

Q. By whose order did you form square?

A. Ibrahim Bey Saleh.

Q. Was it by bugle or by word of mouth?

A. By bugle.

Q. What was the rallying point?

A. On the place where Ibrahim Bey was.

Q. What orders were issued to the square?

A. To fire. Two faces, west and north, fired; the other two did not. The square was on the "Biada radamah." Then we were ordered to march "sagha" (right) on to 1st regiment.

Q. At what time were you ordered to form square?

A. At dawn; when the enemy came from behind.

Q. Did the enemy attack you in front?

A. No.

Q. Were your men firing when the bugle sounded "form square"?

A. Yes, to their right front.

Q. Were there any guns on the parapet?

A. One Krupp in Fort Kalakala.

Q. Under whose command?

A. I do not know.

Q. What did the gun do?

A. It fired.

Q. Did the gunners join you or not?

A. No.

Q. When you passed in the square, did the gun continue firing?

A. Yes, till the Arabs took it.

Q. Were you with Hassan Bey when he was taken?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see all that happened to him?

A. Yes.

Q. Where was it?

A. Inside the parapet; between Kalakala and Messalamieh.

Q. Were you two taken alone?

A. No.

Q. Was he taken inside the ditch?

A. Yes, on the parapet.

Q. Where did Hassan Bey join the square?

A. When it was formed. He stationed himself inside the square and took command.

Q. Which of the officers who were in the square with you came to Cairo?

A. I do not know.

Q. What pay did Hassan Bey get?

A. More than £E. 60 a month.

Q. How did you know he got P. E. 500 extra?

A. When he was promoted he presented a petition about it.

Q. When you were taken prisoner what did you do with your arms and ammunition?

A. The enemy took them from us.

The prisoner declines to re-examine.

Examined by the Court. — Q. Where was Said Eff. Amin?

A. Wounded, in his room since 3d January, at Buri.

Q. What was he doing there?

A. We made a sortie on their flank.

Q. How many companies went out?

A. Four companies and Bashi-Bazuks, under Said Eff. Amin, on 3d January.

Q. Of 3d and 4th companies of your battalion, have none come here?

A. Mohammed Eff. Imam, mulazim of 4th company.

Q. Do you know a sergeant named Yusef Agur?

A. He was in 2d company.

Q. When the bugle sounded a "form square," was it a general call?

A. No; for the two companies only.

Q. Why were the other two companies not joined to you?

A. Farag Eff. Ali was in command of them.

Q. When was Bab el Messalamieh opened?

A. At mid-day; we were taken out through it.

Q. How were you taken out?

A. Our hands were tied behind our backs.

Q. Did you see any officer of 1st regiment in prison?

A. Yes, three or four, with their wives and families. I do not remember their names.

Q. What was Omar Agha?

A. A black. I do not know where he came from.

Q. When you were paid what were you paid in?

A. Paper.

Q. All the last two months?

A. For more than two months; but the men got half a month's pay in money—in December.

Q. Who was Gordon's interpreter?

A. A white man. From his complexion not an Egyptian; tall and thin. I do not know whether a Moslem or not.

Q. What officers were in the square?

A. Ibrahim Eff. Sale Yusef Eff. ed Deeb.

Ibrahim Eff. en Naggar Es Seyid Eff. el Kholi.

Besides those I name.

Q. Where was O stationed?

A. Near Buri, I believe.

Q. When did he desert?

A. Ten days about the fall.

Q. Was Farag Pasha with you, and how was he?

A. Yes; he was taken his money, and afterwards killed. I heard he was treachery.

Q. While you were in prison did you never hear what was the cause of the entry of the British?

A. Omar Agha.

Q. How do you know Bey's condition in prison?

A. I used to sell water to him sitting silent.

Q. What was the strength of the enemy?

A. More than 50,000.

Q. What sort of a prisoner did you get?

A. Four copper piastres; we complained of hunger, but the prisoner got the same.

Q. Did you ever see the British piastre?

A. No; I did not see it.

Q. On the day of the battle did you see the enemy coming?

A. No; I heard firing.

Q. Who was in command of the British?

A. Osman Heshmat, and Yusef Eff. Erfat.

Q. Was Osman Bey and Bey Bahnassawi or not?

A. For administration, fighting, no.

The Court adjourns at 2.5 P.M.
till Monday, 9 A.M.

At 10 A.M. the Court opens on
4th July 1887.

Second witness for the defence.

MAHMOUD AGHA ES SAID, Buluk
Bashi of Khartum, of the company
of Ahmed Bey Abdel Kasim,
attached to 1st regiment, is duly
sworn and states:—

I know Hassan Bey Bahnassawi.
He was a colonel. Gordon Pasha
made him so. Bakhit Bey Betraki
was the colonel of the 1st regiment.

(The prosecutor states that the
question of the rank of Hassan Bey
is not in dispute, for there exists
an autograph letter of Gordon
Pasha, dated 24th Shawal 1301,
promoting sixty-one officers, 5th
regiment, among them Hassan Bey
Bahnassawi, to the rank of colonel,
"16th August 1844.")

Q. What was the first sign of
the approach of the enemy?

A. The sentry told me that he
heard "zinhar" (alert) sounded from
Bahr el Abiad.

Q. Do you know if 5th regiment
did its duty?

A. They fought well.

Q. Were many killed?

A. Yes. Many of all regiments.
More of 5th regiment were killed
than of 1st regiment.

Q. Did you hear guns from Bahr
el Abiad?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the Mahdists leave the
arms alongside the dead?

A. Yes.

Q. After day broke did you see
many arms alongside the dead?

A. I do not know when they
were collected.

Q. Do you know if any men de-
serted from 5th regiment?

A. No.

Q. From 1st regiment?

A. Yes, and twenty-two tried to.
They were shot.

Q. Were all 1st regiment Sudanese?

A. All the men. Some of the
officers were Egyptians.

Q. Where were they collected
from?

A. From the Sudan.

Q. Have you ever heard that
Gordon Pasha was angry with 5th
regiment?

A. No.

Q. Was more pay ever issued to
1st regiment than 5th?

A. Never. Both the same.

Q. Did 5th regiment go out and
fight before the fall?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember them going
out and being brought back with
bands and rewarded?

A. Yes. About beginning of the
month of the fall.

Q. When were last rations issued?

A. None were issued in January
after 10th. Afterwards we ate
palm fibre.

Q. When did you eat gum?

A. When the rations were finished.
Before the palm fibre.

Q. What was the condition of the
men?

A. Weak, no strength.

Q. Did many of 1st regiment sur-
vive?

A. Yes. Many.

Q. Do you know if Hassan Bey
used to get P. T. 500 monthly addi-
tional to his pay?

A. Yes.

Q. Why?

A. When he was a lieutenant-
colonel under Nushi Pasha. I do
not know why.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey in
prison, and who was put there first?

A. Yes ; we were put there the same day. He was marched there in front of me. He was treated in the same way as ourselves. People holding him, and his hands tied behind his back.

Q. Were there marks of blows on him ?

A. No.

Q. In prison did he stay there, or was he sent back to Khartum ?

A. He was sent back to Khartum the third day.

Q. When was he brought back to prison ?

A. I did not see him for seven or eight days.

Q. What was his condition ?

A. He had been beaten. His face had been cut up by the kur-bash.

Q. Do you know what they did with him ?

A. They took him to show them his money. I heard they used to drop him into wells, cesspools, etc., in order that he might bring them money from there.

Q. What was done with his women ?

A. Taken by the Arabs.

Q. How long were you in prison ?

A. Nine months. I ran away before him.

Q. While you were in prison did you ever see his condition improved ?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever hear that he had been guilty of treachery ?

A. No.

Q. Did the Mahdiists give money to any of the prisoners or to Hassan Bey ?

A. Never ; not a piastre, nor to him.

Q. Do you know Omar Ibrahim el Fiki ?

A. He was a sanjak attached to 1st battalion 1st regiment. He de-

serted with about thirty soldiers a month before the fall.

Q. Did Gordon and Farag Pasha know of his desertion ?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened to him ?

A. Nothing. He is not a prisoner, and is contented.

Q. Was he ever with 5th ?

A. No.

Q. Where did he desert from ?

A. From his post, between Kalakala and Messalamieh.

Q. Do you know how the line of Khartum was divided ?

A. Into four divisions—(1) Buri to east of Messalamieh, Bakhit Bey ; (2) Mohammed Bey Ibrahim, as far as Bab el Kalakala nearly ; (3) Kalakala as far as Bab en Nasr under Hassan Bey Bahnassawi ; (4) from thence to Bahr el Abiad, Osman Bey Heshmat.

Q. Did Bakhit Bey and Hassan Bey command the other two divisions ?

A. Yes, except in fighting.

Q. What was the strength of the fighting men in Khartum ?

A. 6000 soldiers of all sorts, including volunteers.

Q. How many men were on the parapets ?

A. I do not know.

Q. How many Mahdiists attacked ?

A. 400,000.

Q. Did you ever see Hassan Bey begging ?

A. Yes.

Cross-examined by the prosecutor.

—Q. What call did the bugle sound ?

A. "Zinhar."

Q. Did it sound "zinhar" or "kabzeh" (alarm) ?

A. "Zinhar."

Q. Where were you ?

A. Near Buri.

Q. How far is your post from Bab el Messalamieh ?

A. As far as from here (War Office) to the Malieh (Finance Office), (about 600 yards).

Q. How far from Messalamieh to the Kalakala?

A. From Ezbekieh to the Citadel (about two miles).

Q. From Kalakala to Nasr Bey?

A. As from here to Abdin Palace (about 800 yards).

Q. From Nasr Bey (Bab en Nasr) to the place where the enemy entered?

A. The same distance.

Q. Could you see all this distance?

A. Not at night.

Q. Did you see the killed with your own eyes?

A. Yes, afterwards.

Q. Were the guns which fired from Bahr el Abiad ours or the enemy's?

A. Ours.

Q. What did you understand by the *khianeh* (treachery) that you say Hassan Bey was accused of?

A. He did nothing against the Government.

Q. Were all Hassan Bey's actions honourable, and did he do his duty?

A. Yes.

Q. When the enemy attacked, do you know if Hassan Bey informed Gordon?

A. No, I do not know.

Q. How did they fight.

A. First on the parapet, afterwards in groups.

Q. Were you under Hassan Bey's command?

A. No.

Q. You said you saw Hassan Bey had had the marks of a beating. What was he wearing?

A. A shirt and loose trousers.

Q. Did any one communicate with the enemy two or three days before the fall?

A. No.

Examined by the Court.—Q. What did you eat before the gum?

A. Sometimes full rations, afterwards less.

Q. Did Omar Agha desert by day or night?

A. By night.

Q. What time did you begin to fire at Buri?

A. After they came from inside the town.

Q. Were you all imprisoned in one place?

A. For three days, afterwards we went where we liked.

Q. Whom did you see there of 1st regiment?

A. A colonel, Surur Bahgat, 3d battalion; Captain Hassan Husni, Lieutenant Mohammed Ali, and soldiers. I do not know the officers of the 5th regiment.

Q. How do you know Hassan Bey committed no treachery?

A. If there had been any I should have heard.

Q. Did you not hear of any treachery while in prison?

A. No.

Q. Did you not get a piastre a week while in prison?

A. The women and civilians got some, but not the soldiers.

Q. Did you never ask for a piastre?

A. Yes, but I got a flogging instead.

His evidence is read over to the witness. The witness withdraws.

Third witness for the defence.

ISMAIL AGHA HASSAN (company bugler of the ordeh), Abdullah Bey Ismail's company, is duly sworn, and states:—

I was in Khartum on the day of the fall. I know Hassan Bey el Bahnassawi. His regiment was the

5th. We were attached to his regiment. We were Bashi-Bazuks. I was on the line of Bahr el Abiad. On the night of the fall the Arabs stormed Khartum and took it. When they charged we were at our posts and at the place where there was no entrenchment. The soldiers could not defend it, and the Arabs got in. The soldiers were dying of hunger, but defended themselves as well as they could.

Q. Why was there no ditch near Bahr el Abiad?

A. The river destroyed it. The soldiers tried to repair it, but on account of the enemy's fire Gordon stopped the work.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey the night of the fall?

A. Yes. He was going his rounds. I saw him on our part of the line.

Q. Did you ever hear any complaints against Hassan Bey as to the way he did his duty?

A. No, never.

Q. When the enemy charged did you see him?

A. No.

Q. Did you hear what he did?

A. No.

Q. Did you not hear what he did in the fort?

A. I heard the fort firing.

Q. Did 5th regiment go out to fight?

A. Yes. I went out in the fight of Wad et Turabi, and in the fights of Saturday and Thursday.

Q. What Thursday?

A. About a month before the fall.

Q. Did you come back victorious from the fight of Wad et Turabi?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see him in prison (Bahnassawi), and how was he treated?

A. Yes; he was badly treated. His head was bare, and he wore a

shirt and drawers begging.

Q. Did you see money from the

A. No.

Q. How long

A. Twenty-four

Q. How long main in prison?

A. Also two of him.

Q. Did you having been beaten?

A. Yes.

Q. What happened and daughter?

A. The Arabs

Q. Was he free

A. No; there

Q. How did he

A. He evaded day of the "Eid festival).

Q. Before he condition been in

A. No.

Q. Which of you

A. Hassan Bey

Q. Did the M

A. Yes.

Q. What did t

A. They sent

Q. Where did again?

A. In Abyssinia Wolkait.

The prosecutor examine.

Examined by the fore the attack alarm) sound?

A. Yes, a quarter before the charge.

Q. When the were the men at t

A. Yes, those up.

Q. How do Gordon Pasha stood on Bahr el Abiad

A. By the order issued.

Q. Did you ever work at night?

A. No.

Q. Who was your sanjak?

A. Abdullah Bey Ismail.

Q. Were you all together, and where?

A. Yes; between 1st battalion and 4th battalion.

Q. Was Abdullah Bey imprisoned?

A. Yes, by the commandant Hassan Bey el Bahnassawi. He was confined in the regiment; he was released after six or seven days. I do not know who ordered his release. I do not know why he was imprisoned. He was with us on the day of the fall.

Q. What tabia (fort) did you say Hassan Bey was in?

A. I do not know its name. It was next us.

Q. Did Hassan Bey patrol every night?

A. Yes, every day and every night.

Q. When 5th regiment went out who was in command?

A. Said Eff. Amin. Two companies of the battalion went out.

This evidence having been read over to the witness, the witness withdraws.

The Court is adjourned till 9 A.M. on 5th July 1887.

At 9.30 on 5th July 1887 the Court opens.

Fourth witness for the defence.

IBRAHIM EFF. HASSANEIN, 2d lieutenant, 4th battalion 1st regiment, being duly sworn, states:—

I was in Khartum on the day of the fall, on the parapet. I know Hassan Bey el Bahnassawi. He

was colonel of the 5th regiment. Suleiman Eff. Nashat was my major. and Bakhit Bey Betraki was my colonel. My post was between the Messalamieh gate and the Kalakala.

Q. Do you know if Hassan Bey was energetic in his duties?

A. Yes.

Q. How do you know?

A. From his patrolling and orders and the behaviour of his men.

Q. Did he patrol once or twice a week?

A. Yes, twice a week.

Q. Did he patrol on your parapet?

A. No; up to the end of his own command.

Q. How far were you from Bab el Kalakala?

A. 100 metres. I could see him patrolling.

Q. Where was his headquarters?

A. Bab el Kalakala.

Q. How did you know that he inspected only once or twice a week?

A. I could see along the line.

Q. Was there a part of the parapet broken down?

A. Yes, next to the Bahr el Abiad. It was sandy and the river washed it away. The river used to come into the ditch and destroy it.

Q. Did Hassan Bey patrol as far as the broken-down part?

A. Yes; he ordered it to be repaired and began to do so.

Q. How do you know?

A. Fatigue parties were sent from our regiment and I saw him.

Q. Why was it not all repaired?

A. It was under fire from the enemy.

Q. Was that the only reason?

A. That was the only reason.

Q. How many men were killed?

A. Three in one day.

Q. Did the piece sink in again after it was dug out?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did these repairs go on?

A. Till the month before the fall.

Q. By whose order were they stopped?

A. Gordon Pasha's.

Q. How do you know?

A. From the orders.

Q. At the time of the charge were you at your post?

A. Yes. Hassan Bey was on the line of defence, in the fort of Bab el Kalakala.

Q. Tell us what you know.

A. We heard the bugle sound "zinhar" on the Bab el Kalakala; after half an hour two guns fired from the fort; after that a rocket was fired and the line commenced firing. Bab el Kalakala kept up a fire diagonally. The Arabs came in from the White Nile. They came in behind the line.

Q. Did the Arabs not charge from in front of the parapet?

A. No.

Q. What did Hassan Bey's men do when the Arabs reached his post?

A. They formed square and fired.

Q. When did you see them forming square?

A. Ten o'clock Arabic.

Q. When the enemy charged was it dark?

A. Yes; the moon had gone in about an hour before.

Q. How did you see the square?

A. It was near us. I saw them forming up and firing and falling back on us.

Q. Did it reach you?

A. Not quite—to ten or fifteen metres from us.

Q. You saw it was a properly formed square?

A. Yes; there were men in it. Hassan was in the centre of it. He was with his men and wearing his turban. I saw him.

Q. What time elapsed between the firing of the first shot and the town was taken?

A. Three hours.

Q. Do you know where the square was?

A. No; from the position of the enemy I could not see.

Q. Did Gordon Pasha direct the lines himself?

A. Yes; he used to give instructions to the officers.

Q. Did you ever see Gordon Pasha with any officers, or troops, or men?

A. No.

Q. Do you know where Hassan Bey was?

A. Yes; they were all in the square together.

Q. Did you see him in the square?

A. Yes; we were in the Messalamieh gate. The gate was open and we went out. Hassan Bey had his sword on his back, but not I. Afterwards the Arabs and daughter were taken. He was treated just the same way as our men.

Q. Did he get no more than the Beit el Mal?

A. No.

Cross-examined by the
—Q. What was the first shot heard when the enemy came?

A. "Zinhar"; after that the guns.

Q. Did you hear any firing from Bahr el Abiad?

A. No.

Q. Were you sleeping in the parapet?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you see any other signs of the enemy?
"Mukran"?

A. No ; it is too far.

Q. Did you see any fire from the part of the parapet broken ?

A. No.

Q. Did you see him in the night before the fall ?

A. Yes, going round the line.

Q. What men formed the square ?

A. Egyptians—no Sudanese, no Shaggieh.

Q. Has any one of them come here ?

A. I do not know.

Q. Which direction did the square move ?

A. Eastwards.

Q. When the Arabs took Hassan Bey how far was he from the Messalamieh gate ?

A. 250 metres.

Q. Was the telegraph near you ?

A. No ; near 1st battalion.

Q. Do you know if Hassan Bey reported the attack ?

A. Yes, to Farag Pasha by a sergeant.

Q. Do you know if Gordon Pasha sent any orders to Hassan Bey at the time of the fall ?

A. No, I do not know.

Examined by the Court.—Were there any enemy in front of you at the time of the attack ?

A. No.

Q. The square came towards you by daylight ?

A. Yes.

Q. They were in the middle of the enemy fighting ?

A. Yes.

Q. What did you do ?

A. We formed square also.

Q. When did you form square ?

A. When they were fifteen yards off.

Q. Who ordered the square to form ?

A. I ordered my own square to form—about twenty men. One officer was with me and was killed.

Q. Did 1st regiment get more pay than 5th ?

A. I do not know. A soldier got P. T. 40.

Q. Did you get a reward from Gordon Pasha ?

A. He ordered twelve months' pay, but we never got it.

Q. Did none of your square come here ?

A. None, though there are some survivors.

Q. What did you hear afterwards of Hassan Bey ?

A. Hassan Bey encouraged his men, etc.

Q. How do you know the sergeant went to Farag Pasha ?

A. He passed us as we went.

Q. Where was Bahnassawi Bey's square ?

A. Just behind the parapet.

His evidence is read over to the witness.

The Court expressed to him their opinion that he had not done his duty on this occasion (the fall of Khartum).

Fifth witness for the defence.

H.E. MUSTAFA PASHA YAWER, late Mudir of Dongola.

He objects on religious grounds to take an oath, and is allowed to make a solemn affirmation.

I have known Hassan Bey Bahnassawi since he was in Sennar till he went to Darfur.

I believe him to be a man incapable of treachery. He was under me as a captain and adjutant-major, and assistant-major for four years. He is a man of good character in every way.

The witness withdraws.

Sixth witness for the defence.

H.E. MOHAMMED NUSHI PASHA, late O. C. navy of Khartum, is duly sworn and states :—

While Hassan Bey Bahnassawi was with me in Khartum till I left I considered him to be an honest and upright man, a good officer and energetic, and he never did anything to the prejudice of the Government.

Cross-examined by the prosecutor.

—Q. How long did you know him?

A. From February 1884 to 1st October 1884. He was under me in the same regiment.

His evidence is read over to the witness. The witness withdraws.

Seventh witness for the defence.

OSMAN HAMDUK MULTIZIM, being duly sworn, is examined by the prisoner, and states :—

I was in Khartum. On the night of the fall I was sleeping in my garden. I went up a tree, and saw the enemy coming in from Bahr el Abiad and Buri. My sister's son was Gordon Pasha's interpreter, and used to come and tell me what had happened.

Q. Did you ever hear from him what was Gordon's opinion of Hassan Bey?

A. I heard that Gordon had borrowed £150 from Hassan Bey at the beginning of January.

Q. Then their relations were friendly and personal?

A. Yes.

Q. Was Gordon afterwards angry with Hassan Bey?

A. I never heard so.

Q. Did you meet your nephew just before the fall?

A. The night before.

Q. Did he tell you they were afraid of treachery?

A. No.

Q. How many interpreters had Gordon?

A. Two. My nephew was one.

Q. Were you a prisoner?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you ever hear afterwards from any of Gordon's attendants that there had been any treachery?

A. No.

Q. Did you see Hassan Bey in prison?

A. Yes; they beat him, and put him down a cesspit to make him bring up money from there. Afterwards he had to beg. I was there when he was beaten. They tortured me by putting fire on my head.

Q. How was it Hassan Bey had to beg since the Beit el Mal gave him ten dollars a week?

A. The Beit el Mal never gave him anything.

Q. What happened to his daughter?

A. The Mahdi took her as a slave girl, and also his wife, Bint Abd es Salam esh Shami.

Cross-examined by the prosecutor.

—Q. Was there water in the ditch?

A. No, there was clay in the piece next the Bahr el Abiad.

Examined by the Court.—Q. When did you see Hassan Bey after the fall?

A. On the third day. He was in the Beit el Mal being beaten.

Q. Were guns being fired?

A. They were fired at the steamer coming.

Q. What time did the enemy enter?

A. About half-past nine (Arabic).

Q. Was that the time you saw them?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you see both Bahr el Abiad, Bahr el Azrak, and Buri?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you know that they came in that way?

A. I saw them coming at half-past nine into the town; but I did not see them getting across the parapet.

The prisoner's counsel points out that this is the same man whom Mikhail Eff. Bocktor says the Arabs were looking for to kill, because he was one of the men most devoted to Gordon.

His evidence is read over to the witness. The witness withdraws.

The Court is adjourned at 1.10 P.M. till Thursday at 9 A.M., and further adjourned, at the request of the defence, till 9 A.M. on 11th July 1887.

Note.—The further proceedings, being merely formal, are omitted.

APPENDIX TO BOOK IX

THE COINAGE OF MOHAMMED AHMED, THE MAHDI OF THE SUDAN,
BY HIS EXCELLENCY YACOB PASHA ARTIN

(Translated from the French)

SINCE the origin of Islamism, the reading of the *Khutba*,¹ in the name of the sovereign, has always been considered a royal privilege. In the first century the right of coining was added to this privilege.

These two customs, which sovereigns had assigned to themselves as their prerogatives of sovereignty and of the spiritual unity of the empire of Islam, both political and universal, appear to have been recognised and accepted since their early origin as royal privileges, both by religious doctors and by Moslems in general.

In the course of time, when a rebel against the authority of the Khalifa was fortunate enough to withdraw himself from subjection, and when he wished to reconstruct and confirm his sovereignty as circumstances permitted him to do so, he first commenced to strike coins, and to proclaim his name from the pulpits at public prayers on a Friday.

When Abd el Melik Ibn Merwan introduced the custom of striking coins after a fixed system, in the Ommiad Empire, in about the year 75 of the Hejira (A.D. 694), he never had his name inscribed on the coins. Later, under the dynasty of the Abbassides, the vizirs or governors of provinces began striking on their coins the names of the towns of their governorates where the money was first struck, and sometimes their own names were engraved thereon.

It was not till towards the third or beginning of the fourth century of the Hejira, when revolts became frequent, and the unity of Islam appeared to be threatened, that the Khalifas thought of engraving their own names on their money.

Up to that time it was tacitly understood that the privilege of

¹ At prayer on Fridays at mid-day.

striking money belonged to the khalifate alone. But when certain of the governors of the provinces went as far as to almost declare themselves independent, the Khalifas determined to at least preserve nominally their authority over the provinces which had got beyond their immediate control. They therefore taxed all those governors who had usurped any of the sovereign rights, but in order to show that they held this power of authority of the Khalifa, the ruling prince, they insisted that their names should be engraved on the money, and that the *Khutba* should be read in their names in the mosques, conjointly with those of the governors who had made themselves independent *de facto*, and who governed as kings the countries they occupied. The majority of princes of this category accepted the spiritual, and very often the political supremacy of the Abbasside Khalifas, as long as their revolt did not take its rise from religion. In Egypt the families of the Toulonides, of the Ikshidites, of the Ayyubites, and of the Mamelukes, who reigned in succession, struck money in the name of the Abbasside Khalifas of Baghdad, and after the conquest of that town by Houlagou Khan, in the thirteenth century A.D., in the name of these Khalifas of whom the Mamelukes had made themselves possessors in Egypt, and where they were considered, both on political and religious grounds, as Khalifas, without however permitting them to exercise any temporal authority. These princes, who were, as a matter of fact, only prisoners in the hands of the Mameluke Sultans, retained the titles of Khalifas, but were obliged to delegate all their powers, religious, civil, political, and military, to these Sultans, who took the title of "El Sultan Ez-Zaher" (or Sultan apparent), that is to say, the Sultan *de facto*, or by delegation or temporal.

The princes of the Obeidieh family, better known under the name of the Fatemiehs, are the only ones who are an exception to this rule in Egypt. These princes assumed a universal khalifate. The Mahdi Obeidallah, who founded the power of this family in Africa, had risen against the Abbasside Khalifas of Baghdad in the tenth century A.D. His successors, in making the conquest of Egypt, of Syria, and of Arabia, from the Abbassides, or those princes who admitted their spiritual sovereignty, had entirely detached these countries from their religious and political authority, and for two centuries their power was supreme; they struck money and read the *Khutba* in their own names without even mentioning the names of the Abbasside Khalifas, and thus confirmed their absolute authority, in opposition to those Khalifas.

Virtually, if not *de facto*, there have only been these two centuries, the tenth to the twelfth, in which Egypt had been franchised from the Moslem authority, for, as we have already said, the other princes of the reigning dynasties of Egypt caused the

Khutba to be proclaimed and struck money in their names in conformity with those of the Khalifas of Baghdad, who were universally Sunni.¹ They made, so to speak, act of sovereignty; but, contrary to the Fatemites, they confirmed the sovereignty of the Khalifa; the unity of power in the empire, according to the canon rights, was, therefore, not contested by them.

On the conquest of Egypt by Yawuz Sultan Selim in 926 (A.H.) 520 A.D., this conqueror, having obliged the last Abbasside Khalifa, Mohammed el Mutawakkil Alallah, whom I will call the last of the spiritual Khalifas resident in Egypt, to cede all his khalifate rights, proclaimed himself the only Khalifa or successor of the Prophet: he was recognised as such by all those peoples whom he had conquered, and who, before him, recognised the heir of the house of Abbas, as under a Sunni Khalifa, whose last offspring had disappeared without heir, after the collapse of the Egyptian Empire.

From this time, in Egypt, the Friday *Khutba* were read in the names of the Ottoman Sultans, and money also was struck in their names. Up to the present time, no governor of Egypt, whether he were in a state of open revolt or even of war with the Sultan, dared to transgress this fundamental law of the Empire. One must come to the end of the last century to find an example, not of a revolt, openly declared by the entire suppression of the reigning Sultan Khalifa's name in the money, but by a species of imitation of the practices of princes of reigning families in Egypt under the Abbasside dynasties.

Whilst these princes, as we have already remarked, ostensibly engraved their names in full, beside the names of the Khalifas, Ali Bey, from the year 1183 A.H. (1769 A.D.) satisfied himself with writing the two first letters of his name "ع" underneath the name of the Sultan Mustafa (III.), son of Sultan Ahmed (III.), on his gold coinage.

A specimen of this money is now in the British Museum, and described under No. 645, vol. viii. of the Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, London, 1883.

On two other gold coins in the same collection, struck in the year 1186 A.H., even this attempt to confirm his independence is entirely absent.²

In striking his silver coinage, Ali Bey seems to have been almost bolder. The two pieces kept in the British Museum collection bear on the reverse the name of علي (Ali), but by a caligraphic turn to which Arabic writing readily lends itself

¹ This word is equivalent to Orthodox or Catholic in Islam, that is to say following the traditions of the Prophet, in opposition to the Shia', who are in the same manner considered heterodox or heretic.

² See Nos. 649 and 648, Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, London, 1883, vol. viii.

the tail of the ي is mixed up with the ب of ضرب (*durib* or struck); the date of both pieces is 1183 A.H. On the obverse is engraved the *Tughra*¹ of Sultan Mustafa (III.).

In addition to these pieces, which have been described by Mr. Stanley Lane Poole in the Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, J. J. Marcel, in the *L'Univers* collection, in the volume entitled *Egypte—Depuis la conquête des arabes jusqu'à la domination française*, Paris 1848, p. 235, also gives the facsimiles of the two silver coins described in the Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum of which we have just spoken. I have somewhat digressed in the description of these coins, although they have already been published, as I have already had the honour to point out to you; I have done so only with the object of showing that even in a state of open revolt or of war against the sovereign, Ali Bey himself, who arrogated to himself the absolute sovereignty of Egypt, never felt himself sufficiently strong to engrave his pretensions openly, and in a decisive manner, on the new money which he struck, whilst undertaking the monetary reforms of his time in Egypt. It was the same thing with regard to the Friday *Khutba*, when his name was never pronounced except after the name of the Ottoman Sultan, who, by canon right, was, for the Egyptians, the legitimate sovereign of Egypt and the universal Khalifa of the empire—one—indivisible, and Sunni.

In the valley of the Nile, beyond Cairo (El Kahira or Masr), and Alexandria (Iskanderieh), I am not aware that any money has been struck since the Arab conquest. Since the Ottoman conquest all money bears the name of Masr (Cairo).

In the Sudan, previous to the expedition of Mohammed Ali Pasha (in 1824 A.D.) and its union with Egypt, all transactions were carried on either by exchanges or by pieces of money such as German *Thalers*, Spanish, Mexican, or other piastres. Gold pieces were unknown or nearly so. There was a considerable trade in gold dust, ingots, or gold animals of fixed weight; this gold, however, did not take the place of money, but was simply merchandise for exchange. It is only since the conquest of the Sudan and Red Sea littoral by the Egyptians that the use of gold and silver money became general on the Upper Nile. Gold money had indeed such a slight value, that, scarcely fifteen years ago, during the Abyssinian campaign, our soldiers could exchange with the Abyssinians Egyptian gold notes for silver thalers, at the rate of about five or six pounds for a thaler.

At the present time, however, in the north of the Egyptian Sudan, although commercial transactions are for the most part carried out by the method of exchanges, gold and silver money is known and valued at its worth.

¹ See footnote, page 595.

Since the revolt of the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmed I heard that this individual struck gold and silver coins in his own name.

This struck me as so far beyond the recognised habits and customs, the action appeared to me so bold, that for long I doubted it, until, thanks to the courtesy of General Sir F. W. Grenfell, Sirdar of the Egyptian army, I obtained a gold piece and two silver pieces from the Sudan. Later, Dr. Abbate Pasha also lent me a silver piece which belongs to him.

It is these pieces which I now undertake to describe.

GOLD PIECE.

No. 1. This gold piece is similar to the Egyptian sovereign of 100 piastres, except that it is not so large, though thicker, than pieces of the same description struck in Cairo.

It weighs 8g. 21, and its diameter is 2 c.m. 03. On the obverse is the *Tughra* (see footnote, p. 595), of Sultan Abdul Mejid, incomplete and badly engraved; and on the reverse it bears the date 1255 A.H. of the succession of this sovereign to the Sultanate, and the figure 2, which indicates that the piece was struck in the second year of his reign; and lastly, the piece is engraved with *Masr*, i.e. that it was struck in Cairo.

There is therefore nothing remarkable about this piece, and it might probably be considered as the workmanship of an unskilful false-money coiner.

The piece appeared to have been cast and not struck, and when gauged by touchstone, it registered 23 k. instead of 21 k., showing that it was of better alloy than Egyptian gold.¹

In short, this piece has nothing remarkable about it to indicate the pretensions of the Mahdi as universal and unique sovereign in Islam and in the world.²

SILVER PIECES.

These pieces resemble all the others as regards inscription.

¹ Our learned colleagues Franz Pasha and Guignod Bey, in examining either gold or silver pieces, have declared that they were struck and not cast. On 11th December 1887 I had these pieces examined at the Cairo Mint at the Citadel. The coiners at this establishment, who are most skilful in such matters, have stated that "the pieces, both gold and silver, were struck and not cast."

² This gold piece and one of the silver pieces were obtained by Colonel Chermiside, who procured them for me at the request of General Sir Francis W. Grenfell, Sirdar, etc. etc.

NOTE FROM COLONEL CHERMSIDE.

"The Mahdi has struck two sorts of coins, the Mejdidi dollar in his own name and the Egyptian pound, similar to the Egyptian pound struck by the Government. It differs in the engraving, the thickness, circumference, and the gold, which is Sennar gold. This is the purest gold, and does not ring when mixed with other pieces. . . . Later he struck the Egyptian pound in his name, but this pound is rare, though it is possible to procure it."

They are faithfully copied as regards the disposition of and the ornamentation of the 20 piastres piece known as "Mejidieh" of Constantinople. The alloy appears to be as that of the Mejidieh. On the obverse is engraved in imitation of the *Tughra* of the Ottoman Sultans; but the ordinary inscription of the names of the reigning Sultans, the palm of the heraldic hand which represents the *Tughra* is the following inscription:—

بامر المهدى

By order of the Mahdi

On the reverse, the inscription is written in four lines:—

٥

ضرب

فى

الهجرة

١٣٠٢

5

Struck

in (the year

of) the Hejira

1302

The figure 5 above the word "struck" indicates the years which have passed since the beginning of the royal mission which Mohammed Ahmed had attributed to himself.

No. 2. The first of these pieces weighs 23 g. 55 and has a diameter of 3 c.m. 78.

The second weighs 23 g. 40 and has a diameter of 3 c.m. 78. These three pieces of gold and silver are now in my collection. They are Arab coins, and have been kindly procured by General Grenfell, as I have already stated.

A third silver piece, in the possession of Dr. Abbate, which he kindly permitted me to examine, is precisely

¹ The *Tughra* is, as a matter of fact, the representation of the impression of the inside of the left hand. The little finger separated on the left, the three fingers joined in the middle and pointing upwards, and the thumb on the right near the bottom. The space representing the palm of the hand is the portion, joining the little finger to the thumb, and it is in this space that the names of the reigning Sultans are written, either of the father or the grandfather, as the case may be. The fingers form the prolongation of the letters composing the name, thus forming an interlaced collection of letters, fantastically grouped, alike permissible in Arabic as in Latin and Gothic caligraphy in Europe.

the two which I now have ; it weighs 23 g. 5, and has a diameter of 3 c.m. 75.¹

As we have already remarked, this is the first time since the Ottoman conquest that any one in the Nile valley has dared to publicly confirm, by striking money in his name, his pretensions to an absolute and universal sovereignty. It is the second time, since the conquest of Egypt by Islam, that a fortunate conqueror has put himself into direct opposition to the universally recognised Sunni Khalifa in this valley. The first was Abdullah El Mahdi Abu Mohammed Obeidallah, who, in 909, raised the standard of revolt against the Abbasside Khalifa, and whose fourth successor, El Moezzedinallah conquered Egypt and founded Cairo in the year 969 A.D.

The second is Mohammed Ahmed El Mahdi, who, in 1880, raised the standard of revolt in the Sudan, and conquered from the Ottoman Khalifa the whole of those countries as far as Wady Halfa.

As in the case of the Mahdi of the tenth century, this Mahdi, to confirm his pretensions *urbi et orbi*, this religious chieftain, opposed to the universally recognised head of the Sunni religious head of Islam, has caused the *Khutba* to be read in his name. All these circumstances have induced me to believe, that in the Sudan, the dervishes and adherents of the Mahdi do not think as we do here. I am persuaded that the movement is not merely a demonstration against the Christian strangers, but against any stranger or native, whoever he may be, who refuses to recognise the supremacy of the Mahdi, and who will not acknowledge the truth of his mission in proof of his divinity. The Mahdi who has just died was a religious reformer, as the Fatemite Mahdi of the tenth century. But whilst the latter had special recommendations in the fact that his ancestors were Ali and Fatima, nephew and daughter of the Prophet, the former gives himself out as the precursor of Christ, the last of God's messengers, and, in this way, the spiritual and temporal representative on earth.

He asserted that he united, in his own person, the dogma of religion, the union of sacerdotal power, and the union of the secular empire.

He was, in short, in the eyes of his followers, the only true *Emir el Mu'minin* (the Commander of the Faithful), who could, by his divine power, conquer the whole world, and gain for Islam the whole of the human race. This appears to me to be perfectly clear and irrefutable, since his successor Abdullah, on the death of the Mahdi, unhesitatingly took up the title of Khalifa.

It is possible that war or other reason may bring the Sudan again under the dominion of the Sunni Khalifas of the Ottoman empire, as Saleh in the 12th century brought Egypt again under

¹ See note on following page.

the rule of the Sunni Khalifas of Baghdad by seizing from the last of the Fatemite Khalifas, who, for two centuries, were the spiritual rivals in Egypt of the Khalifas. It is a fact to repeat, that the Egyptian Sudan may again come under the rule of the Egyptians, who, for fifty years, established peace and order in the form of government throughout its provinces by gradually taming the savage tribes and accustoming them to prefer a settled life to a nomad life. But it will be none the less true that during a more or less lengthened period of time since 1880, independent sovereigns, in opposition to Ottoman sovereigns, have reigned in the Sudan and have established their authority absolutely, and their power is the Khalifate; have struck money, and have had their names inscribed in their names on Fridays, on the recitation of the prayers.

N.B.—Notwithstanding the note which I have already inserted above, which settles the question as to whether the money is related by the Mahdi is struck or cast, and which is given in the form of both gold and silver pieces being struck, I think that the note by our learned colleague, Dr. Bonola, secretary of the Royal Geographical Society, giving the information which he has been able to obtain, should be here inserted.

NOTE ON THE COINING OF THE MONEY OF THE MAHDI

“Two days after the discussion which took place on the 10th of the Mahdi money, a soldier from Sennar arrived in Cairo for him and asked him if he had any Mahdi money. ‘No, for at Sennar there is no more of it. The few pieces which had been put in circulation had run out, for there was no metal for striking money. Besides, these pieces had been refused everywhere, for they could be broken in one’s hands.’

“I then referred to Mr. Santoni, Director of Posts and Telegraphs, who has a great knowledge of the Sudan. He replies, ‘The Mahdi money, I know only two descriptions, the Mejdidi pound, which resembles the Egyptian pound but made of Sudan gold. I possess a few specimens, and I have no more as they are exhausted. This is also the opinion of Mr. Wrigley, Cook and Sons’ chief engineer at Assiut.

“‘This engineer has spent a great deal of his life in the workshops, and has a great knowledge of metals and their fabrication. Moreover, at Khartum, I have had a good deal to do with the Sudanese gold and silversmiths, who carry on their work of melting and casting their metals, and who are very skilful in their art.

“If a machine for striking coins existed in Khartum, Gordon Pasha would not have been obliged to go to the moulder to mould the gold and bronze and lead and silver decorations, with the inscription “Siege of Khartum” and other Arabic inscriptions, which he had made and distributed to the defenders of the town.’

“I also referred to Father Bonomi, who in turn referred to Father Leon Henriot at Assuan, who for long lived at Omdurman, and was also with the Mahdi. I referred to this gentleman in order to obtain more exact information, and now give extracts from Father Henriot and Father Bonomi’s letters on the question :

“The Mahdi, after the capture of Khartum, wished to strike money—pounds, dollars, and piastres, but very few piastres were struck. Some people say that he took possession of the Government machines for striking coins ; others say that at El Obeid, or at the environs of that town, he seized the implements which belonged to a false-money coiner ; but Musalli and Skandar Shiama state that he collected the gold and silver smiths of the city of Khartum, and made them money-coiners. The gold and silver placed at the disposal of these money-coiners have been exhausted. Amongst these artisans are some very skilful workmen, accustomed to make moulds and all descriptions of metal castings. The dollar weighed more than the Government dollar, and the same remark applies to the pound. Besides the coiners employed by the dervishes, there are some others who strike softer pounds and of less weight than the Government sovereigns, as the monthly payments to the ansar (followers of the Mahdi) ; and, as the latter frequented the market, and merchants only accepted four and a half dollars for the sovereign in place of five, and seven piastres tariff for the dollar instead of twenty piastres tariff, both dervishes and ansar naturally complained. The Mahdi and the Khalifa gave orders that money should be accepted at its normal value, and threatened severe punishment for non-compliance with these orders. But in spite of these threats the orders were without result, and remained practically a dead letter. Many people speculated in this money. Merchants who bring cattle or provisions to the *Beit el mal* give the dollar for twenty piastres and the gold pound for a hundred piastres, and thus obtained seven to nine piastres for the dollar, and from 72 to 76 piastres for the pound. Others made dervish ingots out of the gold pounds and silver dollars, which they sent to Suakin, Assuan, Derau, Korosko, Halfa, and other places, and in this manner they made half a dollar per gold pound and a few piastres per silver thaler.

“The end of it was that the Khalifa stopped making Mahdi money, and transactions were carried on in actual weight of gold or silver instead of money.

subject.

"I think that these notes are sufficiently conclusive," adds Dr. Bonola in concluding his memorandum.

AUTHOR'S NOTE

The following letter (extracted from the Mahdi's letter-book captured at Toski on 3d August 1889) is of interest as bearing on the subject of His Excellency Artin Pasha's pamphlet.

It runs as follows :—

"In the name of God, etc.

"From the Khalifa of the Mahdi.

"To all his beloved in God, especially to merchants, dealers, and others.

"BRETHREN,—

"It is not beyond the cognisance of an intelligent man that this world has its men, and also the other world has its men, and the Prophet says, 'The men of this world are not as the men of the other world.'

"The true believers are those who prefer the world to come, and prepare for it by doing good and following in the footsteps of the disciples of the Prophet, in bearing affliction with patience. But the men of this world gather together riches, and are impatient under affliction. They look entirely for the pleasures of this life. It is well known to you that those who possess much of this world's goods are cut off from the world to come, and a veil is as it were let down between them and the other world.

"These men, therefore, deceive themselves, for all pleasures and enjoyments come from God alone, and those who seek pleasures elsewhere will never be satisfied. The Mahdi ever preached this to you, and warned you against this world and its pleasures and riches. Cling, therefore, my brethren, to God.

"You are well aware that the Imam el Mahdi often issued proclamations to the effect that you should accept all descriptions of money ; that you should refuse none, and he spoke many parables on this subject ; I also have done the same.

"I still, however, hear that there are disputes amongst you regarding this, and I see that our orders are not obeyed, and that you still make objections and quarrel amongst yourselves regarding the acceptance of coins.

"Now this is a great scandal amongst all true Moslems ; I therefore again issue you this proclamation, warning you to cease once and for all such disputes regarding coins of every description, dollars of every sort, even if the inscriptions on them be obliterated. Also pounds and piastres, whether they be Kabbashi, Sikigendi, or Egyptian, whether they be obliterated or not. All these must be circulated in all your trans-

actions, and the value of all of them shall be unalterable, whether they be obliterated or not.

"If, henceforth, any one objects to taking an obliterated coin, even should it be merely *atpiastre*, he will be punished by the confiscation of all his property for disobedience of orders, and in accordance with our previous proclamations on this subject.

"The following order will also take effect forthwith: 4 yards of dammur will be sold for a quarter of a dollar throughout the Sudan.

"Beware of disobedience of orders, which involves a heavy punishment.
F. R. W."

APPENDIX TO BOOK XII

COMPOSITION OF NEJUMI'S ARMY, WHICH CROSSED THE EGYPTIAN FRONTIER ON 1ST JULY 1889 (WITH NAMES OF EMIRS)

The army was divided into four divisions, as follows :—

	Fighting Men.	Followers.
1st Division—Nejumi	2400	5000
2d " Ismail Haraka	800	1200
3d " Abd el Halim Mussaid .	1200	1000
4th " Osman Azrak	600	800
	<hr/> 5000	<hr/> 8000

RÉSUMÉ

Number of emirs killed at Argin	6
Number of emirs killed at Toski	62
Number of emirs taken prisoners	18
Number of emirs who escaped	36
	<hr/> 122
Uncertain	2
	<hr/>
Total	124

ESTIMATE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE MAHDI
COMMAND OF ABDERRAHMAN EN NEJUM
THE FRONTIER OF EGYPT ON 1ST JULY
APPROXIMATE CASUALTIES UP TO 6TH A

Strength of army at Semneh	
Strength of Abd el Halim's force at Sarras	
(This total corresponds with that given by Hassan Effendi Habashi, chief-clerk to Abd el Halim's force)	
Deduct numbers deserted from Matuka, 30th June 1889	
Deduct losses at Argin	
Add reinforcements which arrived at Belanga under the emirs Makin en Nur and Haj Ali Wad Saad	
Deduct casualties between 3d July 1889 and 3d August 1889, inclusive of desertions south	
Deduct losses at Toski—Killed, 1200 } Prisoners, 1200 }	
Numbers who escaped south after Toski	

Of the 8000 camp-followers, it is estimated 2000 escaped south, leaving 6000 as prisoners in Egyptian force. Of this latter number the major throughout the various provinces of Egypt; important emirs and chiefs having been retained in Cairo.

No. 1.—The following was the composition of the Force organised on 23d July 1889 :—

HEAD-QUARTER STAFF

Major-General Sir F. W. Grenfell, K.C.B. commanding.

Captain J. G. Maxwell, D.S.O., Royal High School, aide-de-camp.

El Bimbashi Ali Bey Haidar, aide-de-camp.

Milhem Bey Shakur, Arabic secretary.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. H. Settle, R.E., Lewa E.A., senior staff-officer.

Major F. R. Wingate, R.A., Kaimakam E.A., Assistant Adjutant-General (and for intelligence).

Major H. M. Rundle, D.S.O., R.A., Kaimakam E.A., commanding Egyptian Artillery.

Lieutenant C. Godby, R.E., engineer officer.

Surgeon-Major A. E. Hayes, Army Medical Staff, Kaimakam and local and temporary Miralai E.A., principal medical officer E.A.

Captain B. Appelbe, Ordnance Store Department, Kaimakam E.A., senior ordnance store officer.

Captain G. W. Hackett Pain, Royal West Surrey Regiment, Kaimakam E.A., senior transport officer.

Quarter-Master and Hon. Lieutenant W. H. Drage, Army Service Corps, Bimbashi E.A., senior commissariat officer.

Veterinary-Surgeon G. R. Griffith, Army Veterinary Department, Bimbashi E.A., principal veterinary surgeon E.A.

SPECIAL SERVICE OFFICERS

Lieutenant H. O. D. Hickman, Yorkshire Regiment, Bimbashi E.A.

Bimbashi Mustafa Effendi Rasmi.

Saghkolaghasi Abd el Salem Effendi Zaki.

BRITISH BRIGADE

HEAD-QUARTER STAFF

Major-General the Honourable R. H. De Montmorency, commanding.

Major H. Sclater, R.A., senior staff officer (D.A.A.G.—A).

Captain B. F. Holme (East Kent Regiment), staff officer (D.A.A.G.—B).

Second Lieutenant Carruthers (King's Own Scottish Borderers), orderly officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel Rhodes (Royal Dragoons), Special Service.

TROOPS

CAVALRY

I Squadron 20th Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel Irwin).

ARTILLERY

10th Battery I Brigade, Eastern Division R.A. (Major Bury).

ENGINEERS

I Section 24th Company (Major Clayton and Captain Foley).

MOUNTED INFANTRY

3 Divisions "A" Company (Colonel Barrow, D.S.O., Scottish Rifles).

2d Battalion King's Own Scottish Borderers (Colonel Talbot Coke).

1st Battalion Welsh Regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel M'Causland).

2d Battalion Royal Irish Rifles (Lieutenant-Colonel Wyndham).

And details of	{	Medical Staff Corps—(Deputy Surgeon-General Jameson).	
		Army Pay Department—(Major Singer).	
		Army Service Corps—(Major Stevens).	
		Ordnance Store Corps—(Major De Salis).	
		Veterinary Department—(Veterinary Surgeon Anderson).	
	{	Chaplain's Department	Reverend Collins.
		"	Twoomey.
		"	Beattie.

NO. 1 COLUMN AND FRONTIER GARRISONS

Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Wodehouse, R.A., Lewa E.A., commanding.

Mul. Awal Mohammed Effendi Shafik, aide-de-camp, "native."

Captain T. P. B. Ternan, Manchester Regiment, Bimbashi and local Kaimakam E.A., Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain H. G. Dunning, Royal Fusiliers, Bimbashi E.A., Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, Intelligence.

Major A. Hunter, D.S.O., Royal Lancashire Regiment, Kaimakam and local Miralai E.A., commanding Infantry Brigade.

Captain P. W. Machell, Essex Regiment, Bimbashi E.A., brigade major, Infantry Brigade.

Surgeon R. E. R. Morse, Army Medical Staff, Bimbashi and local Kaimakam E.A.

Surgeon W. H. P. Lewis, Army Medical Staff, Bimbashi E.A., in charge of field hospital.

TROOPS

Cavalry	2 Squadrons.
Field Artillery	2 Batteries.
Garrison Artillery	1 Battery.
Camel Corps	3 Companies.
3d Battalion	Egyptian Infantry.
5th „	Egyptian Infantry.
7th „	Egyptian Infantry.
11th Battalion	Sudanese.
Medical Staff }	Details.
Departments }	

ASSUAN

Lewa Sir E. Zohrab Pasha, K.C.M.G., C.B., commandant of station.

Lieutenant W. R. N. Annesley, D.S.O., West Kent Regiment, Bimbashi E.A., staff officer.

Sagh. Ahmed Effendi Zaki, staff officer (native).

TROOPS

Garrison Artillery	1 Battery.
8th Battalion	Egyptian Infantry.
Details.	

KOROSKO

Major J. O. Quirk, D.S.O., Welsh Regiment, Miralai E.A., commandant.

Lieutenant J. J. Palmer, Somerset Light Infantry, Bimbashi E.A., staff officer.

9th Battalion	Sudanese.
10th „	Sudanese.
13th „	Sudanese.
Medical Corps }	Details.
Departments }	

No 2 COLUMN EGYPTIAN ARMY

Colonel H. H. Kitchener, C.M.G., A.D.C., R.E., Lewa E.A., commanding.

Lieutenant A. M. M'Murdo, Highland Light Infantry, Bimbashi E.A., aide-de-camp.

Captain T. E. Hickman, Worcester Regiment, Bimbashi E.A., brigade major.


Lieutenant W. S. Gordon, R.E., Bimbashi E.A., commanding artillery.

Surgeon H. H. Pinching, Army Medical Staff, Bimbashi E.A., senior medical officer.

Lieutenant E. J. Dent, King's Own Scottish Borderers, attached.
Yuzbashi Mohammed Effendi Badri, staff officer (native).

TROOPS

Horse Artillery	.	.	.	1 Division.
Cavalry	.	.	.	1 Squadron.
Field Artillery	.	.	.	1 Division.
Garrison Artillery	.	.	.	1 Division.
1st Battalion	.	.	.	Egyptian Infantry.
2d ,,	.	.	.	Egyptian Infantry.



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
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
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